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ABSTRACT
SOLDIERS, SPORTSMEN, AND POLITICIANS.
MILITARY SPORT IN GERMANY, 19 24-193 5.
May 1977
Michael B. Barrett, B.A., The Citadel
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Harold J. Gordon, Jr.
This dissertation focuses on the subject of military
sport training in Germany from 1924 to 1935. Through this
type of instruction, which paralleled basic military re-
cruit training, the Arm}/ attempted to circumvent the Ver-
sailles Treaty restrictions which prohibited a military
reserve force. The Army Command hoped that military sport
graduates would form a reservoir of semi-trained manpower
available for military emergencies. Military officials did
not openly sponsor military sport training; instead, they
provided indirect subsidies through other government agencies
for sport organizations, youth groups, and veterans associa-
tions which conducted military sport instruction.
Military sport training proved popular, and numerous
political organizations formed their own military sport or-
ganizations at the urging of their members. This development
presented Defense Ministry officials with an awkward problem.
They wanted to offer military sport instruction to the vast
number of men which the political organizations could mobil-
ize, but at the same time, Army officers did not want
any
political ideology to creep into this training, lest their
reservoir of semi-trained manpower become politicized and
unreliable. Moreover, the Army insisted that its leaders
rather than those of the political parties would control
these putative reserves in the event of mobilization. On
the other hand, although the political leaders welcomed
the discipline and experience which their political armies
would acquire through military sport training, they feared,
with justification, that the Army intended to undermine the
loyalty of their followers. These fears prevented the Gov-
ernment from implementing, on a nation-wide basis, its mili-
tary sport training program until 1932.
From its origins in 1924 to its termination in 1935,
the military sport training program provides an excellent
case study of the attitude of the Army Command and the De-
fense Ministry toward the major political parties in Germany
The Army, convinced of the value of military sport instruc-
tion, predicated its expansion and mobilization plans on the
existence of a large military sport program. On becoming
Chancellor, Hitler not only continued the military sport
training program, but transferred it to the SA and increased
military sport activities almost a hundredfold. The Army
Command nonetheless continued its efforts to minimize any
political indoctrination attendant to military sport instruc
tion, fearing that the Army would become politicized.
Based on unpublished archival sources, this disserta-
tion concludes that the policy of the Army Command prior
to 1 933 aimed at undermining the loyalty of a major source
of Hitler's support, the young men in his SA. After 1933,
leading Defense Ministry officials continued the broad
outlines of this policy by attempting to separate and iso-
late the extreme radicals in order to eliminate their in-
fluence on the new government.
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PREFACE
This dissertation focuses on the subject of military
sport in Germany from 1924 to 1935. While at first glance
such a subject might appear to be of interest only to
specialists, the topic was the one area in which the Army,
the political parties, sport associations, and paramilitary
organizations all had a common interest. Although the
policies of the Army Command have been examined in numerous
works for both the Weimar Republic and National Socialist
periods, very few historians, whose work is now dated, have
examined both eras to determine if any continuity exists.
Military sport, of vital interest to the Army Command dur-
ing the Weimar Republic and the early years of the Hitler
Regime, and heretofore unstudied by historians, provides
us with an excellent vehicle for a case study in the atti-
tude of the Army Command toward political movements and in
particular, toward National Socialism.
At the risk of subjecting myself to the accusation
of pedantry, I have provided what some may consider exces-
sive documentation. Two reasons dictated this course of
action. First, with well over one-half of the source material
coming from unpublished archival sources, I feel obligated
to expose this material to other scholars. Second, the con-
troversial nature of several of my theses requires me to
point out exactly where and why I differ with other histori-
viii
ans
.
Writers contemporary with the Nazi regime and those
who wrote in the immediate post-war period argued that the
German Army materially aided Hitler in his quest for politi-
cal power. In contrast, recent scholars have claimed, for
the most part, that while the Army may have not actively
aided the Nazis, it certainly did nothing to hinder them,
and once they were in power, collaborated with the new
order. My research concludes that the Army opposed the
Nazis prior to 1933 by trying to undermine their sources
of political support, and once the Nazis were in power,
leading Army officers attempted to separate and isolate the
extreme radicals in order to eliminate their influence on
the course of the new government.
Folk knowledge holds that a drowning person reviews
his life before taking the final plunge. The analogy be-
tween a drowning person and the writer of a dissertation
is perhaps apt, for there have been numerous occasions
during the preparation of this work when I felt myself sink-
ing in a sea of material. As I submit the dissertation, the
final plunge, so to speak, it seems appropriate to "review"
my life during its preparation, acknowledging with pleasure
those who assisted me and through their efforts improved
it.
An immeasurable debt is owed Prof. Harold J. Gordon,
Jr., who was not only my faculty advisor and
dissertation
director but who was also, in every sense of the
word, the
Doktorvater. He and his family have endured
with exemplary
ix
patience late-night phone calls and visits. Prof. Marvin
Schwarz helped to tranform several rough draft chapters
into reasonable products, and he and Profs. R. H. McNeal
and Peter Fliess, the other members of my dissertation
committee, merit my gratitude.
The staffs of the various archives, institutes, and
libraries where I conducted my research were all very help-
ful and unfailingly courteous. Several colleagues and
friends contributed greatly to this undertaking, offering
criticism, encouragement, and friendship. Among these were
Mr. Gilbert E. Southern, Jr. and Dr. Philip N. Cronenwett.
Professors Henry Smith and Joseph Gundel helped render my
awkward translations into literate English without sacri-
ficing precision or subtelty. My typist, Mrs. Frances
Rosier, performed yeoman service in her first attempt at
typing the German language.
Without financial assistance the dissertation would
have proven impossible. I deeply appreciate the support
provided by the History Department of the University of
Massachusetts, the Germanistic Society of America, and the
Fulbright-Hays Commission.
The greatest debt, however, is due my family. The
confidence expressed by my parents and parents-in-law was
most encouraging. To my wife, Sara, who supported all my
endeavors, I owe everything, and it is to her that this
work is dedicated.
j i M.B.B.The Citadel
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CHAPTER 1
THE END OF THE FREIKORPS
ERA, 1924
German Army officers never reconciled themselves to
the strength limitations of the Reiehswehr, which they re-
garded as hopelessly inadequate for defending Germany's
borders. 1 The diminutive size of the Reiehswehr, 100,000
men, was hardly a matter of their choice, but rather had
been imposed upon Germany by the victorious Allies in 1919
in a vain effort to cripple Germany militarily. Further
treaty stipulations prohibited any mobilization planning
and banned the creation of a military reserve force.
^
Limited by law and treaty to a peace and wartime military
Friedrich von Rabenau, Hans von Seeckt; Aus seinem
Leben, 1918-1936
,
Leipzig, 1931, 481. (Hereafter cited as
Rabenau, Seeckt
.
) See further the Gordon Papers, II, "let-
ters from Reiehswehr officers, 1919-1926". Letters from
the following former Reiehswehr officers state that the
Reiehswehr was adequate as a police force, but that size
and equipment deficiencies rendered hopeless any resistance
against a determined foe: Generaloberst a.D. H-J . v. Arnim;
Gen. d. Inf. a.D. Kurt Brennecke; Gen . d. Inf . a . D. Theodor
Busse; Gen. d. Art . a.D. Fr-W. Hauck; Generaloberst a.D. Gott-
hard Heinrici; Generaloberst a.D. Karl Hollidt; Generalfeld-
marschall Albert Kesselring; Gen. d . Art . a . D. Emil Leeb; Gen.
d. Inf. a.D. Curt Liebmann; Gen. d. Inf. a.D. Walter Melzer;
Gen.d. Panzertruppe a.D. Walter Nehring; Gen .d.Flakart . a.D.
Wolfgang Pichert; Gen . d.Nachrichtentruppe a.D. Albert Praun;
Gen.d. Inf. a.D. Georg v . Sodenstern ; and Generaloberst a.D.
Adolf StrauS.
2Articles 160, 166, and 178. Per Friedensvertrag
Zwischen Deutschland und den Allierten und Assozierten
Machten , Chariot tenberg , 1919, 164-172. This is a trilingual
text, with English and French (the official languages of the
Treaty) given alongside the German.
establishment of one hundred thousand men, the German Army
Command could only watch, with increasing despair, their
neighbors train annually more than one hundred times the
number of recruits as did Germany. With a combined total
of c_a. 7 million trained men available for mobilization,
Germany's potential foes (excluding Great Britain and the
Soviet Union) enjoyed a numerical preponderance of 70 to
3one . J
The world made safe for democracy appeared no less
wicked to most Germans than the old world. The behavior
of Poland and France following the 1914-1918 War hardly
reassured the German Defense Ministry (Reichswehr Ministry)
of their pacific intentions. Poland's unsuccessful attempt
to exploit the confusion of the Russian Civil War was fol-
lowed by an effort to wrest Upper Silesia from Germany
before the official plebiscite, and the subsequent actions
taken by the Allies and the League of Nations confirmed
for many Germans the axiom that might makes right.
4 The
30tto GeBler, Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer
Zeit
,
Stuttgart, 1958, 203f. Former Reichswehrminster
GeBler provides the following figures:
recruits peace strength mobilized
Germany 13,000 100,000 ™°> 000
France 240,000 786,000 4-5 million
Belgium, Poland 200,000 570,000 3 million
and Czechoslovakia
4
In deciding the fate of Upper Silesia, 62% of the
inhabitants indicated a preference for German rule in »
plebiscite conducted by the League in 1921. The disappoints
3military inability of Germany to prevent or even to hinder
seriously the French occupation of the Ruhr region in 1923
further underscored the need for a stronger military force. 5
In addition to the requirement for a stronger force
to protect the territorial integrity of the Reich, internal
unrest dictated a larger force. On several occasions dur-
ing the first years of the Republic, police forces proved
incapable of handling revolutionaries and required military
assistance. The revolutionaries did not present a serious
threat to the armed forces; however, the military require-
ment to prepare for all contingencies resulted in the small
Reichswehr occasionally finding itself spread too thinly.
Poles promptly launched an insurrection with the tacit ap-
proval of the Polish Government. The English and French
occupation forces, bitterly divided over the results of the
plebscite, proved incapable of handling the situation. After
reviewing the vote, the League announced in October 1921 that
Poland would receive slightly under one-half of the province,
including most of the industrial areas which were indisput-
ably German. See S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democ -
racy. A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 ,
New York, 1946, 206ff.
5In April 1921 the Army Command realistically ack-
nowledged its relative impotence vis-a-vis France by order-
ing its commanders of western military districts to withdraw
their units peacefully should the French cross the Rhine.
Harold J. Gordon, Jr., The Reichswehr and the Republic,
1919-1926 , Princeton, 1957, 226. (Hereafter cited as Gordon,
Reichswehr and Republic .
)
6A1though the majority of the German Freikorps flour-
ished during the first six months of 1919, several Freikorps
which had revolted at the prospect of disbanding were temp-
orarily recruited by the Reichswehr for assistance during
the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch, for employment in
Upper
Silesia, and above all, during 1923. See Gordon,
Reichs-
4With the avenue of legal expansion blocked by the Treaty
and the Allies, the Defense Ministry and the Government
believed that they had no choice but to find expedient and
perforce illegal solutions to the shortage of manpower.
The resort to such palpably forbidden activities caused
few crises of conscience: the peremptory treatment accorded
the Germans at Versailles and what Germans considered to be
subsequent Allied transgressions of the Treaty, above all
the French occupation of the Ruhr, convinced the Army Com-
mand and the Government that the French had first broken
7the Treaty
.
It was only after the most penetrating soul-search-
ing that the General Staff (Truppenamt ) officers accepted
the necessity of relying on the temporary assistance of
non-regular paramilitary organizations. As illustrated by
the Upper Silesian Affair, the Army Command in most instances
had no alternative to employing irregular formations. The
deployment of regular troops to Upper Silesia to combat
Polish insurgents would have not only denuded the German
wehr and Republic , 126f., 225, 230, 232ff, 215ff; and
Francis L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politi cs, 1918-1933,
Oxford, 1966 (U. of Calif, paperback, 1973), 88, 149f.,
151ff. (Citations are taken from the paperback edition,
hereafter cited as Carsten, Reichswehr.) A rather lurid
description of the Ruhr revolt is given in R.G.L. Waite s
The Vancruard of Nazism. The Free Corps Movement in P ost
War Germany, 1918-1923 , Cambridge, Mass., 1952, chapter
VII. (Hereafter cited as Waite, Vanguard .
)
Gordon, Reichswehr, 254f.
5border elsewhere of security forces, but might have inaugu-
rated an escalation of military activity with Poland culmi-
nating in war, an action certain to involve France. 8 The
deployment of irregular German formations in Upper Silesia
was not an irresponsible folly, but instead represented
the careful judgement of sober, experienced officers, for
whom the natural law of self-defense transcended a legal-
istic adherence to the Carthaginian strictures of the
victorious Allies.
The major problem which the Army Command faced in
employing irregular forces was control; there simply was
no sure means of compelling the commanders of the para-
military organizations to obey orders. Having experienced
difficulties with these tough-minded and resolute condot-
tieri on several occasions, most notably during the Kapp
Putsch of 1920, the Army Command hesitated to employ non-
regular forces and only committed them in the most desper-
8The Allies, at the instigation of the French Gov-
ernment, refused to allow Germany to send a single soldier
into Upper Silesia to quell the Polish-backed insurrection.
The French made it clear that if the Germans dispatched
Army forces to Upper Silesia, they would occupy the Ruhr,
leaving the Germans the option of either abandoning Upper
Silesia or employing irregular forces. With the approval
of all the German political parties except for the Com-
munists and the Independent Socialists, irregular troops
marched into Upper Silesia. See Gordon, Reichswehr, 226f.;
Waite, Vanguard, 227-232; and Thilo Vogelsang, Reichswehr,
Staat unTNSDAP, Stuttgart, 1962 , 29-32 . (Hereafter cited
as Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP .
)
6ate circumstances. 9 Generally speaking, the Reichswehr
employed three categories of irregular forces: free corps
(Freikorps ) , temporary volunteers ( Zeitfreiwillige ) , and
"labor" commands (Arbeitskommandos )
.
The Freikorps, over which the Army exercised little,
if any authority, were usually composed of war veterans who
found civilian life tedious and unexciting, especially when
unemployed. Not at all squeamish about using violence to
attain their ends, the men in the Freikorps generally de-
spised the Weimar Republic, preferring instead some form
of authoritarian government to which their military service
had conditioned them. Although most Freikorps units served
loyally, several of the larger ones, when ordered to muster
out of service, rebelled against the Government. While
major bloodshed was avoided, the distressing tendency of
these units to act independently of any authority but their
own encouraged Seeckt and his staff to find more suitable
auxilliaries . Nonetheless, on pressing occasions, such as
the Ruhr Revolt of 1920, the Upper Silesian Affair, and the
French invasion of 1923, the Chief of the Army Command
either used or considered using Freikorps units, albeit
with great reluctance. 10
9Carsten, Reichswehr , 156ff; Gordon, Reichswehr
and Republic , 126f, 217f; Rabenau, Seeckt , 300, 460, 466,
and 4 75.
l0Carsten, Reichswehr , 74 f, 149, 156f; Gordon,
Reichswehr and Republic, 24f, 53f, 93f; Waite, Vanguard,
54ff, 106, 136f, and 184.
7Temporary volunteers, recruited and officered by
ostensibly discharged or retired officers, trained and were
billeted with regular Army units and were, in some fashion
or another, in the pay of the Defense Ministry. The Army
accordingly exercised greater control over the temporary
volunteers than the Freikorps units. Usually recruited
for a specific duration and consisting for the most part
of idealistic students, temporary volunteers normally
proved more reliable than their more volatile colleagues,
1
1
the Freikorps
.
While the employment of Freikorps and temporary
volunteers had come, for the most part, to an end by mid-
1920, the crisis year of 1923 compelled Army authorities
not only to employ non-regular forces, but, in Bavaria,
to reach a modus Vivendi with political paramilitary or-
ganizations. The Army Command prepared plans to enlist
temporary volunteers, and a considerable number of "labor"
commands (Arbeitskommandos ) and "labor" groups (Arbeits -
gemeinschaften ) were organized by Major (Ret.) Buchrucker.
While some military training was given to these units,
most of them performed labor details for the Army. Even
these units proved intractable; when faced with dissolu-
tion (a matter of time once the Government abandoned its
1l Carsten, Reichswehr , 187, 222f; Gordon, Reichs-
wehr and Republic , 187f, and 156.
8policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr) they rebelled,
casting further doubt on the wisdom of relying on non-
regular forces during emergencies.^ 2
In addition, the anti-Republican and anti-demo-
cratic attitudes common to most non-regular and paramili-
tary organizations logically spoke against using these
formations to defend the Republic. True, many Reichswehr
officers sympathized with the authoritarian and national-
istic political ideals of the irregular forces, but the
reliance by the Army on conservative and right-radical
irregulars merely reflected their numerical preponderance
and the inroads made by anti-military and pacifist propa-
1 3
ganda in the ranks of the Socialists and Communists.
Moreover, the Army Command appears to have had doubts
concerning the willingness of Republican paramilitary
formations to fire on the working classes.
The Ruhr Occupation and the Hitler Putsch of 1923
publicly illustrated the dangers inherent in using irregu-
lar forces, while simultaneously underscoring the necessity
of a trained military reserve force. The uproar which fol-
12Gordon, Reichswehr and Republic , 233f, 256f;
Carsten, Reichswehr , 156-160, 168f.
13Even Carsten in his otherwise highly critical work
concedes this point. See his Reichswehr, 156. See also
Waite, Vanguard , 53f.
9lowed Hitler's Munich fiasco over the political activities
of the Bavarian Reichswehr division led to increased Allied
vigilance concerning violations of the provisions of the
Versailles Treaty. The Defense Ministry gladly took advan-
tage of the Putsch as an excuse to end all ties with home
guard, non-regular, and political paramilitary formations.
Although the Reichswehr reliance on the Freikorps,
temporary volunteers, and political paramilitary organi-
zations had clearly been one of reluctant expediency and
was terminated in 1924, its raison d'etre still existed:
the 100,000 man limitation imposed on the size of the Army
by the Versailles Treaty. Of equal consequence, yet not
as difficult to circumvent as the strength ceiling on the
Reichswehr, was the treaty prohibition against mobilization
planning. In practice, planning was easily disguised and
kept secret, but no matter how brilliant or thorough the
mobilization plans, they constituted little more than staff
exercises so long as the strength and materiel limitations
remained in effect.
As early as 1921, General Staff officers began to
consider mobilization measures. At a meeting of senior
staff officers held on 15 January 1921, General Hans von
Seeckt, the Chief of the Army Command, presented a memoran-
dum titled "Basic Concepts for the Reconstruction of our
Armed Forces", which presumed some form of conscription and
called for an arithmetic expansion of the seven Reichswehr
10
infantry divisions (to 14, then 21, etc.) until the divis-
ions numbered sixty-three. 14
With military conscription forbidden by the Versaille
Treaty, Seeckt's plan represented wishful thinking and
preparation for a better future, a fact realized by the
General Staff and reflected in their 1924 revised mobiliza-
tion schedule, which called for a more realistic field
force of only twenty-one infantry divisions. This smaller
force also appeared to reflect Seeckt's commitment to end-
ing the Reichswehr's reliance on non-regular forces.
Although the mobilized force would be small, it at least
would be firmly controlled by military authorities; the
new divisions, commanded by regular officers, would be
filled with volunteers. While more realistic in its scope,
this plan did not really solve the problem. In all prob-
ability, sufficient numbers of volunteers would present
themselves during a crisis, but without prior training, at
once illegal and difficult to conceal from the suspicious
Allies, such volunteers would prove more a burden than a
help. The Army, in the midst of mobilization and expansion,
would simply have no time to train new recruits.
14Seeckt Papers/287, Joachim von Stulpnagel notes,
Bl. 6. Rabenau reprints Seeckt's "Grundlegende Gedanken
fur den Wiederaufbau unseren Wehrmacht" in Seeckt, 474f.
15Rabenau, Seeckt, 474f.
11
Although there were millions of veterans from the
First World War who theoretically could be called to
service in the event of mobilization, six years had elapsed
since the end of the war, and the military skills of many
of these veterans had atrophied, necessitating retraining.
This was particularly true of officers, especially staff
officers. Moreover, although men called to service in the
last year of the war were still young enough in 1924 for
combat duties, most other veterans were older and the
passage of each year meant that fewer would be young
enough to perform front line duties by normal standards.
The majority of potential soldiers then, who were to be
mobilized' in the event of war, and certainly those who
were to serve in the front lines, would have to come from
the post-war generation which had had no military training.
The Army Command thus faced a shrinking reservoir of trained
men whose skills were slowly deteriorating and had no pros-
pect of legally increasing this reservoir.
The disastrous trained manpower shortage was not mere-
ly a matter for the generals. German politicians had not
forgotten Clemenceau's dictum and defense matters, even
though reduced to a tiny scale in Germany, lost none of
their importance and were subjected to an exacting scrutiny
by the politicians. In many respects the greatest opposition
to the Army's efforts to circumvent the Treaty came not from
the Allies but from parsimonious and doctrinaire German
12
politicians of the political Left, who tended to be anti-
military and in some cases, pacifists.
Military or military-related issues underwent an
unrelenting but often uninformed scrutiny in the Reichstag
and in the press of the various political parties. The
Communists and the Majority Socialists (SPD)
,
ideologically
suspicious of the Army and claiming real or imagined in-
juries at its hands, ignored libel laws and common sense in
their often inflamatory and inaccurate polemics against the
armed forces. The Socialists (SPD), many of whom were
pacifists, adamant that the mission of the Army was first
and foremost to protect the Weimar Republic against domestic
opponents, were convinced by their own rhetoric that the
Army continually fomented plans to overthrow any "progres-
sive" (i.e., Socialist) government. Opposed to an army of
long term service professionals, the Socialists in theory
embraced the principle of universal military service in a
militia. Even though conscription was highly unpopular
with large numbers of urban workers, the mainstay of the
Socialist Party, the Socialists could safely express their
rhetorical advocacy of equal and universal liability for
military service, knowing that the chances for the actual
introduction of conscription remained remote so long as the
1
6
Versailles Treaty continued in effect.
1
6
Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages: Steno-
graphischen Berich te, Berlin, 1920tt., Hue (SPD), 13.
1920, vol. 333,5075? David (SPD), 7.7. 1922, vol. 356, 8372;
13
The Communists expressed an inexorable hatred for
the Reichswehr. Taking advantage of their parliamentary
immunity from slander, Communist Reichstag deputies ex-
coriated the Army, denouncing it as the tool or reaction-
ary, monied interests. Using the annual Reichstag budget
debates as a forum in which to proselytize their views,
the Communists appeared more interested in execrating the
Army than in reforming it. Appealing to sensationalism,
their often unfounded allegations served little purpose
other than to titilate the faithful, while simultaneously
1 7
alienating the Reichswehr and many patriotic Germans.
Far more discrediting to the Communist campaign to villify
the Reichswehr than their patent prevarications was the
imposition of party discipline from Moscow, which on oc-
Schopflin (SPD) , 14.3. 1922, vol. 353, 6232f; Muller (SPD-
Franken), 30.10. 1922, vol. 353, 6247; Kunstler (SPD), 27.2.
1923, vol. 358, 9891; Schopflin (SPD), 18.3. 1921, vol. 348,
321 5f. (Hereafter cited as RTV. ) See Gustav Noske, Von
Kiel bis Kapp , Berlin, 198f; Carl Severing, Mein Lebensweg;
In, Auf und Ab der Republik , II, Koln, 1950, 111. (Hereafter
cited as Severing, Lebensweg ) ; Otto Braun, Von Weimar zu
Hitler , New York, 1940, 206f. (Hereafter cited as Braun,
Weimar zu Hitler . ) A valuable article is Gustav Adolf Cas-
par, "Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und das deutsche Wehr-
problem in den Jahren der Weimarer Republik" in Beiheft 11
of Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau , October 1959, 13f. (Here-
after cited as Caspar, "SPD und Wehrproblem" .
)
17RTV, Hollein (KPD) , 3.6. 1921, vol. 349, 3780;
Kunstler "(KPD), 11.11. 1921, vol. 351 , 4966; Thomas (KPD) ,
14.3. 1922, vol. 353, 6255-60; Koenen (KPD), 25 ' 6 ' c l
92 i'
vol. 356, 8069f; Koenen, (KPD), 12.7. 1922, vol. 356, 8502;
Frohlich (KPD), 23.2. 1923, vol. 358, 9845f; Koenen (KPD),
28.9. 1923, vol. 361, 11919; and Gordon, Reichswehr,
364tt.
14
casion placed the Communists in league with strange bed-
fellows. When, for example, reports of collaboration
between the Reichswehr and the Red Army to circumvent the
Versailles Treaty appeared from time to time in the German
press, the Communists maintained an embarrassed silence or
when confronted with damaging evidence, joined the right-
ist parties in issuing strident and hollow denials. 18
From the middle and opposite sectors of the politi-
cal spectrum, and especially from the conservative parties,
came the strongest support for the armed forces. The
Democratic Party, while voting in favor of the Army budget,
was critical of Reichswehr recruiting practices and sug-
gested a number of minor changes. On the important issues,
however, the Democrats stood behind the Army Command. The
Center, German Peoples' (DVP) , and German Nationalist (DNVP)
parties all supported the Reichswehr and the policies of
the Army Command in the Reichstag and in their party presses,
although on occasion the German Nationalist newspapers at-
1 Q
tacked the Defense Ministry. 1 ^
In practice, this political support proved to be a
mixed blessing. While secretly welcoming the backing of
18Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible
Allies: A Memoir of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941 , New
York, 1933, 204f. (Hereafter cited as Hilger and Meyer,
Incompatible Allies .
)
19Gordon, Reichswehr, 395-411.
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the conservative parties (the DVP and the DNVP) , the Army
had, as an ostensibly non-partisan institution, to refrain
from seeking and acknowledging partisan endorsements. Not
only did the Army Command have to minimize the social and
ideological affinities existing between an officer corps
tied by blood and education to conservative groups, but it
also had to cope with the natural tendency of an officer
corps maligned and abused by Socialists and Communists to
forge close ties with the party which appeared to be their
staunchest ally, the Nationalist Party.
On the other hand, Reichswehr efforts to elevate
national defense policy to the sphere of non-partisan poli-
tics, a desire shared by many intensely nationalistic and
conservative Germans, meant that conservative party leaders
did not have the opportunity of criticizing either defense*
policies or the Army itself. With the leadership of the
rightist parties remaining for the most part mute vis-a-vis
national defense, there existed the danger of their members
becoming exposed to and identifying themselves with the
interests of the Army, which could result in a substantial
collapse of party discipline and unity should it appear
that the interests of the Army and the party diverged.
Like the Communists, the radical Nazi Party (NSDAP)
castigated the idea of a non-partisan army. To both, the
army served the party which was the state. In denouncing
the idea of a non-partisan Reichswehr, the Nazis initially
exercised a notable lack of restraint in their vicious and
often personal attacks against the Army Command. A typical
article in the official Nazi newspaper concluded that Gen-
eral von Seeckt received his orders from the Jews and Social
20Democrats. While this inflammatory rhetoric and logic (!)
found a ready and credulous audience in the fringe elements
of a society experiencing radical transformations, it was
bound to alienate the more reasonable and moderate majority
of Germans. While Hitler went out of his way to revile and
heap invective on the "moderate majority" ( Spiefibiirger ) , he
deduced in the aftermath of his "march on Berlin" that he
could not successfully oppose the Reichswehr militarily.
Such a conclusion left only the alternative of politics,
the realities of which dictated an outward change of course
toward defense politics.
As a professed revolutionary movement claiming to
oppose the entire rotten and corrupt Weimar system, the
adulatory and uncritical attitude regarding the military
leadership adopted by many Germans who were most likely to
favor Nazism presented the Party with problems of the
greatest magnitude. Were Hitler to employ his normal
2QVolkischer Beobachter, 26 September 1923. The re-
percussions from this article precipitated a crisis between
the Army Command and the Bavarian Division (7th Division)
Commander, culminating in the abrogation of special military
prerogatives for Bavaria. See Harold J. Gordon Jr., The
Beer Hall Putsch , Princeton, 1972, 228ff. (Hereafter cited
as Gordon, Beer Hall Putsch.
)
rhetoric, denouncing the Army as the prop of a decadent and
politically bankrupt regime, the almost certain result
would be an exodus of Nazi followers to more "patriotic",
nationalist parties. Yet a policy of open cooperation with
the Reichswehr would compromise his revolutionary stance,
render suspect his claim to oppose all vestiges of the
execrable Republic of the "November Criminals", and would
scarcely be welcomed with open arms by his supporters.
During the winter of 192 3-24, such considerations
were academic for both Hitler and the Army Command. Im-
mediately following the debacle on the ResidenzstraBe , and
the gunfire at the Bavarian Military District (VII) Head-
quarters, neither Hitler nor the Army Command had the re-
motest idea of ever again reaching a modus vivendi . By
the spring of 1924, however, the Bohemian Corporal, dis-
playing the audacity and brilliance which would propel him
from the defendant's dock to the Reich Chancellory, trans-
formed his trial for high treason into an indictment of
the Weimar Republic and began the first groping steps toward
a rapprochement with the Reichswehr. Having learned the
morning of 9 November 1923 that the Army would not march
with him, Hitler attempted to insure that it would not march
against him. His tactical course was, notwithstanding its
simplicity and directness, brilliant. Ingeniously revers-
ing the Reichwehr's alleged apolitical position, he adopted
an apolitical attitude toward the Army. Avoiding the pit-
18
falls of condemnation and effusive praise with their atten-
dant loss of political support, he informed his accusers
in the Munich courtroom and all Germany that "when I learned
that it was the Green Police [Bavarian Landespolizei ] which
had fired [on the Putschists] , I had the happy feeling that
at least it was not the Reichswehr which had besmirched it-
self; the Reichswehr stands as untarnished as before." 21
The shots fired on the Odeonsplatz not only crushed
the Beer Hall Putsch, they also ended the era of overt
Reichswehr collaboration with paramilitary organizations,
temporary volunteers, and Freikorps units. At the same
time as Hitler began anew his campaign for political power,
General Staff officers began anew their efforts to augment
Germany's inadequate military strength. The experiment
with non-regular forces had failed and the medicine had
proved almost as dangerous as the disease. Yet the chronic
shortage of trained or semi-trained manpower still existed,
the Army officers began a spirited search for a more ame-
nable solution to the reserve force problem.
21Quoted from Konrad Heiden, Per Fuhrer. Hitler's
Rise to Power (trans, by R. Mannheim), Boston, 1944, 2C5f.
(Hereafter cited as Heiden, Per Fuhrer . ) As usual, Hitler
stretched the truth. The Reichswehr did fire on a group
of the Putschists. See Gordon, Beer Hall Putsch , 347ff.
CHAPTER II
THE PEOPLE'S SPORT PROGRAM
1924-1927
A Reserve For the Reichswehr
During the spring of 19 24 Army Command staff officers
considered at length the problem of creating some reservoir
of trained or semi-trained manpower. In January, Seeckt re-
jected a revival of the Kriimper system, which called for the
annual substitution of trained soldiers by recruits. He
also rejected a proposal to extend the temporary volunteer
soldier (
Z
eitfreiwilliger) program. 1 In addition to Seeckt'
s
dissatisfaction with the performance and unreliability of
temporary volunteer units, the Kriimper and Zietfreiwilliger
plans were in all probability rejected because they were
violations of the Versailles Treaty which would have been
impossible to disguise or keep secret.
In March, discussion in the Defense Ministry turned
2to the concept of pre-military training, that is, provid-
ing some basic military instruction, such as marksmanship
or drill, prior to actual enlistment. Pre-military train-
ing would thus shorten considerably the time required for
training recruits, and it presented an attractive alterna-
1Seeckt Papers, 281; .General Lieber Notes on the
Hasse Diaries.
Ibid
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tive to the Kriimper system or volunteer units because it
could be conducted by civilians, and if carefully planned
to avoid actual military weapons training, would not con-
stitute a clear violation of the Versailles Treaty.
While insufficient evidence exists to trace the
evolution of pre-military training in the Reichswehr Min-
3istry from March to October, the Reichswehr, in October,
began its first pre-military training course which had the
euphimistic code name "Peoples' Sport" (Volkssport ) . The
first course commenced on 1 October 1924, in the village
of Wiinsdorf, south of Berlin. 4 In all likelihood Wiinsdorf
was chosen as the location for the Volkssport course be-
cause the Reichswehr Sport School was also located there
and it could provide clandestine assistance. The Volks-
sport course had a distinct military mission: "... to
provide, at the least, a pre-trained reserve for the con-
5
tingency plan Border Guard." Even though many of the
3For evidence which indicates government interest in
pre-military training, see Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv,
Miinchen (Hereafter cited as BHStA) , I, MI 72449, "Bericht
iiber die Besprechung am 5. August 1924 im Corpshaus Suevia,
Universitat Heidelberg", 21.8. 1924, Nr. 2022; and Otto
Lehmann-Russbueldt , Aggression , New York and London, n.d.,
21-22.
4
BA, R-43 11/519, "Wehrhaftmachung der Jugend", Bl.
2; Institut fur Zeitgeschichte , Miinchen (Hereafter cited as
IfZG)
,
Zgs. 44, Oberst i.G.a.D. Granz Gaertner, "Volkssport
zur Staats jugend" , Bl. 26-7.
5BA, R-43 11/519, Reichswehrminis ter Groener to
Reichskanzlei, 3669/30 W Id geheim, 18 October 1930, "... U
21
course participants were former officers, 6 Volkssport
courses were not restricted to veterans, but were also to
include untrained personnel, who would be provided a modi-
cum of training which would serve to lessen the amount of
7
training in the event of mobilization. The mission of
creating a large, semi-trained reserve was the first con-
sideration of the Army Command in establishing Volkssport
courses .
°
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) 0. Billmann led the first
courses at Wiinsdorf. He integrated small bore marksman-
ship into the Volkssport curriculum, which also included
gymnastics, close order drill, map reading, and terrain
studies. Twenty-five students participated in the first
fur den im - Ernstfall notwendigen Grenzschutz einen wenig-
stens einigermassen vorgebildeten Ersatz heranzubilden .
"
Bl. 2. For an explanation of the Border Guard, see Chapter
IV.
6IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur Staats-
jugend", Bl . 26-29 . Volkssport trainees were probably from
a conservative, nationalist middle class or artisan class
background. Gordon, in Reichswehr and Republic , 58, 207,
and 290-1, provides an explanation and literature review of
the reasons for the lack of working class participation in
military activities, a phenomenon encouraged by the Commu-
nist, Independent Socialist, and Majority Socialist Parties
7BA, R-43 11/519, "Wehrhaftmachung der Jugend, Bl. 2
8Ibid. In this report, prepared by Oberstlt. von
Schleicher, the purpose of Volkssport was defined as "Fur
den jungen Ersatz, der keine militarische Ausbildung genos-
sen hatte, muBte eine gewisse Vorarbeit geleistet werden,
urn die militarische Ausbildung auf einen geringen Zeitraum
zusammenzudrangen. Zu diesem Zweck wurde die Vc ssport-
organisation geschaffen."
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course, most of whom were former company-grade officers
from Silesia or Brandenburg. The course lasted two weeks,
and at the end of the course the participants decided to
hold an annual refresher course, not only to improve and
refine skills, but also to share experiences arising from
teaching Volkssport courses in home town areas. 9
Military authorities hoped to establish a Volks-
sport school in every province, or at the least, in every
military district. 10 Upon completion of the course, Volks-
sport graduates were to teach similar courses in their home
town areas, possibly utilizing the assistance of local
veterans' groups, sport clubs, and youth groups. 11 By
9 IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur Staats-
jugend" , Bl. 26-9.
10BA R-4 3 11/519, "Wehrhaftmachung der Jugend" , see
also Rainer Wohlfeil and Edgar Graf von Matuschka, Reichswehr
und Republik
,
Frankfurt, 19 70, 211. (Hereafter cited as Wohf
feil, Reichswehr und Republi kc) There were seven military
districts during this period: I (headquarters in Konigsberg)
consisted of East Prussia; II (Stettin) covered Pomerania,
Mecklenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Liibeck; III
(Berlin) included Brandenburg and Silesia; IV (Dresden) en-
compassed Anhalt, the Prussian Province of Saxony, and the
state of Saxony; V (Stuttgart) included both Hesses, Thur-
ingia, Baden, and Wiirttemberg; VI (Miinster) covered Hannover,
Westphalia, Brunswick, the Rhineland, and Oldenburg; and VII
(Munich) consisted of Bavaria. Clandestine military activi-
ties within Germany were conducted, for the most part, in
the eastern districts, It, II , III , IV, and to a lesser ex-
tent, VII. Surviving evidence limits this discussion of
Volkssport activities to districts II, III, and VII. There
is no reason to assume that similar activities did not occur
in districts I and IV.
11 IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur Staats-
jugend", Bl. 26-9; Akten zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik
teaching Volkssport students, in relatively small classes,
to serve as training cadres for further pre-military train-
ing courses, the Army Command lessened the chances that its
indirect ties to the Volkssport courses would be discovered,
while simultaneously increasing the effectiveness of the
program at a minimum cost.
The Volkssport program thus offered several advan-
tages for the Army Command. Youths who otherwise would not
have received any military training would be instructed in
the basic military fundamentals. A pool of semi-trained
personnel, useful for defensive operations if integrated
with regular units, would be developed and available in
the event of mobilization. Moreover, veterans would be
able to refresh and perfect their military skills by serv-
ing as Volkssport instructors.
The Reichswehr, especially in Military District III
(Berlin, Brandenburg and Silesia)
,
energetically supported
1 2the Volkssport program. Major (Ret.) Hentschel, an em-
ployee of District III, supervised the activities of the
Wiinsdorf school. A second Volkssport school was established
in Silesia at the troop training area of Neuhammer during
1918-1945
, Series B, 1925-1933, (Hereafter cited as AAA)
,
Gottingen, 1958, vol. I, part 2, Nr. 238, letter Wels-Muller
to GeBler, 6 December 1926, 555.
1 2
For an account of the financing of Volkssport in
Wehrkreis III, see Francis Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics,
1918-1933, Oxford, 1964, 224. (Hereafter cited as Carsten,
Reichswehr and Politics)
.
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the winter of 1924-1925. Captain (Ret.) von Winterfeldt,
the school leader, conducted many courses with a focus on
the guerilla tactics employed by General von Lettow-Vor-
beck in German East Africa. These courses were popular,
especially with younger students. Youth, sport club,
1
veterans, and political paramilitary group ( e.g. , SA,
Stahlhelm) members were allowed to participate in the
Neuhammer training, but any form of political expression,
recruitment, and propaganda was forbidden. 13
The graduates of the first Wiinsdorf course met, as
planned, in July 1925 to discuss their experiences in teach
ing Volkssport courses since leaving Wiinsdorf. All agreed
that the results had been generally positive, but several
graduates complained that the students they were now in-
structing were neither in good physical condition nor had
they any experience or particular qualifications in sports
or sport instruction. The Wiinsdorf graduates decided to
insist that students in the future be tested for physical
fitness prior to enrollment. A special effort would be
made to find students with considerable athletic experi-
1 4ence .
'
Two additional Volkssport schools were established
13IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Erlebnis" , Bl. 12-16.
14 Ibid., "Volkssport zur Staats jugend" , Bl. 26-9.
under the aegis of Military District III in Silesia in
1925-1926. The popularity of Volkssport necessitated a
larger facility in Silesia than Neuhammer, and Military
District III staff officers directed von Winterfeldt to
find a more suitable location. He chose the Braunau
estate (SchloB Braunau) near Lowenberg in Upper Silesia. 15
A former naval officer, Corvette-Captain (Ret.) Hermann,
established a smaller school, with an enrollment of twenty-
five students, at Reichenbach in Oberlausitz. The army
cavalry division in Breslau provided some assistance to
Hermann's school. The core of instruction at Reichenbach
consisted of Lettow-Vorbeck 1 s guerilla tactics. The
twenty-five students of the first course, conducted dur-
ing the summer of 1925, quickly established their own
Volkssport schools in the Silesian mountains. 16
Officers of Military District II (headquarters in
Stettin) were equally active in conducting Volkssport in-
struction. Major (Ret.) Wagner, ostensibly a civilian em-
ployee of the district, taught drill, marksmanship, war
games, and terrain studies at a Volkssport school in
Kreckow, near Stettin. Captain (Ret.) Metger, also a
civilian employee of District II, assisted Wagner. His
1
5
Ibid . Bl. 31-2. No date is given for the estab-
lishment of the Braunau school. It was, in all likelihood,
1926, as Winterfeldt was busy in Neuhammer in 1925.
16Ibid., Bl. 26-29.
further responsibilities extended to directing the Volks-
sport movement within the Stettin area, while Lieutenant
(Ret.) Hermann directed the movement within the Gutenhagen
17
area
.
The popularity of Volkssport within the Stettin
area was so great that Wagner was forced to send prospect-
ive students to courses conducted in the countryside.
Former military officers ran Volkssport schools at "Hoch-
burg" in Neubrandenburg and "Mierow" in Mecklenburg. Both
1 8
schools were financially supported by the Reichswehr.
About fifteen former officers served as special
deputies for Military District II Volkssport activities.
Several were attached to various unit staffs, and eight
to ten officers operated at-large throughout the district.
These officers controlled secret weapons caches and con-
ducted Volkssport courses. The Reichswehr paid the sal-
aries of these "special deputies" and covered expenses
arising from Volkssport instruction. 1 ^
Bavarian Reichswehr officers established a pre-
military training program in Bavaria somewhat similar to
the Volkssport program conducted by the Reichswehr in
Military Districts II and III. In a letter of 6 February
17AAA, B, I, part 2, Nr. 238, enclosure 7 of Wels-
Miiller letter to GeBler, 6 December 1926, 554-555.
18Ibid .
19Ibid., 556.
1925 to the Bavarian Government, the Commanding General of
the Bavarian Military District (VII), Baron Friedrich Kress
von Kressenstein, proposed that physical-military fitness
programs be instituted throughout the Bavarian school sys-
tem. Kress claimed that 80 to 90 percent of candidates for
recruitment in the Reichswehr had to be rejected as physi-
cally unfit for service, a deplorably high percentage re-
sulting, he said, in all probability from the war and post-
war dietary deficiencies. A mandatory physical fitness
training program integrated into the school curriculum
would, according to the Army, help to rectify the problem
of the poor physical condition of Army recruit candidates.
Kress cited the Reserve Officer Training Corps programs of
the United States and Great Britain as examples of how
military-physical training was integrated into school
curricula abroad. Although he acknowledged that Germany
could not conduct the overt military aspects of such train-
ing, he hoped to see school and state authorities institute
a physical training program whose goal would be "... the
creation of the closest possible substitute for the de-
funct universal conscription." 20
Instead of founding Volkssport schools like their
counterparts in northern Germany, Bavarian Reichswehr of-
20IfZG, MA-619, letter of Wehrkreis VII/7 Inf. Div.,
Ia 320 pers., to Bavarian Minister-President, 6 February
1925. "Ziel muB, m.E. sein, ... einen moglichst vollwerti-
gen Ersatz fur die in Wegfall gekommene Wehrpflicht zu scha
fen." Bl. 1612872.
28
ficers left Volkssport-type activities to the Deutscher
Notbann (German Emergency Group) , an organization sponsored
by the Bavarian Government
.
2 1 The Bavarian Reichswehr,
however, worked closely with the Notbann whose commandant 1 s
office was located in Military District VII headquarters. 22
Major General (Ret.) Franz Ritter von Epp, 23 a notorious
Freikorps leader who was eased out of the Reichswehr on
account of his pro-racist (Volkisch) activities, commanded
the Notbann. During 1924 the Notbann had concentrated its
energies on the training of temporary volunteers and func-
tioned, for all intents, as a secret military reserve for
the Bavarian Government. The Bavarian Ministry of the In-
terior and private sources paid for the cost of this train-
2
''The Deutscher Notbann was organized after the Beer
Hall Putsch of November 1923 as a successor to the Organisa-
tion Escherisch and the Bavarian Notpolizei. See BHStA, I,
MI 72449, Report of the Reichskommissar fur uberwachung der
offentlichen Ordnung, I 5330/24 I, 23 June 1924; and Gordon,
Hitler and Beer Hall Putsch , 599ff.
22BHStA, I, MI 72449, Report of the Reichskommissar
fur uberwachung der offentlichen Ordnung, I 53 30/2 4 I, 2 3
June 19 24.
23
1 864-1947, Generalleutnant a.D. Epp had a distin-
guished career as a regimental commander in the First World
War and was ennobled for his services. His activity in raci'st
radical politics eventually led to his retirment in 1923,
the official reason being that no suitable post could be found
for him. Active in NSDAP circles, he joined the party in 1928
(Nr. 85457), advised Hitler on military-political relations,
and served as leader of the NSDAP Wehrpolitisches Amt from
1932 to 1935 and as Reichsstattshalter in Bavaria from 1933
to 1934.
29
ing. 24
By 1925 the Reichswehr phased out the temporary vol-
unteer program and the interest of the Bavarian Government
in paying for a secret reserve force had declined. Bavarian
authorities were willing to make money available for train-
ing auxiliary police but not for training auxiliary soldiers.
Instead, the Bavarian Government urged the Notbann to take
an interest in pre-military training, 25 apparently in response
to the urging of military leaders as evidenced in the above-
mentioned letter of 6 February from General Kress.
In a meeting of Bavarian cabinet ministers and Not-
bann leaders on 24 March 1925, Bavarian Minister-President
Held urged that the Notbann undertake the preparation of
young men for military service by establishing and super-
vising pre-military training activities in the Bavarian
schools. The Reichswehr, he added, agreed to this proposal.
This training, he explained, included hiking, physical con-
ditioning, marching, field exercises, map reading, and
24BHStA, I, MI 72449, Notes of the Staatsminister
des Innern, "Ergebnis der Besprechung am 18.6.24 Nachm-
[ittag] iiber den "deutschen Notbann'", 19 June 1924. After
1 July 1924, owing to pressure from the Inter-Allied Mili-
tary Control Commission, the Notbann was disbanded. This,
however, was merely a "Scheinauflosung" and orders from the
Ministry of the Interior were given orally rather than in
writing. See ibid . , Notbann Kreisleiter meeting, 19 Decem-
ber 1924, Bl. 1-3.
25Ibid . , "Kurze Niederschrif t iiber die Besprechung
am 24. Marz 1925 iiber Notbann", 26 March 1924; Gordon,
Reichswehr and Republic , 260.
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theoretical exercises. Small bore marksmanship courses,
he noted, could be run in coordination with local shooting
clubs. The entire program could be conducted publicly,
and Held stated that it was his opinion that it should be-
come part of the school curriculum. In communities which
did not have school instructors qualified to teach pre-
military training, he hoped that former army and police
non-commissioned officers would be hired to teach the pre-
military training courses. After a heated discussion and
debate, Notbann leaders agreed to Heldas proposal. 26
Minister-President Held then offered to have the
Bavarian Government assist in financing the pre-military
training program, provided the Government retained ulti-
mate control of the program. The Notbann , he added, would
have to remain a silent partner in these activities on
account of difficulties which might arise in the Bavarian
Parliament and also on account of the sensitivity with
which the military-related activities in addition to those
permitted by the Versailles Treaty were viewed abroad. The
Notbann must not, said Held, be publicly identified or
connected with pre-military training under any circumstances,
and would, in the near future, "... make its appearance
under a different name." 27 Financial support would come
26lbid. , "Ministerbesprechung am 24.3. 25", 2-3.
27Ibid
.
,
"... unter einen anderen Firma Auftritt."
3-4.
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from private circles to the Notbann through the Bavarian
Government, which would undertake the responsibility for
raising the necessary funds. 28
Although evidence of the Notbann'
s
subsequent activi-
ties is insufficient to allow any estimate of the size or
2 9effectiveness of its pre-military training program, the
Notbann pre-military training program of 1925 demonstrates
an interest and commitment to pre-military training by the
Bavarian Government on a scale potentially greater than
Volkssport in Prussia. Notbann pre-military training and
Volkssport encompassed, in all details, identical training
activities and goals.
Army Command officers, apparently pleased with the
Volkssport and Notbann pre-military training programs,
hoped to expand them throughout Germany . General von
Seeckt wanted to establish a National Sport Office in 1925.
This apparently civilian institution would have integrated
28Ibid
.
, and "Aktenvermerk" of the meeting between
Ministry of the Interior officials and Oberstlt. a.D. Kas-
par [Notbann Chief of Staff] 15 April 1925.
29Bund Oberland, the Isengau, and the Hermannsbund
all subsequently joined the Notbann pre-military training
program, 'see ibid . , "Aktenvermerk", Referat 15 and 17 of
Staatsmin. d. Innern, 23.5.25, and letter Epp, Nr. 648, to
Staatsmin. d. Innern, 27.5.25. Gordon gives the Oberland
strength in Bavaria during November 1923 at ca. 2000, a fig-
ure that by 1925 was in all probability much smaller. See
his Beer Hall Putsch, pp. 94-99, 206, 440, and 449.
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the Volkssport schools in all the military districts into
the larger framework of civilian sport activities. The
National Sport Office would have also directed the activi-
ties of the paramilitary groups into useful channels by
integrating them into the Volkssport movement. The estab-
lishment of a secret and illegal mobilization registration
system for all youth would have been a further function of
the National Sport Office. Seeckt failed, however, for
reasons unknown, to gain the necessary cabinet approval
for the creation of the National Sport Office. 30
Reichswehr interest in Volkssport activities had
not gone unnoticed by the political parties, especially
those of the political left. The Socialists carefully
scrutinized the annual Reichswehr budget for any evidence
of Reichswehr association with or support for the para-
3
1
military units and they were quick to denounce such. 1
30Rabenau, Seeckt , 4 81. Rabenau states that these
secret mobilization measures were in part responsible for
Seeckt' s forced resignation in October 1926. For a more
complete discussion of Seeckt' s resignation, see Gordon,
Reichswehr and Republic , 261-8. Volker Berghahn, in Der
Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten 1918-1935 , Dusseldorf,
1966, 58f, claims that Seeckt did establish "sport schools"
throughout Germany as part of a program, to create a secret
army. Berghahn utilized sources from East Germany, the
Deutsches Zentralarchiv in Potsdam, to which this author
did not have access. (Berghahn will hereafter be cited as
Berghahn, Stahlhelm .) See also Wohlfeil, Reichswehr und
Republik , 21 Of.
3 ?RTV, Schopflin (SPD) , 26 May 1925, vol. 385,
2020-26; Hilferding (SPD), 11 February 1926, vol. 388,
5432; Kunstler (SPD), 3 March 1926, vol. 389, 5874-80;
33
The imprecise nature of the military budget hampered the
Socialists in their search for evidence because the Reichs-
wehr Law of 1921 permitted the submission of a bland docu-
ment that did not list proposed expenditures in any great
3 2detail. Even had the Reichswehr budget given a complete
account of proposed spending, the political parties still
would have been unaware of what was actually being spent
and for what purposes. The Defense Ministry, unique among
the Government ministries, did not have to either return
or account for appropriated funds that were not actually
3 3
spent for assigned purposes. Thus money budgeted for
other uses could be siphoned off by officers in the De-
fense ministry for Volkssport and clandestine re-armament
activities without the overt knowledge of the political
parties. In addition to funds appropriated by the Reich-
stag, the Reichswehr had its own sources of money which
further complicated Socialist-Communist efforts to ascer-
Scheidemann (SPD), 16 December 1926, vol. 391, 8577-86;
Caspar, "SPD und Wehrproblem" , 31-2, 43, 70-2.
32Rtv , Chancellor Marx, 16 December 1926, vol. 391,
8586f.
33Braun, Weimar zu Hitler , 107; PTV, Herz (SPD), 16
February 1927, vol. 392, 9021. The SPD claimed that in 1926,
3 3% of the Army and 40% of the Navy budget operating expenses
could be carried over to another year, and were effectively
removed from parliamentary control. In 1927 the carry-over
from the 1926 Reichswehr budget was 60 million RM, and in
1928 RM 37 million was carried over from 1927. See Caspar,
"SPD und Wehrproblem", 73f.
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tain military expenditures. 34
The Socialists, cognizant of Reichswehr secret activi
ties in Prussia, were also aware, to a degree, of the pre-
military training activities conducted by the Army and the
Elements of the Reichswehr budget were hidden in
the budgets of other Reich ministries. In addition, the
Reichswehr had secret funds, which, for example, it used to
pay Freikorps during the Silesian -Polish insurgency and later
to finance clandestine rearmament activities in Russia. To
replenish these funds, Reichswehr officers invested money in
civilian firms. The failure of the "Phoebus" movie company,
in which the Reichswehr had invested heavily, led to public
disclosure of the secret funds and the resultant scandal in
1927-28 ended only with the resignation of Defense Minister
GeBler. BHStA, I, MI 72449, "Ergebnis der Besprechung am
18.6.24 nachm. iiber den 'deutschen Notbann 1 " , 19 June 1924;
RTV
,
Schopflin, (SPD) , 26 May 1925, vol. 385, 2023? GeBler
(RWM)
, 26 May 1925, vol. 385, 2135; Scheidemann (SPD), 16
December 1926, vol. 391, 8577-80; Gordon Craig, The Politics
of the Prussian Army 1 640- 1 9 45
,
Oxford, 1964, 410; and for
the Navy's use of secret funds see International Military
Tribunal, Trials of the Major War Criminals
,
Nuremberg,
1947-49, (Hereafter cited as IMT) , vol. XXIV, Dok. 156-C,
Kapitan zur See Schliisser, "Kampf der Marine gegen Versail-
les", 554ff.
"^^The Reichswehr procured illegal weapons in Russia
and arranged for armor and aviation training for its per-
sonnel in Russia, dating from 1921. The Socialist leader-
ship knew of these arrangements from their onset. See
Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics , 232-8; and Hans W. Gatzke,
Stresemann and the Re-Armament of Germany , Baltimore, 1954,
86 (Hereafter cited as Gatzke, Stressmann ) ; Hilger and Meyer,
Incompatible Allies . Even as late as 1926 the SPD was will-
ing to keep secret the ties with Russia. See Otto Egger-
stedt, "Protokoll" of a meeting of government and SPD offici-
als, 1 December 1926, in "Die Reichswehr und die Regierung,
Briefe des Monats" , sent in by Dr. Robert M. W. Kempner, Der
Monat
, 1(6), March, 1949, 103-5. (Hereafter cited as Egger-
stedt, "Protokoll", 1 December 1926). See also BA, R-43
1/1417, "Kabinettsprotokoll" , 15 December 1926. The SPD was
also well aware of secret arms caches. See Severing testi-
mony, 21 May 1946, IMT, vol. XIV, 250-251, 255, and letter
of SPD Deputy Adolf Braun to GeBler, 29 July 1922, US
National Archives, series T-79, roll 82, 105-108.
paramilitary groups. Beginning in 1925, the Socialists col'
lected evidence of illegal Reichswehr activities, in all
likelihood because of suspicions that the Reichswehr had
revived the Zeitfreiwillige units, which the Socialists
appear to have confused with Volkssport, and was training
monarchists and reactionaries who planned to overthrow the
Republic. Efforts to prove the existence of this conspir-
acy failed and caused the Socialist government of Prussia
some embarrassment.
Undaunted by such setbacks, Prussian Minister-
President Otto Braun presented Defense Minister GeBler with
a number of further complaints concerning illegal military
activities including Volkssport on the 29th of October
1926. Foreign Minister Stresemann was also present at this
meeting, as the issue of army-paramilitary group collabora-
tion was especially sensitive in light of the German effort
to have the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission in
Germany abolished. Braun *s allegations of Reichswehr-para-
military cooperation were not denied by GeBler, who merely
shifted the blame for Defense Ministry inaction concerning
past complaints of a similar nature to the former Chief of
the Army Command, General von Seeckt. GeBler added that
the recent retirement of Seeckt meant the inauguration of
36Braun, Weimar zu Hitler , 99-100; and Gordon Papers
testimony of Reichsminister a.D. Willhelm Sollmann.
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a new course .
°
The German request to have the Military Control
Commission disbanded was pending, 38 and Braun's complaints
doubtless increased Stresemann' s anxiety, as the French
appeared somewhat hesitant to abolish the Control Commis-
sion, principally owing to their concern over German para-
military associations. Aristide Briand, the French Foreign
Minister, used the occasion of the famous luncheon at
Thoiry of 17 September 1926 to urge Stresemann to do some-
thing about Volkssport and the paramilitary groups. Strese-
mann's affirmative reply that day did not entirely satisfy
the French, who continuously repeated their concern over
this issue during October and November. 39
The decision to terminate the Control Commission in
Germany was not made by the League of Nations until 11 De-
cember, and although Stresemann was aware that the outcome,
in all probability, would favor Germany, he could have hard-
ly wanted the Volkssport program to provide the French with
3 ^AAA
,
B, vol. I (2) , Nr. 168, Aufzeichnung des Reichs
ministers des Auswartigen Stresemann, 29 October 1926, 394;
and Gatzke, Stresemann, 62f.
38BA, R-43 1/1415, Report of Staatssekretiir Piinder and
Generalleutnant Pawelsz to Ministers Conference, 20 September
1926, Bl. 20-23; and Gatzke, Stresemann , 53-6.
39BA, R-43 1/1415, Piinder Report, Bl. 20-23; Minister-
besprechung, 24 September 1926, Bl. 3; AAA, B, 1(2), Nrs. 184
(6 November), 187 (9 November), and 199 (18 November); Gatzke
Stresemann, 62-7.
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an excuse to prolong the life of the Control Commission. *0
Certainly after his 29 October meeting with Braun, he was
aware that an opposition party had some evidence of Reichs-
wehr collaboration with the paramilitary groups, evidence
which if published could conceiveable topple the Government
and undermine all of his "fulfillment" policy. Thus some-
time in November, Gefiler, probably at Stresemann' s insis-
tence, ordered the Reichswehr to cease its participation in
Volkssport activities and so informed the Socialists at a
1 December meeting. 41
The Socialists, during the 1 December meeting, again
presented further charges and evidence of illegal Reichs-
wehr activities. The Government representatives were Chan-
cellor Wilhelm Marx, Stresemann, and GeBler; and from the
Socialist Party were former Chancellor Hermann Miiller,
party leader and former Vorwarts editor Otto Wels, Reich-
stag Deputies Rudolf Breitscheid and Philipp Scheidemann,
and Otto Eggerstedt, the Police President of Altona. 42
Stresemann appears to have attempted to meet reason
able French demands. For example, a veterans' group (Stahl-
helm) Volkssport training booklet, which had been expressly
mentioned by Briand at Thoiry as illustrative of Reichswehr-
paramilitary group ties, was taken off the open market dur-
ing November at the insistence of the Reich government. See
Berghahn, Stahlhelm
, 62; and Michael Salewski, Entwaf fnung
und Militarkrontrolle in Deutschland 1919-1927 , Munchen,
1966, 353. (Hereafter cited as Salewski, Entwaf fnung )
.
41 Eggerstedt, "Protokoll" , 1 December 1926, 103ff.
42Ibid.
i
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Scheidemann began the Socialist attack almost apolo-
getically; he acknowledged that what he had to say might
compromise Stresemann's foreign policy, but the French, he
claimed, were already familiar with some of this material.
Moreover, he noted, past complaints of illegal military
activities made to GeBler had resulted in little or no
satisfaction, so that it might be best to bring the issue
into the public light. The Socialists would, he added,
give the Government one last opportunity to redress the
situation.
He then launched into a litany of complaints: em-
ployment of retired officers by the Reichswehr, ostensibly
in civilian capacities, to direct illegal recruiting efforts
for the Zeitfreiwillige ; the activities of the Junkers Air-
craft Company in Russia; the manufacture and stockpiling of
illegal munitions in Russia; and the illegal ties between
the Reichswehr and the paramilitary groups which included
joint marksmanship training. The last mentioned activities,
claimed Scheidemann, were funded by both the Reichswehr and
industrial circles.
Wels then repeated Scheidemann 1 s complaints, emphasiz
ing that Reichswehr-paramilitary group relations were danger
ous, and added "... that a sharp delineation must be made
between the Reichswehr and the sport associations, for the
paramilitary groups had forged themselves into sport associa
tions in order to maintain their contacts with the Reichs-
39
, «43
wehr.
Wels' complaint, interestingly, was not against
the pre-military training concept of Volkssport, but rathe
against the opportunity inherent in Volkssport, as was the
conducted, for the Reichswehr and the paramilitary groups
to meet on common ground. He instead proposed a nation-
wide sport and gymnastic movement in which all youth could
participate, but which would be divorced from any contact
with the Reichswehr. 44
GeBler answered Scheidemann and Wels by requesting
an opportunity to ascertain the accuracy of the charges
and accompanying evidence. He implied that some of the
blame for illegal Reichswehr activities lay with Seeckt,
with whom it had been very difficult to work and who de-
liberately had kept GeBler in the dark on many issues.
Things seemed to be working much smoother, he said, with
Seeckt' s successor, General Wilhelm Heye. Moreover, in
respect to the allegation of Reichswehr support for the
paramilitary groups and Volkssport activities, he stated
that "... already in the last few days negotiations had
taken place [and] the Army and Navy have received direct-
43Ibid
.
, 104. "...daB eine scharfe Trennung zwis-
chen diesen Sportverbanden und der Reichswehr bestehen
miisse, denn die vaterlandischen Verbande hatten sich jetzt
zu solchen Sportvereinigungen zusammengeschlossen, um so
die Verbindungen mit der Reichswehr aufrechterhalten zu
konnen .
"
44Ibid
40
ives to maintain a strict neutrality." 45
Chancellor Marx then asked the Socialists to allow
the Government sufficient time to prepare a response to
each allegation. A future meeting would then be scheduled.
This suggestion met with general agreement, but Wels re-
iterated the Socialist position that something visible
would shortly be required to illustrate clearly the Govern-
ment's new course. 4 ^
The 1 December meeting demonstrated that the Social-
ists' anger was directed not so much at Volkssport as at
the participation of the Army in sport activities with the
paramilitary associations/ the majority of which were
avowed enemies of the Republic. The Socialists felt that
not only did this joint Reichswehr-paramilitary group par-
ticipation border on the edge of violating the Versailles
Treaty, but also that it had a potential for the revival
of their bete noir , the Zeitfreiwillige . The Socialists
accusations concerning secret re-armament activities in
Russia seem to have been raised pro forma and were certain-
ly answered in that fashion by GeBler.
Stresemann nonetheless must have worried that the
Ibid., 105. "...daJ3 daruber gerade, in den letzten
Tagen Verhandlungen stattgefunden hatten, dafl die Reichswehr
und Marine bestimmte Anweisungen bekommen habe [ sic ] vollig
neutral zu handeln."
46Ibid., 104.
41
Socialists might publicize their material on illegal
Reichswehr activities before the League of Nations made
its decision on the abolition of the Military Control Com-
mission in Germany. He therefore stalled for time; hence
Marx's request that the Government be given additional
time to study the Socialist charges and evidence. His re-
quest would not have appeared unusual as the Government
normally ascertained the accuracy of complaints prior to
making a response. 47
After the 11 December League decision to dismantle
the Control Commission no later than 31 January 1927, the
Socialist charges no longer presented a serious threat, as
is evidenced by the perfunctory Government response to
Scheidemann 1 s speech of 16 December in the Reichstag, dur-
ing which he made public the accusations made during the
4 o
1 December meeting.
The Reichswehr may have wanted to continue clandes-
tine ties of some sort to the Volkssport program, for the
47Salewski, Entwaf fnung
,
361; and BA, R-43 1/1417,
"Kabinettsprotokoll" of 8 December 1926. GeBler explained
that he had asked the Socialists to delay their Reichstag
interpellation until Stresemann returned from Geneva, a
proposition which they accepted.
48The SPD material on illegal Reichswehr activities
had been gathered by Carl Mierendorff, a former front of-
ficer turned left Socialist. Mierendorff offered the material
to SPD Reichstag Deputy and former Reichsinnenminister Wil-
helm Sollmann, who promptly returned it, saying, "the man
who makes this speech will never give another in the Reich-
stag." Scheidemann, who wanted publicity, seized the material
42
program was not entirely terminated after GeBler told the
Socialists on 1 December that he had ordered the Army and
Navy to cease their activities with the paramilitary associ-
ations. Instead, responsibility for the Volkssport program
was transfered to the Reich Ministry of the Interior and
only after assurances from civilian authorities that the
same level of financial support would continue. 4 9 Perhaps
the appointment of Wilhelm von Keudell of the German Nation-
alist Party as Reich Minister of the Interior in January
1927 influenced the transfer of the Volkssport program to
the Interior Ministry. The transfer, in appearance at
least, would stress the new civilian nature of Volkssport,
while the German Nationalists could be relied upon to con-
tinue the level of financial support for the program.
Evidence indicates that Reichswehr Volkssport activi-
ties ceased on or about 1 December 1926 and that responsi-
bility for the Volkssport program was transfered to the In-
terior Ministry in January 1927. General (Ret.) Wilhelm
and convinced a doubtful SPD Reichstag fraction to permit
him to give the speech. Sollmann was correct; it was Scheide
mann's last Reichstag speech. The speech caused an uproar;
amidst cries of treason the DNVP fraction walked out and
the Government resigned the following day. See Gordon Papers
testimony of Reichsminister a.D. Wilhelm Sollmann. For
Scheidemann 1 s speech, see RTV, 16 December 1926, vol. 391,
8577-86, and 8586f. for Chancellor Marx's reply.
49BA, R-43 11/519, Groener to Reichskanzlei , 18 Oc-
tober 1930, Bl. 2.
50Groener, GeBler's successor as Defense Minister, later
wrote, without giving the exact date, that the Reichswehr
terminated its connections to the Volkssport movement at
the insistence of the Reich and Prussian Ministries of
the Interior because of potential domestic and foreign
policy complications should the direct participation of
the Army in Volkssport be exposed. 51
Although the transfer of Volkssport to the Reich
Ministry of the Interior temporarily ended both military,
and for all practical purposes, Government support, Colonel
50
1 867-1 939. Son of a Swabian non-commissioned of-
ficer, Groener headed the General Staff Railway Section
during most of the First World War. He later commanded a
division on the Western Front and replaced Ludendorff as
First Quartermaster General in 1918. Groener was instru-
mental in arranging a modus Vivendi between the Army and
the new Republican Government in 1918. Retiring from the
Army in 1919, he served as Reich Minister of Transportation
and later as Reich Defense Minister (1928-1932).
51 BA, R-43 11/519, Groener to Reichskanzlei , 18
October 1930, Bl. 2. In the 29 October 1926 meeting of
Braun, GeBler, and Stresemann, Braun mentioned that Sever-
ing (then Prussian Minister of the Interior) had complained
to GeBler of Reichswehr-Sportverbande activities, as had
Braun, who had received this reply from Schleicher: "Die
Reichswehr hat die Schniif feleien der PreuBischen Regierung
satt." AAA , B, 1(2), Nr. 168, Aufzeichnung des Reichs-
ministers des Auswiirtigen Stresemann, 29 October 1926, 394;
and Nr. 23 8, footnote 7, letter of Chancellor Marx to Otto
Braun, 6 January 1927. Marx wrote that talks on the trans-
fer to Volkssport activities to the Reichsinnenministerium
were still in progress and he hoped that differences would
soon be resolved, for this work (Volkssport) was essential
and had to continue. Cf. Wohlfeil, Reichswehr und Repub-
lik, 211.
von Schleicher 52 of the Wehrmachtabteilung of the Defense
Ministry never ceased trying to find support for Volks-
sport, or similar programs, from patriotic private and
industrial sources. 53
Despite the abrupt end of overt military participa-
tion in the Volkssport program, the experiment had been of
great value. The quality of the training may have been
questionable, but more important, Volkssport kept alive
the concept of service to and sacrifice for the state. It
provided a means for directing the energy of youth and the
paramilitary groups into militarily useful channels and
served as a forum for the transition of the values of the
front generation to the post-war generation. The Reichs-
wehr accepted pre-military training as the most practical
alternative to conscription and the establishment of a
882- 19 34. A former member of the 3rd Guard In-
fantry Regiment, Schleicher served during World War I as a
General Staff Corps officer assigned to General Groener's
Railroad Section and became Groener's unofficial adopted
son. During most of his career in the Reichswehr, Schleicher
served as a political liaison officer and chief of staff to
Groener when he became Defense Minister. Schleicher sub-
sequently became Defense Minister and Chancellor in 1932.
He was shot by the SS during the Blood Purge of 1934, al-
though at whose orders has never been determined.
53Bundesmilitararchiv, Freiburg, (Hereafter cited
as BA-MA) , NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/20; and Generalleutnant
a.D. Vincenz Miiller, Ich fand das wahre Vaterland, Nach-
gelassene Memoiren , [East] Berlin, 1963, 287.
potential reserve military force that was possible under
the limitations of the Versailles Treaty. The transfer of
Volkssport to the Reich Ministry of the Interior did not
lessen military interest in pre-military training. Reichs-
wehr officers kept abreast of the civilian military sport
(Wehrsport ) movement that developed after 1927 and they
were ready to re-introduce pre-military training when the
circumstances were propitious.
CHAPTER III
A CONSCIOUS GERMAN SPIRIT
THE MILITARY SPORT MOVEMENT,
1927 to 1932
Although the transfer of Volkssport activities from
the Defense Ministry to the Reich Ministry of the Interior
resulted in the loss of most government subvention for
Volkssport groups, the military sport (Wehrsport ) movement
not only survived after 1927 but gained momentum. 1 Various
paramilitary associations, student groups, sport clubs, and
work-groups took over the Volkssport facilities or created
new ones, and conducted military sport training for their
members. It was unlikely that ties between the Reichswehr
and military sport groups were ever completely severed;
many military sport instructors and leaders were former
officers who maintained their friendships with comrades
still on active service and leading Reichswehr officers
were aware of currents within the military sport movement.
1 The term Wehrsport (defensive sport) , the training
content of which was identical to Volkssport , came into usage
and gradually superseded Volkssport after 1927. See IfZG,
Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur Staats jugend" , Bl. 32.
Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, military sport
will be used to describe training activities associated with
Volkssport
,
Gelandesport (terrain sport), and Wehrsport .
2For example, see the Truppenamt directives concern-
ing Wehrsport in BA-MA, RH-8/v896, CHL TA 251/31g.K. "Z",
T2IIIA, 20 March 1931; CHL TA 784/31g.K. "Z", T2IIIA,
24 July 1 931
.
Even though Reich and State Governments kept a close
watch upon the military sport movement and regarded the
participation of political parties and their auxiliary
groups in military sport activities with some alarm, 3 there
was little that any State or Reich minister could do to
hinder or halt such developments. The Reichswehr Law of
4March, 1921, prohibited the organization of uniformed,
military formations other than those permitted by law for
defense and police purposes, but there was little danger
of military sport groups running afoul of the law so long
as they emphasized the sport aspects of their programs.
Local government officials who petitioned higher authori-
ties for permission to prohibit military sport activities
often received the reply that no action could be taken be-
cause the leagues and clubs active in military sport train-
ing explained that their purpose was to further physical
training, the attainment of which was quite legitimate. 4
^Internationale Instituut voor Sociale Gesch.i oden is
(Hereafter cited as IISG) , NachlaB Grzesinski, G 1514, PMdl
,
II 1420 b 5/1, 7 May 1929; Severing, Lebensweg
,
II, 202ff.
4Reichsgesetzblatt
, 1921, 329-341.
^Letter of Reich Ministry of the Interior to Thuringian
Ministerium fur Inneres und Wirtschaft, 28 January 1925, quot-
ed in Karl Rohe, Das Reichsbanner : Schwartz, Rot, Gold. Ein
Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur der politischen Kampfve r-
bande zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik
,
Diisseldorf, 1966, 160.
(Hereafter cited as Rohe, Reichsbanner . ) Hauptarchiv of
NSDAP (hereafter cited as HA), f. 1554, PDM VId notes, 14
October 1929; f. 1878, PDM report to Bay. Staatsmin . d . Innern
,
25 September 1931; F. 1553, PDM VId. 2339/32, 14 October 1932,
48
The Socialists (SPD)
, who were most anxious to pro-
hibit the paramilitary groups of their political opponents
from conducting military sport activities, conveniently
overlooked the extensive military sport program directed
by the Reichsbanner
,
6
a paramilitary organization with
close ties to the Socialist Party. Their one major triumph
was short-lived. Claiming, in October 1929, that a recent
Stahlhelm (a large veterans organization with close ties
to the German Nationalist Party) field exercise conclusive-
ly demonstrated the military nature of Stahlhelm military
sport units, Prussian Minister of the Interior Albert
Grzesinski, a Socialist, banned the Stahlhelm in the Prus-
sian Rhineland provinces. Reich-President Hindenburg, an
honorary member of the Stahlhelm, intervened personally
and lifted the prohibition within three months of its in-
7
ception . '
The only telling action which the Socialists could
"... daB gelandesportliche Ubungen militarahnlichen Verbande
nach der Entschl. [oe3ung]. des Staatsmin. des Innern vom
23.7.32, Nr. 2198f. a 32, nur dann wie Versammlungen oder
Aufziige zu behandeln sind, wenn sie demonstrativen Charakter
tragen".; f. 317, PDM report to Bay. Staatsmin. d. Innern,
4033 IA, 22 December 1932.
^See pp. 67ff, this chapter.
7IISG, NachlaG Grzesinski, G 1524, PMdl, II 1420 b/39,
24 October 1929; G 1520, "Die sog. [enannten] Wehrsport-
tatigkeit des Stahlhelms in Rheinland und Westfalen" n.d.
[Dec. ]9 29]; G 1524, letter Grzesinski to Otto Braun, Prus-
sian Minister-President, 9 July 1930.
take against military sport groups was to eliminate Govern-
ment sport subventions to suspect groups. This procedure
was restricted, however, to the years (1928-1930) during
which the Socialists controlled the Reich Interior Minis-
try, the agency responsible for sport subsidies. 8 Moreover,
the weapon of withdrawing Government financial assistance
was blunted by the numerous inter-locking directorships and
affiliations which existed among the military sport groups
and which made it extremely difficult for the Government to
determine the recipients of sport subsidies. Finally, most
military sport organizations were not entirely dependent on
9Government assistance, which was at best niggardly.
Thus the decision of the Reich Government to termi-
nate its semi-official sponsorship of Volkssport groups in
January 1927 had little effect in the long run on the bur-
geoning military sport movement. Military sport groups
proliferated, taking over the facilities of Volkssport
organizations and expanding their activities. In its search
for an expedient solution to its manpower problems, the Army
Command had struck a responsive chord.
The facilities of the Braunau Volkssport school were
taken over by a group called the Work-Group Braunau (Arbeits -
°Severing, Lebensweg , II, 221 ff.
9BA, R-43/519, Anlage 2 to RWM WId, Nr. 3669/30, 17
October 1930; and "Wehrhaftmachung der Jugend" , RWM 86/31,
4 March 1931 , Bl. 18.
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gemeinschaft Braunau ) , directed by Major General (Ret.)
1
0
Severin. The Branau school, led by von Winterfeldt,
formed the nucleus of the thirteen military sport schools
that composed the work-Group Braunau. The schools were
scattered throughout the Silesian mountains. Winterfeldt '
s
growing interest in the National-Socialist movement led to
an increasing number of Nazi leaders, especially Hitler
Youth leaders, participating in the Work-Group's activi-
1
1
ties. Financial support for the Work-Broup Braunau, in
all probability, came from membership dues and contribu-
tions from patriotic individuals and business circles,
although assistance from the Reich Interior Ministry can-
not be completely dismissed.
One of the more active figures in the military
sport movement was Brigadier General (Ret.) Ludwig Vogt.
Upon his retirement from the Reichswehr in 1926, he joined
the League of Young Germany, succeeding, as director of
the League, retired General Riidiger Freiherr von der Goltz,
the nephew of the League's founder, Field Marshal Colmar
Freiherr von der Goltz. 12 With ca. 250,000 members, the
10His last Reichswehr post was City Commandant of
Berlin, from which he retired in 1927. See Rangliste ,
1927, p. 21.
11
IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur Staats-
jugend", Bl. 31 f; Vogelsang, RW-S taat-NSDAP , 230f.
12Colmar von der Goltz founded the Bund Jungdeutsch-
land in 1911 for the purpose of furthering pre-military
51
League of Young Germany conducted encampments at which
the members of various nationalist and conservative youth
leagues, clubs, and associations could gather and through
sport courses improve "... the physical, spiritual, and
traditional strength of youth in a conscious German Spirit
„13
• • • •
Although the League was composed of numerous politi-
cal youth organizations, recruiting, propaganda, and other
political activities were not permitted during League en-
campments. It was hoped, instead, that sport would forge
the splintered nationalist-conservative youth movement
into a common front, united against the enemy, the politi-
1 4
cal left.
The League's activities were guided by a board of
directors elected by its national assembly, a representa-
tive body of deputies from each of the member organizations.
The board of directors appointed General Vogt as executive
president. Financial support came from dues, industrial
youth training. See Dieter Fricke, Geschichte der Burger-
lichen Parteien in Deutschland, 1830-1945 , 2 vols., [East]
Berlin, 1968, I, 162-176. (Hereafter cited as Fricke,
Biirgerlichen Parteien .
)
13IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Satzungen des Bundes Jungdeutsch-
land e.V.", Bl. 161ff. " ...zu fordern... die korperliche,
geistige und sittliche Kraftigung der Jugend in bewuBt
deutschen Geiste..."; Fricke, Biirgerliche Parteien ,!, 162f.
l4IfZG, Ed-67/19, Bl. 161 ff.
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circles, and the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The
member organizations numbered over fifty and among the
most important were the Boy Scouts, the Eagle and Falcon,
the Young Nationalist League, the German Youth League, the
Journeymen, the Bismarck Youth, the Youth of the German
Peoples' Party (DVP)
, the Young Stahlhelm, and the Scharn-
horst Youth. 15
In late 1930 Vogt organized, apparently as an af-
filiated organization of the League of Young Germany, the
Work-Group of Terrain Sport Associations (Gelandesport-
Verbande-Arbeitsgemeinschaf
t
) , commonly referred to by its
German initials, GVA. Its goals were to promote all facets
of military sport undertaken by its various member groups,
to prepare guidelines for military sport clubs, to effect
liaison with Government authorities, and to assist in find-
1 6ing financial backing for military sport activities.
The GVA was a nation-wide organization composed of
clubs, student groups, paramilitary associations, and youth
1
5
Ibid
.
, See also Vogt letter to Dr. von Witzleben
(Siemens), 8 May 1928, Bl. 160; and Vogt letters to Siemens
Company asking for funds, 1 February 1929, 9 March 1929, and
30 August 1930. A complete list of all member and affiliated
groups can be seen in Fricke, Burgerliche Parteien ,!, 162f.
16BA, R-43/519, Vogt to Reichskanz ler , Briining, 4 Feb.
1932, Bl. 1-6, with two enclosures. The enclosures, unfortu-
nately missing, were GVA annual reports. For government
subvention, see ibid . , Anlage 2 of RWM, WId, 3669/32, 17
October 1930, Bl. 17.
groups actively involved in military sport programs. Among
the members were the Boy Scouts, the League of Colonial Boy
Scouts, the Free Squad of the Young Nation, the Reich
Association League, the Young Storm of Home Defense, the
Reich Group of Patriotic Workers, the Student Corporation,
the German-National Merchant Employees Group, the League
of Country Youth, and the Kyffhauser League. 17
The combined individual membership of the groups in
the GVA numbered ca. 500,000, although it is uncertain if
all these individuals were active military sport partici-
pants. The GVA was best organized in the Berlin area.
Establishing several military sport camps near Berlin, GVA
instructors conducted theoretical instruction in thirty-
four different locations within Berlin alone. Over 20,000
participants were graduated from military sport courses by
the GVA during the winter of 1931-1932. 18
Vogt maintained close ties with both civil and mili-
tary authorities. In February 1931, he held a conference
17BA-MA, RH-8/v896, CHL TA 251/31g.K. "Z" , T2IIIA,
20 March 1931; CHL TA 784/31 g.K. "Z", T2IIIA, 24 July 1931.
There is reason to believe that at one time the SA may have
been a member of the GVA. See p. 164f., n. 78.
18BA, R-43/519, Vogt to Briining, 4 February 1932;
IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Aktennotiz iiber eine Besprechung mit Herrn
General Vogt am 7.3.19 32", by Dr von Witzleben, Siemens
G.m.b.H., Bl. 144f; and letter of von Witzleben to Siemens
Director Dr von Winterfeldt, "personlich im Hause", 6 June
1933, Bl. 134-141.
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with Dr. Joseph Wirth, the Reich Minister of the Interior,
during which Wirth boldly asked Vogt if he were training a
militia. Vogt affirmed this, but insisted that his activi-
ties were neutral, that is, that there were no ties between
the GVA and any political party. This statement apparently
met with Wirth' s approval, for the GVA received financial
support from the Reich Ministry of the Interior during
1 91931.' Financial difficulties in 1932 prevented the Reich
Government from giving any monetary assistance to the GVA,
but Vogt succeeded in raising money from the Siemens, I.G.
Farben, and Borsig corporations. He told these firms that
he needed their assistance only for a short period, until
the temporary "drought" in Government funding, as General
von Schleicher called it, ended. ^°
The Defense Ministry, however, maintained something
of a "fair-weather" friendship with Vogt. From 1928 to
1930, he was a frequent visitor at the Defense Ministry,
trying to secure, without apparent success, money for
19IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Aktennotiz" , 7 March 1932; BA,
R-43 11/519, Vogt to Briining, 4 February 1932.
20IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Aktennotiz", 7 March 1932. Vogt
told Siemens officials that he needed RM 15-20,000 for his
operations, and that Dr. Kalbe of IG Farben had already
pledged RM 10,000. Dr. Vogler [a leading Volkssport fund
raiser in 1924] of Borsig Company gave RM 1500. Siemens
finally gave Vogt RM 3000 on 17 March; ibid , letter of von
Witzleben to von Winterfeldt, 17 March 1932; and BA, R-43
11/519, Vogt to Briining, 4 February 1932.
"youth and military fitness training.
"
2 1 Shortly after the
founding of the GVA, the Reichswehr expressed a positive
but cautious attitude towards the work of the GVA. The
"non-political," "military work" of Vogt's group created a
favorable impression, but Reichswehr commanders were warned
that nothing more than advice could be extended to General
Vogt, and that he and his followers were in no fashion to
be regarded as representatives of, or associated with, the
Defense Ministry. 22
Several months later, in July 1931, the Reichswehr
adopted a more friendly attitude. Acknowledging the work
of the GVA as a valuable contribution to defense, the Army
Command described the GVA military sport program as "... a
2 3preliminary step and a makeshift foundation... for a
reserve for the Border Buard and the Army. Nonetheless,
military officials were adamant that responsibilities be
delineated and maintained: "While the defense fitness
training work is exclusively the responsibility of the
paramilitary organizations, military training is entirely
the provenance of the Reichswehr. This delineation has
21Muller, Das wahre Vaterland , "...Jugend- und
Wehrertuchtigung" , 279.
22BA-MA, RH-8/V896, CHL TA 251/31 g.K. "Z", T2IIIA,
20 March 1931.
2 3Ibjd . , CHL TA 784/31 g.K. "Z", T2IIIA, 24 July
19 32, "...Vorstufe und notdiirftige Grundlage . . . " Bl. 5.
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to be maintained.
Reichswehr support for the GVA and other military
sport groups continued throughout 1931. Vogt claimed to
have had 60 former officers and non-commissioned officers,
trained by the Defense Ministry, as military sport in-
structors, placed at his disposal in 1931. 25 Military
authorities also allowed Vogt to use troop training facili-
ties at Doberitz, a training area close to Berlin. 26
While General Staff (Truppenamt ) officers extended
limited assistance to military sport groups, the Defense
Ministry and the Reich Ministry of the Interior planned
to organize their own military sport association, which
would, in effect, render the GVA superfluous. Vogt had
even proposed such a Government sponsored organization in
June 1931, with, of course, a prominent position reserved
for himself. His plan was apparently rejected because it
Ibid , "wahrend die Wehrertiichtigungsarbeit aus-
schlieBlich unter die Verantwortung der Verbande fallt, ist
die militarsiche Ausbildung allein Sache der Reichswehr.
Die Grenze mu6 unbedingt eingehalten werden." Bl. 5f.
25IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Aktennotiz" , 7 March 1932, Bl. 144.
Efforts to confirm Vogt ' s claim have been unsuccessful, how-
ever, the economic situation was such that instructor posi-
tions in the GVA would have been very attractive to recently
discharged or retired military personnel. Other groups
active in military sport also attempted to hire recently
discharged military personnel.
2
6
Ibid. / witzleben to von Winterfeldt, 6 January
1933, Bl. 138. See also Fa-88/337, HJ Stabsleitung, Ref.
VI, 1/32, 26 August 1932, circular to HJ Gebiets- und
Bannfiihrer
.
duplicated the Government project. 27 With both the GVA and
a Government-sponsored military sport organization compet-
ing for the same limited funds in 1932, it probably was no
coincidence that funds previously available to the GVA in
1931 were no longer available in 1932.
Vogt realized the vulnerability of his position once
the Government committed itself to establishing a military
sport organization, and in the fall of 1932 he concluded
an agreement with Lt
. General (Ret.) Edwin von Stiilpnagel,
the leader of the Government military sport organization.
Under the provisions of this pact, Vogt organized a sport
program for boys under 16 years of age, and Stiilpnagel'
s
group conducted military sport training for young men from
16 to 25 years of age. Reflecting this new mission, Vogt
reorganized the GVA on 24 November 1932 into the German
Youth Service ( Deutscher Jugenddienst ) , or DJD. The DJD
received financial support from its predecessor's patrons:
the Reich Ministry of the Interior, Siemens Co., I. G.
Farben, and the Borsig Corporation.^ 0
27BA, R-43 11/519, Vogt to Briining, (Rk. 5609) 29
May 1931, "Gedanken iiber die Durchfiihrung eines Wehrsportes
in grosseren Rahmen" . The Reichswehr comment on his pro-
posal was, "Man halt eine solche Stelle fur iiberfliissig
.
"
The government-sponsored military sport organization, the
Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung, is discussed in
Chapters V and VI
.
28IfZG, Ed-67/19, von Witzleben to von Winterfeldt,
6 January 1933, Bl. 138.
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Students in various institutes of higher learning
enthusiastically participated in the military sport move-
ment. Fraternities became interested in small-bore marks-
manship and hand-to-hand combat sports as early as 1926,
and by 19 30 the more traditional interest in gymnastic
sports was eclipsed by the growing popularity of military
sport. 1931 was an especially active year for student
military sport enthusiasts: as a result of student interest,
chairs of military studies were established at several uni-
versities, and the Academic-Scientific Work Office (Aka-
demisches-Wissenschaftliches Arbeit samt, or AWA) , an or-
ganization of student groups interested in military sports,
was founded with the approval of the Defense Ministry. 29
The mission of the AWA was "...to build up the
legally permissible collegiate military sport [movement]
on a non-partisan basis, to prepare and disseminate regu-
lations, and to lead political negotiations with the pur-
pose of securing [approval and assistance] and promoting
^Anselm Faust, Per Nationalsozialistische Studen -
tenbund
,
Dusseldorf, 1973, I, 94-97. (Hereafter cited as
Faust, NSDStB ) ; Hans-Peter Bleuel and Hans Klinnert,
Deutsche Studenten auf dem Wege ins Dritte Reich , Giiters-
loh, 1967, 118, 250f. (Hereafter cited as Bleuel and
Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten .) Both Faust and Bleuel-
Klinnert state that the Reichswehrministerium approved of
the founding of the AWA. See also BA-MA, RH-8/v896,
CHL TA 784/31 g.K. "Z" T2IIIA, 24 July 1931.
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the military sport work [of the AWA]." 30 The most im-
portant student groups within the AWA were the National-
Socialist German Student League, the Weapons Ring, the
Wingolf, and the Catholic Student Association. 31
During 1931-1932, the AWA established offices at
every institution of higher learning in Germany. Office
directors were either students or young professors. Mili-
tary sport courses of either eight or twenty-one days
duration, depending on the holiday schedule, were conducted
at encampments during school vacations. The AWA maintained
close ties with the GVA and the Stahlhelm. AWA courses,
for example, were given at GVA facilities at Wunsdorf and
at Stahlhelm facilities at Camp Lechfeld, Bavaria. 32
"...den gesetzlich erlaubten akademischen Wehr-
sport auf iiberparteilichen Grundlage aufzubauen, einheit-
liche Ubungsvorschriften zu erlassen und die politischen
Verhandlungen mit dem Ziel der Sicherung und Forderung der
Arbeit zu fuhren." in Faust, NSDStB
,
II, 16. The non-
partisan nature of the AWA is suspect; its founder and
leader, Diplom Ing. Otto Schwab, a former front officer,
was a member of the NSDAP and subsequently became the Chief
of Staff of the Reich SA Hochschulamt in 19 33. He apparent-
ly maintained close ties with the Riechswehr throughout the
1920s following his discharge from active duty, as he wrote
several pamphlets, among them "Ingenieur und Soldat", for
the Reichswehr.
31 BA-MA, RH-8/V896, CHL TA 251/31 g.K. "Z", T2IIIA,
20 March 1931
.
32 IfZG, Ma-619, AWA to Rektor of Universitat Mirnchen,
9 March 1933, Bl. 1612876; and BHStA, IV, Bestand Stahlhelm,
Bd. 54.
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The League of Front Soldiers, or the Stahlhelm, had
shown an interest in military sport activities as early as
1923. Military sport training served a dual purpose for
the Stahlhelm. First, it provided a vehicle for imparting
values important to the Stahlhelm, values which had been
previously imparted during the recruit training of the pre-
1914 German Army. These values were comradeship, duty,
discipline, and self-sacrifice. 33 The Reichswehr, of course
emphasized these values in its recruit training programs,
but the small size of the Reichswehr meant that fewer young
men received training in comparison to the pre-1914 Armv.
Second, military sport training kept alive, insofar as was
possible, the concept of universal military training and
34service . *
The initial Stahlhelm sport program (1919-1924) faile
to satisfy Stahlhelm directors. The program, they felt,
encouraged individual competition and achievement, which
not only contradicted the Stahlhelm doctrine of the "front"
as a leveling and equalizing influence , but also resulted
in sport events being restricted to the most talented ath-
letes, thus excluding most Stahlhelm members.
Der Bund der Frontsoldaten (herausgegeben von) , Per
Stahlhelm. Erinnerungen und Bilder aus den Jahren 1918-1933
2 vols., 2d ed., Berlin, 1933, II, 89. (Hereafter cited as
Stahlhelm
.
)
34Stahlhelm Handbuch , 4th ed., quoted from Stahlhelm ,
I
, 138; Rohe , Reichsbanner , 160.
35Stahlhelm, II, 89ff.
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Military sport, which emphasized group achievement
in contrast to individual excellence, offered an acceptable
alternative to the traditional sport program. 36 Not only
did military sport encompass military training, but it pro-
vided a common activity in which most Stahlhelm members and
members of the Stahlhelm-af filiated youth groups (Young
Stahlhelm or Jungs ta, and the Scharnhorst Youth) could
participate
.
Stahlhelm youth organizations had begun military
sport-type courses as early as 1923. Most of this activity
appears to have taken place in Northern Germany. A mili-
tary sport unit, for example, was formed in Luneburg in
192 3 and Capt. (Ret.) von der Wense gave instruction in
marksmanship, marching, and terrain studies to ca. 800
members of the Young Stahlhelm in the Hildesheim area.
In 1926, a large field exercise with ca. 1000 participants,
led by Col. (Ret.) Schulze, was held in Hildesheim. Over
36Der Bund der Frontsoldaten (herausgegegen von)
,
Der NSDFB (Stahlhelm) : Geschichte, Wesen und Aufgabe des
Frontsoldatenbundes
,
Berlin, 1935, 45. (Hereafter cited
as NSDFB .
)
37The Young Stahlhelm was founded at the 5th Front
Soldiers Assembly held in January, 19 24, in response to a
recognition of the need for a youth program. It trained
its members militarily insofar as the Versailles Treaty
permitted. In 1926, Stahlhelm directors permitted Young
Stahlhelm members to transfer to the regular Stahlhelm
after two years active membership in the Young Stahlhelm.
NSDFB, 43ff; Stahlhelm ,!, 48, 53, 64, 113f.
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four hundred youth and regular Stahlhelm members turned out
for the 1926 Hildesheim Sport Day, which culminated in a
15km march with full field equipment. The 1927 Gottingen
Sport Day had ca. 1000 participants. 38
In December 1928, the central office of the Stahl-
helm ordered each of its local organizations (Ortsgruppe )
to organize military sport formations for the purpose of
developing and preserving the practical, as opposed to
theoretical, semi-military skills of its members. For
Stahlhelm members under thirty years of age, according to
the directive, joining this new formation was mandatory.
For those over thirty, membership was optional. At the
Stahlhelm National Headquarters in Magdeburg, a new section,
•39
Section lb, supervised all military sport activity.
In addition to military sport activities conducted
during special courses or military sport unit training, 40
LV [Landesverband] Niedersachsen , Funfzehn Jahre
Stahlhelm in Niedersachsen , Braunschweig, 1936, 9, 19, 26,
81-85, 106f., 126. (Hereafter cited as S tahlhelm-Nieder-
sachsen . ) Participation figures quoted above are, for the
most part, from north central Germany, as this was the
region of the Stahlhelm 's greatest strength. Its support
came from middle and small size cities, and the countryside
or east, north, and middle Germany. See BHStA, I, MI,
71490, "Referat auf der Nachrichtenkonferenz in Dresden am
27.4.1928", Bl. 9.
39nsG, NachlaB Grzesinski, G 1514, letter Grzesinski
to Otto Braun, PMdl , II 1420 b 5/1, 7 May 1929 with copy of
the Stahlhelm Bundeszeitschrift Nr. 51, 16 December 1928.
4oSee Stahlhelm , II, 92-96, for a detailed description
of the daily routine in a Stahlhelm Wehrsportlager
.
members of the Stahlhelm Labor Service received a minimum
of two hours of military sport instruction daily. The Labor
Service camps, begun in 1931, allegedly numbered over 1100
by the summer of 1933, with an enrollment capacity of ca.
41
70,000. Admittedly many of the participants in the labor
service camps had previously had, or later received, mili-
tary sport training, but a conservative estimate would indi-
cate that at least 150,000 Young Stahlhelm members received
their only exposure to military sport training in the labor
service camps
.
At the Front Soldiers' Assembly of 1931, Stahlhelm
leaders ordered each Stahlhelm region to establish Defense
Stahlhelm sections (Wehrstahlhelmabteilungen ) composed of
all physically qualified Stahlhelm members under 35 years
of age. The sections were to be ready for action at all
times and were to maintain a high state of proficiency,
presumably through military sport activity. In northern
Germany, at least, the Defense Sections were organized.
In lower Saxony, two Wehrstahlhelm battalions led by Lt.
Col. (Ret.) Kraut and Major (Ret.) Rodenbeck were formed
in the Hildesheim area, while three battalions were organ-
ized into the "Heidegau" regiment, led by Capt . (Ret.) von
41 Ibid. 128ff; and NSDFB
,
36, 41 f. The cumulative
enrollment figure of the camps is not known. A much lower
estimate, without evidence or citation, is given in Klaus
Hornung, Per Jungdeutsche Orden
,
Diisseldorf, 1958, 1 1 8.
(Hereafter cited as Hornung, Jungdo .
)
der Wense. The Hannover region conducted military sport
training for its Defense Sections at its Oershausen school.
A Wehrstahlhelm regiment was raised from Hannover. Lune-
burg Stahlhelm members raised a regiment of three battalions,
and in lower Saxony military sport schools were established
in Scheuen near Celle, Hildesheim, Nordstemmen-Gronau, and
Bad Zwischenann. 42
In May 1932, Stahlhelm leader Franz Seldte revised
the military sport guidelines of December 1928, and declared
the support of the Stahlhelm for instituting mandatory
military sport training for all young male Germans. He
further emphasized the Stahlhelm 1 s commitment to this goal
by elevating its military sport training section (lb) to an
Inspectorate on 1 July 1932. The Inspector assumed respon-
sibility for training Stahlhelm military sport instructors
and for insuring that they were paid if their services were
utilized in a full-time capacity. The majority of these ap-
pear to have been recently retired or discharged Reichswehr
personnel. Advice, lesson plans, and assistance were ex-
tended to the Stahlhelm regional commands by the federal
Inspectorate. The remainder of 19 32 (July to December) was
42Stahlhelm-Niedersachsen , 85f, 99f, 113, 115, 127f,
and 135ff.
43
Ibid
. , 114; Stahlhe lm, I, 102, Berghahn, Stahlhelm ,
224, 229.
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designated by Seldte as a period of preparation and testing
in order for as many members as possible to qualify for the
Stahlhelm military sport badge. In addition to Stahlhelm-
wide testing for the badge, large scale field exercises
were conducted by Wehrstahlhelm units, including an exercise
in the Braunschweig area with ca. 4000 participants. 44
The reason for the increased interest in military
sport manifested by Seldte and other Stahlhelm leaders is
not known. It may have represented an attempt to rival
the nascent Government-sponsored military sport organiza-
tion or Stahlhelm leaders may have increased their efforts
at the urging of the Defense Ministry. At any rate, the
Defense Ministry did not ignore the Stahlhem military sport
program. During the Volkssport Era (1924-1927), Reichswehr
officers apparently gave some assistance to the Stahlhelm
military sport units, 4 ^ and although the Army showed little
official overt interest in military sport from 1927 to
1930, 1931 saw a revival of Defense Ministry interest. A
44BA, R-43 11/828, Notizen fur eine Unterredung mit
dem Herrn Reichswehrminister , Rk. 904 7, 2 8 September 1932,
Part 1(6); Stahlhelm, I, 105f; Stahlhelm-Nieder-Sachsen
,
23f; Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 230-238. In all likelihood, the
Inspector for Wehrsport was Lt. (Ret.) Karl Gornemann, Stahl-
helm Bundeswehrsportwart since June 1931, and director of the
Jungsta Wehrsport activities since 1924. For evidence of in-
creased Stahlhelm Wehrsport activity during the summer of
19 32, see Neue Preufiische Kreuzzeitung, passim for June,
July, August, and September 1932.
45Berghahn, Stahlhe lm, 58f. Berghahn uses sources
from the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam, to demonstrate
Reichswehr interest in Stahlhelm Wehrsport, 1924 to 1926.
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series of briefings was arranged for former officers in the
Stahlhelm by the Defense Ministry, and Col. von Schleicher
extended financial assistance for Stahlhelm military sport
activities to Capt. (Ret.) von Morozowicz, the leader of
the Young Stahlhelm. 46 In the eastern border provinces the
Stahlhelm was apparently permitted to use military and pub-
lic facilities for its military sport activities. 47 At the
13th Stahlhelm Assembly, held in Berlin during September
1932, officers of the Defense Ministry attended for the
first time in an official capacity. 48
Exact figures for the number of Stahlhelm military
sport participants are not available. Berghahn states that
in the fall 1933 transfer of the Young Stahlhelm to the
Nazi Storm Troopers, several hundreds of thousands of
young men changed uniforms. This is confirmed by the suc-
cessor to the Stahlhelm, the National-Socialist Front
46BA, Sam Sch/271 , Stahlhelm Gau III, Ortsgruppe
[Berlin] Zehlendorf, 856/31 G, to Maj.a.D. Siegfried Runge,
26 October 1931; BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/20, Bl
.
184ff, 197ff.
47BA, R-43 11/828, Stahlhelm "Notizen", 28 September
1932. In Part 1(1), the Stahlhelm Bundesvorstand requested
"Uberlassung im ganzen Reich, nicht nur in den Grenzgebieten
,
der Kasernenhofe, Exerziersplatze , SchieBst^nde , stadtischen
Turnhallen u. Exerziershauser fur Wehrsportausbildung . . . " ,
which implies that permission to use military and public
facilities in the border regions had been previously granted,
(emphasis in original)
48Stahlhelm, I, 129ff.
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Soldiers' League (NSDFB)
, which stated that 314,000 Young
Stahlhelm members were transferred, ^ a number three times
the size of the then army.
Although the GVA, the Stahlhelm, and the SA were per-
haps the most active military sport enthusiasts, they were
by no means the only ones. Members of the Reichsbanner,
Black-Red-Gold (Reichsbanner, Schwarz-Rot-Gold ) , a pro-
Republic paramilitary association, engaged in military sport
activities, as did various member groups of the German
Gymnasts, the German Reich Committee for Physical Exercises,
the Reich Committee of German Youth Organizations, numerous
clubs in Bavaria, and Admiral (Ret.) von Trotha's Youth
League
.
The Reichsbanner, a paramilitary association of pro-
Republic war veterans, was organized as a counter-weight to
the Stahlhelm and other anti-Republican veterans groups.
Commencing in 1925, local chapters of the Reichsbanner
participated in military sport activities, emphasizing small-
bore marksmanship, terrain sport exercises, hand-to-hand
combat, marching, and close order drill. In 1926, the
national headquarters of the Reichsbanner, located in Magde-
burg, founded the League of Republican Small-Bore Marksman-
ship Clubs, in response to requests from local Reichsbanner
chapters, which were alarmed by the increase of military
49Berghahn, Stahlhelm , 268; NSDFB , 47
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sport programs sponsored by their political opponents. Ap-
parently Reichsbanner leaders were worried that anti-Repub-
lican elements were training forces to overthrow the Gov-
ernment
.
The spectacular success of the NSDAP in the Reichs-
tag election of 14 September 1930 appeared to substantiate
Reichsbanner suspicions that an anti-Republic coup d'etat
was in the offing. Reichsbanner leaders, at a meeting of
their federal council, 20-21 September 1930, decided to
organize an elite section to combat the SA. The Reichs-
banner Protective Formations ( Schuf
o
) were organized with-
in each Reichsbanner region, along with their own staff
for training the new formations. Following the ouster of
the Socialist Government of Prussia by a Federal Commissar
on 20 July 1932, Reichsbanner officials concentrated all
their efforts on military sport programs, feeling the Re-
public to be in imminent danger from an authoritarian take-
over. Slogans such as "Military sport more than ever!",
"Universal military service for freedom! " and "With every
last man and penny for military sport!" characterized the
intensity of the Reichsbanner commitment, a commitment made
obsolete by the January 1933 forming of the Hitler Govern-
ment. 51
50Rohe, Reichsbanner , 164, 166f.
5l Ibid.
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A shortage of trained instructors and leaders severe-
ly hampered the Reichsbanner effort to provide military
sport training for the Protective Formations. Discharged
and retired Reichswehr personnel showed little interest in
working with the Reichsbanner, a phenomenon consistent with
the ant i-Republican attitude of most Reichswehr personnel.
Defense Minister Groener also showed little interest in
furthering Reichsbanner military sport training. Reichs-
wehr apathy, or hostility, and the shortage of trained in-
structors, however, were somewhat overcome by Reichsbanner-
GVA collaboration, and the Socialist Government of Prussia,
prior to its 1932 ouster, arranged for men from the Prussian
State Police to train Reichsbanner personnel.-52
Groener 1 s successor as Defense Minister was Schleicher,
who reversed Groener' s position. Consistent with the Army
Command's policy of involving every patriotic German who so
desired in non-regular defense planning, Schleicher not only
encouraged Reichsbanner members to participate in the Border
Guard-East training, but also made available for Reichsbanner
53
use the military firing ranges at Tegel.
Owing to the scattering and destruction of local Reichs-
52BA, R-43 11/519, letter Vogt to Bruning, 4 February
1932; Rohe, Reichsbanne r, 365-74, 441-444.
53
BA-MA, NachlaB Bredow, N-97/1 , Orientation report
for Schleicher, undated, but initialled by Schleicher on 15
June 1932; Rohe, Reichsbanner, 365-74, 441-444.
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banner records and archives following the Nazi consolida-
tion of power, and the fact that a permanent central head-
quarters for the Protective Formations was never established,
it is difficult to arrive at an estimate of the size of the
Reichsbanner military sport program. The best estimate for
the strength of the Protective Formations (which does not
include pre-1930 military sport activities) is 400,000, of
whom, by far, the greater part received military sport train-
ing, a not always enforced pre-requisite for enlistment in
the Protective Formations. 54
The German Turners ( Deutsche Turners chaft ) , an or-
ganization of over one and one-half million members, 55 had,
since 1922, stressed "defense-readiness" (Wehrhaftigkei
t
)
as a goal for its members. The Turners did not view de-
fense-readiness as an end in itself, but rather as a vehicle
for the development of manly and nationalistic character
traits. Defense-Readiness training, to them, formed the
basis for later military training. By 1931, however, the
~^Rohe, Reichsbanner , 365-74. To prevent over-aging
and to attempt to keep its membership young, the Reichsbanner
created a youth section, the Jungkameraden , who were allowed
to transfer to the Reichsbanner at age 21. In 1932, 60 to
70% of the men in the Protective Formations were under 30
years of age.
55Jiirgen Dieckert, Die Turnerjugendbewegung , Schorn-
dorff bei Stuttgart, 1968, 142f. (Hereafter cited as Dieckert
Turner j ugendbewegung . ) The Deutsche Turnerschaf t was organ-
ized in 1862 and existed until 1933, when it was disbanded by
the National Socialists. In 1925 there were 18 regional coun
cils and 11,911 local chapters with a membership of 1,622,377
See also Fricke, Biirgerliche Parteien,!, 616f.
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onset of the Depression and the growth of radical political
activity had caused a politicization of German youth, which
in the ranks of the Turners manifested itself in demands
from racist elements that defense-readiness be transformed
into concrete activity. The Turners' Youth Committee, meet-
ing in Kassel in September 1931, called for the introduction
of marksmanship training and field marches into the associa-
tion's sport program. The directors of the Turners accepted
these innovations. The more radical goals of the Bavarian
Regional Council, which demanded the introduction of a
special year-long program for eighteen year olds, of terrain
studies, first aid, marksmanship, map reading, and rescue
training were not adopted until the following year. In 1932
the Turner youth groups were militarized: uniforms with in-
signia of rank were introduced, as were military sport train-
ing courses and encampments . 56
In Bavaria, the Peoples' Improvement Section (Volks -
ertiichtigungsabteilung ) of the Bavarian Society for the Ad-
vancement of Physical Training, a state-sponsored organiza-
tion funded by the Bavarian Ministry for Education and Culture,
seems to have coordinated and supervised most military sport
activity. The director of the Improvement Section, Lt. Col.
(Ret.) August Horl, had been active in the Deutscher Notbann
in 1925. With Bavarian Government financial backing, Horl's
Dieckert, Turnerjugendbewegung , 142f.
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section sponsored military sport courses and underwrote
health and accident insurance for course participants. The
GVA, Stahlhelm, and local Bavarian clubs took advantage of
the services of the Improvement Section, which, in 1931,
for example, sponsored over 100 military sport courses. 57
The Bavarian and Reich Federation ( Bund Bayern und
Reich), the largest (ca. 55,000) and best armed of the
Bavarian defense organizations of 1923, became active in
the military sport movement in 1926. Despite some personnel
defections following the Hitler Putsch of 1923, most members
remained active and there were over 1200 local chapters in
Bavaria in 1926. During that year the Bund founded and
sponsored military sport groups and published its own mili-
tary sport pamphlet, "A Primer for Practical Federation
Work in the Area of Defense Fitness". Although the Bund
remained distant from Epp's Notbann
, in 1927 Bund leaders
held a series of conferences with Horl, which apparently
resulted in financial assistance for Bund military sport
activities from Horl's Improvement Section. Bund leaders
in Munich attended Lt. Col. Billman's [of Wiinsdorf] lecture
on German Volkssport about the time of their talks with
Horl, so they were aware of nation-wide currents in the
57BHStA, IV, Bestand Stahlhelm, Bd. 54. It is possibl
although evidence is by no means conclusive, that the Volks-
ertiichtigungsabteilung developed from Epp's Deutscher Notbann
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movement .
°
B
.
un4 Oberland (Upper [Bavarian] Country Federation)
also formed military sport clubs for its younger members
and its youth group affiliates. 59
Vice-Admiral (Ret.) Adolf von Trotha, with financial
support from the Navy, founded the Hanseatic Youth League
in 1925. Officially organized as a nautical sport club,
the real purpose of Trotha's League was to train interested
young men as crew members for torpedo motor boats. The
German Navy was not permitted such boats under the provisions
of the Versailles Treaty, yet German civilian firms, with
capital from secret defense funds, manufactured the boats,
ostensibly as civilian recreation craft, and sold them to
"patriotic" yacht clubs. Experiments conducted in Spain
proved that the boats could easily be converted to a mili-
tary configuration, and the Trotha sport school provided a
nucleus of trained crew members for whatever contingencies
might arise. In addition, prospective naval seaplane pilots
were sent to the Trotha school prior to commencing their il-
legal flight training. The school facilities, located in a
former hotel in Travemtinde, were purchased with Defense
Ministry funds and in 1933 the school was transferred to
58BHStA, II, Bd. Bayern und Reich, 2/3, 2/4, and
2/5. See also Gordon, Beer Hall Putsch, 591-99. In 1929
Blind Bayern und Reich affiliated with the Stahlhelm. BHStA,
II, Bd. Bayern und Reich, 2/6.
59BHStA, I, MI 71490, "Referat auf der Nachrichten-
konferenz in Dresden, am 27.4. 1928." Bl. 5.
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the Navy and used to train submarine crews. Trotha was
subsequently made an honorary Hitler Youth Leader for his
services to the "national movement." 60
Most of the military sport organizations mentioned,
which by no means exhausts the list, belonged to one or
both of two, nation-wide athletic promotion groups, the
German Reich Committee for Physical Exercises, 61 and the
Reich Committee of German Youth Groups. 62 These agencies,
in effect, lobbied for and channeled Government subsidies
to various sport groups. While their relationship to the
military sport movement is unclear, the two committees, by
60IMT, XXXIV, Dok. 156-C, (Bearb. von Kapitan z.
See Schliisser)
, "Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles,
1919-1935", 554-557; Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
, Nr. 496,
15 October 1940; Adolf von Trotha, Vizeadmiral a.D.
(herausgegeben von B. von Bargen)
, Admiral von Trotha;
Personliches, Briefe, Reden und Aufzeichnungen
,
Berlin,
193 8, 12f. A corvette-Captain (Ret.) Fritz Albrecht direct
ed a small (ca. 1000) naval military sport youth group, the
"Marinejugend Vaterland"
. Its ties (if any) to the Trotha
Organization are unknown. See Neue Preuflische Kreuzzeitung
,
Nr. 198, 17 July 1932.
fi 1u
'Originally established in 1895 as the German
Olympic Committee/ the Deutscher ReichsausschuB fur
Leibesubungen in 1 932 had 49 member groups, 27 affiliated
university chapters, and representatives from 26 govern-
ment agencies. Its total membership was ca. 5.5 million.
See Fricke, Biirgerliche Parteien
,
I, 530-540.
^Organized in 1919 to secure Government subvention
for its members, the ReichsausschuB der deutschen Jugendver
bande had 117 affiliated member groups with a combined mem-
bership of ca. 4.5 million. See Fricke, Biirgerliche
Parteien
,
I, 481 f; and Baldur von Schirach, Ich Glaubte an
Hitler
,
Hamburg, 1967, 176ff. (Hereafter cited as Schirach
Ich Glaubte an Hitler.)
virtue of their traditions and size, contributed immensely
to the standing and prestige of their directors, who were
interested in military sport. 63 It is probably no coinci-
dence that the zenith of Government cooperation with the
military sport movement occurred during the winter of 1931-
1932, the year of Vogt's election as director of the Reich
Committee of German Youth Groups.
In summary, the transfer of Volkssport from the
Defense Ministry to the Reich Ministry of the Interior in
1927 did not, as the generals had feared, result in a slow
death for military sport. Government funds, perhaps on a
smaller scale, continued to trickle to various military
sport groups after 1927. Reichswehr officers were aware
of and indirectly influenced developments within the mili-
tary sport organizations.
Owing to a lack of evidence, only the roughest esti-
mate of the number of military sport participants from 1927
to 1932 can be attempted. A very conservative estimate
would be that 1.5 million young men received some type of
training. 6 ^ In practical terms, this meant a reservoir of
63Vogt directed the Reich Committee of German Youth
Groups after 1931. For the leaders of the German Reich Com-
mittee for Physical Exercises and their role in the Govern-
ment-sponsored military sport organization, see Cpt . VI.
pp. 152f.
6
^This estimate is based on the following figures:
GVA, 500,000 (footnote 18); Stahlhelm, 314,000 (footnote 49);
SA, (See next chapter) 44 6 ,000 (BA, NS-23/124, OSAF I, 14.11.3
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partially pre-trained men fifteen times the size of the
then Reichswehr. While the quality of the military sport
training doubtless varied immensely, the psychological
value of such training far outweighed its deficiencies.
Young men, for the most part belonging to the post-war
generation, could now state, with justice and pride, that
as a result of their training they now had a claim to de-
fend their country, a right denied them by the Versailles
Treaty. In addition to its potential as a source of re-
cruits for mobilization, Reichswehr officers welcomed
military sport for its service in keeping alive the con-
cept of universal military service.
strength report for September 1932); Reichsbanner , 400,000
(footnote 93); and Deutsche Turnerschaft , 500,000 (Bernett,
Leibeserziehungen
,
177f.) This does not include members of
the AWA, Trotha's Hansa League, or various Bavarian groups,
as the figures are not available. If one discounts 30% of
the total of 2.1 million military sport participants to
compensate for duplicate training in the Grenzschutz-Ost
,
plural membership, and inactive members, one arrives at
the estimate of 1.5 million.
CHAPTER IV
THE SA AND THE MILITARY SPORT
MOVEMENT, 1924-1932
Of the two major, radical political parties in
Germany after 1924, the Communists and the National
Socialists, the Nazis alone made an effort to appeal to
nationalist sentiments. From the genesis of the Nazi
Party, the strident nationalism of its speakers attracted
the attention of their competitors for the working class
vote, the Communists. They discovered that their clien-
tele, the proletariat, had a remarkably strong addiction
to the bourgeois opiate of nationalism. Unable to match
the flag-waving of the National Socialists owing to ideo-
logical grounds, the Communists instead dispatched thugs
to disrupt and break up Nazi rallies and to terrorize
both the audience and the speakers. The Nazis responded
by organizing a guard force to insure that Communist heck-
lers were discouraged, normally by the most brutal of
methods.^ Following a particularly vicious melee in the
"HA, f. 1548, Polizei Direktion Munchen [PDM] Vl/d,
410/27, Nachlage to 24 February 1927 report, Anlage 1;
Ernst Bayer, Die SA. Geschichte, Arbeit, Zweck und Organi -
sation der Sturmabteilung des Fuhrers und Oberster SA -
Filhrung
,
Berlin, 1938, 8. (Hereafter cited as Bayer, SA
Geschichte ) and Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf , (trans. R. Mann-
heim)
,
Sentry Edition, Boston, 1943, 502-506. (Hereafter
cited as Hitler, Mein Kampf .)
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Hofbrauhaus in Munich in November 1921, Hitler designated
his hall guard the Storm Section of the National Socialist
Party (commonly referred to by its German initials, SA, or
Sturmabteiluncr)
. With obvious pride, Hitler noted the de-
tails of this action in his autobiography:
I_ iHitler] went' into the hall [where he was to
give a speech] and surveyed the situation with
my own eyes. Innumerable faces were turned
towards me with sullen hatred, while again
others, with mocking grimmaces , let out cries
capable of no two interpretations. ...A few
angry shouts and a man suddenly jumped on a
chair and roared into the hall 'Freedom:' At
which signal the fighters for freedom began
their work. In a few seconds the whole hall
was filled with a roaring, screaming crowd,
over which, like howitzer shells, flew in-
numerable beer mugs, and in-between the crack-
ing of chair legs, the crashing of mugs, howl-
ing and screaming. For twenty minutes the
hellish tumult lasted. . . . Your heart almost
rejoiced at such a revival of old war experi-
ences. The fight slowly ended, the provacteurs
being driven out. 2
The SA soon acquired sufficient recruits to begin
counterattacks on their communist foes and Hitler, in
1923, used the SA as the nucleus of a force in an attempt
to overthrow the Republic. He had known that the odds did
not favor a successful coup de main
,
yet possessed of a
gambler's nature, and inspired by the example of Mussolini,
he preferred to risk all or nothing. To a certain extent
he had no choice. As the prophet of a new and revolution-
ary order, the time had come to either lead the upheaval
2Hitler, Mein Kampf , 502-506.
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or to suffer discredit, scorn, and the reprobation of his
followers, who could be subsequently expected to rally to
other flags. 3 Hitler's "March on Berlin" proved an unwise
decision and succumbed to a show of force less than two
miles from its origin, but the attempt to topple the Gov-
ernment by violent means introduced a fateful confusion
concerning the mission of the SA which continued to plague
SA-Party relations until 19 34.
Hitler always regarded the SA as an auxiliary to
the Party, responsible for Party Security and for carrying
out assigned tasks of a political nature (e.g.
,
propaganda
marches, recruiting drives, leaflet distribution). 4 On the
other hand, many of the men in the SA, remembering the
Munich Putsch, were convinced that their mission was es-
sentially military and they made preparations for the oft-
mentioned National Socialist revolution during which, they
assumed, they would take the Government by assault. Al-
though the abortive Putsch in Munich caused Reich and
Bavarian Governments to ban the Party and the SA, a number
of SA men appear to have participated, as a means of pre-
paring for what they assumed to be the imminent counter-
revolution, in the military sport programs of the Notbann
Ibid., 553; Gordon,
4Hitler, Mein Kampf ,
Beer Hall Putsch ,
536f, 543, 546f.
242f f
.
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or in similar activities elsewhere.
During his term in prison, Hitler grappled with
the problem of the SA and its future. Concluding that a
forceable seizure of power had little chance for success,
he decided to concentrate his efforts on gaining political
power through essentially legal means. Within this frame-
work the SA played a definite role. Its mission, wrote
Hitler, was political, and "its training must not proceed
from military criteria, but from the criteria of expediency
for the party." 6
Shortly after his release from jail, Hitler re-
founded the Party and the SA. He did not reins titute a
J In many instances, especially in Bavaria, the mem-
bership of the Notbann, Rohm's and Ludendorff's abortive
Frontbann, and the re-organized (in February, 1925) SA was
identical. Rohm and Notbann officials were highly interest-
ed in pre-military training. Initially accepting the command
of the new SA, Rohm quit in April 1925, owing to disgust at
political in-fighting. His Frontbann disintegrated; in
areas where the SA was legal, most Frontbann members joined
it. HA, f. 1636, Frontbann Oberkommando lb 190, 11 September
1924; f. 1549, PDM Vl/d, 131, 30 May 1925, "Richtlinien fur
die Neuorganisation der SA der NSDAP", streng geheim, Miinchen,
24 May 1924; Ernst Rohm, Geschichte eines Hcchverraters , 5th
ed., Miinchen, 1 934, 323-327, 334-38, 340, 343. (Hereafter
cited as Rohm, Hochverrater ) ; Andreas Werner, SA und NSDAP :
SA; Wehrverband, Partei truppe , oder Revolut ionsarmee? Studien
zur Geschichte der SA und der NSDAP 1920-1933 , Phil diss.
Erlangen-Nurnberg, 1964, 199-209, 211-231, 239-50, 256f,
268-76, 280ff, 305-313. (Hereafter cited as Werner, SA und
NSDAP ) ; Gordon, Beer Hall Putsch , 565-571; Heinrich Bennecke,
Hitler und die SA , Miinchen, 1 962, 109-1 1 4. (Hereafter cited
as Bennecke, Hitler und die SA.
)
Hitler, Mein Kampf , 546.
81
central SA headquarters, and he prohibited SA men from
carrying or stockpiling weapons. 7 These provisions appear
to have stemmed from two concerns: first, that an armed,
centrally directed SA could provide Government authorities
with an excuse to proscribe the nascent movement; and
second, a fear on Hitler's behalf that a militarized SA
engaging in military politics would again attempt to force
his hand by rashly precipitating a crisis with either the
Reich or one of the state Governments.
Within two years, however, the Nazi Party leader
reversed himself and appointed an over-all SA commander, 8
Captain (Ret.) Franz von Pfeffer. 9 Hitler's reasons for
7Volkischer Beobachter
, Nr. 1, 26 February 1925.
gThe central SA headquarters for all Germany, the
Supreme SA Headquarters (Oberste SA-Fiihrung, or as it was
more commonly called, OSAF) was located in Miinchen. The
SS (Schutzstaf fel , Hitler's bodyguard) and the Hitler
Youth (HJ) were subordinate sections of the OSAF.
Volkischer Beobachter , Nr. 234, 29 October 1926; HA, f.
1548, PDM Vl/d, 410/27, 13 November 1926, and report of
the Reichsminister des Innern, 2 8 March 1927,
9 19 February 1888-?. Pfeffer matriculated at Hei-
delberg, but left to join the army, saw service on the
Western Front, 1914-1918, as a unit and General Staff
Corps officer, and was wounded several times. He or-
ganized and led the "Freikorps Pfeffer" in the Baltic
region and Upper Silesia, 1919-1920. He participated
in the Kapp Putsch and the Ruhr resistance, where a
French court-martial sentenced him to death in ab-
stentia . His first contact with the NSDAP came in
1924, and he was appointed Gauleiter of Westphalia and
later of the Ruhr area. From 1926 to 1930 he was
Oberster SA-Fuhrer.
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this action are unknown, but he may have concluded that a
supreme SA commander could bring to a halt SA units engag-
ing in military sport activities . 10 He expressed his con'
cern about the nature of SA training in a letter to Pfef-
fer. "The training of the SA", wrote Hitler, "is not
oriented toward a military standpoint, but instead toward
Party needs." 11 The new SA commander echoed his Fiihrer's
policies, adding that "the political leadership of the
NSDAP directs what shall be done with the SA... [and] no
SA [unit] can, in any manner whatsoever, maintain a re-
lationship with the Reichswehr .
"
1
2
Miscreants and re-
fractory individuals, explained both Hitler and Pfeffer,
could expect prompt expulsion from the Party. 13
These caveats nothwithstanding , Lt. (Ret.) Edmund
Heines 14 conducted military sport activities with the
HA, f. 1553, PDM Vl/d 131, Nr. 1451, 22 July 1926;
Bay. Staatsmin. d. Innern to PDM, 2023 Nr. 3, 19 November
1926. An exercise planned for the spring of 1926 was can-
celled owing to bad weather. PDM VI /d, Lagebericht Nr. 49,
22 June 1926.
11 ieZG, Fa-107/1, SA Befehl [SABE] 1, 1 November 1926,
Brief Adolf Hitlers an Hauptmann v. Pfeffer. "Die Ausbildung
der SA hat nicht nach militarischen Gesichtspunkten, sondern
nach parteizwecksmaBigen zu erfolgen."
12Ibid , SABE 2, 2 November 1926. "Die politische
Leitung der NSDAP hat zu bestimmen, was mit der SA geschehen
soli Keine SA darf mit der Reichswehr in irgendwelcher
Beziehung stehen."
13Ibid.
14
1 897-1 934. Joining the Army in 1914, he was com-
missioned in 1918, served in the Freikorps Oberland in 1919,
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bicycle section "RoGbach" (a Munich SA unit) in the Rosen-
heim area in early May 1927, and several other SA units
followed suit. 15 These actions prompted a strong rejoinder
from Hitler, who wrote that "any form of military fun and
games is strictly forbidden. The SA is no defense organi-
zation. The military training of the nation is the task
of the Reich Army, not the NSDAP." 16 Heines was sacked,
although the gounds for his dismissal were multifarious. 17
then with the Freikorps RoGbach in the Baltic, and later in
Upper Silesia and the Ruhr. He participated in the Hitler
Putsch, and later received a 15 year sentence for partici-
pating in the Feme murders but was amnestied. Heines joined
the reconstituted NSDAP in 192 5 along with many ex-RoGbach
men. Expelled from the Party for numerous pecadillos, Hit-
ler re-instated him in 1929. Heines later held a number of
important Party and SA posts, culminating as SA leader of
Silesia, where his activities terrorized and scandalized
the region. A blatant homosexual, he was discovered en
flagrante by Hitler at Wiessee the morning of the purge of
the SA, 30 June 1934. He was shot that morning.
15HA, f. 1553, PDM Lagebericht 1°, Nr. 56, 6 May 1927;
PDM files 571 and 576 for reports on military training by
SA "sport" units, 30 April- 1 May and 11-12 June 1927, re-
spectively; report of Gendarmeriestation Deining to Bezirksamt
Wolfratshausen, Nr. 69, 5 May 1927.
16IfZG, FA-107/1, GRUSA [Grundsatzliche Anordnung] II,
3 May 1927. "Strengstens untersagt ist jede Art von mili-
tarischer Spielerei. Die SA ist kein Wehrverband. Die
militarische Ausbildung der Nation ist Aufgabe des Reich-
sheeres und nicht der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei.
"
17Heines apparently had his hands in the Party cash-
box. When confronted by Hitler, Heines retorted that Hitler
was a reactionary who had surrounded himself with "Bonzen und
Bremsern." Calling together the Munich SA, Hitler denounced
Heines as a mutineer, adding "daG er [Hitler] sich von einem
kaum 25. jahrigen Jungen nicht verschreiben lasse was
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Pfeffer, whose own interests inclined toward a SA
independent of Party control, attempted to enforce Hitler's
guidelines. The SA leader reacted strongly to an article
in the 10 November 1928 NSDAP newspaper, the Volkischer
Beobachter, which printed pictures showing SA men running
obstacle courses and negotiating barbed wire entanglements.
He demanded the names of the men engaged in the "forbidden
exercises". 18 Although Pfeffer dismissed as "patently
fabricated Jewish swindel-news" reports published in the
Wolff's telegraphic Bureau and the Berliner Tagblatt al-
leging that SA men conducted military exercises near Ber-
1 Qlin, 1:7 Hitler used these reports to remind SA men of his
caveat against cooperating with the Army. In particular,
the Nazi leader was against their participation in the
Border Guard-East, a secret border defense force organized
in the eastern border regions and trained by the Reichs-
wehr with the approval of the Reich and Prussian authori-
20ties. Lashing out at Nazis who had ignored his ban
Aktivismus sei." Informing his listeners of Heines' expul-
sion from the Party, Hitler ended his two hour harangue with
a review of his life's work and stated that his only wish
was to have the swastika flag for his burial shroud. HA,
1549, PDM Lagebericht N/57, 9 June 1927.
1
8
Volkischer Beobachter , 30 November 1928.
19 Ibid. , 2-3 December 1928. "glatt erfundene judische
Schwindelnachrichten .
"
20For information on the Border Guard, see Gaines
Post Jr., The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy,
Princeton, 1973, 176-184, 318f. (Hereafter cited as Post,
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against military related activities, he denounced
Party Comrades, who participate in any
military exercises, regardless of whether
or not weapons are involved, violate the
express prohibition of the Party leader-
ship. The National Socialist, and above
all the SA and SS man, has no cause to
raise one finger [to help] the present
Government, which has no understanding
of what honor means to us and which has
only perpetuated the misery of our people. 21
In threatening to expel SA men who cooperated with
the Army, Hitler was not, in accordance with his own logic,
being unpatriotic. SA-Reichswehr joint undertakings of
any sort contained not only the potential for diverting SA
men from their political tasks, but such undertakings also
posed the possibility that SA men might come to identify
the Army's interests as paramount to those of the Nazi
Party. From Hitler's perspective both these developments
were undesirable. Moreover, should a defenseless Germany
Civil-Military. ). Walter Gorlitz, History of the German
General Staff, 1657-1945
,
(trans. B. Battershaw) , New York,
1953, 259f. (Hereafter cited as Gorlitz, General Staff .).
Rudolf Absolon, Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich , 3 vols.,
Boppard am Rhein, 1969, I, 35f. (Hereafter cited as Absolon,
Wehrmacht
.
) and Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP , 160.
2 1 Volkischer Beobachter , 5 December 1928. "Parteigenos
sen, die an irgendwelchen militarischen ubungen teilnehmen,
ganz gleich, ob diese bewaffneter oder nich bewaffneter
Natur sind, verstossen gegen das ausdriickliche Verbot der
Parteileitung. Der Nationalsozialist und in erster Linie
der SA- und SS-Mann hat keine Veranlassung, fur den heutigen
Staat, der kein Verstandnis fur unsere Ehrauf fassung besitzt
und der das Ungliick unseres Volkes nur verewigt hat, auch
nur einen Finger zu riihren."
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be attacked, a revolutionary situation could develop,
hastening the Nazi triumph.
Pfeffer found Hitler's insistence that "the SA
is a means to an end" 2 2 unacceptable. The SA leader's
own inclinations led to an increasingly active and inde-
pendent SA, and he eventually resigned his command over
the issue of the domination of the SA by the Party's
2 3political leaders. His resignation by no means re-
solved the issue of SA independence vis-a-vis the NSDAP
and the question of the primacy of the political mission
of the SA was temporarily established only after two
mutinies and a subsequent purge of the Berlin SA. 24
The greatest immediate problem facing the SA fol-
lowing Pfeffer 's resignation was not the question of its
mission, but rather the quality of its leaders. As a
zz IfZG, Fa-107/1, SABE 2, 2 November 1926. "Die
SA ist Mittel zum Zweck."
23IfZG, Fa-107/1, Bl. 57 for the official, public
letter of resignation. A confidential Pfeffer letter to
SA leaders, 29 August 1930, is also in this file, Bl. 56.
Hitler assumed personal command of the SA on 3 September
1930. Volkischer Beobachter , Nr. 200, 3 September 1930.
24For material on. the Berlin SA Mutiny (Sept. 1930)
and the Stennes Putsch (April 1931), see HA, f. 83, 325,
1550, and 1551; Bennecke, Hitler und die SA , 148; and
Johann K.V. von Engelbrechten , Eine Braune Armee Entsteht ;
Die Geschichte der Berlin-Brandenburger SA , Miinchen, 1 937,
33-41. (Hereafter cited as Engelbrechten, Braune Armee .)
Also, Werner, SA und NSDAP , 360-364.
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consequence of the rapid growth of the SA, 25 leaders were
often quite young and most middle and lower level leaders
had neither SA nor military training suitable for their
SA positions. 26 Efforts of former military officers in
the SA to insist on a rigorous leader selection and train-
ing program met with ridicule and violent opposition from
the "old fighters", the pre-1930 Party stalwarts. Typical
in this respect was the experience of Col. (Ret.) Hans-
27Georg "Trotsky" Hofmann. In a speech to SA leaders dur-
From ca. 100,000 in 1930 (IfZG, Fa- 2, Bl. 71; HA,
f. 1553, PDM 717, report of 29-30 November 1930 SA leaders
conference) to over one-half million in September 1932 (BA,
NS-23/124, OSAF I, 14 November 1932 .
26 IfZG, Fa-107/1, PDM report on SA-Fiihrertagung,
15-16 September 1931; for some idea of the ages of the SA
leaders, see the statistical sections of the reports of the
SA Reich Leaders' School (RFS) in HA, f. 312, RFS 593/31,
4.8.31; RFS 926/31, 5.9.31; RFS 1024/31, 15.9.31; and RFS
1460/31M, 6.11.31. Of the senior SA leaders who attended
classes 1,2,3 and 5 (the classes for v/hich reports survive),
only 6.7% were over 35 years of age. 19% of the class mem-
bers were between ages 31-35, 36% were between ages 26-30,
and 25.5% were between ages 21-25. Thus an astonishing
61.5% of senior SA leaders attending the RFS in the fall of
1931 were thirty years of age or younger. These men, for
the most part, were too young to have served in the war and
although some may have received a small amount of military
training through the Freikorps or Zeitfreiwillige programs,
most had no formal military or leadership training. SA lead-
ers were aware of this problem. See IfZG, Fa-107/1, PDM re-
port on 15-16 September 1931 SA-Fiihrertagung; and HA, f.
1553, Lagebericht Nr. 23, Lapo Berlin, IA, 1 December 1930.
2
7
1 873-1 942. Retired from the Reichswehr in 1926, he
served as SA Gruppenfuhrer of Gruppe Bayern, then Gruppe
Mittelland (1931-1934) and as Staatssekretar for the Reichs-
statthalter of Bavaria, General von Epp.
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ing a September 1931 SA conference, he encouraged them to
interest themselves in the Army-sponsored Border Guard and
to take advantage of the training associated with it. He
was rudely interrupted during his speech and scornfully
reminded by some of his audience that the duties of the SA
were political. He responded by launching into an unre-
strained tirade, emphasizing that it was public knowledge
that the SA leaders were unqualified and ignorant. Ac-
cording to one astounded recipient of "Trotsky's" philip-
pic, it was evident that he did not really understand the
Nazi movement, and afterwards a dazed Hitler remarked that
"he [Trotsky] would have to be shipped out." 28
In an effort to improve the quality of SA leaders,
Police Capt. (Ret.) Walter Stennes, 29 the leader of the
Berlin SA from 1926 to 1931, founded a school to train
Berlin area SA leaders in the fall of 1930. Classroom
instruction was held at the "wiener Garten" restaurant in
28IfZG, Fa-107/1, PDM report on SA leaders conference,
15 September 1931 (Pol. Pras. Berlin, I 7. 42.02/24.9).
"Dieser [Hofmann] muB ausgeschift werdenl," •
29Stennes, Walter, Police Captain (Ret.) A front
officer during the First World War, Stennes later served
with the Freikorps Pfeffer in the Baltic region and eventu-
ally found his way to the Prussian Landespolizei (1921?)
from which he retired as a Captain in 1926. Pfeffer ap-
pointed Stennes as OSAF-Ost, Berlin, in 1926, a post which
he held until his expulsion from the party and the SA in
1931 after leading a revolt of the Berlin SA. He was op-
posed to the legal course of the party and the primacy of
its political sections. Following incarceration and torture
by the Gestapo in 1933, he was exiled from Germany and found
employment as a military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek.
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Berlin-Kreuzberg, and practical training, including military
sport instruction, was conducted on weekends at Grund-
miihle, a village north of Berlin. In May 1931, the
school facilities were re-organized into a two week resi-
dent course and the school name was changed to the Sport
Leaders' School. Enrollment was ca. 150 students per
course, and although the main emphasis of the instruction
focused on leadership training, military sport instruction
30was included. Two similar schools were established in
Silesia during 1931, with a combined enrollment of ca.
450 students. 31
Capt. (Ret.) Ernst Rohm, 32 Pfeffer's successor to
command of the SA, was aware of SA training deficiencies,
and despite a perfunctory order to the SA to refrain from
-^HA, f. 1553, Lagebericht Nr. 23, Lapo Berlin, IA,
1 December 1930; Engelbrechten, Braune Armee , 245.
31 Volkischer Beobachter , Nr. 288, 11 October 1931.
32
1 883-1 934. Joining the Bavarian Army in 1906, R6hm
served in a number of command and staff positions during the
war. Accepted into the Reichswehr as a General Staff Corps
officer, his duties as Bavarian Division (7) liaison officer
to various paramilitary units led to his increasing involve-
ment in racist-radical politics, which resulted in his prema-
ture retirement from the Army in the fall of 1923. He par-
ticipated in the Hitler Putsch, seizing the headquarters of
the Bavarian Division. Found guilty of high treason, but
receiving a suspended sentence, his unsuccessful efforts to
organize the Frontbann (see note 5, this chapter) were fol-
lowed by a sojourn in Bolivia as a military advisor, a post
from which he was providentially recalled to Germany in the
fall of 19 30 by Hitler to take over the SA. He served as
Chief of Staff (in effect, commander) of the SA unit until
his execution in 1934.
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offering its services to the Reichswehr in the event of a
Polish attack, 33 he at once set about contacting Defense
Ministry officers concerning a role for the SA in the Border
Guard-East. In March 1931, he reached an agreement with
Schleicher by which SA men, as private individuals, would
be allowed to participate in the Border Guard. 34
In negotiating this mutually advantageous agreement,
both Rohm and Schleicher apparently exceeded their authori-
ty. Schleicher's approval for individual SA men, but not
SA units, to participate in the Border Guard was consistent
with both Army policy and Reichswehr experience vis-a-vis
the paramilitary organizations, 35 but the legality of per-
mitting SA men to participate was questionable. On 2 Janu-
33HA, f. 1554B, SA Befehl, 13 January 1931.
34Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
, 118f.
35The Reichswehr was of the opinion that any patri-
otic German citizen living within the threatened eastern
border regions should be allowed to participate in the
Grenzschutz. See BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/25, Groe-
ner letter to Reichskanzler Briining, RWM Wla, - September
1931; RH-8 v896, proposed agenda for lb officers conference,
24-25 November 1931 and the subsequent minutes of that meet-
ing, CHL TA 1207/31, betr. Ic Besprechung am 24.-25. Novem-
ber 1931; and Muller, Das wahre Vaterland
, 322ff. The Reichs
wehr, in 1921, had unsuccessfully attempted to incorporate
paramilitary groups into the Grenzschutz, an experiment which
left a poor after-taste with the Army Command. During a Mili
tary District-Commanding Generals Conference, 2 5 October 19 30
Schleicher stated, "Die Erfahrung hat beweisen, daB die
'Verbande' als solche zur Mitarbeit im 'Grenzschutz' und
'Landesschutz ' ganzlich unbrauchbar sind.... Also, jeder
einzelne nationale Mann soli fur Landesschutz willkommen
sein, 'Verbande' sind als unbrauchbar abzulehnen." IfZG,
Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bl . 157.
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ary 1931 the Defense Ministry had secretly announced that
it would no longer fire civilian employees found to be
members of the Nazi Party, while simultaneously it caution
ed soldiers and employees that the issue of the legality
of the Nazi Party was still under litigation and therefore
unresolved. 36 The Prussian Government angrily protested
the Schleicher-Rohm agreement, 37 forcing Defense Minister
Groener to refer the matter to the Reich Cabinet, which
eventually resolved the issue in favor of the Nazis. 38
The Rohm-Schleicher Agreement contradicted Hitler's
orders to the SA to refuse collaboration with the "system"
yet is improbable that Hitler did not know of Rohm's
activities, and in all likelihood, he probably approved
of them. Accutely sensitive to the currents within his
movement, and aware of the psychological importance of
the Border Guard to the inhabitants of the eastern regions
Hitler appears to have concluded that his adamant refusal
to allow SA men to participate in the Border Guard posed a
36BA-MA, H-24/5, RMW 639.30, g. Wla, Berlin, 2 Janu
ary 1931.
37Ibid
.
, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/25, Groener lette
to Briining, September 1931; Severing, Lebensweg , II, 321ff
326f
.
38BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/25, Groener to
Briining, September 1931. On 29 January 1 932, Groener per-
mitted former members of any political party, except the
Communist, to enlist in the Reichswehr. See Berliner
Borsenzeitung , Nr. 65, 9 February 1932, quoted in Ursachen
und Folgen
,
VII, 561ff.
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far greater risk to the unity of the Party than did any
Reichswehr-SA fraternization. Whatever training the SA
received from Border Guard-East authorities or the Reichs-
wehr would only benefit the SA and would help to alleviate
the shortage of trained leaders. Should difficulties with
Government authorities arise, Hitler could always fall back
on his 192 8 order and disclaim any responsibility for the
acts of his subordinates . ^9
In light of Reichswehr efforts to allow members of
the paramilitary groups but not the groups themselves, to
participate in Border Guard-East training, there is no
For example, Hitler publicly repudiated the Box-
heimer Documents (a draconic Nazi contingency plan for the
consolidation of power in Hesse involving the arming of the
SA) as the private work of dilettantes, and he issued a
public warning to the SA to beware of provocateurs who
urged illegal actions under the guise of a desire for activ-
ity and ordered a halt, under penalty of expulsion from post
and party, to "...alle Bestrebungen und Stilubungen aber,
die illegale Handlungen zur Vorausset zungen oder zum Ziele
haben und dadurch die Partei schadigen und gefahrden,
HA, f. 1872, OSAF 725/31, 9 December 1931. Despite public
disavowal of the documents, the NSDAP promptly hired the
author of the Boxheimer Documents, Dr Werner Best, who had
been released from his civil service post. See also Sever-
ing, Lebensweg
,
II, 31 1f; Bullock, Hitler , 202f; and Vogel-
sang, RW-Staat-NSDAP , 141, 146f. Manfred von Killinger, a
Dresden SA leader, wrote to inform Hitler that his men were
going to join the Grenzschutz regardless of the position
taken by the party and it would therefore be best, he sug-
gested, to approve of Grenzschutz participation, thus giving
at least the appearance that the SA was in command of the
situation. BDC, Personalakt von Killinger, letter Killinger
to Hitler, n.d. [1932]. Hitler's reply is not known, but SA
collaboration with the Reichswehr did continue. See BDC,
Personalakt F-W. Kriiger, letter Kruger to Rohm, 17 August
1932.
93
reason to believe that SA men received training different
from other Border Guard recruits. Training courses for
the Border Guard duplicated military sport training in all
important aspects. The recruits received instruction in
drill, physical conditioning, marksmanship, encampment and
entrenchment techniques, and methods of cover and conceal-
ment . 4°
Reichswehr-SA ties were, as to be expected, closest
in the eastern military districts, I (E . Prussia), III
(Brandenburg-Berlin-Silesia)
, and IV (Saxony)
,
owing to
the Polish threat and the existence of the Border Guard-
East in these districts. Training courses for SA recruits
in the Border Guard were held throughout 1931 and 1932,
although actual Border Guard units (composed mostly of
Stahlhelm members) appear to have been established only
in East Prussia prior to 1932. 41 Records indicating the
40BA-MA, RH-8/V896, CHL TA 600/31 g.K. T4 Id "Z"
,
1 July 1931; CHL TA 628/31 g.K. T4 Id, 17 September 1931;
WKVII/734, copy of CHL TA 100/32 g.K.T4 Id, 29 January 1929;
RH-8/v896, CHL TA 570/32 g.K. T2IIIA, 25 July 1932, mentions
that terrain sport training was the means of training re-
serves for the Grenzschutz and enclosed for commanders a
copy of "Richtlinien fur die Ausbildung im Gelandesport" , a
booklet prepared by the GVA and the Defense and Interior
Ministries
.
41BDC, Personalakt von Killinger, letter Killinger to
Hitler, spring 1 932; Personalakt Kriiger, letter Kriiger to
Rohm, 17 August 1932; IfZG, F-56, letter of General (Ret.)
Kurt Weckmann to General (Ret.) Hermann Foertsch, 19 May
19 52. Weckman was assigned to Grenzschutz duties in Pome-
rania; and BA, NachlaB Kriiger, Aktenbeschlagnahme im
Abschnitt die [SA] Gruppe-Ost, [April] 1932.
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the extent of SA participation in the Border Guard have not
survived but there is evidence showing that SA leaders and
men did receive some training from military authorities. 42
At least one incident of SA-Reichswehr training col-
laboration was brought to public attention. The German
Peoples' Sport Association (Deutscher Volkssportverein ) , a
front organization for the Berlin SA, was discovered using
the facilities of the Reichswehr training area of Doberitz.
Although the leftist political press was outraged, the
Reich Government merely suspended permission for the Sport
Association to use Doberitz pending an investigation, 43
which appears to have never been completed.
In addition to the military sport training which SA
men received in the Border Guard-East, extensive military
sport and semi-military training programs were conducted
by SA units throughout the Reich. 44 SA units in the Berlin
42BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu 2509/32, 16 September 1932,
claims that over 60% of SA leaders in the Berlin-Branden-
burg area attended Army sponsored military sport training
at Doberitz.
43IfZG, Fa-88/337, HJ Stabsleitung to Referat VI
1/32, 26 August 1932 circular to HJ Gebiets- und Bannfuhrer;
Braun, Weimar zu Hitler , 150; Engelbrechten , Braune Armee,
165f., 209; Schutzle, Reichswehr wider Nation , 128; and
Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP , 159-162.
44HA, f. 1553, Gendarmeriestation Herrsching to Be-
zirksamt Starnberg [Bavaria] 172a, 29 September 1930; Bayer-
ischer Kurier , Nr. 33 8, 11 December 19 30, reported a large
SA field exercise near Breslau; HA, f. 1553, PDM Vl/d, PND
717, SA exercise near Munich, 7 January 1931; Munchener Post,
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Brandenburg region even organized and trained signal, medi-
cal, security, and combat engineer sections. 45 SA regional
headquarters issued military sport guidelines to subordinate
units and required them to establish mandatory military
sport courses. 46 An apparently unsuccessful effort was made
by the SA in northern Bavaria to hire recently discharged
Reichswehr officers and non-commissioned officers as instruc
tors for military sport courses. 47
Nr. 8, 12 January 1931, reported SA marksmanship practice near
Munich which was confirmed by Munich police, HA, f. 1553, PDM
Vl/d, 21 February 1931; ibid. , PDM Vl/d, PND 749, SA military
exercise near Ebersburg [Munich], 29-30 August 1931; ibid
.
,
Polizei Direktion Niirnberg-Furth
, Nr. 196/31, 25 October 1931,
noted a large SA field exercise near Schweinfurt and Bayreuth;
Munchener Post
,
Nr. 259, 7 November 1931, reported numerous SA
training exercises in Silesia and Saxony; HA, f. 1553, PDM
Vl/d, PND 757, 21 December 1931, gave a report of an SA exer-
cise north of Munich; ibid
. , f. 317, PDM to Bay. Staatsmin. d.
Innern, 401221a, 22 December 1931, stated that a May, 1931 SA
field exercise involved the "taking" of opponents after a
village was "captured"; SA Mann
, Nr. 8, February 1932, showed
Danzig SA men practicing hand grenade throwing from trenches
and negotiating barbed wire obstacles; HA, f. 1553, PDM Vl/d,
939/32, 4 May 1932, reported SA field training exercises near
Kempton; ibid
.
, PDM Vl/d, PND 788, 9 September 1932 reported
that Munich SA units had conducted a night passage of lines
near Dachau; ibid
.
, PDM VI/N, morning report of 14 October
1932, stated that a SA field exercise led by General (Ret.)
Ritter von Epp [the former Notbann commander] was planned for
the immediate future and would involve all Munich SA units;
Volkischer Beobachter , Nr. 285, 11 October 1932, reported a
SA Wehrsport exercise of SA Gruppe Siidwest [Wuttemberg] at
which Rohm was present.
45BA, NS-23/123, OSAF 7367/31, Viertels jahrebericht
,
III, 8 December 1931
.
46 HA, f. 1554 , PDM to Polizei Direktion Wiirzburg,
1624/32, VIV, 17 June 1932, reference SA Gruppe Mittelland
"Richtlinien" , 23.9.31; ibid . , SA Gruppe Mittelland, Nr.
233/31, 16 January 1932.
47HA, f. 1554, Wehrkreis VII/7th I.D. 30a/R Ic geh
.
,
6 October 1932. 1880 geheim
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During the summer of 1931, Rohm founded the Reich
Leader School in Munich. During the three week course,
students received 4 2 hours of military sport training as
well as a further 10 hours of land navigation (compass)
training. 48
Lower level (squad and platoon) leaders received
their initial training at SA Leader Prepatory Schools, es-
tablished by Rohm in 1931. By the fall of 1932, there were
at least sixteen of these schools through the Reich and
Austria. Courses lasted two to three weeks with a minimum
enrollment of 35 and a maximum enrollment of 60 students
per course. Of the forty-nine hours of instruction pre-
sented weekly, ten were devoted to drill, 17 to terrain ar*d
military sports, and 5 to marksmanship. 49
In 1932, Rohm created a special staff section for
military sport and other training activities, the Chief
4 8The Reichsfiihrerschule , directed by Major (Ret.)
Kurt Kuhme, was founded 1 June 1931. Average enrollment
was ca. 60-80students per course. HA, f. 1548, PDM Vl/d,
"Akten betr. RFS", 14.10.31; PDM to Bay. Staatsmin. D. In
nern, 229/32, 11.2.32; ibid . , f. 312, RFS to OSAF, Iter
Lehrgangsbericht, 591/31, 4.8.31; RFS to OSAF, 2ter Lehr-
gangsbericht
, 926/31, 5.9.31. Prior to coming to Munich
in May 1931, Kuhme lived in Wiinsdorf, and, in all likeli-
hood, had ties with the military sport school there. See
HA, f. 1565, letter Kiihme to Hptm.a. D. Schreyer, Braunes
Haus, 22 March 1931.
4 Q
BA, NS-23/124, Chef des Ausbildungsstabes und
Inspekteur der Schulen, A, Nr. 3380/32, 17 November 1932.
Rohm wanted to establish a Fuhrervorschule in every SA
Untergruppe
.
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of the Training Staff and Inspector of Schools. 50 Briga-
dier General (Ret.) Franz Ritter von Horauf 51 was appointed
to this position. He also supervised non-military sporting
activities, which Rohm encouraged in order to promote a
high level of physical fitness. 52
In the fall of 1932, Rohm launched an ambitious
military sport training program and ordered his SA leaders
to begin to train their units, commencing with programs in
the smallest units and advancing progressively to the larg-
est formations. 5 3 It is doubtful that much was accomplish-
ed by this program, because SA priorities underwent a
drastic change following Hitler's appointment as Chancel-
lor in January 19 33.
In addition to the actual military sport activities
50BA, NS-23/123, OSAF Qu 1509/32, 23 June 1932;
Fa-90/1, OSAF Ch. 1565/32, 1 July 1932, "Dienstanweisunq
fur den Chef des Ausbildungsstabes und Inspekteur der Schu-
len."
5lRe joined the Bavarian Army in 1896 and was in the
10th Infantry Regiment which Rohm joined in 1906. In 1912
Horauf entered the Kriegsakademie in Berlin and was appoint-
ed to the General Staff Corps in 1914, and served with dis-
tinction in various Bavarian Army units throughout the First
World War. He was ennobled for bravery (Max Joseph Orden)
and served with the Freikorps Epp in 1919. He joined the
NSDAP in 1930, after a year in the Stahlhelm, and was ap-
pointed an SA Gruppenfiihrer and assigned as Chef des Fiih-
rungsstabes until his assignment as Chef des Ausbildungs-
stabes in 1932.
52HA, f. 1553, OSAF I, Nr. 6197/31, 15 October 1931.
5
3
Ibid. , PDM Vl/d, Auszug aus dem Morgenrapport des
Referat VI /N, 14 October 1932.
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conducted by the SA, several National Socialist pamph-
leteers worked to increase public awareness of the bene-
fits of military sport as a substitute for the defunct
conscription. Col. (Ret.) Friedrich Haselmayr, 54 founded
the Work-Group for Defense Improvement in 1930. This or-
ganization published six pamphlets, apparently at public
expense, between 1930 and 1932, on various defense related
subjects. The six pamphlets and their authors were:
"Germany's Right to Defense" (Haselmayr); "Germany's Fate-
ful Hours" (Haselmayr); "Polish War Threats" (H. von Falk-
enberg of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung ) ; "Naval Bros-
chure" (Friedrich Fecht) ; "Air War is Imminent" (GroBkreuz)
;
and "Pre-Military Defense Training" (Fecht). 55
The Fecht pamphlet, "Pre-Military Defense Training",
is worth paraphrasing because the outlines of the program
Fecht proposed were later adopted by Hitler. Fecht began
with the usual nationalist condemnation of the "Dictate of
54Retired from the Reichswehr in 1928 as a Colonel,
Haselmayr joined the NSDAP and entered the University of
Munich, where he was elected to the student government as
an NSDStB representative. He left the University in 1930
and founded the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur deutsche Wehr-
verstarkung. In September 1932 he joined the NSDAP Wehr-
politisches Amt, headed by Epp, the former Notbann leader.
In 193 5 Haselmayr received an honorary promotion to Briga-
dier General. Recalled to active service in 1939, he was
retired in 1943 as a Generalleutnant
.
55IfZG, Zgs. 62, Generalleutnant a.D. Friedrich
Haselmayr, Bl. 6f. He claimed he had Government support
and that his most influential friends were in the Foreign
Ministry.
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Versailles", and although he acknowledged that pre-military
training was banned by the Treaty, he called upon every
German to repudiate and ignore this shameful prohibition.
The experiences of the First World War proved, he wrote,
that mass, conscripted armies were essential, yet modern
weaponry was so advanced that a lengthy training period
was required to gain proficiency in even the most basic
of weapons. No nation, he explained, could afford to
maintain, let alone properly train, the hordes of recruits
necessary for a future war of materiel; therefore the logi-
cal task was to reduce training time to the minimum. Fecht
proposed pre-military training as the best means by which
the term of military service could be reduced. This sug-
gestion was especially applicable to Germany, and indeed,
he claimed, its only alternative owing to the military
restrictions imposed by the Allies.
To be effective, wrote Fecht, pre-military training
had to be mandatory and universal, and only the state could
afford such a program. Pre-military training could, he ex-
plained, be most easily conducted in three phases. The
first phase, physical training, would be instituted for
school children from 8 to 1 3 years of age, and conducted,
he noted, during the school day, with Saturday afternoons
reserved for Boy Scout training. Terrain sport training,
said Fecht, would be required of 14 to 17 year olds in the
second phase. Terrain sport encampments would be held dur-
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ing school vacations and, he explained, students would
progress from physical conditioning to small-bore marks-
manship, drill and marching, and terrain utilization tech-
niques. The third phase, weapons training, would be re-
quired of 18 year olds who would then begin their active
service upon completion of the weapons training phase. 56
It is not possible to say if Fecht's pamphlet is
entirely original, for he appears to have developed ideas,
albeit in greater detail, proposed a year earlier by Col.
(Ret.) Konstantin Hierl, 57 in his book, German Defense
Policy ( Deutsche Wehrpolitik ) . He hoped that schools
would help prepare young men from 14 to 20 years of age
for their military service by means of conducting a mili-
tary sport program, while simultaneously identifying and
training potential leaders. Military service, he wrote,
should follow immediately upon completion of schooling. 58
There is little evidence by which to estimate the
56Friedrich Fecht, "Vormilitarische Wehrerziehung"
,
Miinchen, n.d. [1930], passim .
57
1 875-1 948. Hierl retired from the Reichswehr in
1924, prematurely, owing to irregularities in his personal
life. He claimed that he was forced out owing to his con-
nections with National-Socialism. In 1926 he led the Tan-
nenbergbund fur Siiddeutschland , a Ludendorff organization.
Hierl became Organisationsleiter II for the NSDAP in 1929
and served as a labor service and military consultant to
Hitler. In 1933 he became Staatssekretar for Labor Service
in the Labor Ministry.
58Konstantin Hierl, Deutsche Wehrpolitik , Miinchen,
1929, 28-31.
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influence, if any, of Hierl's or Fecht
' s pamphlets on the
German public. What is more important, however, is that
prior to the Hitler Government, National Socialist leaders
were giving some consideration to the concept and potential
value of a pre-military training program, a concept which
they developed fully after 1933.
In reviewing Hitler's response to the problems posed
by the burgeoning military sport movement and the Border
Guard, one is struck by the outward consistency of his at-
titude. He did not deviate from his insistence that the
political activities of the SA constituted its raison d'etre
and for as long as possible he tried to prevent non-politi-
cal SA activities. By 1931 such a course was no longer
possible, yet the change in tack was never official, but
surreptitious. Rather than risk defections from the SA by
men who felt the Border Guard preserved their way of life,
Hitler overlooked violations of his non-compromise policy.
He relaxed his attitude toward military sport activities,
which enabled Rohm to create a military sport training sec-
tion within the SA, a partial remedy for the dearth of
qualified SA leaders. Nazi leaders, confident of their
eventual political success, looked toward military sport,
as did the Army, as a means of subverting the Versailles
Treaty.
CHAPTER V
GROENER, MILITARY SPORT,
AND THE SA BAN
The clandestine support for military sport promised
by the Reich Government in 1927 failed to materialize in
any appreciable amounts. It is uncertain if the DNVP
Reich Interior Minister Keudell made available funds to
military sport enthusiasts, but his successor, Socialist
(SPD) Carl Severing who served from 192 8 to 1929, used the
extensive ministerial discretionary authority as to the
disposition of sport subsidies to deny funds to organiza-
tions espousing conservative or radical political philoso-
phies. "The assumption, naturally," he wrote, "in all
cases involving the distribution of money [to sporting
organizations] was that the official line [of the Republic]
was at the same time supported [by these groups]." 1 As in-
terpreted by Severing, the condition of endorsing the "of-
ficial line" tended to exclude racist, anti-Republican
Severing, Lebensweg
,
II, 202ff. "Vorausset zung
in alien Fallen, daB mit der Hergabe von Geldern auch der
Staatsgedanke gepflegt wurde . " Severing* s hostile attitude
toward Volkssport was compounded by budget reductions, ap-
parently related to the onset of the Depression. Prior to
1929, RM 1.5 million was allocated for sport subsidies,
which by 1931 had fallen to RM 750,000. BA, R-43 11/519,
RWM WId, Nr. 3669/30, Anlage 2 [excerpt from 1931 Reich
budget]
.
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organizations, such as the Stalhelm and the SA.
Since the majority of military sport associations
either enjoyed close ties with or were sponsored by con-
servative and racist political organizations, Severing'
s
definition effective crippled the hopes of the Defense
Ministry for indirect Government subsidization of the
military sport movement. 2 Initially, the absence of
military sport movement constituted more of a nuisance
than a problem for the Defense Ministry, but the comple-
tion in 1929 of a new mobilization plan dictated a more
active role for the Army vis-a-vis the organizations in-
volved in military sport.
In 1929 the General Staff adopted a mobilization
plan incorporating several changes from the existing
mobilization schedule which had been approved in 1926.
Like its predecessor, the 19 29 plan called for the expan-
sion of the Reichswehr in units of seven (from 7 to 1
4
infantry divisions, then 21, etc.). The major difference
between the two plans was that the 1929 mobilization
schedule assumed a standing Army strength of 300,000 men
BA
,
R-43, 11/519, Groener to Reichskanzlei , 18
October 1930, Bl . 2; IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, "Aufzeichnungen des
Generals Curt Liebmann", Befehlshaberbesprechung, 25 Octo-
ber 1930. Liebmann 's notes indicate the chagrin of the
Heeresleitung over the lack of support from the Reich In-
terior Ministry: "Die Innenministerien haben in diesem
Punkt [support for Volkssport] das RWM betrogen! Die 'Sport
vereine' wurden 'seinerzeit nur unter die Bedingung an die
Zivilbehorden abgegeben, da£ sie im Geiste der Wehrhaft-
machung weiter gefhiirt werden. Dies geschiet tatsachlich
nicht." Bl. 157.
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while the 1926 plan accepted the Versailles Treaty strength
of 100,000 men. The expansion plan attached to the 1929
mobilization scheme called for no less than a thorough re-
organization of the Reichswehr. Proposing a gradual trip-
ling over a five year period of the number of soldiers,
commencing in 1933, the expansion plan envisioned a short-
ening of the actual term of military service. Instead of
the mandatory twelve year enlistment, most soldiers would
spend only a year or two with the colors, followed by an
indefinite number of years in an inactive status, subject
to recall in the event of a national emergency. 3
The General Staff left the task of convincing the
Allies to accept the change in Treaty strength to the Foreign
Ministry. With unrealistic optimism, however, Defense Min-
istry officers hoped for Allied concurrence no later than
April 19 33, the time for which they scheduled the initiation
of the expansion plan. While awaiting Allied approval, the
Defense Ministry began, in 1930, to procure supplies and
3BA-MA, II H/135-2; II H/597; and RH-896. See Hans-
Jiirgen Rautenberg, Deutsche Abrustungspolitik vom Beginn
der Genfer Abriistungskonferenz bis zur Wiedereinfiihrung ~der
allgemeinen Wehrpflicht, 1932-19 35, Phil. Diss, Bonn, 1975,
212-219. (Hereafter cited as Rautenberg, Rustungspolitik
.
)
Vincenz Miiller, Schleicher's assistant, dates the first
mobilization plan to 1928, while Field Marshal Erich Von
Manstein, then a Lt.Col. in the Operations (T-1) Section of
the General Staff, dates the 21 division plan from 1929. In
all likelihood Manstein considered the 1926 plan as a first,
rough draft. See Miiller, Das v/ahre Vaterland
,
318ff; and
Manstein, Aus einem Soldaten leben
,
Bonn, 1958, 111-115.
(Hereafter cited as Manstein, Soldatenleben
.
)
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equipment for the anticipated influx of new soldiers. 4
Should the Army have to mobilize, the Defense Min-
istry planned to implement immediately the expansion of
the army to 300,000 men and to follow the scheme outlined
in the 1929 mobilization plan. The expansion plan simply
called for the Army to triple in size, with new units
forming around the nucleus of Reichswehr units. This
meant, for example, that a Reichswehr regiment of three
battalions would, with the influx of new recruits, become
a division of three regiments, with the former regiment
commander assuming command of the new division and the
former battalion commanders becoming regiment commanders.
The actual mobilization scheme envisioned in the
1929 plan resembled, in all major points, its 1926 pre-
decessor. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities or
an order from the Reich President to mobilize, the 23 regi-
ment size units of the Border Guard-East would protect the
eastern border regions while the Reichswehr mobilized in
the fortified areas some 50km behind the actual border.
The Border Guard would conduct delaying tactics and gradu-
ally fall back to the fortified areas under enemy pressure,
trading space for time, until the mobilized Reichswehr of
4BA-MA, Wi F 5/499, CHL TA 957/30 g.K., 30 Septem-
ber 1932; Post, Civil-Military , 197; Rautenberg, Rustungs -
politik
,
212-219; Wohlfeil, Reichswehr und Republik , 210.
106
twenty-one infantry divisions was prepared to take the
field. 5 This mobilization format assumed an attack from
the east (Poland); the military situation in the west was
apparently regarded as hopeless and no serious efforts
were made with to cope with the possibility of a French
attack.
The shortage of trained personnel to fill the ranks
of the mobilized Reichswehr constituted the weakest point
of the mobilization scheme. Defense Minister Groener
estimated that the Army needed from five to eight days in
which to mobilize and expand from seven to twenty-one
infantry divisions. 6 On the other hand, studies conducted
by the General Staff during 1931 and 1932 demonstrated that
at least seven and preferably fourteen days were required
in which to train recruits to perform even the most ele-
mentary military skills. 7 In other words, in a scenario
which assumed optimum conditions and the existence of a
Post, Civil-Military
, 198ff. Cf. Carsten, Reichs-
wehr
, 273, who incorrectly states that the forces to sup-
plement the 7 infantry divisions would come from the Border
Guard.
6Reichswehrminister to CHL, CML , PF 3 4072, 16 April
1930, cited in Post, Civil-Military
, 198.
7BA-MA, RH-8/896, CHL TA 600/31 g.K. "Z" T4Id, 1 July
1931; CHL TA 628/31 g.K. "Z" T4Id, 17 September 1931; WK
VII/734 CHL TA 100/32 g.k. T4Id, 29 January 1932; H-24/6,
Anlage 11 of CHL TA 660/32 g.K. T4Id, 15 September 1932;
IfZG, Zgs. 152, Generalleutnant a.D. Otto Stapf, then assign
ed to section T2, Organization of the General Staff, Bl. 6.
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trained reserve, the Border Guard had to delay the Poles
for a minimum of five days
, while stark reality required
a poorly trained and equipped, under-strength Border Guard
to contain within a thirty mile zone over a front of sev-
eral hundred miles for up to two weeks an advancing and
well-equipped Polish force. The most experienced and re-
liable shock troops of the First World War would have been
unequal to such a task.
The inevitable solution to the reserve problem was
either some form of secret and illegal military training
or pre-military training, that is, training which would
considerably shorten the time needed to train recruits
once mobilized and which would not run afoul of the Ver-
sailles limitations. The patent illegality of creating a
military reserve force, as well as the difficulty in dis-
guising or keeping secret such a program, ruled out a
massive, secret reserve training scheme. On the other hand,
a vast pre-military training program and the apparatus al-
ready existed: the numerous military sport organizations
and associations, which by 1932, had trained an estimated
g1.5 million men. It would be a relatively simple matter
for the Army to issue guidelines to the various military
sport groups in order to insure uniform, militarily useful
training. In the event of mobilization, personnel who had
See Chapter III, note 64.
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completed military sport training could be conscripted to
fill the ranks of the mobilized Army. Moreover, voluntary
military sport training did not necessarily or clearly
constitute a violation of the Versailles Treaty.
General Groener intimated his acceptance of such a
solution to the reserve problem as early as March 1930. in
a conversation with Chancellor Heinrich Briming,
9
the De-
fense Minister stated that establishing a state physical
and military fitness program for young men was the one re-
maining goal of his life. This program, he said, would
serve as the preparatory step to replacing the professional
mercenary Reichswehr with a peoples' army. 10
Thinking initially of his state-sponsored military
sport program for youths as a solution to a military exi-
gency, Groener quickly discerned a potential political
profit from the project. Military sport would act, he
hoped, as an antidote to the cancer of fanatical political
extremism, metastizing among the nation's youth and threat-
ening the body politic.
The Defense Minister apprehensively watched the
growing political radicalization of Germany's youth. Con-
siderable numbers of the post-war generation, alienated by
9 1 885-1 970. A front officer in the First World War
and a Center Party Riechstag Deputy, he served as Reich
Chancellor from March 1930 to May 1932.
10Heinrich Bruning, Memorien
,
1918-1934, Stuttgart,
159-160. Hereafter cited as Bruning, Memorien.
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em-
an unresponsive, unpopular Government and a social system
that in the current economic crisis could offer neither
ployment nor hope, accepted the promising rhetoric of the
extremist, anti-Republican movements
.
1 1 By 1929 National
Socialists made their earliest and most spectacular break-
through in the youth movement: starting at the Universities
of Erlangen and Greifswald, Nazi students rapidly gained
control of the student governments at most institutions of
higher learning. 1
2
To a certain extent, the infatuation of the students
and the younger generation in general could be ascribed to
the normal inclination of the young toward rebellion and
1
1
In 1930, ca. 30% of NSDAP membershiD in Bavaria
were between 21 and 30 years of age, with 30% more between
31 and 40 years of age. In 1933, the 21 to 30 group account-
ed for ca. 40%, with ca. 28% between ages 31 and 40. Thus
two-thirds of party membership came from the war (31-40) and
post-war (21-30) generations. These figures are from the
Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP
, Parteistatistik
,
I,
Berlin, 1935, 202-204, quoted in Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler's
Rise to Power. The Nazi Movement in Bavaria 1923-1933
, New
York, 1973, 205-206. (Hereafter cited as Pridham, Hitler's
Rise to Power
.) These figures are comparable to those of
the SA leaders given in chapter IV, footnote 26. In contrast
see Richard Hunt, German Social Democracy
, New Haven, 1964,
106, who states that more than one-half the members of the
Social Democratic Party were over forty years of age. See
also the characterization of the Nazi electoral success in
1930 by Reichswehr officers as an inexorable youth movement
in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1933
,
(ed. Wood-
ward, Butler, and Lambert), 2d series, London, 1950, vol. I,
512, note 2; as well as Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catas -
trophe
,
(trans. S. B. Fay,) Cambridge, Mass., 1950, 44-45.
(Hereafter cited as Meinecke, The German Catastrophe .)
^ 2Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship ,
(trans. J. Steinberg), New York, 1974, 164ff; and Klinnert
und Bleuel, Deutsche Studenten
,
passim .
1 10
novelty. What made this otherwise perennial attraction of
youth and radicalism especially deplorable to Greener was
the absence of the earlier means for moderating the exuber
ance and idealism of youth, the conscripted armed forces,
the "school of the nation". Inducting an impressive per-
centage (50%) of eligible youths, the pre-1914 Army had
served as a vehicle for inculcating the civic values of
discipline, responsibility, obedience and loyalty. 13 in
addition, the Army had been the embodiment and defender of
the existing social and poll tical order. Not only had
military service provided a useful outlet for the surplus
energies of young men, but it was a sobering experience
conferring a certain respectability and civic status.
Groener envisioned his state sponsored military sport pro-
gram becoming a substitute "school of the nation". The
task was immense. Not only would he have to subordinate
the idealistic instincts of the nation's youth to the de-
fense of institutions they hated, but he would have to
demonstrate that the Republic had values worth preserving
that merited their allegiance.
* 30n the concept of the "Army as the school of the
nation", see the famous military publicist, Friedrich von
Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War
,
(trans. A. H. Powles)
,
New York, 1914, 116, 206, 244f, 248; General (Ret.) Max van
den Bergh, Das Deutsche Heer vor dem Weltkrieg: Eine Dar-
stellung und Wiirdigung
,
Berlin, 1 934, 53f, 56; and the ex-
haustive monograph by Richard Hohn, Die Armee als Erzie -
hungsschule der Nation , Bad Harzburg, 1963, passim .
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He addressed himself to this problem in a letter of
1 August 1930 to Reich Minister of the Interior Joseph
Wirth. Expressing his concern that the Reich Government's
policy of responding to the symptoms instead of treating
the cause of student unrest merely exacerbated the problem,
he explained that banning student paramilitary groups in
the name of the Versailles treaty would associate the Gov-
ernment with enforcing that treaty. Such action, he said,
could only increase the unpopularity of the Government and
further radicalize the students. The Government must be
very careful, he added, that in doing away with student
play-soldiering, it did not destroy the will and desire of
youth to serve the state. In closing, Groener warned that
proscriptions would not suffice, but rather:
• •
•
an educational effort [is] necersary,
which has to be jointly directed by the
state and the educators. Only through
such [an effort] can the dual goals of
the Government vis-a-vis the [radical]
movement be realized: the prevention of
actions inimical to [our] foreign policy
and showing youngsters a way to forgo
radicalism. '
4
14BA-MA, RH-8/896, RWM to RMdl , 1 August 1930. "Eine
Erziehungsarbeit [ist] notwendig, die gemeinsam von Staat
und Lehrerschaft geleistet werden muJ3. Nur durch sie kann
das doppelte Ziel der Regierung gegeniiber der Bewegung
erreicht werden: die Unterbindung aussenpolitisch gefiihr-
lichen Handlungen und das Herausfiihren der Jugand aus dem
Lager des Radikalismus . " Bl. 4-5.
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In a secret letter written several months later to
Chancellor Bruning, Greener sketched the outline of his
state-sponsored military sport project. Claiming that the
Government policy of proscribing organizations interested
in military sport thwarted the natural desire of the na-
tion's youth for defending their country (Wehrhafticrkeit ),
he explained that continuing this policy "... without at
the same time giving positive inducements ..." 1 5 to the
military sport organizations would only serve to embitter
and alienate young Germans. Already the suspicion existed,
he added, that the Government used the Versailles Treaty
as a police measure against the paramilitary associations
of its political opponents, a theme which the demagogues
continued to elaborate to the masses with great success. 16
The Defense Minister then suggested establishing a
physical training program. It was of critical importance,
he wrote, because the Versailles Treaty prohibited Germany
from raising a military reserve. However, he noted, the
Treaty did not proscribe a voluntary, nation-wide physical
training organization that would enable the German Govern-
ment to bring all its young men to prime physical condition
15BA, R-43 11/519, Groener to Reichskanzlei , Nr.
3669/30, WId, geheim, 18 October 1930. "...ohne gleich-
zeitig positive Anregungen zu geben..."
16Ibid.
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prior to their actual military service. it was for this
purpose, explained the Defense Minister less than candidly,
that the Reichswehr in 1924 had begun the Volkssport pro-
gram, which, he added, the Reich Interior Ministry had sub-
sequently subverted into subsidies for sports such as tennis
and rugby. 17 Not Qnly did ^ Government ^ ^
its sport subventions into projects he considered important
to the nation, but, raged Greener, it did not even demand
any service in exchange for its subsidies. He concluded by
stating that he strongly recommended that the Government
establish a youth physical fitness training program and
requested that Bruning refer the matter to the Reich Cabinet,
noting that his proposal involved the jurisdiction of the
Reich Ministry of the Interior. He appended a twelve page
"Summary of Military Youth Training Abroad", apparently to
illustrate how other countries expended their sport subsi-
dies and to intimate what the Defense Ministry felt was a
project deserving Government support. 18
1 7Ibid
. Groener enclosed, as exhibit 2 to his re
port, a copy of the Reich budget relating to sport subsi
dies for fiscal year 1929. The names of Socialist and
Socialist-oriented groups were underlined in an apparent
attempt either to indicate disgust that a party beridden
with pacifists would receive funds supposedly ear-marked
for defense purposes or to emphasize his predecessor's
(Severing) "impartial" disbursements.
1
8
Ibid
. ,
Anlage 1, "Zusammenstellung uber die
militarische Ausbildung imAuslande."
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Within a week after submitting his report, Greener
told Bruning that until his proposed project was approved,
the Reioh Ministry of the Interior should be required to
obtain the approval of the Defense Ministry prior to award-
ing sport subsidies. He claimed that the generosity of the
Interior Ministry had gotten out of hand and he hoped that
once again the Defense Ministry could exercise some control
over sport subsidies. 19
.
At the end of January 1931, Groener asked the Reich
Cabinet to reconsider his youth fitness training project,
but this time he abandoned his proposal to review Interior
Ministry subsidies. Instead, he suggested that their sport
subventions be merely "regulated", which he interpreted as
meaning the award of sport funds only to groups pursuing
activities useful to the armed forces. The Defense Minister
also wished to issue guidelines in cooperation with the In-
terior Ministry regulating military sport training. Groener
noted that his suggestions could, in all likelihood, be
carried out at no expense to the Government. 20
On the 4th of March 1931, General Schleicher forward-
ed to the Chancellory a twenty page, top secret report titled
1 9IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Befehlshaberbe-
sprechung, 30 October 1930.
20BA, R-43 11/519, Vermerk, Betr. Wehrhaftigkeit der
Jugend, Rk. 8732°, 21 January 1931. On the margin of the
report is written, "Herr Reichskanzler ist einverstanden .
"
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"Defense-Readiness of Youth"
, in which he further elaborat
ed Greener's concept of a youth fitness training program.
The subtitle of the report, "Construction of a Useful Re-
serve for National Defense" exposed the direct military
nature of the project. 21 Schleicher explained that the
Army had become interested in military sport training be-
cause Germany no longer had the opportunity to train a
military reserve force. Consequently, he added, mobiliza-
tion measures depended, for the most part, on a ready
supply of untrained volunteers. A physical training pro-
gram with military overtones involving the nation's youth
would help to alleviate the reserve shortage, as well as
to provide some activity for the thousands of unemployed
youths, who, according to Schleicher, were daily becoming
more susceptible to radical oratory. A military fitness
training program would, he explained, provide young men
with an alternative to the paramilitary organizations of
the political parties and perhaps win the loyalty of some
of the program's participants for the Republic. 22
Schleicher then reviewed the status of militarv
training conducted by the Reichswehr for civilians. In
the eastern border regions, he wrote, Border Guard members
2
1
Ibid
. , Schleicher to Oberregierungsrat Planck,
4 March 1931, with enclosure RWM 36/31 g.K., wid streng
geheim!
,
"Wehrhaftmachung der Jugend"
.
Bl. 1.
22BA, R-43 11/519, "Wehrhaftmachung der Jugend",
116
received military and terrain sport instruction, m addi-
tion, he explained, a minimal amount of actual training
with weapons was conducted, but, he hastened to add, such
training was only experimental. The Army did not conduct,
he noted, any training in the demilitarized areas along
the Rhine Valley, but it did provide some classroom ins true
tion in other parts of the Reich. The General emphasized
that the Army cooperated fully with local civilian authori-
ties concerning its training courses for non-military per-
sonnel. Participants for these courses, he stressed, were
selected on an "above-party" basis and no paramilitary
groups participated as such, although, he readily acknow-
ledged, individual members of those groups were allowed to
enroll. ^3
Turning to finances, the General noted that the De-
fense Ministry hoped to work with existing military sport
groups, thus avoiding personnel and administrative costs
associated with the creation of a new agency. Groener,
according to his assistant, wanted to award Government sub-
sidies only to those groups which pursued activities of
Ibid. , Bl. 10. There were two advantages which
accompanied an "above-party" approach. First, the Army
avoided accusations of partisanship while minimizing the
exposure of its men to political involvement. Second, by
dealing with individuals rather than groups, the Army
weakened the cohesion of the groups, a phenomenon noticed
by Hitler. See chapter I, 14 f.
117
interest and merit to the armed forces. The Reich Govern-
ment, he ennunciated, should issue guidelines to those or-
ganizations awarded sport subsidies, clearly defining its
standards and expectations, and, of equal importance, stat-
ing what it did not want. 24
As a condition of awarding subsidies, explained the
General, the Defense Ministry would demand evidence that
military sport organizations met Government imposed stand-
ards. In all likelihood, he added, this evidence would
take the form of requiring that a certain percentage of
students from a military sport organization pass a Govern-
ment-sponsored and supervised test. Along with the subsi-
dies the Defense Ministry would issue lesson plans and
guidelines to prevent, he noted, military sport enthusiasts
from becoming involved in "foolish soldiering games" which
might involve infractions of the Versailles Treaty. 25
The Defense Ministry proposal for a youth fitness
program failed to receive immediate attention from the Reich
Cabinet, apparently because the Defense Minister and the
Minister of the Interior could not agree on the organization
of the sport program. Groener wanted to supervise and con-
trol the participating military sport groups through the
24BA, R-43 11/519, "Wehrhaftmachung" , Bl. 13-14.
2
5
Ibid. , Bl. 17. "Einem Verband, der torichte Sol-
datenspielerei betriebt, kann die Ausbildungsplan als
Richtlinie fur seine weitere Arbeit angegeben werden."
1 1 8
awarding of subsidies, namely giving assistance only to
those organizations adhering to Defense Ministry guide-
lines. Regardless of the subsidizing agency, either the
Defense or Interior Ministry, ultimate control of the
program would rest with the Defense Minister, who would
determine the standards for awarding assistance
.
2 6
On the other hand, the Reich Minister of the In-
terior wanted to create an intermediate supervisory agency,
under his control, which would watch over the youth fitness
program. The head of this agency would be appointed by and
responsible to the Minister of the Interior. Assisted by
a committee of Government experts and representatives of
the military sport organizations, the supervisory agency
would allocate subsidies, issue guidelines and directives,
and prevent political partisanship in the administration
of the program. 27 These differences between the two Min-
istries had not been resolved when the first Briining Gov-
ernment collapsed in October 1931.
Following Briining' s shifting of cabinet posts, Groe-
ner emerged as the acting head of the Reich Interior Minis-
try in addition to retaining the Defense Ministry. Evidence
26BA, R-43 11/519, Vermerk des S taatssekretar [Punder]
in der Reichskanzlei, Rk. 5609, 6 June 1931.
27±bid., letter of Generalmajor a.D. L. Vogt to Reichs
kanzler, Rk. 5609, 29 May 1931; Punder Memorandum to Staats-
sekretar [des Reichsprasident s Hindenburg] , 8 August 1931,
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indicates that he did not seek the extra post, but he ap-
pears to have demonstrated no reluctance to assuming the
additional burdens. In fact, he may have welcomed the addi
tional post as an opportunity which would enable him to
implement his military sport training program. He appears
to have had an understanding with Bruning that he could use
his new post to hasten progress toward implementing his
military sport program. Both men hoped to see it become a
mandatory school subject. 28
In a newspaper interview, published shortly after
his appointment to the Reich Ministery of the Interior,
Groener stated that one of the most important tasks facing
the Government in the coming months was to effect a diminu-
tion of the physical and moral misery of the country's un-
employed youth. The state, he claimed, could not alleviate
this suffering by itself; it was imperative for all youth-
oriented clubs and fashions to assist the Reich Government.
2 8IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, remarks of General
Hammerstein, 21 May 1932; Captain Noeldchen (Schleicher's
adjutant) on MeiBner's book in Werner Conze's "Zum Sturz
Brunings", Viertels jahrhefte fur Zeitgeschichte
,
I, 1953,
273. (Hereafter cited as Conze, "Sturz Brunings"; Severing,
Lebensweg
,
II, 33 6; and Eugen Mayer, Skizzen aus dem Leben
der Weimarer Republik
,
Berlin, 1962, 128f. (Hereafter cited
as Mayer, Skizzen
. ) Mayer became the "Obmann" of the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, a position created by Groener.
Mayer's duties included facilitating Groener' s projects,
above all the military sport project, "ein Lieblingsthema
des Ministers."
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He then added:
My most noble task as Reich Minister of theInterior will be to support, insofar aspossible, all efforts and attempts to getthe young men off the street, and teach themdiscipline and order, to improve them physi-
cally, and to make them willing to defendtheir convictions
.... Youth needs ideals
!
They should have the freedom to live for thoseideals as long as they are not inimical to the
fSture
m
29
fc
' ^ inStead contribute to Germany's
Groener 's hopes for a speedy resolution of the or-
ganizational difficulties between the two Ministries re-
garding his fitness organization were frustrated when the
Reich Finance Minister refused to release the necessary
funds until after the Reich presidential elections, sched'
uled for March 10th, 1932. 30 The Defense Minister also
^Frankfurter Zeitung
, Nr. 782, 2d morning edition,
20 October 1931. "Es wird meine vornehmste Aufgabe als
Reichsinnenminister sein, alle Bemuhungen und Versuche,
die gemacht werden, urn die Jugend von der StraBe wegzubringen
sie zu Zucht und Ordnung zu erziehen, sie korperlich zu
ertiichtigen und in ihrer geistigen Haltung wehrhaft zu
machen, so weit wie moglich zu unterstiitzen
. . . . Die Jugend
braucht Ideale i Sie soli die Freiheit haben, fur sie zu
Ieben, wenn sie nicht gegen den Staat gerichtet sind, son-
dern auf Deutschlands Zukunft." (emphasis in original) Cf.
Mayer, Skizzen
, 134, "Eine Sache, die dem Minister sehr am
Herzen lag ... war die Entpolitisierung der Jugend."
30BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, Oehme Fragebogen,
31 December 1932. Groener stated that Reichsfinanzminister
Deitrich wanted to wait until after the March Reich Presi-
dential elections, for if Hindenburg lost, "... die Gelder
nur den Nazis zu gute kamen." This is a strange argument,
its logical extension being the suspension of the entire
Reich budget until after the presidential election! Perhaps
Groener misinterpreted Dietrich, who wanted to wait until
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made little progress in ending the dispute between the two
ministries concerning the organizational difficulties aris-
ing from the youth fitness program. 31
Owing perhaps to impatience with an overly cautious
Finance Ministry and disgust at inter-departmental squab-
bling, Greener approached the Stahlhelm in the hopes that
it would assume a leading role in his military sport league.
From a military standpoint, the Stahlhelm was the most re-
liable of the large paramilitary organizations, and Groener
asked Stahlhelm leaders Seldte and Duesterberg, 32 on 18 De-
cember 1931, to direct his military sport program. Express-
ing interest, the Stahlhelm leaders refused to commit their
organization without the approval of its directors. Some
after the election when the political atmosphere would be
calmer, a thesis which is corroborated by Hammers tein 1 s
statement to the division commanders on 27 February 1932:
"Finanz [ministerium] bereit, Summe bereit zu stellen.
Dietrich mochte die S[ache] aber nicht einstellen, ehe er
in d. Entwicklung der pol[itische] Vernal tnisse klarer
sieht." See Thilo Vogelsang, "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte
der Reichswehr", Viertels j ahrhefte fur Zeitgeschic bte
, (2),
1954, 422. Befehlhaberbesprechung am 27.2.32.
31 IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Besprechung des
Chefs der Heeresleitung auf der Fiihrerreise, 21 May 1932,
Bl. 182.
3 2Lt. Col. Retired. He was the Deputy Commander of
the Stahlhelm (Zweiter Bundesfiihrer) . An ardent national-
ist, he was the unsuccessful candidate of the DNVP and the
political Right in the first Reich Presidential election
of 1932. The Nazis hounded him from the Stahlhelm after
discovering that his grandfather had converted from Judaism.
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Stahlhelm leaders protested the proposed undertaking, but
before the directors met, Groener withdrew his offer. 33
Like some of the Stahlhelm leaders, Groener had
second thoughts. At a Reichswehr commanders conference in
January 1932, he stressed that although the Army wanted to
attract and nuture the "good elements" in the paramilitary
organizations, it could not become associated with any one
group in particular. Schleicher then outlined to the of-
ficers Groener »s plans for the military sport organization,
explaining that participating groups would have considerabl
freedom, yet the Defense Ministry, by allocating funds to
only those groups which followed its directives, would
exercise ultimate control. The paramilitary organizations,
he crudely added, would soon learn who paid them and for
what purposes, and would accordingly restrict their activi-
ties to military sport instead of politics. The General
then announced that recently retired Lieutenant General
Edwin von Stiilpnagel 34 had been selected to head the
Berghahn, Stahlhelm
, 19 4-195. Berghahn does not
specify the nature of the opposition. See also Meinecke,
The German Catastrophe
, 67
.
34 1876-1933. General der Infanterie a.D. Decorated
with the Pour le merite medal during the First World War,
his last post had been commander of Military District IV
(Saxony) and the 4th Infantry Division, from which he re-
tired in October 1931.
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putative military sport organization . 35
Within three weeks Groener again changed his mind
and informed the generals that the military sport organi-
zation would be run by the Reich Ministry of the Interior. 36
Although the reasons for his reversal are unknown, he may
have feared that direct administration of the military
sport organization by the Defense Ministry would compromise
Briining's efforts to improve Germany's military position
3 5Groener f s notes for this conference have survived.
See BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/152, Notizen fur Fuhrer-besprechung beim RWM, 11 January 1932. Groener wrote:
"Das Gute aus den Verbanden an uns heranziehen, jedoch
nicht, wie Italien Wehrmacht in Geflogschaft politisch
eingestellt Miliz bringen." This statement is confirmed
by General Liebmann, who reports: "Groener: f Scharf betonen:
Nicht Hoheres als Wehrmacht! Das Gut der Verbande wollen wir
erhalten und pflegen, aber nicht etwa Anhangsel von irgend-
welchen Verbanden werden. 1 " See IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann
Notizen, Bl. 1 70.
36IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, letter of Lieb-
mann (Commanding General, Wk V) to Infantrie- und Artillerie
fuhrer V, 8 February 1932. Bl. 171. It is possible that
Groener may have adopted the Interior Ministry's organiza-
tion as early as the 11-12 January Commanders 1 Conference
as Liebmann 1 s letter does not give the date of Groener f s
change of mind and Liebmann may have been informing his
subordinates of an important fact which he had forgotten in
his earlier report to them. His letter reads: "Zur Organi-
sation des Wehrsports erganzende Bemerkung: Wehrsport
Organisation wird unter Reichsminister des Innern aufgezogen
It is likely, however , that Liebmann 1 s letter reflects a
turn-about in Groener f s position, as it was normal practice
for the division chief of staff to accompany the commander
to the conferences and it is improbable that both men would
have ommitted an announcement of such importance.
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at the imminent Geneva Disarmament Conference. 3 ? m addi-
tion, promotion and subvention of sport activities had
traditionally been a function of the Interior Ministry, a
function which General Hammerstein
,
38 the Chief of the Army
Command, implied that Ministry of the Interior officials
were reluctant to relinquish. 39
The excesses committed by the SA during the first
inconclusive presidential election campaign 40 appalled the
governments of several of the states and their interior
37Briining hoped to secure a much needed triumph by
winning League of Nations recognition of German sovereignty
in relation to its defense posture. He called for general
disarmament as stipulated in Article 53 of the Versailles
Treaty, but hoped instead that his suggestion would be re-
fused and that Germany would be allowed gradually to increase
its defense forces. Not only would such a success have al-
lowed the Reichswehr to implement its expansion plan, but
it would have been a major tour de force for Briining 1 s sag-
ging government. See IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen,
Befehlhaberbesprechung, 11-12 January 1932, Bl. 167-168;
Bracher, Auflosung, 483-84; Craig, Politics
,
441-46; Vogel-
sang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
,
180-184; Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis
,
228-230.
38Hammerstein-Equord, Kurt Freiherr von (1876-1943).
Hammerstein had served in the same regiment (3rd Guard In-
fantry) as Schleicher and Hindenburg's son prior to the
First World War. Sympathetic to the Republic, Hammerstein
was the Chief of the Army Command from 1930 to January, 1934,
and retired a Generaloberst
.
39 IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Befehlshaberbe-
sprechung mit dem Chef der Heeresleitung auf der Fiihrer-
reise, 21 May 1932, 31. 182.
4oThe Prussian Government claimed that the Nazis had
mobilized the SA on election day and were planning a Putsch,
prevented only by the intervention of the Prussian police.
See HA, f. 32 8, "Eine Erklarung des Preuflischen Innenministers
gegen die NSDAP, 17.3.32"; Albert Grzesinski, Inside Germany ,
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ministers demanded that the Reich Government take some
action against the SA.41 Their entreaty placed Greener in
an exceptionally difficult position. On the one hand, re-
sponsible for public security as Reich Minister of the
Interior, he could hardly ignore their pleas; on the other
hand, his solution to the problem of political extremism,
his military sport organization for young men, would be
jeopardized by Government action against the SA. Moreover,
as Defense Minister his constitutional responsibility to
defend the nation was intimately linked to the military
sport program, which formed the nucleus of the Army's ex-
pansion plan.
Groener attempted to convince the Interior Ministers
of Prussia, Baden, Saxony, Wurttemberg, Hesse and Bavaria,
during a meeting on 5 April 1932, that disbanding the SA
without providing an alternate outlet for the idealism of
its members would solve nothing. 42 The problem of the SA
New York, 1933, 252; and the Frankfurter Zeitung
, Nr. 254-6,
5 April 1932. In a letter of 18 March to Groener, Rohm de-
nied Severing 's charges of treason, claiming that the SA had
been alerted merely to defend itself against possible marxist
uprisings which would be supported by the marxis t-dominated
Prussian police. Rohm submitted reports from his units con-
cerning their activities on 13 March. See HA, f. 328, letter
Rohm to Groener, 18 March 1932. Rohm's original mobilization
order to the SA, OSAF I Nr. 6 73/3 2, 2 March 19 32, which sup-
ports his refutation of Severing, can be seen in HA, f. 307.
41Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP , 161-165.
4
2
Ibid. , Dok. 21, "Niederschrift des Regierungrats von
LengieBer uber die Besprechung der Innenminister der Lander,
5.4.32", 445-449. Bracher incorrectly claims that Groener was
committed to banning the SA long before 5 April. See Bracher,
Auflosung , 483ff.
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was serious, he acknowledged, but
Many thousands of men of the best convictionsare among them [the SA]
, who should not be re-jected by the Government. These people haveto be grven the opportunity to side with theGovernment.... One has to attract the bestelements to the Government and meaningfullyinvolve them. 43 3 *
Prussian Minister of the Interior Severing promptly objected
to Groener's implication that the SA men were patriots, cit-
ing as evidence to the contrary Hitler's recent order pro-
hibiting SA men from participating in the Border Guard-East,
even in the event of a Polish attack. 44
Apparently Groener, like so many of his countrymen,
had proven susceptible to the siren song of nationalism
sung by the Nazis and was willing to overlook the more rep-
rehensible elements of their program. At any rate, he
lamely attempted to explain the excesses of the SA as the
manifestations of impatient and frustrated youngsters. Im-
plying that further violence would accompany a ban of the
SA unless its members were provided with some useful, altern-
4 3vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
, "Niederschrift" . "Viele
Tausend Menschen von bester Gesinnung seien unter ihnen [SA]
,
die nicht vom Staate abgestossen werden sollten. Diesen
Leuten miisse die Moglichkeit gegeben werden, daB sie zum
Staate kommen.... Man miisse die guten Elementen an den
Staat heranziehen und positiv fur den Staat einstellen."
pp. 448-9. Carsten's unfair criticism of Groener's actions
makes no mention of Groener's Wehrsport project plans. See
Reichswehr and Politics, 340.
Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP, "Niederschrift", 449.
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ative activity, the Defense Minister revealed his plans to
establish a military sport organization. Participation,
he explained, would be opened to members of all the para-
military organizations, not just the SA.45 Nonetheless,
he gave no indication that he planned any immediate action,
prompting the state interior ministers to state that if the
Reich failed to act to curb the SA, they would not be so
remiss
.
46
Faced with this ultimatum, he reconsidered his
position concerning the SA and overnight changed his mind.
On the following day, 6 April, he revealed to General
Schleicher his plan to disband the SA following the second
Reich presidential election on 10 April. 47 The Defense
4 5
^Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
, "Niederschrift"
,
445ff;
see also Groener's memorandum "Chronologische Darstellung
der Vorkommisse, die zur meinem Rucktritt als Reichswehr-
und Reichsinnenminister gefiihrt haben" in BA-MA, NachlaB
Groener, N-46/145, Bl. 1.
46Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
, "Niederschrift" , 449.
In at least one instance this was not an idle threat. At a
secret meeting (7 April) in the Prussian Ministry of the In-
terior, Severing promised to disband the SA in Prussia short-
ly after the 10 April election. The SA knew at once of this
meeting. See BA, NachlaB Kruger/20, Aktenvermerk
, 7.4.32.
Incredibly, the party leadership received no word of the ban
until 11 April. See Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei
,
Berlin, 1934, 65f. (Hereafter cited as Goebbels, Kaiserhof
.
)
47BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, "Chronologische
Darstellung", Bl. 1; Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
,
168ff, states
that Severing 1 s publication on 5 April of compromising SA
material may have contributed to Schleicher's initial sup-
port of Groener's proposed ban. Supposedly Schleicher was
upset that Hitler had ordered the SA not to assist the Border
Buard in the event of Polish attack. Schleicher's support of
1 28
Minister explained his volte face in a letter to Briining,
writing that any unilateral prohibition of the SA by the
state governments would be interpreted as an admission of
the impotence of the Government. He added that he was con-
vinced that Prussia and Bavaria were preparing to ban the
SA following the election. Recommending a pre-emptive
action by the Reich against the SA as imperative, he further
added that it was intolerable for any government to permit
a political party to have its own army. 48
Groener's action against the SA cannot be dismissed
as a haphazard and impromptu reaction to immediate pressure
the SA ban for this reason would be unlikely, as the SA rolein the Border Guard was at best minimal, and Hitler's order(reflecting the official NSDAP position) was hardly novel
and could have been attributed to campaign rhetoric. It is
possible that Groener's attitude took Schleicher by surprise
(cf IfZG, Zgs 217, General der Art. a.D. Erich Frhr. von dem
Busche-Ippenburg, Bl. 53. Busche was the head of the Army
Personnel Office)
.
Schleicher may have even been momentari-
ly convinced by Groener's argument, but after reflection,
returned to his original position. See IfZG, Zgs. 248,
Holtzendorf f , Bl. 30, and Groener-Geyer (Groener's daughter)
in BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/
48BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/152, letter Groener to
Briining, 13 April 1932. In an updated memorandum, written
after 13 April, Groener instructed his press aide to make
public that "... der einzige Grund fur die Auflosung der SA
die Gefahr fur die Staatsautoritat war." Briining, Memoiren
,
538, 542-44, states that Groener was convinced that unless
the SA were disbanded, it would prove to be a stumbling
block for Briining' s disarmanent talks at Geneva. See also
Mayer, Skizzen, 137.
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generated by the state governments. Greener claimed later
that he knew of the political hazards involved in recommend-
ing that the Reich Government proscribe the SA. 49 Although
he had in the past warned of the dangers of outlawing polit:
cal paramilitary organizations without providing an alter-
nate outlet for the energies of their rank and file, he ap-
parently felt that with the organizational difficulties of
his own military sport organization resolved, he could offej
it as a substitute to the SA. 50
Generals Schleicher and Hammerstein initially went
along with Groener's proposal to ban the SA, 51 but after
49BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/112, letter Groener
to Dr. Richard Bahr, editor of the Braunschweigerische
Landeszeitung
, 22 May 1932.
5oApparently confident that the military sport organi
zation would be quickly established, Groener released the
" Richtlinien fur die Ausbildung im Gelandesport" during the
spring of 1932. See BA, R-43 11/519, letter Vogt to Reichs-
kanzlei, 4 February 19 32; and BHStA, I, MK 13832, RMdl to
Lander, IA 1414/13.9 II, 24 October 1932. See also Cpt. Ill
pp. 21. In all likelihood Groener issued the "Richtlinien"
immediately prior to the SA ban, hoping that the release of
the "Richtlinien" would be interpreted by the military sport
groups as a statement of the Government's intention to spon-
sor a comprehensive military sport program.
J, For the official Reichswehr version see IfZG, Ed-1/
1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Besprechung mit dem Chef des Heeres-
leitung auf der Fiihrerreise, 21 May 1 932, Bl. 183. For con-
tradictory, but more accurate versions, see BA-MA, NachlaB
Groener, N-46/145, letter Groener to Chief Editor Biicher of
Miin chner Neuesten Nachrichten , 5 August 1932; and N-46/1 52,
Hermann Piinder (S taatssekretar in der Reichskanzlei , "Neider
schrift uber die Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei iiber den
Verbot der SA" , 30 May 1932, Bl. 1-3.
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reflection they faltered in their support. Schleicher
suggested instead forcing Hitler to exercise greater control
over the SA by issuing him an ultimatum. In the event he
refused to accept it, the onus for disbanding the SA would
fall on the Nazi leader rather than on the Reich Govern-
ment. 52 Bruning and Greener both rejected this idea, and
persuaded Hindenburg to sign the decree outlawing the SA. 53
Although the divergence of opinion between Groener
and the Army Command did not at first appear to be of great
significance, 54 Schleicher's and Hammerstein
• s opposition
remained firm and the gap between the Defense Minister and
his generals could not be bridged. The political Right,
hostile to Groener since 1918, successfully utilized the
split between him and the Army Command to undermine Hinden-
burg 's confidence in the Defense Minister and to drive him
52BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, Groener to Bucher,
5 August 1 932, Bl. 1-3; N-46/152, Piinder Niederschrift , Bl.
5-7; Bruning, Memoiren
,
537-39.
53BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, Groener to Bucher,
5 August 1932, Bl. 5-7; N-46/152, Piinder Niederschrift, Bl.
5-7; Bruning, Memoiren
,
540-544.
54
"Auch habe ich [Groener] nicht den Eindruck gewonnen,
als ob Schleicher grundsatzlich seine Meinung [Schleicher's
initial approval of the SA Verbot] geandert hatte." BA-MA,
NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, "Chronologische Darstellung" , Bl.
4. When first informed on 15 April by Schleicher that there
was unrest in the Reichswehr over the SA ban, Groener merely
replied that it was the Army's duty to obey its leaders, not
to question them. See ibid. , Bl. 13.
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and Bruning from office by the end of May. 55 Franz von
Papen56 and the "presidential" cabinet succeeded Bruning
and Papen rescinded the SA ban on 16 June in return for
the acquiescence of the Nazis in the Reichstag to the
existence of his government . 57
Ironically, it appears that Schleicher's and Ham-
merstein's opposition to the SA ban originated from an
apparently sincere conviction that the ban threatened
Groener's military sport project, a program which promised
to help alleviate Germany's youth problem, while simul-
taneously improving its defense posture. The Army Command'
official position regarding the SA ban was that Groener's
dual ministerial responsibilities had compromised the
political impartiality of the Reichswehr by indirectly in-
volving it, through the person of Groener, in domestic,
55Bracher, Auflosung
,
490-99; Carsten, Reichswehr
and Politics
,
344-48; Craig, Politics
, 430, 448-53; Vogel-
sang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
,
173-80, 184-202; Wheeler-Bennett,
Nemesis
,
236-244.
5 6A former career Army officer who had served with
Hindenburg in the First World War, Papen left the service
in 1919 and became active in Center Party political circles
serving in both the Prussian Lantag and the Reichstag. A
relatively unknown politician, his own party abandoned him
after his role in Bruning' s downfall became public. Spon-
sored by Schleicher, Papen served as Chancellor from June
to December 1932.
5^Franz von Papen, Die Wahrheit einer Gasse , Munchen
1952, 161-3; Goebbels, Kaiserhof , 77, 81-84; Vogelsang,
RW-Staat-NSDAP, 189-191, 215-221.
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partisan politics. According to Hammerstein, the "action
[against] the SA was purely domestic and partisan. The im-
partiality of the armed forced was injured, as the [Defense]
Minister has to be impartial." 58 The Chief of the Army Com-
mand admitted that he had supported Greener's assignment to
the Ministry of the Interior "... because it already had
been clear that the dismantling of the [para] mi litary organi
zations [was] necessary. [This dismantling was] possible
only if there was something else to offer." 59 That "some-
thing else" was Groener's military sport program, the plan-
ning for which was unfortunately incomplete at the time of
the SA ban. Schleicher and Hammerstein felt that Groener's
action against the SA was not only inopportune, but also
politically motivated. 60 It damaged the Army's reputation
for political neutrality as well as the plans for a non-
5 8IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Besprechung mit
dem Chef der Heeresleitung auf der Fuhrreise, 21 May 1932,
Bl. 183. "Aktion SA war rein innen- und parteipolitisch
.
Uberparteilichkeit der Wehrmacht war verletzt, auch Minister
muB iiberparteilich sein."
59Ibid
. ,
Bl. 182f. "... weil schon damals klar, daB
Abbau der militarischen Organisationen notig. Nur moglich,
wenn etwas anders zu bieten." Carsten ignores this state-
ment, which does not corroborate his thesis, namely that
Hammerstein ' s alleged concern for the impartiality of the
Reichswehr was a pretext for opposing Groener, who was block-
ing the "taming" of the Nazis. See Carsten, Reichswehr and
Republic
,
340, 343.
60BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/22, letter Schleicher
to Bruning, 18 June 1932.
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partisan sport organization. 6 1
Schleicher's critics have questioned his opposition
to Greener and the SA ban, maintaining that he followed a
devious course, attempting to exploit the Nazi movement
for the benefit of the Reichswehr. Groener's campaign
against the SA, in this interpretation, became an attack
on Schleicher's plans. The General therefore manuevered
Briining and Groener from office and replaced them with the
62pliant Franz von Papen.
In fairness to Schleicher, it should be pointed out
that the policy of exploiting the Nazis or any other
political movement was not restricted to the Army Command
but enjoyed the tacit acquiescence of the Government. Since
1924 the Army had attempted, directly or indirectly, to
benefit from the pre-military training conducted by mili-
tary sport enthusiasts. Groener hoped to continue that
policy by exploiting the patriotic sentiments awakened in
61 IfZG, Zgs. 248 (II), Generalmajor a.D. Hans-Henning
von Holtzendorf f , Bl. 28. Holtzendorf f , in 1932, was a
Reichswehr civilian employee and economic consultant to
Schleicher; 7 February 1949 interview of Dr. Adam von Car-
lowitz, Schleicher's legal advisor, by Dr. von zur Miihlen
in Conze, "Sturz Brunings", 270-271, and Holtzendorf f '
s
comments on same, ibid., 272-3. See also Miiller, Das wahre
Vaterland
, 349, Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP , 175; and Bracher,
Auflosung , 495-99.
D Bracher, Auflosung
,
276-81; Carsten, Reichswehr
and Politics
, 343, 348-50; Craig, Politics , 428, 453-55;
Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
, 185; Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis ,
226.
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the young by the Nazis. 63 Schleicher and Ham^nerstein turn-
ed against Greener after they concluded that his apparently
precipitious action against the SA threatened to alienate
the political Right and thus destroy Reichswehr plans to
recruit supporters for the military sport program from all
interested groups, regardless of their political doctrine.
Schleicher continued this policy in a more even-handed
manner after Groener resigned. ^ Unaffected by his pre-
decessor's mistrust and hostility to the Socialist Reichs -
banner, Schleicher encouraged it to become active in the
Border Guard and the proposed military sport program. 65
6 3Craig, who did not utilize the documents of theReichskanzlei, states that Groener, as a soldier and cabinet
member, was firmly convinced from the beginning of 1931 ofthe necessity of eliminating the SA. Craig does not mentionthat Groener saw "valuable elements" in the SA and hoped to
attract these elements. Thus Craig, like Wheeler-Bennett,
makes the mistake of interpreting Groener »s military sport
organization as a sop to the critics of the SA Verbot. See
Craig, Politics
, 440-442, and Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis
,229f. According to this interpretation, Schleicher's op-
position to the SA Verbot appears to be a policy of opportun-
ism rather than one of continuity.
64See, for example, Schleicher's article in Illus -
trierte Zeitung (partly reproduced in Neue PreuBische
Kreuzzeitung
, 206, 26 July 1932) in which he wrote that
"...der Staat zum aktiven Trager des Wehrgedankens werden
muB, daB der Staat die Ertuchtigung der Jugend, im vater-
landischen Geist und korperlicher Leistungsfahigkeit nicht
den Parteien und Verbanden iiberlassen konne. Der Staat
darf aber 'in der heutigen Lage unseres Vaterlandes keine
Hand zuriickstoBen , die ihm im Dienst dieser Idee geboten
wird . ' " . (emphasis in original)
65BA-MA, NachlaB Bredow, N-97/1, 15 June 1932. Groe-
ner' s hostility to the Reichsbanner , as well as his inactivity
vis-a-vis the growing SA menace, contributed to growing SPD
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It would also be unfair to characterize military
leaders as either blind to the Weimar Republic's political
difficulties or myopic in presenting only military solu-
tions to complex social problems. Although their proffered
solution (a youth military fitness program) to counteract
the growing alienation of the young had immediate and ob-
vious benefits for the armed forces, Greener and Schleicher
attempted to grapple with what they regarded as the gravest
problem of the Weimar Republic: its failure to inspire
confidence. The Republic, according to the Defense Minister
and his assistant, had simply lost the support of a majority
of the population, especially the younger generation from
which the nation's future leaders would come. Characteris-
tic of many Germans who had reached maturity prior to 1914,
the Army leaders were convinced that the Army, the "school
of the nation", represented the best means of inculcating
civic virtues and for developing citizenship. 66
dissatisfaction with the Bruning Government. See Vogelsang,
RW-Staat-NSDAP
, 161. The Socialists had supported Hinden-
burg's re-election and their toleration in the Reichstag was
essential for the survival of the Bruning Cabinet. Apparent-
ly angered at Groener's attitude towards the Reichsbanner,
they offered no help to Groener when he came under violent
attack. Schleicher did not repeat Groener's mistake.
6^In a letter to Reichswehr Commanders, 22 January
1932, Groener stated that one immutable value during the
current crisis was "...die Staatsidee. Die Wehrmacht ist
ihr notwendiger und sinnfalligster Ausdruck." BA-MA, NachlaB
Stiilpnagel, N-5/23, RWM B Nr. 295, Will, 22 January 1930.
One should not assume the concept of the army as school of
the nation to be regressive; Hitler later adopted it for the
benefit of the SA. See also Schleicher's radio address of
26 July 1932 in BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/22.
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Prevented by the restrictions of the Versailles
Treaty from a return to the Army as the school of the
nation, Greener and Schleicher had favored a comprehensive,
state-sponsored youth program, of which the military sport
organization was to be but one phase, aimed at capturing
the loyalty and enthusiasm of the nation's youth. 67 in a
secret letter to Chancellor von Papen, Schleicher wrote
that "teaching the coming generation to advocate the ideol-
ogy of the Government is unquestionably one of the most im-
portant pre-requisites of a national recovery and of an
autonomous conduct of state." 68 Admitting that he viewed
6 7IfZG, Zgs. 37, General der Infanterie a.D. Hermann
Foertsch, Bl. 30-31. Foertsch, assigned to the Ministeramt
in 1933, states that Schleicher was very concerned with a
solution to Germany's social problems, and "In diesem Zusam-
menhang sah er [Schleicher] auch das Problem der Jugend, die
er in einer staatlichen Organisation ( "Staats j ugend" ) erfaBt
sehen wollte, um sie den reinen Parteieinfliissen zu entzie-
hen; seine Plane bezuglich der Vermehrung des Heeres auf
300,000 Mann entsprangen daher u.a. auch der Absicht, diese
Jugend von der Strassen wegzubringen . " Bl. 30-31. See also
IfZG, Ed-1/1-2. Liebmann Notizen, Commanders' Conference,
undated notes, December 1932, Bl. 186; Zgs. 1709, Ma j. a.D.
Dr. Wolfgang Huwe, letter of Oberst a.D. Arnim, Bl. 36; and
Eugen Ott, Botschafter and Oberstlt.a.D. , "Ein Bild des
Generals Kurt von Schleicher", Politische Studien
,
110, June
1959, 367. Ott, then a section chief of Schleicher's Minis-
teramt, was Schleicher's choice to be Chief of Staff in a
proposed Youth Ministry. For Schleicher's Youth Program,
see Kreuzzeitung , Nr. 351, 17 December 1932.
68Schleicher to Papen, RWM Nr. 486/32 g.WV, 17 October
1932 (from DZA-Potsdam, RMdl, Bd. 2 56 74, photo copy in Schutzle
Reichswehr wider Nation
,
appendix) . "Die Erziehung der heran-
wachsenden Jugend zu tatiger Staatsgesinnung ist zweifellos
eine der wichtigsten Voraussetzungen nationaler Gesundung und
unabhangiger Staatsfuhrung . " Bl. 13.
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the proposed youth program from a military standpoint, he
added that it was a "... guarantee of the national defense
by means of healthy, able and committed young men. "69
In retrospect, the divergence between Greener and
the Army Command was one of tactics, not strategy. Both
parties were troubled by the impossible task of the armed
forces, namely to protect, with insufficient forces, a
system of government which a considerable number of Ger-
mans, especially younger ones, rejected. A state-sponsored
military sport program sppeared to be the best solution
for augmenting the Army with trained manpower and for in-
stilling among the young confidence in the Republic. The
tragedy causing Groener's hounding from office was bureau-
cratic obstructionism which delayed the military sport
program for two invaluable years. Available evidence does
not indicate the extent to which Groener was responsible
for failing to break through bureaucratic chicanery. Evi-
dence does show that the Defense Minister, exasperated
with obstructionism, spiritually and physically exhausted,
his health shattered, and under vitriolic personal and
political attack, succumbed to the intense pressure of the
state governments and agreed to execute a hasty, ill-con-
ceived action against the SA. This action destroyed not
p ^Ibid
. , Bl. 14. " . . . Sicherstellung der Landesver-
teidigung durch eine gesunde, leistungsfahige und einsatz-
bereite junge Mannschaften.
"
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only his own political future but that of the Republic as
well. Convinced that Groener's actions against the SA were
premature, Schleicher confronted the choices of either re-
maining loyal to Groener and perishing politically with
him, or of disassociating himself from his former mentor
in order to present the vital military sport organization
at a more opportune time. He chose the latter course.
CHAPTER VI
TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE
THE REICHSKURATORIUM FUR JUGEND-
ERTUCHTIGUNG
Despite his preoccupation during the crisis caused
by the SA ban, General Groener found time to initiate the
steps to establish his youth, or military sport project.
Because the fiscal year had already begun (1 April to 31
March) and he had not requested an appropriation, he ap-
proached Reich Finance Minister Dietrich late in April to
see if he could unearth and shepherd funds for the youth
sport project. Dietrich appears to have assured Groener
in early May that he could help 1 and within a week the De-
fense Minister submitted to the Reich Council ( Reichsrat )
a detailed budget for his project. He asked for an appro-
priation of RM 1.5 million, which would allow him to begin
1 K6hler, Arbeitsdienst
, 219. According to Schutzle,
Reichswehr wider Nation
, 187, who quotes from DZA-RMdl , Bd.
25676, Bl. 2f, Groener requested funding authorization in
April. His rationale: "Als Folge der ungewohnlichen groBen
Arbeitslosigkeit ist eine wachsende Verwahrlosung der Jugend
eingetreten. Es sind MaBnahmen erforderlich durch korperliche
Ertiichtigung der Jugend dieser fur den Staat bedrohlichen
Entwicklung Einhalt zu gebieten und dadurch zugleich die
Voraussetzung fur eine gesunde geistige Einstellung der
Jugend zu Volk und Staat zu sichern." Except for a short
chapter in Kohler's Arbeitsdienst , there is no substantive
treatment of the Reichskuratorium. Kohler's chapter is in-
complete; he did not use material from the Bavarian archives
or the Bundesmilitararchiv.
140
operating the military sport program from July until the end
of the fiscal year in March 1933.2 A special outlay would
then no longer be required, as the expenses for the sport
program would be listed in the operating budget of Reich
Ministry of the Interior.
The Reich Council did not consider Groener's request
until the end of June, 3 apparently adopting an attitude of
"wait and see", following his resignation and subsequently
that of the Briining Government. The new Papen Regime
adopted a similar dilatory attitude toward the military
sport project. To a certain extent, this attitude may have
reflected Schleicher's policy; as the new Defense Minister
he continued the former policy, momentarily abandoned by
Groener, of an "above party" approach to the military
sport project. He could take little action until the Gov-
ernment concluded a rapprochement with the offended politi-
cal Right, which was mollified with the lifting of the ban
on the SA on the 16th of June. Moreover, the General did
not want to repeat Groener's mistake of acting too hastily,
namely proscribing the SA before the military sport program
2BHStA, I, MK 13828, letter of Bay. Stellvertretende
Bevollmachtiger zum Reichsrat to Bay. Staatsmin. des Aussern,
Nr. 613, 12 May 1932; letter Bay. Stellvertrende Bevoll-
machtiger zum Reichsrat to Bay. Staatsmin. fiir Kultus und
Unterricht, 13 May 1932.
3Deutscher Reichsanzieger und PreuBischer Staats -
anzieger , Nr. 150, 29 June 1932.
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was ready for operation. When the leaders of several of the
state governments asked Papen about the status of the mili-
tary sport project during a conference on June 12th, he la-
conically replied "that in general, all of these [para] mili-
tary organizations will be placed under some sort of control
[exercised] by the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Confer-
ences concerning the implementation of this control are not
completed, nor has the Reich President been informed of any
of the details." 4
Improvisation and delay subsequently characterized
the establishment of the military sport organization. Dur-
ing the summer of 1932, for example, the name of the organi-
zation underwent several changes 5 and the start of the first
instructor training course was twice postponed. 6 In at least
4 IfZG, Ma 87, Niederschrift iiber die am Sonntag, 12.
Juni [ 1932] Besprechung. "Im iibrigen wiirden alle diesen Or-
ganisationen unter eine Kontrolle des Reichsministeriums des
Innerns gestellt werden. Die Besprechungen iiber die Durch-
fuhrung dieser Kontrolle sind noch nicht abgeschlossen, es
1st auch dem Herrn Reichsprasidenten noch kein Vortrag iiber
die Einzelheiten gehalten worden." Bl. 91.
5BA-MA, NachlaG Bredow, N-97/1 , "Kurze Orientierung"
,
6 July; 4 August 1932.
6BHStA, I, MF 67303, letter of Wehrkreis VII, 929/32
g./A. to Bay. Staatsmin. des Finanzen/Ausserns/Kultus und
Unterricht, 3 August 1932; IfZG, Fa 88/337, JH Stabsleitung
Ref. VI 16/31, 14 September 1932; and letter of Stiilpnagel
to RMdl, 7 November 1932, DZA-Potsdam, RMdl, Bd. 25676 (re-
produced in Schiitzle, Reichswehr wider Nation , appendix,
p. 5. )
.
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one instance a regional director was appointed only after
the program was to have been functioning. 7 The makeshift
arrangements and failures to meet schedules suggest either
that Greener's concept experienced considerable modifica-
tions or that planning for the program had not been as ad-
vanced as Groener had indicated in January.
9
The new Reich Minister of the Interior, Baron von
Gayl, apparently felt that the money committed to the
military sport project could be better spent elsewhere,
namely for a volunteer labor service. Schleicher, during
a cabinet meeting on June 18th, emphatically spoke against
Gayl's suggestion that the Government establish a labor
service, stating that although the concept appeared promis-
ing, finding the necessary extra funds would, he thought,
7BHStA, MK 13828, Horl, Nr. 1723, to Bay. Staatsmin.fur Kultus und Unterricht, 26 September 1932; MK 1384 7, Bay.Staatsmin. fur Kultus und Unterricht, Ref. VII 36161, to
Horl, 28 September 1932.
gSee the letter of Bavarian Representative to the
Reich Council Imhoff, in BHStA,-I, MK 13 828, to the Bay.
Staatsmin. fur Kultus und Unterricht, 7 July 1932. Former
Staatssekretar Hermann Piinder later wrote that "... im
Kabinett habe er [Schleicher] manchmal Krach mit den
Minister von Neurath und von Gayl.", indicating that there
were difficulties between Gayl and Schleicher. See Piinder's
Politik in der Reichskanz le i , 141.
9At the Commanding Generals' Conference of 11-12 Jan-
uary 1932, Schleicher stated that "Organisation fur Wehrsport
ziemlich weit vorgeschritten . " IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann
Notizen, Bl. 169.
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prove difficult. In any event, insisted the Defense Minis-
ter, military sport and its budget had to be kept separate
from any labor service projects. Gayl had no answer for
Schleicher. 10
It is possible, but unlikely, that military planning
contributed to the delay in organizing the military sport
program. The disarmament conferences at Geneva had not
been successful from Germany's viewpoint, 11 and the Foreign
Office as well as the Defense Ministry may have delayed the
implementation of the military sport program pending further
progress at Geneva. Army leaders, however, decided on 14
July to begin preparations for implementing their 21 division
expansion plan (of which military sport was an integral
part) regardless of the outcome at Geneva, 12 and it would
hardly appear coincidental that at this time the Reichswehr
commenced extensive assistance to General Edwin von Stulp-
nagel and his staff. On the other hand, military assistance
to the military sport program might have been related to the
1 0lfZG, Ma 88, 18 June 1932 Reichskabinettsprotokoll,
Bl. D790242.
1 1 Bruning, Memoiren
, 556-565.
12BA-MA, II H/27, CHL TA 562/32 g.K. T2III, 14 July
1932; II H/228, CHL TA 549/32 g.K. T2IIIB, 15 July 1932.
This order called for preparation for a 15% personnel expan-
sion, commencing 1 April 1 933 . See also Rautenberg, Riistungs
politik
, 212-219. The Disarmament Committee adjourned on 23
July v/ithout making any changes favorable to Germany. See
Heiden, Der Fiihrer, 476 .
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approval of the program's budget by the Reich Council on 29
June. 13 In all likelihood/ the decis . on Qf the
Staff to implement its expansion plan did not precipitate
the military sport project, but merely added a sense of
urgency that had been absent since Greener's resignation.
It is also possible that the temporary modus vivendi
of the Reich Government with Hitler concerning his acquies-
cence of the Papen Regime may have lulled Government officials
into a false sense of security in respect to the threat posed
by the National Socialists. In the eight week election cam-
paign (ending 31 July) for the Reichstag, the actions of the
SA, especially the carnage at Altona ending in nineteen
deaths, 14 gave every indication that the Nazis still consti-
tuted a menace and dispelled any illusions concerning Hitler's
acceptance of the Papen Government. In light of the ex-
cesses committed by the SA, and especially after the spec-
tacular Nazi electoral success on 31 July, 15 Schleicher may
1 3°Deutscher Reichsanzieger und Preufiischer Staats -
anzeiger
,
Nr. 150, 29 June 1932. '
—
14Heiden, Per Fuhrer
, 46 7ff; Pridham, Hitler's Rise to
Power
,
281 ff; Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny
, rev.
ed., New York, 1962, 213ff; and Joachim Fest, Hitler
,
(trans.
R. and C. Winston), New York, 1974, 338ff.
1
5
The Nazis, now the strongest party in the Reichstag,
more than doubled their representation, winning 230 seats as
compared to their 1930 shoring of 107 seats. See appendix C
of Fritz Stern (ed.), The Path to Dictatorship 1918-1933 .
Essays by Ten German Scholars
,
(trans. J. Conway), New York,
1966, 206f. A voting pattern analysis is given in Bracher,
Auflosunq
,
part II, chapter X.
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have decided that the situation demanded an acceleration of
the pace at which he had progressed toward setting up the
military sport program.
Whatever the reason for the delay, the Defense and
Interior Ministries subsequently worked closely with one
another during July and August in an effort to organize the
military sport program. 16 The Defense Ministry furloughed
50 captains and lieutenants, for three months, to serve as
military sport instructors, and the Army Administrative
0ffice (Heeresverwaltungsamt) provided surplus uniforms and
equipment to General von Stiilpnagel. Army General Staff
officers were ordered to work closely with him. 17
Reichswehr interest in the Stiilpnagel Organization
was clearly expressed in a memorandum entitled "Military
Requirements of an Organization for the Physical Improve-
ment of German Youth", which was published as an appendix
to the furlough directive. According to the Army, Stiilp-
1 6On 6 July General Bredow [Schleicher's successor
in the Ministeramt] forwarded to Schleicher a report (un-
fortunately missing from the NachlaB) outlining Stiilpnagel 1
progress, and on 4 August Schleicher received a draft copy
(also missing) of "Satzungen des Reichskuratoriums fur
Gelandesport" requesting his approval. See BA-MA, NachlaB
Bredow, N-97/1, 6 July 1932 and 4 August 1932. See also
Keitel, Verbreche r, 50, letter of Keitel to his father,
10 July 1932.
17BA-MA, RH-8/896, CHL TA 570/32 g.K. T2IIIA, 25
July 1932. The order did not specify the dates of the fur-
lough, which, in all likelihood, began about 1 October, the
scheduled course commencement date.
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nagel's ultimate goal was the "physical improvement and
pre-militarv training, of all male Germans between the ages
of 6 and 21.-18 As a more practical and iinmedlate object _
ive, the Army wanted him to provide terrain sport training
for "... the reserve for the Border Guard, the Army, and
the Navy, [and for youth] between the ages of 16 and 21.-19
In encouraging General von Stulpnagel to train a reserve,
the General Staff stated that his training courses should
encompass "infantry basic (recruit) training without
20arms..." the exact content of which was detailed in the
pamphlet "Guidelines of the Reich Ministry of the Interior
for Training in Terrain Sport. "21
By early September work on the military sport organi-
1 8Ibid., appendix "Militarische Forderungen an eineOrganisation zur Ertiichtigung der deutschen Jugend". § 1.
"Endziel: Korperliche Ertiichtigung und vormilitarische
Ausbildung der gesamten mannlichen deutschen Jugend im
Alter von 6.-21. JahrenV (emphasis in original).
1 9Ibid
.
,
"b. Ziel fur die nachste Zeit: Gelandesport -
lich Vorbildung des Ersatzes fur Grenzschutz, Heer und
Marine, im Alter von 16.-21. Jahren" . (emphasis in original)
20
BA-MA, RH-8/896, CHL TA 570/32 g.K. T2IIIA, 25
July 1932. "Ausbildungsziel: Infanteris tische Grund (Re-
kruten Ausbildung ohne Waffen . . . " (emphasis in original).
2
1
Ibid
. , This booklet, prepared by the Reich Ministry
of the Interior, can be seen in BHStA, I, MK 13828. This
booklet was drawn up in consultation with General Vogt of
the GVA and the Defense Ministry. See BA, R-43 11/519, Vogt
to Reichskanzlei , 4 February 1932; and IfZG, Ed-67/19, en-"
closure to v. Witzleben letter to Siemens' Director v. Win-
terfeldt, 6 January 1933.
147
zation had progressed sufficiently22 to allow the Govern-
ment to announce publicly the existence of Stulpnagel's
Organization. The Reich Cabinet, meeting on 12 September,
approved a presidential decree which established a "Reich
Board of Trustees for Youth Physical Fitness Improvement
(Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichti 0,,n^ " After affirm-
ing the importance of physical fitness for national defense,
the Cabinet:
Upon request of the Reich Minister of the
Interior, resolves
... that all measuresm this area [youth fitness] are to be ef-fected in close cooperation between the
Defense Minister and the Minister of the
Interior. The Reich Minister of the In-
terior is specifically required to secure
the agreement of the Defense Minister prior
to approving changes in the articles of the
Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung and
the Association for the Promotion of Terrain
Sport. In the event of a change in the
position of the Executive Presidency of the
Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung, the
Reich Minister of the Interior, in agreement
with the Defense Minister, will nominate [a
replacement] to the Reich President. 23
22 For examples of Reich-Lander cooperation, see BHStA,
I, MF 67303, Wehrkreis VII, b Nr. 929/32 2/A, vertraulich,
to Bay. Staatsmin. des Finanzen, 3 August 1932; correspond-
ence between the Bavarian Ministry of Finance and Augsburg
(Lechfeld) and Wiirzburg (Hammelberg) of 9 August, 12 August,
and 26 September; see also MK 13828, Horl to Ministerialrat
Jahn, 13 August, and the correspondence between Horl and the
Bay. Staatsmin. fur Kultus und Unterricht in MK 1384 7.
23 IfZG, Ma-88, Reichskabinettsprotokoll , 12 September
1932, "Punkt 5; AuBerhalb der Tagesordnung: Berufung eines
Reichskuratoriums fur Jugendertiichtigung," Bl. D790674f.
"Auf Antrag des Herrn Reichsministers des Innern beschlieBt
daB alle MaBnahmen auf diesem Gebiete im engen Einver-
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Neither the dominant role of the Defense Ministry
nor the military purpose of the Reichskuratorium appeared
in Hindenburg 's public decree of 13 September which for-
mally established the Reichskuratorium. Hindenburg instead
carefully stressed the supervisory function of the Reich-
skuratorium; it merely reflected, he said, the desire of the
Reich Government to rationalize the numerous youth physical
fitness programs and to direct a unified and concerted effort
by all organizations interested in the physical welfare of
German youth. The Reich Minister of the Interior, he stated,
would serve as chairman of the Reichskuratorium, assisted by
General (Ret.} Edwin von Stulpnagel, who had the title of
Executive President. In concluding the decree, Hindenburg
directed Gayl to appoint to the board of the Reichskuratorium
persons both qualified and experienced in youth affairs.24
nehmen zwischen dem Reichminister des Innern und dem Reichs-
wehrminister zu treffen sind. Insbesondere ist der Reichs-
minister des Innern verpflichtet , sich der Zustimmung des
Reichswehrminister zu versichern, ehe an den Satzungen des
Reichskuratoriums fur Jucendertuchtigung und des Vereins zur
Forderung des Gelandesports eine Anderung vorgenommen wird.
Bei einem etwaigen Wechsel in der Stelle des geschaftsfiihren-
den Prasidenten des Reichskuratoriums fur Jugendertuchtigung
wird der Reichsminister des Innern dem Herrn Reichsprasiden-
ten einen Vorschlag nur mit Zustimmung des Reichswehrministers
machen." Bl. D790674f. Throughout the remainder of this
dissertation, Reichskuratorium will be employed in lieu of
the complete title.
24
BA, R-43 11/519; BHStA, I, MK 13828, letter of
Reichprasident von Hindenburg to RMdl, IA 1414/13.9, Berlin,
13 September 1932.
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Composed of a board of thirty-three members, 25 the
Reichskuratorium had four functions: (1) to train and certi-
fy military sport instructors, (2) to develop and encourage
a cooperative relationship among all military sport organi-
zations, (3) to supervise the operations of the Government-
sponsored terrain sport schools [in reality military sport
schools], and (4) to recommend and supervise the awarding
of Government subsidies to groups active in the military
sport movement. In an apparent effort to insure close
ties at all levels between the military sport organizations
and the Reichskuratorium, Stulpnagel established twelve
regional offices, which were also to act as contact points
between the civilian military sport organizations and the
Government military sport schools. 27 Regional office
25Bayerische Staatazeitung
, Nr. 24 9, 26 October 19 32.
Of the 3 3 member board, three members were representatives
of the Reich government; 11 were Lander representatives; 13
represented the military sport groups; and the remaining 6
had no affiliation.
26Stulpnagel outlined the functions of his organiza-
tion in a letter apparently sent in early September to all
military sport organizations. The SA response, with excerpts
from Stiilpnagel 's letter, has survived. See BA, NS-23/124,
OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September 1932.
27 Regional offices were located in the following
cities: Konigsberg, Stettin, Berlin, Breslau, Dresden, Madge-
burg, Stuttgart, Kassel, Minister, Kiel, Hannover, and Miinchen
See letter of Stulpnagel to RMdl , 7 November 1932 (from DZA-
Potsdam, Bd. 25676, reproduced in Shiitzle, Reichswehr wider
Nation
,
appendix, p. 5.).
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directors chosen by Stulpnagel, were, for the most part,
retired military officers. 28
In practice, the Reichskuratorium functioned mainly
as a reviewing agency for authorizing funds for Stulpnagel 's
military sport schools. 29 it also determined which military
sport groups were eligible for Government subvention and
for participation in the Stulpnagel program, although the
criteria for selection have apparently not survived. 30 At
its first meeting, on 3 October 1932, the Reichskuratorium
certified eighteen military sport organizations as eligible
31to participate, and decided that rather than sending its
28
BA-MA
,
Nachlafi Bredow, N-97/2, "Kurze Orientierunq"
,
17 September 1932.
29
Letter of Stulpnagel to RMdl , 7 November 19 32 (from
DZA-Potsdam, Bd. 25676, reproduced in Schutzle, Reichswehr
wider Nation, appendix, p. 5.); and BHStA, I, MF 67303, Nr.
544 79/32, contract between Bavaria and the Verein zur Forde-
rung des Gelandesports, 26 October 1932. For an example of
Reichskuratorium subvention of a Wehrsport group (SA) , see
BA, NachlaB Kriiger/22, letters Grupperfiihrer z.b.V. IVa to
OSAF, 1 March 1933; 8 April 1933; and 12 June 1933. The
Reichskuratorium awarded the SA RM 157,500 from January to
June 1933.
30 It is probable that the criteria for eligibility to
participate in the Border Guard were used for the Reichs-
kuratorium. Border Guard eligibility was defined as "...
jeder waf fenfahiger Deutsche ... soweit er wehrwillig und
staatsbejahend eingestellt ist." BA-MA, II H/292, CHL TA
816/32 g.K. T2IIIA/T4III , 1 December 1932.
31BHStA, I, MK 13832, RMdl to Landesregierungen, IA
1414/8.10, Berlin, 22 October 1932. The following Wehrsport-
verbande were allowed to participate: Stahlhelm (including
Jungsta) ; SA and HJ; Reichsbanner
,
Kyffhauser and Kyffh^user-
jugend; Reichsjunglandbund; DHV (Deutsch Nationale Handlungs-
gehilfenenverband) ; Jungdeutscherorden; Jungsturm; DOB
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own instructors to these groups to teach military sport, it
would be easier for Sttilpnagel • s staff to train and certify
personnel selected by the groups who would then conduct their
own programs. 32 At their second meeting,33 on 27 October,
Reichskuratorium members inspected a proposed military sport
school site near Berlin and admitted several more military
sport organizations to the Reichskuratorium. 34
(Deutscherof fiziersbund)
; ReichsausschuB fur Leibeserzie-hungen (Deutsche Turnerschaf t) ; AWA (Akademisch-Wissen-
schaftliches Arbeitsamt) ; Institut fur Leibesubungen an dendeutschen Hochschulen ; GVA; Freischar junger Nation; Bis-
marck j ugend; Reichsverband vaterliindischer Arbeiter; Reich-
skuratorium fur Reit- und Fahrschulen; and the Kleinkaliber-
schiitzenverbande
.
32
BHStA, I, MK 13 82 8, "Niederschrift " of a conference
on Gelandesport, VII/35975, 4 October 1932. Stiilpnagel was
already committed to this decision since early September.
See BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September 1932.
33According to Kohler, Arbeitsdienst
, 221, the Reichs-
kuratorium planned to meet twice annually, the first meeting
taking place on 27 October 1932. A letter of the RMdl to the
LandeSregierungen of 22 October (BHStA, I, MK 13832, RMdl to
Landesregierungen, IA 1414/8.10, 22 October 1932) states that
the first Reichskuratorium meeting was held 3 October.
34
BHStA
,
I, MK 13 832, RMdl to Landesregierungen, IA
1414/24.10, 7 November 1932. Admitted were the: Eichenkreuz;
Jugenbund im Gewerkschaftsbund der Angestellten (GDA) ; Wehr-
wolf; and Deutsche Jugendkraft. The Bayernwacht and Pfalz-
wacht were admitted in December. See BA, R-43 11/519, RMdl
to Ministerialrat von Lex, MdR, 1414 a/ 12.12, 24 December
1932. The Communist Party and its affiliated organizations
were banned from the Reichskuratorium. See also Vogelsang,
RW-Staat-NSDAP, 9 7-100.
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It is not certain if Interior Minister Gayl ever
appointed the full complement of thirty-three members to
the board of the Reichskuratorium. At the end of October
1932, he had named only ten: Defense Minister (Ret.) GeBler,
State Secretary (Ret.) Dr. Theodor Leewald, 35 former Reich
Minister for Food and Agriculture Dr. Heinrich Haslinde 36
State Minister (Ret.) Dr. Alexander Dominicus, 37 Dr. Carl
38Diem, the famous surgeon Dr. Ferdinand Sauerbruch 39
Reich Commissioner for Voluntary Labor Service Dr. Fried-
35 1860-1947. Lewald, Staatssekretar in the Reich In-
terior Ministry, 1919-21, was a founder of the Hochschule fur
Leibesiibungen in 1920. Director of the Deutscher Reichs-
ausschuB fur Leibesiibungen (the successor to the pre-war
German Olympic Committee) from 1919-1933, he maintained
close ties with the Reichswehr and the Volkssport movement.
He served on the International Olympic Committee from 1924
to 1939, and was its director after 1933. He was also the
director of the German Olympic Committee.
36 1881-?. Regierungsprasident in Munster from 1922 to
1927, Haslinde was Reichminister fur Ernahrung und Land-
wirtschaft during 1926. He was associated with the Center
Party
.
37
1873-1945. Mayor of Berlin-Schoneburg from 1911
to 1920, he served as Prussian Minister of the Interior in
1921. From 1921 to 1933 he was a board member of the Deutscher
ReichsausschuB fur Leibesiibungen and was a member of the Board
of Directors of the Deutsche Turnerschaft , and was director
of that organization from 1929 to 1933.
38 1882- 1962. Diem was General Secretary of the Deutscher
ReichsausschuB fur Leibesiibungen, 1 91 3-1 933, and General Sec-
retary of the International Olympic Committee, 1936-39.
39
1875-1951. The most famous surgeon of his time in
Germany, he was the Ordinarius of the Berlin Charite Hospital
and medical school. He also had a distinguished career in
both world wars as a military surgeon.
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rich Syrup, 40 President of the Catholic Voung Mens ,
Father Ludwig Wolker, 41 Captain (Ret.) Elhard von Morozow-
42icz of the Stahlhelm, and Lieutenant (Ret.) Friedrich-
Wilhelm Kriiger ^ of the SA Thou Lu ine first seven members were
appointed by Gayl as representatives of the Reich; the
40
*
1881-1945. From 1920 to 1927, Syrup was Presidentof the Rexchsarbeitsverwaltung, and in 1 92 V^ecame Present
vfrsroh™ 5^^ 1 ' "5 ^beitsvermitt lung und Arbeits^osen-ersicherung. He served as Reichskommissar fur den Freiwilli
?he S^h?
itS
H
ien
^-
1932 - 1933
'
and aS ^ichsarbeitsmiLsSr\nt c leicher Cabinet.
41
• 1887-?. Generalprases of the Katholischen Juna-
mannerverband, Wolker was also a director of the Reichsaus-
schuB des deutschen Jugendverbande (along with General Vogt)
.
42
1893- 1934. A landowner from Brandenburg, he served
as leader of the Stahlhelm region Brandenburg and as Reichs-fuhrer des Jungstahlhelms
. Appointed to the OSAF in 19 33,he was killed the following February in an auto accident/
43
1894- 1945. A graduate of Lichterfelde Cadet school
and son of a regimental commander, Kriiger was commissioned
in the Prussian army in 1914. He served all four years of
the war on the front, was wounded three times, and was high-
ly decorated. Following the war and service in several Frei-
korps (Iron Torpedoboat Flotilla and the Freikorps Liitzow)
,
he resigned in March 1920. From 1924 to 1928 he was the
Director and Vorstandsmitglieder of the Berlin Miillabfuhr AG.
He joined the NSDAP in 1929 (Nr. 171,199) and the SS in
1931 (Nr. 6123). Transferring to the SA in April 1931, he
remained in it as Gruppenfiihrer-Ost
,
Gruppenfuhrer z.b.V.,
and Chef des Ausbildungswesens der SA, until 1934, when he
became the head of the Organisation Kriiger (Chef AW) . In
June 1935, following the disbanding of the Chef AW, Kriiger
rejoined the SS as Obergruppenfuhrer
,
serving as HSSPF-Ost
(Poland) from 1939 to 1943. He became commander of the 6th
SS Gebirgsdivision in 1944 and then commander of the Vth SS
Mountain Army Corps. He is reported to have died in 1945,
either in action or by his own hand.
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latter three represented military sport organizations.44
The Reich Government attempted to insure the politi-
cal impartiality of the Reichskuratorium, as an examination
of the list of approved organizations indicates. It also
attempted to encourage the trade unions, with their vast
membership, to participate, an attempt not altogether un-
successful. 45 Nonetheless, the infreguency of the Reichs-
kuratorium meetings and the inter-locking directorships
held by Sttilpnagel tended to lessen the influence of the
Reichskuratorium.
Sttilpnagel, in addition to his duties as executive
president of the Reichskuratorium, directed the "Associa-
tion for the Promotion of Terrain Sport", an organization
which Hindenburg founded along with the Reichskuratorium. 46
Organized as a legal entity (a corporation) distinct from
the Reich Ministry of the Interior in order to free it from
44
Bayerische Staatszeitung , Nr. 248, 26 October 1932.
45
On 16 January 1933, the Reichskuratorium invited
the Allgemeiner Deutschen Gewerksschaftbund to participate,
an offer which was accepted, but which the Nazi takeover
rendered obsolete. See Schiitzle, Reichswehr wider Nation,
203.
46
BHStA, I, MK 13832, letter RMdl to Landesregierungen
,
1414/13.9, Berlin, 15 September 1932. "Stulpnagel Organiza-
tion" is employed for the sake of simplicity rather than the
more cumbersome full title. Many scholars (e.g., Vogelsang,
Kohler, Bracher, Carsten) have either been unaware of, or
have ignored the difference between the Reichskuratorium and
the Stulpnagel Organization. While in practice the difference
may have been blurred, the two organizations were quite
separate in theory.
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administrative details, the purpose of the Terrain Sport
Association was to organize and operate the sixteen mili-
tary (terrain) sport schools sponsored by the Reichskura-
47torium.
The Terrain Sport Association, like the Reichskura-
torium, had a board of directors. The board, chaired by
General von Stiilpnagel, was composed of Senior Counselors
Max Adam and Hans Erbe, 49 Counselor (Ret.) Richard Jahn,
Capt. (Ret.) Hans-Henning von Holtzendorf f
,
51
and Majors
50
47 Ibid., and letter of RMdl to Landesregierungen
,
IA 1414/17.1 III, 3 February 1933. The sixteen schools werelocated in: Arys, Lokstedter Lager, Burg Stargard, Wunsdorf,Dobentz, Neuhammer, Altengrabow, Konigsbruck, Ohrdruf,
Ganseweg-Munsingen, Oershausen, Scheuen, Munsterlager
, Lech-feld, Hammelburg, and Kiel-Friedrichsort
. See Vogelsang,
RW-Staat-NSDAP, 286-87. Stiilpnagel originally planned for
18 schools. Compare the above list to OSAF Qu Nr. 1509/32,
16 September 1932 in BA, NS-23/124.
48
.
.Oberregierungsrat in the Reich Ministry of the In-
terior (?) .
49 Oberegierungsrat in the Reich Ministry of the In-
terior. Erbe was responsible for supervising the activities
of the Reichskuratorium.
50
Regierungsrat (Ret.) Jahn was the administrative
chief (Verwaltungschef ) of the Reichskuratorium and later
assumed the same position in the Chef des Ausbildungswesens
der SA.
51
Koltzendorff served under Schleicher and Groener
during the First World War, but left the Army as a captain
to administer family estates. In 1928 Schleicher hired him
as an economic advisor to the Reichswehrminister . Holtzen-
dorf f re-entered the Army in 19 33 and was a Brigadier General
at the end of the Second World War.
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(Ret.) Hans Walter von Olberg 52 and Herbert Scultetus. 53
Olberg and Scultetus were also executive vice-presidents
of the Terrain Sport Association. 54 The majority of the
Association's instructor and staff personnel were former
officers and non-commissioned officers selected by Stulp-
nagel. J
In a letter sent in early September to all military
sport organizations, Stulpnagel outlined the goals and
plans of his new organization. Its function, he explained,
was to train and certify military instructors from the
participating military sport organizations. Although the
organizations could nominate whomever they wished to attend
52A former AWA instructor at Wunsdorf, with close
ties to the GVA (Vogt)
,
Olberg was the Press Chief in the
Stahlhelm Bundesleitung and operated the Wehrsport program
of the Stahlhelm Student Group, Langemarck.
53 Little is known of the background of this man. He
later apparently served in some capacity as a liaison officer
between the Army General Staff (T-4, Training) and the Chef
des Ausbildungswesens der SA.
54
BHStA, I, MK 13832, letter RMdl to Landesregierungen
IA 1414/13.9 and 1414/17.1 III, 15 September 1932 and 3 Febru
ary, respectively.
55
BHStA, I, MK 13832, Minutes of a Conference on Ter-
rain Sport Schools, Kultusministerium, VII 35975, 4 October
1932; BA, R-36/2013, Deutscher Gemeindetag, "Vermerk" , 27
February 1933; Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich , I, 98f.,
states that according to CHL PA 1017/34, PI (W) , 29 January
1934, service with the Reichskuratorium was credited as
military service for re-activated officers.
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the instructor training, he noted that enrollment in the
Association's schools would be computed on a percentage
basis: the number of students from any military sport or-
ganization would be determined from the number of members
in that organization in comparison to the total of all
military sport participants in the region in which the
organization was located. 56 The courses, explained Stiilp-
nagel, would last three weeks, commencing 1 November. 57
The regional Reichskuratorium branch office would make the
actual student allocations from lists submitted by local
military sport organizations, and, he added, would arrange
transportation to and from the schools and assume all ex-
penses. All students, he insisted, would be screened prior
to admission to insure that they had some prior sport and
marksmanship training. In closing his letter, the General
ennunciated his policy that political activity within the
camps and schools of the Association would not be tolerated
and would result in the immediate dismissal of the perpe-
trator.^^
BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September
1932, "Merkblatt".
57
IfZG, Fa 88/337, HJ Stabsleitung, Ref VI 16/31,
14 September 1932.
CO
BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September
1932, "Merkblatt".
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Defense Ministry and Army Command planning for im-
plementing the 21 division expansion program progressed
along with the organization of the Reichskuratorium. The
Disarmament Conferences at Geneva had been fruitless from
the perspective of Germany, and as early as September 1932,
the Reich Government began to consider going ahead with its
expansion plan on 1 April 1933 regardless of the outcome of
the talks at Geneva. 59 On 7 November Defense Minister von
Schleicher ordered the General Staff to issue the orders
authorizing the Army to increase its personnel strength by
14%. The Army, he wrote, would enlist the extra recruits
the following April in anticipation of the later expansion
to 21 divisions.60
The General Staff at once took advantage of the Reichs
kuratoriurn training program: recruits for the expanded
Reichswehr were expected, insofar as possible, to have com-
pleted a Reichskuratorium pre-military training course or a
similar course conducted by Reichskuratorium certified in-
61
structors. The same requirement was extended, three weeks
59
BA-MA, NachlaB Bredow, N-97/1 , letter Bredow to
Freiherr von Richtofen, 12 September 1932. Germany's theoret-
ical right to re-arm was recognized on 10 December, 1932.
See Bracher, Auflosung , 631
.
60BA-MA, II H/139, CHL TA 737/32, g.K.T2IIIB, 7 Nov-
ember 1932.
61 Ibid.
1 59
later, to prospective Border Guard recruits.62 The Reich
Government underscored the importance of the Reichskuratorium
contribution to the defense effort by approving Minister
Gayl's request63 that Reich officials be given furloughs
to attend the Terrain Sport Association courses.64
'
Although the Reich Government enthusiastically en-
dorsed Stiilpnagel's courses, the reaction to the Reichs-
kuratorium by the military sport organizations and their
political sponsors varied. The radical political parties
predictably condemned the Reichskuratorium in theory but
not in practice, while the conservative organizations and
parties supported it. A surprising acceptance came from
the Socialists, although their enthusiasm soon waned as
their traditional pacifism and hostility toward the Reichs-
wehr re-appeared.
Stahlhelm leaders, strongly committed to an extensive
military sport program of their own, 65 had initially been
62
Ibid., II H/292, CHL TA 816/32, g.K. T2IIIA/T4 III,
1 December 1932.
63
BA, R-43 11/519, letter RMdl IA 1414/15.10, to
Staatssekretar in der Reichskanzlei , 12 November 1932 (Rk.
Nr. 11227).
64
Heeresverordnungsblat t
, 1933, para. 55, 15 February
1933.
65
Berghahn, Stahlhelm
, 229, 233f. For the expanded
Stahlhelm Wehrsport program, see Chapter III, pp.64ff,and
BA, R-43 11/828, Rk . 9047, Notizen fur eine Unterredung mit
dem Herrn Reichswehrminister , 26 September 19 32.
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skeptical of Papen and Schleicher and had not expressed any
feelings toward either the Reichskuratorium or the Terrain
Sport Association during the genesis of these organizations.
By the fall of 1932, however, Seldte and Duesterberg had
reversed their attitude toward Papen, realizing that he
better represented their interests than Schleicher, with
whom their relations had been strained. 66 Following the
Reichstag vote of no-confidence of 12 September 1932 in his
Government, Papen attempted to gain the support of the
Stahlhelm and the Nationalist Party (DNVP) by offering
Seldte a vice-chancellorship as well as control of the
Reichskuratorium and the Voluntary Labor Service. 67 Before
anything concrete developed from this offer, Schleicher be-
came Chancellor (6 December 1932) and re-asserted the Army's
long standing policy of neutrality vis-a-vis the military
sport organizations, a neutrality which excluded the Stahl-
helm or any organization from assuming control of the
Reichskuratorium.
In spite of their mistrust of Schleicher, Seldte and
Duesterberg did not discourage Stahlhelm members from attend-
ing the Stiilpnagel schools. In practice the Stahlhelm may
66Berghahn, Stahlhelm
,
233-37.
Ibid. , 2 38 . Seldte 1 s interest in gaining control of
the Reichskuratorium and the Voluntary Labor Service may have
originated from Papen 1 s overtures , but at any rate, the inter-
est became an idee fixee. See Reichsminister Hugenberg's
letter to Seldte, 17 April 1933, in BA, R-43 11/143, "Zustan-
digkeitsfragen"
.
161
have received more than its fair share of enrollment allo-
cations. Total attendance for the first Terrain Sport Asso-
ciation three week instructor course (7-28 November) was
2150 men, of whom 549 or 26% were from the Stahlhelm. 68
This appears to be a higher percentage than that to which
the Stahlhelm was entitled; its relative strength in the
military sport movement was only 20%. It is possible that
the extra Stahlhelm participants were enrolled to fill the
quota of the Reichsbanner
, which sent students to Stulp-
nagel 's schools only in Bavaria. 69
Although the National Socialists did not expressly
condemn the Reichskuratorium, their reception was distinct-
ly cold:
An invention of the Papen Regime, to be
viewed with suspicion.... How can anyone
conceive of bringing together for a common
task Nazi and let us say Marxist organiza-
68
The figures are from Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
,
2 86, who lists enrollment by group. The document from which
Vogelsang quotes, Anlage 4 of a letter of Stulpnagel to the
RMdl, 7 November 19 32, is reproduced in the appendix of
Schutzle, Reichswehr wider Nation .
69 Using the estimates of 1.5 million military sport
participants (Chapter 111/64) and 314,000 Wehrstahlhelm mem-
bers (Chapter 111/49) , the Stahlhelm percentage of the move-
ment is 20. It is possible that the 6% variance can also be
explained by the defection of many Wehrstahlhelm members to
the Nazis after January 1933, as the Stahlhelm estimate dates
from July 1933. For Reichsbanner participation in the two
Stulpnagel schools in Bavaria, see BHStA, I, MK 13828, Abt.
"Volksertuchtigung" der bay. Gesellschaft zur Forderung der
Leibesubungen, Nr. 275G. , 31 October 1932.
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tions, as Government circles are thinking
of doing, only Messers. Paper and Gaylknow. 70 *
Brushing aside the reservations of the Party lead-
ers, the ever-practical Rohm promptly informed his SA
commanders that the "request of the [Reichskuratorium]
branch offices regarding [SA] attendance at the instructor
training courses would be met as closely as possible."71
After acknowledging the unpalatable conditions (e.g.
, a ban
on all political activity by students during the training
courses, communal camp arrangements mixing Nazis with Marx-
ists) attendant to participation, he ordered complete
compliance with Stiilpnagel's regulations, adding that the
benefits arising from the training exceeded any momentary
disadvantages
.
72
The SA leaders appear to have obeyed Rohm's orders
requiring maximum SA participation and strict adherence to
A front page article in the Volkischer Beobachter
,
Nr. 260 (Reichsausgabe) , 16 September 1932, denounced the
Reichskuratorium as "eine Neugriindung der Regierung Papen,
gegen die Mifitrauen geboten ist.... Wie man es sich al-
lerdings in den Kreisen der Regierung vorstellt, etwa
marxistische und nationalsozialistische Organisation 'zu
gemeinsamer Arbeit zusammenzufassen 1 bleibt das Geheimnis
der Herren Papen und Gayl."
71
BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September
1932. "Der Aufforderung der Zweigstellen zwecks Teilnahme
an den Lehrkursen muB in moglichst hohen Zahl nachgekommen
werden." (emphasis in original)
72/<£Ibid.
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Reichskuratorium regulations. 73 SA attendance at the first
instructor training course was 714 of 21 50 students, or 33%,
the largest of any group and consistent with the strength
of the SA in relation to the military sport movement. 74 m
comparison to the Stahlhelm and the Reichsbanner, the SA had
an immense advantage vis-a-vis the Stulpnagel attendance
formula: most SA men were under the maximum age of 26 set
by Stulpnagel, while the bulk of the men in the Stahlhelm
and the Reichsbanner exceeded that age.
In appointing Gruppenfiihrer z.h.v._ (zur besonderen
Verwendung
) Friedrich-Wilhelm Kriiger as SA Liaison Officer
73The SA, for example, asked that its members bepermitted to wear their uniforms while in transit to andfrom Reichskuratorium courses as well as in the students'free time. The Reichskuratorium replied that it would per-
mit, though discourage, the wearing of paramilitary group
uniforms for students in transit, but would not allow stu-dents to wear paramilitary uniforms, except in extraordinary
circumstances, during leisure time. BHStA, I, MK 13832,
Reichskuratorium to all branch offices, 14 February 1933.The Bavarian Government promptly protested the wearing of
any uniforms. See ibid.
, letter Bay. Staatsmin. fur Kultus
und Unterricht, Nr. VII 6847 ZA, to RMdl, 18 February 1933.
74
Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
, 286. R6hm ordered his
SA commanders to include SS and older HJ members in their
strength calculations. See BA-NS-23/1 2 4 , OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/
32, 16 September 1932. As of September 1932, SA strength
was 446, /42, with 26,998 Motor-SA, 24,405 SS , and 24,859 SA
recruits, a total of 522,304. See ibid
. , OSAF I, 14 Novem-
ber 1932. Carsten, unaware of Stulpnagel' s percentage en-
rollment formula, attributes incorrectly the large SA par-
ticipation to a favorable Reichswehr attitude. See his
Reichswehr and Politics, 354f.
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to the Reichskuratorium and the Terrain Sport Association,
Rohm, in effect, placed him in charge of all SA relations
with the military sport program, sponsored by the Government,
although the SA Chief of Staff reserved "basic policy" de-
cisions for himself.75 Kriiger 's special task was to estab-
lish personal contact with the leaders and staff of the
Reichskuratorium branch offices as well as the Terrain Sport
Association. Rohm further authorized Kriiger to contact
directly in behalf of the SA the appropriate Government
agency on questions concerning the Reichskuratorium, the
Border Guard, and the Volunteer Labor Service. 76
The Terrain Sport Association eclipsed General Vogt's
GVA ( Gelandesport-Verbande-Arbeitsegemeinschaft ) and, in
effect, rendered it superflous. Stulpnagel's attendance
formula proved disastrous for the GVA. Several of the
77groups which had belonged to the GVA withdrew, apparently
75
BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September
1932; ibid
. , Sam. Sch/409, OSAF Qu Nr. 3388/32, 20 November
1932, "Dienstanweisung fur den Gruppenstab z.b.V. in Berlin";
BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, OSAF II Nr. 2 791/32, Rohm to Rmdl,
4 October 1932.
76 BA, Sam Sch/409, OSAF Qu Nr. 3388/32, 20 November
1932, "Dienstanweisung".
77 These were the Kyf fhauserbund, Junglandbund , Reichs-
verband vaterlandischen Arbeiter, DHV, and the Freischar
Junger Nation. Compare this list to Chapter 111/17. It ap-
pears that at one time or another, most major Wehrsport groups
belonged to the GVA. For Stahlhelm involvement in the Bund
Jungdeutschland (the predecessor to the GVA) see IfZG, Ed-67/
19, "Satzungen des Bund Jungdeutschland e.V." For Reichs-
banner-GVA cooperation, see BA, R-43 11/519, letter Vogt to
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convinced that their enrollment quota in Stulpnagel's
schools would be greater if they applied individually.
Although itself admitted to the Reichskuratorium, Vogt '
s
organization was apparently a fraction of its former size,
and he quickly concluded an agreement with Stulpnagel
which allowed him to concentrate his energies on training
youngsters under 26 years of age, i^., those too young to
qualify for the Reichskuratorium. Following this pact,
Vogt disbanded the GVA and founded, on the 24th of November,
the German Youth Service (Deutscher Jugenddienst ) , which in
1933 was absorbed into the Hitler Youth. 78
Initially the Reichskuratorium subsidies and the
free training provided by the schools of the Terrain Sport
Association appeared attractive to the Reichsbanner
, which
also conducted its own extensive military sport program.
Reichsbanner Commander Karl Holtermann persuaded SPD lead-
ers that participation in the Reichskuratorium allowed
Socialists, for the first time, a chance to work indirectly
with the Army, an opportunity which he categorized as having
79great potential. The Reichsbanner joined the Reichskura-
Briining, 4 February 1932. A Hitler Youth circular of August
1932 indicates that the SA and the HJ, in all likelihood us-
ing the cover of the "Deutscher Volkssportverein" (Chapter
IV/94.) had once belonged to the GVA. See IfZG, Fa 88/337,
HJ Stabsleitung Ref. VI, 1/32, 26 August 1932, Bl. 168.
78
IfZG
,
Ed-67/19, letter Witzleben to Winterfeldt,
6 January 1933, Bl. 138.
79 Rohe, Reichsbanner, 449ff
.
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in
ain-
torium in October and sent its meters, apparently only
Bavaria, to at least the first and second instructor t
ing courses. 80 By December, however, official Reichsbanner
Reichskuratorium cooperation had ended. Socialist Party
leaders, convinced that the Reichskuratorium was the first
step toward the re-introduction of conscription, ordered
all Reichsbanner participation in the Reichskuratorium and
Terrain Sport Association ended, 81 it is not clear if
Holtermann, who had tearfully argued in favor of continuing
ties with the Reichskuratorium, actually ordered a complete
halt to all Reichsbanner-Reichskuratorium activity.82 in
80
,
BHStA
,
I, MK 13832, RMdl to Landesregierungen
, IA1414/8.10, 22 October 1932; letter H6rl, Abt. Volksertuchti-
gung, Nr. 275G and 591G, to Bay. Staatsmin. fur Kultus und
Unterricht, 31 October and 8 December 19 32.
81
Rohe, Reichsbanner, 449ff; Absolon, Wehrmacht im
Dritten Reich
,
I, 9 7ff; Vorwarts, Jahrgang 49, Nr. 435, 15
September 1932; Nr. 515, 1 November 1932; and Nr. 578, 8
December 1932.
82
Reichsbanner members did participate at least in
Bavaria in the second course (conducted during December)
,
although the SPD directive to cease participation may have
been issued too late to affect this course. See BHStA
,
I,
MK 13832, letters Horl to Bay. Staatsmin. fur Kultus und
Unterricht, Nrs. 591G and 743G (BHStA, I, MK 13828), 8 and
23 December, respectively. A letter from the Reichskura-
torium of 16 February 1933 states that for political reasons
the Reichsbanner may not be allowed to participate in the
fourth course (26 February-18 March 1933), which implies
that the Reichsbanner participated in the third course (22
January-1 1 February 1933). See ibid
. , Reichskuratorium to
Zweigstellen , 16 February 1933. This letter is signed by
Major Model, an officer then assigned to the Training
Section (T-4) of the General Staff ( Rangliste
, 1932, p. 3. ).
According to fellow Truppenamt officer and later General der
Waffen-SS Felix Steiner, Model was responsible for military
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any event, following the National-Socialist take-over of
the Weimar Republic (30 January 1933), Reichsbanner par-
ticipation became a moot issue, as various state govern-
ments, followed by the Reich, outlawed the Socialist or-
ganization. 83
The Communist Party, whose paramilitary organiza-
tion, the Red Front Fighters' League, was banned from the
Reichskuratorium, apparently at the whim of the Papen Gov-
ernment, responded with a Reichstag motion calling for the
dissolution of the Reichskuratorium. Communist Reichstag
Deputy Torgler and twenty others requested the motion on
17 November 1932, a proposal which apparently died in com-
84
mittee
.
The political effectiveness of the Reichskuratorium
does not readily lend itself to assessment. While it is
easy to criticize politicians for their lack of enthusiasm
for the one program which promised to lessen the alienation
of Germany's youth, it must be remembered that the Army, at
least initially, had presented the Reichskuratorium as a
liaison with the Reichskuratorium. See Felix Steiner, Von
Clausewitz bis Bulganin
,
Bielefeld, 1956, 112ff. (Hereafter
cited as Steiner, Clausewitz bis Bulganin .)
83
Rohe, Reichsbanner, 459-470.
RTV, Torgler (KPD) , 17 December 1932, vol. 456,
Antrag Nr. 258. There is no record of this motion ever
leaving committee.
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solution to a military problem, not a political one. This
presented grave difficulties for the Socialists, who found
it difficult to countenance what amounted to a violation
of the spirit of the Versailles Treaty. Ever suspicious of
the Defense Ministry, they missed a major opportunity to
demonstrate good will and to participate meaningfully in
the national defense effort. Their vacillation and reluct-
ance to commit themselves openly to an alliance—even one
of convenience—with the Defense Ministry doubtless increased
the mistrust of the officer corps for the Party, to say
nothing of alienating considerable numbers of patriotic,
republican workers. The Stahlhelm, with more than its
usual ineptitude, failed to seize the opportunity to take
control of the military sport project on two occasions, and
foolishly entered, for all intents and purposes, into a
rivalry with the Reichskuratorium. Their distrust and sus-
picion of General Schleicher were manipulated by Papen and
the venal Seldte into a mesalliance with the Nazis.
Ironically, the SA profited the most from the Reichs-
kuratorium. With their uncanny ability to use the institu-
tions of the Republic for their own benefit, i.e ., to under-
mine it, the Nazis cynically encouraged the Weimar Republic
to train their brown battalions. The Government, of course,
welcomed the participation of the Nazis, regardless of moti-
vation, hoping that their exposure to responsible military
and political activity would deradicalize most of the SA men.
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Just how long Hitler would have permitted SA participation
had the Government succeeded in its aims must remain an un-
answered question, as must the question of his successfully
carrying out that prohibition.
In assessing the military contribution of the Reichs-
kuratorium, one must conclude that it (and its successor,
the chef des Ausbilduncrswesens der SA) was highly success-
ful. On the other hand, it was established too late to ac-
complish its twin political goals of depoliticizing the
youth of Germany and providing an alternate "school of the
nation". Commencing operations in the last months of the
Weimar Republic, the Reichskuratorium was simply a matter
of too little, too late.
Its potential, however, as a substitute school of
the nation did not escape the Nazis. Already thinking of
universal military sport training for the youth of Germany?5
the Reichskuratorium provided a ready-made base from which
to expand. Such an area of activity, moreover, appealed to
Rohm and Kruger, the SA liaison officer to the Reichskura-
torium, as an ideal task for the SA once the Party came to
power.
See Chapter VII, 179ff,; and Hitler, Mein Kampf
,
279f, 408-414.
CHAPTER VII
RELUCTANT SURRENDER:
THE TRANSFER OF PRE
-MILITARY
TRAINING TO THE SA
The advent of the Hitler regime paved the way for
the eventual take-over of the Reichskuratorium by the SA.
The political potential of the Reichskuratorium had not
escaped the National Socialists, who no longer found in-
doctrination objectionable when aimed at supporting their
new Government. There was, moreover, no question that
Hitler planned to continue military sport training. In
his book he had written that the Nazi state:
. .
.
will have to look on post school physical
training ... as a state function, ... through
state institutions. This education in its
broad outlines can serve as a preparation for
future military service. The Army will not
have to teach the young men the fundamentals
of the most elementary drill book as hitherto,
and it will not get recruits of the present
type; no, it will only have to transform a
young man who has already received flawless
physical preparation into a soldier. 1
Yet despite Hitler's interest in military sport,
two factors prevented the SA from immediately assuming the
duties of the Reichskuratorium. First, the attitude of the
Army toward the SA was problematical, and until the Army
Hitler, Mein Kampf
,
413f, 279ff, 408-411
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approached the SA Hitler could ill-afford to antagonize th
soldiers. Second, the SA had a number of demanding and im
portant duties during the first months of the Nazi regime.
These duties included, for example, the usual propaganda
marches, leaflet distribution, and assembly protection, as
well as the assigning of SA men to serve as auxiliary
police. Not until the Nazi Regime was finally anchored
would Rohm be able to devote his full attention to the
future of the Reichskuratorium and the SA military sport
program.
The National Socialists met with a mixed reaction
from the Army. While many Reichswehr officers were sympa-
thetic to certain elements of the Nazi world-view, e.g.
,
its nationalism, anti-liberal and anti-democratic outlook,
and hierarchical organization, its very nature as a politi-
cal party compelled most officers to avoid any public asso-
ciation with the Nazis. 2 Seeckt's doctrine of the politi-
cally impartial Army remained dogma to most soldiers. This
conviction the Nazis, despite strenuous efforts, never
completely undermined.
Field and general grade officers, by and large,
2Manfred Messerschmidt , Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat ;
Zeit der Indoktrination
,
Hamburg, 1969, 2-3, 17. (Hereafter
cited as Messerschmidt, Wehrmacht und NS ) ; and Klaus-Jurgen
Muller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und Nationalsozialist -
isches Regime
, Stuttgart, 1969, 29-33. (Hereafter cited as
Muller, Heer und Hitler)
.
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exercised more restraint toward National Socialism than did
their younger counterparts, the company grade officers. The
activism and radicalism of the Nazis had little appeal to
the older officers, whose age and experience had taught them
to be suspicious of instant solutions. The more perceptive
officers probably realized that even a policy of political
neutrality was bankrupt: should the Nazis succeed in solving
Germany's problems and becoming the first political party to
win the loyalty of a majority of Germans, it would be extreme-
ly difficult to retain the political impartiality of the Reichs
wehr. Nonetheless, most senior officers tolerated what they
perceived to be a triumph of conservative, national forces,
and hoped that the Nazis would demonstrate responsibility in
their new position. 3
Younger officers, on the other hand, showed more en-
thusiasm for the new government than did their superiors.
Many younger officers saw the combination of the leader prin-
ciple, the concern for the common welfare, and the strong
nationalism espoused by Hitler and his followers as the ans-
wer to Germany's internal unrest and weak international
position. Hitler carefully nurtured this enthusiasm by ap-
pealing to the idealism and self-interest of his audience.
Casting off the shackles of Versailles meant military ex-
Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics
,
310; Messerschmidt
,
Wehrmacht und NS , 2f
.
, 6f.
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pansion, which implied more rapid promotions, always an
issue of concern to the junior officers. 4
Of crucial importance in determining the relation-
ship of the Reichswehr to the Nazi state were the appoint-
ments of Lieutenant General Werner von Blomberg, 5 Command-
ing General of Military District I (East Prussia)
, and his
chief of staff, Colonel Walter von Reichenau, 6 as Defense
Minister and Chief of the Ministry Office (Ministeramt )
.
respectively. While the circumstances of Blomberg' s ap-
pointment are still unclear, 7 his tour of duty in East
IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, n.d. [Spring] 1932,Bl. 173f.; Zgs. 326, General a.D. Eccard Freiherr von Gab-lenz, Bl. 23; Bracher, Machtergreifung
, 738-43; Carsten,
Reichswehr and Politics
, 396; Muller, Heer und Hitler
, 29-33,
3 8f
.
(2878-2946), Generalfeldmarschall
. He entered the
army in 1897, completed the General Staff school in 1907, andheld a number of General Staff positions during the First
World War, and afterwards. He was Chief of the Truppenamt
(General Staff) from 1927 to 1930, but was transferred to E.
Prussia following difficulties with the Reichstag. He appeared
to suffer a nervous breakdown in May 1932, following the death
of his wife, and was temporarily assigned as Chief of the Mili-
tary Delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conferences, an un-
demanding position, from which it was expected he would retire.
6 (1884-1942) , Generalfeldmarschall. Entering the army
in 1903, Reichenau was graduated from the General Staff school
during the First World War. After the war he held a number of
command and staff positions culminating with his appointment
as Blomberg's chief of staff in 1931. A progressive and ener-
getic military figure, he commanded a number of armies during
the Second World War, but died of a heart attack while command-
ing Army Group South in Russia.
7IfZG, Zgs. 37, Foertsch, Bl. 56; Zgs. 182, Generalfeld-
marschall Maximilian Frieherr von Weichs, Bl. 4; Messerschmidt
,
Wehrmacht und NS
, 5; Muller, Heer und Hitler , 49f.; and Vogel-
sang, RW-Staat-NSDAP, 375, 386f.
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Prussia since 1930 had kept him from public involvement in
or connection with politics, a condition highly desirable
to both Hindenburg and Hitler. Considering the National
Socialist and German Nationalist cabinet coalition to be
the most favorable political solution to the instability
of the Republic, Blomberg naively expected the politicians
to restrict themselves to non-military activities, allowing
him and his staff the necessary time and resources to con-
centrate on military affairs. 8
Blomberg 's laissez faire attitude toward politics
was not shared by his assistant, von Reichenau. Introduced
to leading Nazis as early as 1931 by Ludwig Muller, then
Chaplain of Military District I, Reichenau maintained close
and public ties to the Nazi Party. Meeting with Hitler on
several occasions, he became an avid supporter of National
Socialism. 9 Impressed with the dynamism and mass appeal of
the Nazi movement, Reicheanu felt that solidarity with Nat-
ional Socialism could only benefit the Army and himself in
BA-MA, NachlaB Stulpnagel, N-5/27, 75 Jahre
, 309;Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics
, 394f.; Messerschmidt
, Wehr
macht und NS
, 19; Muller, Heer und Hitler
, 49-52; Vogelsang"
RW-Staat-NSDAP
, 375.
"
See, for example, Reichenau's letter of 7 April 1932
to Schleicher, BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/25; IfZG, Zgs
105, General d. Art. a.D. Horst von Mellenthin, Bl. 27f.;
Muller, Heer und Hitler
, 52-6; and Robert J. O'Neill, The
German Army and the Nazi Party
,
London, 1968, 19. (Hereafter
cited as O'Neil, German Army )
.
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the long run. 10 Personally impatient, energetic, and am-
bitious, he was a progressive military thinker who favored
efforts to increase Army mobility. His colleagues consid-
ered him a trifle eccentric on account of his preference
for civilian clothes, his anglophilia, and his distressing
habit of accompanying lunches with two liters of Moselle
1
1
wine
.
'
'
Reichenau's position as Chief of the Ministry Office,
which acted as a liaison between the Reichswehr and the Gov-
ernment, assumed a greater importance on account of the
peculiar circumstances surrounding General von Hammers tein,
the Chief of the Army Command. Hammerstein, clearly identi-
fied with the disgraced Schleicher, had become an outspoken
opponent of the Nazis and he had offered to resign when
Hitler became Chancellor. Although Hindenburg did not im-
mediately accept the resignation, feeling perhaps that a
change of the entire military command might undermine con-
fidence in the new government, Hammerstein knew that his
tenure of office was insecure. Never a very energetic per-
son, he abandoned himself to his favorite pastime, hunting. 12
10IfZG, Zgs. 105, Mellenthin, Bl . 27f.; Messerschmidt
,
Wehrmacht und NS
,
4f.; Miiller, Heer und Hitler
,
53-6.
11 IfZG, Zgs. 37, Foertsch, Bl. 56-64; BA-MA, NachlaB
Generaloberst a.D. Ludwig Beck, N-28/3, "Fritsch Aufzeichnung,
2 January 1938; and Steiner, Clausewitz bis Bulganin
, 100.
12 IfZG, Zgs. 37, Foertsch, Bl. 56ff; Zgs. 105, Mellen-
thin, Bl. 8; Zgs. 217, Bussche-Ippenburg, Bl. 22; Manstein,
Soldatenleben
, 108; Bracher, Machtergreifung , 733f; Miiller,
Heer und Hitler, 59ff; and O'Neill, German Army, 19f, 23.
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in what amounted to the almost complete absence of the Chief
of the Army Command, Reichenau's Ministry Office became the
central point of contact between the Army Command and Blom-
berg, with all important matters passing through Reichenau's
hands. in addition, his outspoken support and sympathy for
the National Socialist movement, unique among the senior
military officers, allowed him access to Hitler.
In spite of the many different attitudes toward the
Nazis expressed by Army officers, there was one issue on
which all agreed: that the armed forces of the state were
and would remain the sole agency of national defense. 13
This issue arose from the fact that for the first time in
German history a chancellor had his own army, the SA. De-
spite its role in his electoral victories, Hitler had ap-
parently not given much thought to the future of his politi-
cal soldiers once he gained power. Although their deployment
as auxiliary police during the spring of 1933™ relieved him
of the necessity for an immediate decision, the ultimate
13Messerschmidt, Wehrmacht und NS, 20; Karl MartinGraB
'
Edgar Jung, Papenkreis und Rohmkrise
, 1933-34, phil.diss., Heidelberg, 1967, 98. (Hereafter cited as GraB,
Rohmkrise
.
)
14BHStA, IV, Stahlhelm, Bd. 78, "Durchfuhrungsbes tim-
mungen zum ErlaB vom 22.2 1933, betr. Hilfspolizei" ; Hans
Buchheim, "SA-Hilfspolizei
,
SA-Feldpolizei und Feldj agerkorps
und die Beamtenliche Stellung Ihrer Angehorigen" in Gutachten
des Instituts fur Zeitgeschichte
,
Munchen, 1958, 335-40. Rohm
did, on one occasion, attempt to prevent SA Hilfspolizei from
engaging in revenge and vendettas. See Volkischer Beobachter
,
Nr. 55, 24 February 1933; and Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the
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disposition of the SA and its relation to the armed forces
were to prove an issue of major concern.
Whatever his doubts concerning the future of the SA,
Hitler had none regarding the Reichswehr. Meeting with
leading generals and admirals at Hammerstein' s apartment
three days after becoming chancellor, he reassured them
that the armed forces would remain non-political, adding
that the coming struggle for the consolidation of the Nazi
state was not their tasfc, but that of his party organiza-
tions. There would be, he noted, no merger of the SA and
the Reichswehr. Outlining a program sure to win their ap-
proval, he explained that he planned to orient his domestic
policy toward improving the disastrous economic conditions,
crushing pacifism, and eliminating Marxism, while simultane-
ously directing his efforts in foreign policy to breaking
the shackles of the Versailles Treaty. Such a program, he
acknowledged, presented grave difficulties, requiring the
conscription of the nation's youth in various state service
projects, and of course, the eventual re-introduction of
universal military service. It would be the Government's
function, he added, to insure that youth was not poisoned
by Marxism and pacifism. Concluding his two hour harangue,
he emphasized that the most dangerous period would be that
Bitter End
, (trans. R. andC. Winston), Boston, 1947, 50f.,
58, 103ff.; Grafi, Rohmkrise
,
99f.; Bracher, Machtergreifung
,
434-442; Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power, 307-317.
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of the building of the milltary forces
_ ^ ^
seen if France had any statesmen, Hitler explained, for if
so, France would at once attack Germany. 1 5
Hitler's speech largely coincided with that of De-
fense Minister Blomberg, delivered earlier that morning to
the generals. His own goals, explained Blomberg, consisted
of retaining the impartial political position of the Reichs-
wehr, making the Army a truly useful instrument of security,
and reinforcing the Reichswehr by militarizing the entire
population. This last goal, he stated, would necessitate
increasing and expanding activities related to defense,
especially the activities of the Reichskuratorium. "The
man for that in the Cabinet," said Blomberg, "is Seldte
(his ministerial portfolio is only provisional). Hitler's
and Seldte 's thoughts and intentions come together in the
desire for the [greater] defensive preparation of the popu-
lace. Seldte,': explained Blomberg, "is just the man to carry
1 5
D i
IfZG
'
Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 3 February 1933,Bl. 191f. ; Zgs. 105, Mellenthin, Bl. 6. Hitler, at this
stage in his career, was consistent in what he said to hisgenerals and civilian aides, and his message to the latter
within a week of his conference with the generals was un-
equivical: "Die Zunkunft Deutschlands hange ausschlieBlich
und allein vom Wiederaufbau der Wehrmacht ab. Alle anderenAufgaben mussen hinter der Aufgabe der Wiederaufrustung
zurucktreten." in BA, R-43 11/1292, Rk. 1188, "Niederschrif
t
uber erne Sitzung des AusschuBes der Reichsreg.lerung fur
Arbeitsbeschaffung in der Reichskanzlei" , 9 February 1933,
Bl. 9.
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out this task together with us soldiers." 16
in other words, as General Liebmann wrote in a secret
letter to the subordinate commanders of his 5th Division,
the attitude of the Army to the youth training and military
sport associations would change. it was, he noted, the wish
of both the Chancellor and the Defense Minister that the
armed forces henceforth would participate at once in discus-
sions with the relevant groups on this issue. 1 7
Hitler and Blomberg were not the only ones who had
given thought to a semi-military training program for the
nation's youth. Gruppenfuhrer Kruger, the ambitious SA
representative to the Reichskuratorium and de facto head
of the SA military sport program, drafted a proposal calling
for the establishment of a "German Military Sport Office",
an agency similar to that suggested by Seeckt in 1925. 18
Kruger recommended that the Government organize the
new office to direct all youth physical fitness and military
sport training. The current military sport activities of
the SA and the Stahlhelm would, he wrote, remain essentially
1 6IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 3 February 1933.
"Der Mann dazu im Kabinett ist Seldte (Minister-Portefeuille
nur vorlaufig). Hitlers und Seldtes Denken und Wollen mundenim Wunsch auf Wehrhaftmachung des Volkes. Minister [Blomberg]bezeichnet Seldte als geeigneten Mann dafur, im Verein mit uns
Soldaten diese Aufgabe durchzufiihren . " Bl. 188f.
1 7
' Ibid
. ,
draft of a secret letter from Liebmann to his
5th Division subordinate commanders, 6 February 1933, Bl . 193.
18IfZG, Fa-90/2, "Vorschlag, Grundgedanke" , 19 February
1933, Bl. 131-143.
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unaffected by this office
. ^ ^ ^^
would be to centralis and standardize all fitness and^
tary sport programs, especialiy those conducted by organiza-
tions outside the "national movement"
. Coordinating the
activities of these groups, he noted, would be the function
of the Reichskuratorium. GroUps which presently supervised
military sport training in the spirit of the "new" Germany,
he hastened to add, would have the complete support of the
purported military sport office, but those organizations
hostile to the new course would be ruthlessly and inexor-
ably disbanded. 19
In effect, Kruger envisioned an agency (with a promi-
nent position reserved for himself) supervising the military
sport activities of an otherwise autonomous SA and Stahl-
helm, and a subordinate Rei chskuratorium, training over
250,000 adolescents per year. The Chief of the Military
Sport Office, attached to the Defense Ministry with a rank
analogous to State Secretary and equivalent to the Chief
of the Ministry Office, would receive instructions from and
be responsible to a committee composed of the Chancellor
and the Ministers of Defense, Air Transport, and Labor. In
carrying out its duties, added Kruger, the Military Sport
Office would "... establish the bases for the subsequent ex-
pansion of the armed forces and, within the framework of the
9Ibid., Bl. 132-35
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restrictions of the fVer«am aB i[ s illes] peace treaty, make prepa-
rations for universal military service "20 „, c „XV
* His presumptio
in suggesting that he be given a position comparable to
State Secretary and elevated to head an agency that, in
effect, would supervise Rohm was rivaled only by his naiv-
ete in believing that the Defense Ministry, the SA, the
Stahlhelm, and the Reichskuratorium would all meekly abdi-
cate their individual pretensions to the control of a pro-
gram of the greatest importance to the state and the Army.
Although Kruger apparently prepared his report at
Rohm's insistence, it appears that the SA Chief of Staff
was unable to act immediately upon its suggestions, in all
likelihood owing to his pre-occupation with the consolida-
tion of Nazi power. 21 Officers in the Defense Ministry,
however, sensed the increasing importance of military
sport activities and began efforts to insure that Franz
Seldte would direct any program that might be established.
That Seldte should direct the military sport effort
would have appeared only natural to the Defense Ministry,
especially after Blomberg's warm endorsement of 3 February.
20
IM^-/ "Das D . [eutsche] W. [erhsport] A. [mt] stellt...die Grundlage fur spatere Wehrmachterweiterungen her undbereitet im Rahmen der heute durch den Friedensvertrag
gezogenen Grenzen die allgemeine Wehrpflicht vor." Bl. 143.
2 1
BA, Nachla/3 Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme zur 'Nieder-
schrift iiber den Chef des Ausbildungswesens '
" , 10 October1935, Bl. 1f. (Hereafter cited as "Stellungnahme".) For
some idea of Rohm's activities during this period, see foot-
note 13, this chapter.
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Moreover, Seldte, in his capacity of^ ^
trolled the Voluntary Labor Service, a growing activity in
which the Stahlhelm had participated and which the Army had
seen as a constant to its military sport program." But
perhaps most important, he still headed the Stahlhelm,
Which not only equaled the SA in size, but was composed of
the right" sort of people (Hindenburg was an honorary mem-
ber)
,
and it pursued its own active military sport program.
Finally, the Nazis were still a minority i„ the Cabinet
with a seemingly uncertain future and to turn over to the
SA the responsibility for the military sport training effort
would have appeared irresponsible to Blomberg. Certainly
few outside of the Nazi Party believed that Hitler would
soon drive out or neutralize his coalition comrades.
On the 4th of March Hindenburg appointed Seldte
Chairman of the Reichskuratorium, 23 thus transferring effect-
ive control over the military sport program from the Reich
Interior Ministry to the Labor Ministry. The importance
of this transfer became apparent two days later upon the
.
IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, "Schleicher als
m™
C
^?5 ler "' DSC * 1932 ' B1 ' 186; letter Schleicher to PapenRWM 486/32, g.W.V.
, 17 October 1932 (reproduced in SchutzleTReichswehr wider Nation
, appendix); and Kreuzzeitung
, Nr 351
17 December 1932. The Nazis also saw the Labor Service as a
'
preparatory step towards military service. See Hans-Henning
Freiherr von Grote, Konstantin Hierl; Oberst a.D. Staats -
sekretar fur den Arbei tsdiens t . Per Mann und sein Werk
, Berlin
•934/ 5 5 f •
23BA, R-43 11/519, Rk. 2487, ErlaB des Reichsprasidents
4 March 1933.
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unexpected death of Genera! von StUlpnagel. Seldte and
Blomberg, in compliance with the Cabinet directive of 12
September 1932, recommended Captain (Ret ) r-„„^ I1 ^K .j Georg von Neuf-
ville 2 ^ as stiilpnagel • s succe^nr +-o u- ud cesso , to which Hindenburg
assented on 16 March. 25
Although Neufville made the obligatory promise to
work closely „ith all mllitary sporfc organizations
_
26 ^
fact remains that the Stahlhelm had taken over, with the
active support of the Defense Ministry, the state-sponsored
military sport program, a program which the new Chancellor
had already indicated would be enlarged. Indeed, by the
middle of March, Seldte, in his triple capacity of Reich
Labor Minister, Stahlhelm Bundesfuhrer, and Reichskuratorium
chairman was in apparent control of most youth oriented
military training programs. Being on excellent terms with
the Defense Ministry, he appeared to be "just the man."
Seldte and Blomberg wasted no time in attempting to
consolidate Seldte
-s control of youth training programs.
q , aM , , (;
~
1
2
41?)
'
Rittmeister a.D. The former leader ofstahlhelm Landesverband Baden-Wiirttemberg, Neufville, afterthe disolution of the Reichskuratorium, joined the Chef AWR^ ferent with the rank of Standartenfiihrer
. In Marchiyjb, he was appointed to lead the newly-created OSAF Aus-bildungsabteilung. Apparently re-joining the army, he fellin action in Russia in 1941.
25BHStA, I, MK 13832, Reichskuratorium fur Jugender-tuchtigung, Der Geschaftsfuhrende President, Nr. 4169 a 18,to Bay. Staatsmin. d. Innerns, 24 March 1933.
26ibid.
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At Blomberg-s request
, Dr . „alter Kayser( a h±gh ievei
servant working ln Relchenau , s ^ ^^^
cerning the feasiMUty of organizing aH Government-spon-
sored youth programs under
. singlg ^^
shortages, poor organization, dupUoatlon, and bureaucratic
red tape characterized current Government subsidized youth
proems, Kayser suggested establishing a Reich Youth Min-
istry. It would, he explained, have four sections: the
Reichskuratorium (greatly expanded)
, a Youth Employment
Services division, the Labor Service, and a Physical Train-
ing division. m contrast to the existing haphazard ar-
rangements, he argued that a youth ministry could rationally
dove-tail all youth programs with proposed mobilization
measures. The Youth Minister, for reasons unexplained by
Kayser but perhaps reflecting a hint from Blomberg, would
also act as either Reich Labor Minister or Prussian Minis-
ter for Academics, Art, and Education. 27
Urging that a special commission be created to study
and organize the proposed youth ministry, Blomberg forwarded
Kayser
-s report to the Chancellory, the Reich Interior and
Labor Ministries, and the Prussian Ministry for Academics,
27
o-,-,
G
'
MA"260
'
KWM 1630/33 W.F., 18 March 1 933, Bl.
oZZ I o i 7-23
•
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**. and Bducation - ^^ ^ ^
discussed ideas reseinbUng Biombergis propQsa^ ^
nothing concrete appears to come ^
oept the approval of the Labor Servlce^ „
eventual Hitler rejected ^ ^ ^
youth Ministry demonstrated that both the SA and the Reichs-
°bSerVed 3 "~ f°r * comprehensive youth training
program a„d that both had specific, although confUctlng
,
.deas regarding the organization of youth military sport
'
programs
.
30
Blomierg meanwhile lost no time in expanding the
activities of the Reichskuratorium. In an order of „ ftprll
to Reichswehr commanding generals, General Wilhelm Adam
. „
Ibl 3- , Bl. 6227822f. ; BA, R-43 IT/sio n^ vto Dr Lammers, Rk. 3054, 18 March 1933 (V ' ? Kayser
dem VorsIt^des
4
Lrrn
5
ReIchI^efk Chefb^Prechung unter
,,ftQ/,5 »,.., ,7 Herr i skanzlers am 4. April 1933" pv3509/33; Volkischer Beobachter
, Nr. 95, 5 April 1933.
'
4.u
3°Kf^er claimed that Rohm had long forseen him as h^r\of the youth program (BA, NachlaB Kruger/L, "Steilunqnahme"
vl\Z } J"hlle Blomb^g's remarks of 3 February and Kavser's '
Sv^Wd 8s3d?r?°8a;h leaVe littlS d°Ubt ^at'thfL^c'h wehr
3 Februarv tltt * ,*^* Blomberg's curious remark ofiJZSZ Y/ - ? Seldte's heading the Labor Ministry was onlytemporary, xmplxes that both Blomberg and Seldte had alreadygiven thought to a Youth Ministry. This is confirmed in a letter
pi
r
aTns
U
?h^
e
»?
t0 Se
T\dtS\ in WhiCh thS f°rmer Petulfnily cotl i that "Es war Ihre [Seldte] Absicht, ein Ministerium ftir
^iTrZT^T ^beitsdienst zu ubernehmen" nicnt aber
trk^J? Tc1Stf1Um< Sie haben dieS in eine Unterhaltung...
«u J'
Sie das Arbeitsministerium vorlaufig als solchesubernehmen...." BA, R-43 11/143, letter Hugenberg to Seldte,
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(Chief of the General Staff) explained that the Reichskura-
torium would sponsor, during the coming summer, an increased
nUmb6r
°
f miUtar
^
SP°^ encampments. Noting that neither
the Reichskuratorium nor the para-military organizations
(the SA and the Stahlhelm) could provide a sufficient number
of instructors for these new encampments, he ordered each
Military District to provide about 40 sergeants or corporals
for this duty. Stressing that commanders should select
competent men, he added that those chosen would attend a
special training course to be conducted by the Reichskura-
torium during early May. 31
Apparently the soldiers did not think highly of this
duty, for a week later Hammerstein reminded all commanders
that the Army Command placed the highest value on military
sport training. To suppress any doubts, he stated that
from the 1st of May, all recruits for the Border Guard-East
would be required to complete a military sport course prior
to receiving any military training. Noting that familiariz-
ing recruits with military weapons took relatively little
time in comparison to marksmanship training which could just
as easily be provided in a military sport course, he con-
cluded that "the Army Command hopes that every soldier upon
enlistment is ready to begin immediately combat training
31 BA-MA, WK VII/2188, CHL TA 261/33 g.Kdos. T4 III,13 April 1933. '
187
with [his] weapon." 32
While Blomberg and Seldte were expanding the activi-
ties of the Reichskuratorium and ensconcing Seldte auth-
ority over military sport training, RShm was Dre ..0ccUpied
with the "coordination" of the state governments. He had
however, by no roeans ^ ^ ^
Reichskuratoriu, as a preparatory step to an increased
role for his SA in military affairs. 33 Although aware Qf
Seldte's improved position, there was little Rohm could do
to block the Stahlhelm leader, aside from making threaten-
ing noises, 34 untll the completion Qf ^^ ^
32-r
.^.Ihid-, CHL TA 262/33, g. Kdos. T4 III, 21 April
sein^m Dienst'T
1^^ Strebt «n ' daB 3 eder Soldafmxte nstantntt so vorgebildet ist, daB bei der Trucoe
warden kannf"'
Gefeoht—^-g mit d4r Waffe^"^"^8
33
to Kriiapr £
Nac|^ a^ K^ger/9a , "Stellungnahme" . Accordinguger,
...
SA sich unmittelbar nach der Machtergreifung
FUhrnia^nf x^r ZU befassen und den Anspruch auf
™L p 6 " 1^ d^ ^^^tarischen Ausbildung geltendzu machen. Das Prasidum des Reichskuratoriums fur Jugender-tuchtigung wurde daher im Fruhjahr 1933 von der damaligenObersten SA-Fuhrung beansprucht und als erstes greifbares Zielfur die Betatigung der SA im Sinne der Landesverteidigunq insAuge gefaBt." Bl. 1f. See further IfZG, Fa-88/337, Hitler-jugend, Stabsleitung/Ref VI, 1/32, vertraulich, 26 August
1932, which states that universal, mandatory Wehrsport programs
will be set up in the "Third Reich". Bl. 167ff.
34BA, NS-23/124, OSAF I, Nr. 751/33, 18 March 1933.Rohm stated that new guidelines (presumably his own) would
follow for selection of the students for Reichskuratorium
courses. Evidence does not indicate if new regulations were
ever issued.
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Power in April. He did order KrUger, in Penary, to pre-
pare for the SA take-over of the Reichskuratorium, 35 but .
Kruger made no visible progress except for attending a
conferenoe in mid-April during which ali participants (SA
and Stahlhelm leaders, as well as Neufville and the Reichs-
kuratorium direotors) merely agreed that military sport
courses were of great importance and required more subsi-
dization
.
36
To a certain extent, Kruger's lack of visible progress
in his discussions with Reichskuratorium leaders can perhaps
be explained by the fact that from outward appearance, he
was negotiating from a position of weakness. Seldte and
Neufville, unaware that Hitler planned to turn on his co-
alition allies once the Nazis had eliminated their poten-
tially dangerous foes, saw no reason to enter into conversa-
tions with Kruger. Nonetheless, Kruger's lack of progress
in his conversations with Seldte and the leaders of the
Reichskuratorium did not really matter. In any question of
jurisdiction concerning Nazi Party affairs, the final arbiter
was Hitler, whose decision in this episode was predictable.
35BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 2.
36Volkischer Beobachter
, Nr. 103/104, 13-14 April1933. A budget, expanded or not, was necessary, as the
original Reichskuratorium budget ran only through MarchSee IfZG, Thilo Vogelsang, "Der Chef des Ausbildunqs
unpublished MS (15pp.), p. 1.
wesens
"
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As the Nazis consolidated their power, RShm moved to elimi-
nate or render impotent all paramilitary organizations except
the SA. By the end of April it was public knowledge that
the Stahlhelm would shortly lose its independence, becoming
subordinate, in some as yet unknown fashion, to the SA.37
There could no longer be any question that the SA would in-
herit control of all pre-military training programs.
With his own future made secure by this recent turn
of events, Kruger traveled in early May to Geneva with SS
Gruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the SS Security
Service. Officially, Kruger and Heydrich went to Geneva as
SA and SS representatives, respectively, to represent the
Nazi Party at the Disarmament Committee discussions, but
the third member of their delegation, Rudolf Hess, did not
accompany them. It is possible, but unlikely, that the
trip was merely an excuse to get the prickly Kruger out of
town in an effort to facilitate the discussions between the
SA and the Stahlhelm over the future of the Reichskuratorium.
For one reason, Heydrich was too valuable an assistant to
Himmler to waste on a wild goose chase, and for another
reason, less expensive pretexts could have been found to
There had been some difficulties between the SA andthe Stahlhelm since February, and by the end of April, it was
clear that the Stahlhelm would shortly lose its independence.See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , 19 April 1933; Berghahn,
'
Stahlhelm
, 263-267; and Hans Buchheim, "Die Eingliederung desStahlhelms in der SA"
, in Gutachtendes Instituts fur Zeit-
geschichte
, Munchen, 1958, 370-77.
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exclude Kruger from the talks with the Reichskuratorium.
in all likelihood, the Krliger-Heydrich mission was either
a crude attempt to intimidate the delegations to the Dis-
armament Conference or a by no means unique example of
Nazi exuberance and enthusiasm in the first months of the
Hitler Regime. Whatever the purpose for their presence in
Geneva, Kruger and Heydrich left an unpleasant impression . 38
During Kruger »s absence from Berlin, his chief of
staff, Helmut Wahmann,39 assisted R6hlR/ whQ nQw &
more personal and active role in the discussions with Neuf-
ville over the future of the Reichskuratorium. On 5 May,
Lt. Col. Walter Model, the Reichswehr liaison officer to
the Reichskuratorium, met with Wahmann. Allegedly speaking
for Neufville, Model stated that once the SA had assimilated
, nn , -
kruger and Heydrich created a sensation by appear-
ihf ^
uniform during conference sessions. Expressing
S a t ^ anti-Semitism of the Hitler Reqime, they shock-ed Ambassador Nadolny by demanding that the Delegation's in-terpreter be immediately replaced, claiming that his "jew-ishness offended them. Another ugly scene followed whenKruger discovered that the Delegation neither possessed nor
riew a Swastika flag. In his report to R6hm, Kruger urgedthat the members of the Delegation be dismissed. They had,he claimed, lost all touch with the Fatherland and shouldbe replaced by men more sympathetic to the "new" course.See Ba, Nachla/3 Kruger/15, Report to Rohm, 12 May 1933 . Itis perhaps no coincidence that within a week after the re-
turn of Kruger and Heydrich to Germany, Hitler made his 17May Reichstag "peace" speech, aimed at dampening fears of
resurgent German militarism. For the speech, see footnote
47, this chapter.
39A member of the SA since February 1932, he served
as adjutant, then staff leader under Kriiger's Gruppenstab
z.b.V., and became chief of staff of the Chef des Ausbildung-
swesens in 1933. Allegedly an alcoholic, who frequently re-
quired "drying out", he joined the SS in 1935 with Kruger.
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the Stahlhelm, the Reichskuratorium would place itself under
the SA and recognize Rohm as the organizer of all non-military
defense preparations. «> it is not certain why Neufville
adopted this position, but perhaps he drew the proper con-
clusions from Seldte-s visibly weakened position vis-a-vis
the SA,H which apparently even Blomberg recognized, as the
Army certainly offered no objections to Neufville's pro-
posal
.
Two days later, Neufville personally repeated his
offer, first to Rohm in a private conversation, then to
Wahmann, Model, and Reichskuratorium Executive Secretary
Major (Ret.) von Olberg. Neufville stated that there could
only be one agency for non-military defense preparations,
the SA. Rohm explained that he envisioned a role for the
Reichskuratorium as a liaison office between the Reichswehr
and a putative SA Ministry, adding that he would fill in
more details following Hitler's awaited decision concerning
the SA Ministry. Although he had indicated that there might
40IfZG, Fa-90/1
,
letter Wahmann to Kriiger, 5 May 1933,
Bl. 2f.
1 In addition to his difficulties with the SA, by the
end of April Seldte had lost control of the Labor Service to
Col. (Ret.) Konstantin Hierl. See the concluding chapter of
Kohler's Arbeitsdien st ; Berghahn, Stahlhelm
, 252f.; Bracher,
Machtergreifung
, 206-208; and Paul Meier-Benneckenstein (ed.),
Dokumente der Deutschen Politik ,!, Berlin, 1935, Nr. 86,
Erklarung des Staatssekretars fur den Arbeitsdienst Hierl
iiber die Aufgaben des Arbeitsdienstes" , 248-252. (Hereafter
cited as Dokumente der dt. Politik.)
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be some role for the Reichskuratorium, Rohm went on to
state bluntly that some of its personnel were flatly un-
acceptable. These were, he said, people with whom his SA
men simply could not work, which necessitated the immediate
dismissal of the personnel in question. 42 Neufville assent-
ed, stating that he would quickly take care of this matter.
He then asked Rohm to name a SA leader as OSAF Deputy to
the Reichskuratorium, who would also simultaneously serve
as its vice-president. Rohm agreed to this suggestion, but
added that only Kriiger, on account of his past ties to the
Reichskuratorium, could be considered for this post, and
suggested that Neufville discuss this position with him. 43
After the meeting had ended and the Reichskuratorium
participants had left, Rohm told Wahmann that "... this
42Rohm did not mention anyone by name, but perhapshe had in mind Lt
.
Col. (Ret.) August Horl, the Munich region
al office director. He had drawn the fire of the FranconianbA leader v. Obernitz, who alleged that Horl, prior to 1933had been anti-Nazi. Horl vainly defended himself, but Ober-
nitz insisted on his removal, claiming that Horl, as a Reichskuratonum leader, "...die SA benachteiligte und die system-treuen Verbande oder Organisationen bevorzugte, [and he] hat
in unserem Reich an fuhrenden Stellung nichts mehr zu suchen.
Im Namen der ganzen frankischen SA bitte ich . . . den Oberst-leutnant Horl so schnell wie moglich verschwinden zu lassen."
See BHStA, I, MK 13843, Bay. Staatsmin. f.Kultus und Unter-
richt, VII, 13821, to Horl, 13 April 1933; Horl's reply in
MK 13874, 21 April; and Obernitz 's letter, Nr. 7292/32 [sic],
24 August 1933. The final disposition of Horl's case is urP
clear, but his name does not appear again, so it is likely
that he was dismissed.
43IfZG, Fa-90/1, Bericht Nr. 1 (7 May), attached to
Wahmann' s 5 May letter to Kriiger, Bl. 5f.
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Neufville is an indigent and nice fellow, and that , s why
he must be ruthlessly eU,»inated . .44 Perplexed/ he askefl
wahmann if Neufville always surrounded himself with "ruins"
such as Olberg. 45
Model, Olberg, and Wahmann met on the 9th of May to
discuss the plans of the Reichswehr to utilize military
sport training. Model explained that in accordance with
its expansion plan, the Army needed as many military sport
program graduates as possible. He added that graduates of
the Reichskuratorium and SA military sport courses would
receive training in the use of military weapons. Further
details and information concerning weapons training, he
noted, would be provided at a later date by the Defense
Ministry. 46
Blomberg partially addressed this problem a week
later, on 17 May, agreeing to transfer sufficient small
arms to the SA for "... its training and its domestic
political tasks...." with the explicit understanding that
44
Ikidw "... der Neufville ein ganz gescheiter undnetter Kerl sei und gerade darum riicksichtlos gleichgeschal-tet werden musse." Bl. 6.
45
Ibid
.
46Ibid
. ,
Bericht Nr. 2 of letter Wahmann to Kriiqer,
10 May 1933, Bl. 12-15.
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all such weapons refined Reichswehr property" Although
issuing Army weapons to the SA implied recognition of a SA
role in national security affairs, Blomberg buttressed his
position by securing a decree from Hitler asserting the
primacy of the Reichswehr in all defense issues. Hitler
further emphasized the authority of the Reichswehr by sub-
ordinating the Labor Ministrv efiii r™ • nnxiub y, st ll nominally responsible
for the Reichskuratorium and fitness training programs, to
the Defense Ministry in all matters relating to military
sport and youth fitness programs. 48
Nonetheless, with the existence of the Reichskura-
torium in doubt, its subordination to the Defense Ministry
had little meaning and without establishing some form of
control and supervision over the weapons given to the SA,
the Army might as well have relinquished all its claims to
the weapons loaned the SA. Blomberg solved both these
4 7IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Befehlshaber-besprechung, 1 June 1933. "... fur ihre Ausbildung undinre mnerpolitischen Aufgaben " Bl. 199f. Cf. Hitler'sPeace Speech" of the 17th of May, in which he stated "DieAufgabe, daB die SA und SS der nationalsozialistischen
Partei in irgendeiner Beziehung zur Reichswehr in dem Sinne
stunde, daB es sich urn militarisch ausgebildete BestandeOder Reserven der Armee handeln wiirde, ist unwahr. ... Ihr
[SA] Zweck war und ist ausschlieBlich die Beseitigung derkommunistischen Gefahr, ihre Ausbildung ohne jede Anlehnung
an das Heer nur berechnet fur Zwecke der Propaganda, der
Aufklarung, der psychologischen Massenwirkung, des Nieder-
brechens des kommunistischen Terrors." Dokumente der deuts -
chen Politik, I, Nr. 35, Hitlers Friedensrede im Reichstaq,
17 May 1933, 9ff.
48IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 1 June 1933.
195
problems in early June by agreeing with Kruger to disband
the Reichskuratorium and to allow the SA, under what amount
ed to Army supervision, to assume sole responsibility for
all military sport training. Reiohenau concurred. 49
Blomberg's support for the SA at the expense of the
Stahlhelm, a reversal of his position in February, was
dictated by circumstances beyond his control. The equality
in the "national" movement that Blomberg had assumed in
February between the SA and the Stahlhelm, which had never
existed in the minds of Hitler and his followers, had dis-
appeared by June. Moreover, the Defense Minister abandoned
his earlier hopes that the Reichswehr could remain apoliti-
cal. During a conference on 1 June with his division com-
manders, he stated that the era of political parties had
run its course, adding that "being apolitical now is over
{for us] and there remains only one [course of action]: to
support the national movement with all devotion." 50
The Defense Ministry solved several related problems
by acknowledging the SA as the sole military sport training
agency. By dealing directly with Kruger rather than a
number of military sport groups, the Reichswehr greatly
49BA, Sam Sch/421, letter Kruger to Reichenau, K/P,
Qu 1538/33, 19 June 1933. Bl. 2.
3UIfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 1 June 1933,
"Jetzt ist das unpolitisch sein vorbei und es bleibt nur
eins: der Nationalen Bewegung mit aller Hingabe zu dienen."
Bl. 199.
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simplified its responsibilities for control and supervision
Moreover, by channeling the SA into pre-military training,
the Defense Ministry hoped to satiate SA claims to a mean-
ingful role in national defense affairs, 51 while 8lmultane_
ously providing an activity for considerable numbers of un-
employed SA men. 52
It is unlikely that Blomberg and Reichenau handed
the SA the task of pre-military training without some mis-
givings. They feared, with some justification, that SA
leaders might see military sport activities as a pretext
for a greater voice for the SA in defense preparations.
Nonetheless, Army leaders were hardly in a position to do
otherwise, for their own 14% expansion and increased train-
ing commitments 53 left most Reichswehr units short of ex-
» n n
5l^m ' NachlaB Beck ' N-28/3, Fritsch Aufzeichnung;NachlaB Stulpnagel, N-5/27, 75 Jahre, 350; Bracher, Machter-greiiung, 945ff. ; Messerschmidt
, Wehrmacht und NS . 35; andpoller, He«£jmidjmiep
f 91. Many SA men believed themselvesto be the vanguard of a new peoples' army. See HA, f 1876OSAF, Stellvertreter-Sud, November 1930; f. 1874, SA General-
mspekteur, 453/31, 17 December 1931.
52
mot Kruger's Wehrsport organization, when disbanded in1935, employed over 10,000. See BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Nieder-
schrift iiber den Chef des Ausbildungswesens"
,
by General Fromm,
Rk. 6754, 25 September 1935. For the problem of SA unemployment,
see HA, f. 1547, PND 741, 9 July 1931; f. 1874, SA Generalin-
spekteur, 453/31, 17 December 1931; Engelbrechten, Braune
Armee
,
122f., 190ff; and Heinrich Bennecke, Die Reichswehr un ddie "Rohmputsch"
, Munchen, 1 964, 37f. (Hereafter cited as
Bennecke, Rohmputsch.
)
53In addition to normal recruit training activities,
expanded by 14% in 1933, the Army Command had assigned a further
264 officers and 792 men as Border Guard instructors. An addi-
tional 45 officers and some 150 men were scheduled to train
197
perienced instructors. To drain .ore instructors for mili-
tary sport training from units already committed to an ex-
panded recruit training effort would cause immense diffi-
culties, and to relinquish or curtail the pre-military
training program meant effecting corresponding changes in
or abandoning the expansion and mobilization plans of 1929.
Thus someone had to be given the task of pre-military train,
ing, and in spite of possible misgivings, the evolution of
the Nazi state by June 1933 left Blomberg and Reichenau
little choice but to turn to Kruger and the SA. 54
Other Nazi Party organizations at that time apparent-
ly did not openly question Kruger' s title to military sport
activities, although Baldur von Schirach, 55 the Hitler
university students, but it is not certain if this latter
commitment were carried out. See BA-MA, II H/139 CHL TA232/33, T2 IIIA/T4 III, 10 April 1933, and CHL Ta'300/33
g.K., T4 III, 11 April 1933, and Chapter VIII, 216ff.
54Bracher, Machtergreifuna , 886; and O'Neill, GermanArmy, 33f
. ,
state that the SA was given control of the pre-
military training program in return for acknowledging the
authority of the Reichswehr in all defense related matters.While the Defense Ministry may have promoted the idea that
pre-military training was assigned the SA as a quid pro quo
,the over-extension of the Reichswehr' s training capacities
suggests that Blomberg and Reichenau simply made the best of
a necessary bargain.
55 (1907-1974)
.
He joined the NSDAP (Nr. 17251) in 1925
while a university student, and became Reich Leader of the
National Socialist German Students' League in 1928. In 1931
he was named Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP and Reich Leader
of the Hitler Youth in 1932. He became Gauleiter of Vienna
in 1940 and remained there until 1945.
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Youth Leader, and Hans von Tschammer and Osten,56 the Reich
Sport Commissar, both contested his claims to control all
youth fitness programs. During the spring of 1933, Schirach
and Tschammer und Osten had methodically eliminated or taken
over most non-Party youth and sport organizations, including
some with military sport interests. 57 Schirach attempted to
become Reich Youth Commissar, an ambition which Tschammer
und Osten and Rohm resolutely opposed. 58 Schirach eventually
Armv in I9n? Zl i L ColmTllssloned a lieutenant in the Saxon
riaht Lll i TSCha™er Was invalided in 1919 with a lameg hand, a war injury. He administered estates after hisdischarge, and served as leader of the Jungdo in Saxony until
number nV?a ^ ^ in ^30 (Nr. 205742) and held aof SA positions in Dresden until 1933, when he wasSofM nl^Mar1 *5 Reich-PortskoMnissar in the R^ich In-
an^ hfi^ ?! I Y '
He
.
became Reich Sport Leader in July 1933,d eld that position until his death in 1943.
57See Baldur von Schirach, Ich Glaubte an Hitler, Ham-
t
U£V 9kZ' 176 ~ 181 ' 191-195. HereiTte-r cited as SchirachIch Glaubte; Dokumente der dt. Politik, T, Nr. 96, Frick
speech of 9 May 1933 on Tschammer
• s "duties, 307; HerbertMichaelis und Ernst Schraipler, Ursachen und Folgen. Vomdeutschen Zusammenbruch 1918 bis zur staatlichen NeuordnunaDeutschlands in der Gegenwart
, Frankfurt-, n . r\ .
f
t'y/"'mv oo'^q
Order banning the GroBdeutsche Jugendbund [Trotha group] and'the ReichsausschuB der deutschen Jugendverbande [Vogt group],
23 June 1933, 518; Hajo Bernett, Nationalsozialistische
Leibeserziehungen. Eine Dokumentation ihrer Theorie und
Organisation, Schorndorf, 1966, 177f.; Hajo Bernett, Sport-
politik im Dritten Reich
, Schorndorf, 1971, 25-31; Hans-
Christian Brandenburg, Die Geschichte der HJ. Wege und Irrwege
einer Generation
, Koln, 1968, 283-6; and Jiirgen Dieckert, Die
Turner j ugendbewegung , Schorndorf, 1 968, 1 1 1-121.
C OJOIfZG, Fa-90/1, letters Wahmann to Kruger, 5 May, 10
May 1933. Bl
. 4, 10; BA, NachlaB Kriiger/15, letter Wahmann to
Kruger, 11 May 1933; and Schirach, Ich Glaubte, 186ff., 190f.
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triumphed, but his appointment as Reich youth ^^^^ d^
not resolve the jurisdictional problem over youth fitness
program, because the activities of the Labor Service, the
Heich Sport Com.issar, and the SA, all of which over-lapped,
remained unaffected by Schirach's new title.
With the seizure of the Reichskuratorium by the SA
imminent, Neufville made one last attempt to save his posi-
tion. He suggested to Reichenau, on 17 June, that the
Reichskuratorium should continue "as the central training
agency of the paramilitary groups (SA
, SS, Stahlhelm, and
National Socialist Motorized Corps) «.™ Kruger would, he
wrote, be named chief of staff of the Reichskuratorium,
and Captain von Bernuth, a regular officer assigned to the
Defense Ministry, would become the military chief of the
Reichskuratorium, a new position upon which Neufville did
not elaborate. 61
Reichenau informed Kruger of his conversation with
Neufville, which prompted Kruger to reply two days later in
an angry missive "... that Neufville 's proposal is an unac-
5Wumente der dt. Politik, I, Nr. 33, "VerfiigungAdolf Hitlers uber die Ernennung des ' Jugendfuhrers des
Youth?
h
^99f
elCheS
'
17
'
6
-
1933 "' 65f "' Stachura, Nazi
60BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, Reichenau' s notes, "Be-
sprechung am 17.6 [1933] mit Neufville als Vorschlag"
. Written
on the bottom of the notes is [Reichskuratorium] "als zentrale
Ausbildungsstelle (T.4) der Wehrverbande"
.
61
Ibid.; and Sam Sch/421, letter Kruger to Reichenau,
K/P, Qu 1538/33, 19 June 1933.
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ceptable compromise for the SA ......62 claiming ^^
ville's suggestions went contrary to all his own
, KrUger
added that he believed Neufville's latest ideas had the
support of the Defense Ministry, it was difficult, he
admitted, to understand the apparent volte face by the
Army Command, when Reichenau himself had acknowledged that
Neufville's leadership of the Reichskuratorium had been
poor. Kruger then reminded Reichenau of Rohm's promise
to watch the Reichskuratorium with "Argus Eyes", and added,
in a naked threat, that Rohm would be coming to Berlin in
two days and that he, Kruger, felt duty-bound to take what-
ever measures seemed appropriate to insure the realization
of the SA's wishes vis-a-vis the Reichskuratorium. 63
Reichenau 's response to KrUger' s insubordinate
letter has unfortunately not survived, but either Kruger
successfully carried out his threat or Reichenau thought he
would and abandoned his support for Neufville's proposal.
Rohm, who had come to Berlin to celebrate the incorporation
of the Stahlhelm into the SA, 64 met with Blomberg and
6 2BA, Sam Sch/421, Kruger to Reichenau, K/P, Qu 1538/33
39 June 1933. "... da/3 dies Vorschlag des Herrn v. Neufvilletur die SA einen unmoglichen KompromiB bedeute und [ich] er-
wahnte weiterhin, daB da s Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichti-gung uberholt sei." Bl. 1. Kruger »s impression that Reichenau
ravored Neufville's proposal may have been erroneous. See IfZG
Zgs. 1709, Huv/e, Bl. 17, 35. Huwe states that Reichenau sup-ported Kruger' s candidacy throughout the spring of 1933.
6 3BA, Sam Sch/421, Kruger to Reichenau, K/P, Qu 1538/33.
19 June 1933, Bl. 2ff.
64Publicly announced on 21 June 1933. See BA, R-43
11/828, Wolffs' Telegraphisches Biiro, Nr. 1495.
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Reichenau and resolved the issue of the leadership of the
military sport project in favor of Kruger." 0n 2?^
Rohm promoted Krilger to the rank of o» ^cu K SA Obergruppenfuhrer
and named him Chief of Training Affairs of the SA (Chef
^^bildu^v^^er_SA)
, or in its abbreviated Ger-
man form, Chef AW. 66 "
After the resolution of the military sport leader-
ship question, there remained the task of determining
Kruger's responsibilities. The interested parties, Kruger,
Reichenau, Rohm, Tschammer und Osten, Schirach, and Hitler,
met at the SA Leaders' Conference at Bad Reichenhall from
1 to 3 July. They discussed, among ether things, the youth
training program. 67 During the conference, Hitler told
Kruger that he wanted him to train annually some 250,000
men in the use of military weapons. Hitler envisioned the
courses lasting from four to six weeks. 68 At the end of
the conference, Rohm issued an order outlining Kruger «s
65BA, Nachlafi Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl . 2.
66 IfZG, Fiihrerbefeh l, Nr. 15, OSAF II, 1328/33, 1July 1933, effective 26 JuKe 1933.
67For a summary of the conference and the speechesgiven by the participants, see SchultheB 1 Europaischer
Geschichtskalendar 1933 , Berlin, 1934, 167f., and Norman
Baynes, (ed.) The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-
August 1939, (trans. N. Baynes) London, 1942, 553f.
68BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme", Bl. 8; IMT,
XXIX, 1850-PS, "Besprechung mit Oberst von Vietinghoff, Chef
der Wehrmachtabteilung, am Mittwoch, 5.7. 1933", 4.
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tasks as Chef AW w-i +-v> ±ur aw. W th the concurrence of the Defense
Ministry, wrote the SA Chief of Staff, "... the entire pre_
military youth training program is transferred to the
Supreme SA Headquarters . " 6
9
A week later, Hitler superseded Rohm's order, issu-
ing his own "Basic Directives for Pre-Military Youth Train-
ing."^ Hitler delineated three classes of sport: (1) youth
sport, for youngsters under 15 years of age, to be conducted
in the schools and in youth groups directed by Youth Leader
Schirach; (2) terrain sport, for 16 and 17 year olds, to be
conducted in the schools and by the various sport organiza-
tions under the jurisdiction of Reich Sport Commissar Tscham-
mer und Osten; and (3), SA-sport, which OSAF would conduct
for its men between 18 and 35 years of age. The SA leader
responsible for SA-sport, wrote Hitler, was Kriiger, who,
after consulting with the Defense Ministry, would prepare
the basic directives for all three classes of sport, insur-
t n jj tt V : dl« gesamte vormilitarische Jugendertiichtigungi die Hand der Obersten SA-Fuhrung gelegt worden." Rohm's
order, apparently OSAF Ch. 2001/33, is reproduced without aheading or number in Rundbefehl Nr. 184 of the StahlhelmBundesamt, Abt. Ia, 4 July 1933, in BHStA, IV, Stahlhelm,
Bd. 78. On the problem of the number of this order, see BA,NS-10/77, letter Kriiger to Bruckner, Chef AW Ch. 213/33,Geheim, 13 July 1933.
70BA, NS-10/77, "Grundsatzliche Anordnungen fur die
vormilitarische Jugendertiichtigung", 12 July 1933. The two
orders, Hitler's and Rohm's of 4 July, are basically the same,
with minor wording changes. Hitler did rescind Kriiger 's authorlty to regulate the Wehrsport activities of the Reichsarbeits-
dienst
.
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ing that all sport activities merged into a comprehensive
youth fitness program. The implementation of Kruger's
guidelines for youth and terrain sport, explained Hitler,
was the responsibility of Schirach and Tschammer und Osten,
while Kruger was responsible, after consulting Blomberg,
for implementing the guidelines for SA-sport. 7 1
By July, five months after the advent of Hitler to
power, he and Rohm had eased Seldte, Neufville, and the
Stahlhelm out of the military sport movement, replacing them
by Kruger and the SA, a phenomenon paralleling the Nazi
seizure of power in other spheres of activity during the
first half of 1933. Everywhere the conservative National-
ists were routed, displaced by the irrepressible Nazis whom
they had hoped to exploit. The Army, like so many other
organizations, acknowledged the Nazi victory when it turned
over its cherished youth fitness program to the SA.
The consolidation, under the aegis of the SA, of all
defense related youth activities, recognized at Bad Reiche-
enhall, represented the ironic completion of Groener's youth
fitness program concept of October 1930. The SA, the better
elements of which he had hoped to convert to loyal supporters
of the Weimar Republic, instead adopted, albeit in mirror
image, his idea of using the Government sponsored youth fit-
ness program as a substitute "school of the nation" to com-
71 Ibid.
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bat political partisanship. Rather^ eradicating^
cal partisanship, the Na2is wanted tQ
Socialist loyalty through youth tralning and ^
activities. In the words of Rohm, the SA had become »
the grand school for the education of the German youth in
a militant and National Socialist spirit." 72
72Schulthe fi' Europaischer Geschichtskalendar 1933,167
-
•••die groBe Schule fur die deutsche Jugend zur Erzieh-
ung in wehrhaftem und nationalsozialis tischem Geist."
CHAPTER VIII
THE CHEF AW ORGANIZATION:
KRtiGER'S EMPIRE
Upon returning to Berlin from the Bad Reichenhall
SA Conference (1 -3 July 1933 ), Kruger faced immence prob-
lems. The SA pre-military training program, which Rohm
had recently appointed him to direct, existed in name only.
An organization capable of providing pre-miiitary training
for 250,000 men annually, which Hitler demanded of Krtiger
simply did not exist. No less nrP ,.!„„ = 0 tK „xct>t5 p essing was the problem of
the disposition of the personnel and facilities of the
Reichskuratorium.
With characteristic energy, however, Kruger lost no
time in disbanding the Reichskuratorium. On the 5th of
July, he promptly rejected a suggestion from Neufville that
the Reichskuratorium be allowed to retain a vestige of
autonomy 1 and three days later the SA leader ordered Neuf-
ville 's organization disbanded. 2 The budget of the Reichs-
1 IMT, XXIX, 1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk"
, Kriiger-Vieting-hoff conversation, 5 July 1933, 2ff.
2
BHStA, I, MK 13832, Reichskuratorium fur Jugender-
tiichtigung, Zweigstelle Munchen, Nr. 2167R, to Bay.Staats-
min. f. Kultus und Unterricht, 8 July 1933. The Reichswehr
claimed that Kruger assumed control of the Reichskuratorium
on 7 July. See BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Niederschrift"
, Bl.
1 •
kuratorium was absorbed by the chef AW Organization. 3 To
insure the complete isolation of Seldte an. hi s Stahlhelm
lieutenants from any facet of military sport training/
Kruger proposed that ministerial responsibility for the
Chef AW Organization budget be transferred fro, Seldte'
s
Heioh Labor Ministry back to the Reich Ministry of the
interior, a proposal to which Blomberg agreed. * Krliger
also received authorization fro, Rohm on the 6th of July
to take over Stahlhelm military sport training facilities.
5
In organizing the headquarters of his new Chef AW
Organization, Kruger apparently used the personnel of his
former Group Staff for Special Purposes (Gr^enstab
?
'
b
'
VJ 35 3 nucleus for the new Chef AW Organization
staff. From an original strength of three men at its in-
ception in June 1932, the Gj^en^^ had grown tQ
number at least twenty by June 19 33 .6 very little evidence
XXIX 1^n'pQ
aCh1
^
Mber/ 9a
'
"Stellungnahme", Bl. 4; IMT,
ll^Ll C°nference of Kr^er and Staatssekretar Im~Reichsfmanzmmisterium Reinhard, 18 July 1 933, 7.
4
BA, NachlaS Kriiger/lO, "Aktenvermerk"
, Blomberq-Kruger conversation, 10 July 1933; IMT, XXIX, 1850-PS "Ak-tenvermerk", Blomberg-Kruger meeting7~1 5 July 1933, 4f.
5BA, Sam Sch/270, OSAF 1336/33, 6 July 1933.
Tnn. io^^.S6 Gruppenstab z.b.V. was organized inJu e 1932, Rohm did not issue the "Dienstanweisung fttr denGruppenstab z.b.V. in Berlin", until 20 November 1932. See
~'
Sam Sch/408, OSAF Qu. Nr. 3388/32, 20 November 1932;IfZG, Fuhrerbefehl II, OSAF 2420/32, 9 September 1932;Fuhrerbefehl IV, OSAF Reichartzt/II
, 3790/32, 15 December
I 11 i Z m
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concerning this organization is known to have survived, but
its mission was to serve as a iiaison between the SA and
the Reichswehr in matters relating to military sport programs,
the Border Guard-East, and the Volunteer Labor Service.'
At any rate, the central staff headquarters of the
Chef AW Organization, located in Berlin at Friedrich-Wil-
helmstr. 5, seems to have emerged from the Gruppenstab z.h.v
by mid-July. The Chef AW Organization headquarters, under
the direction of Staff Leader WHhmann, initially had six
sections: personnel, training, organization, financial ad-
ministration, a general section, and the staff inspectorate
sections. 8 The Army Command assigned two liaison officers,
Captain von Bernuth and Major Model, to the Chef AW Organi-
g
zation
.
While the duties of most of the staff sections are
self-explanatory, the general section, headed by Dr. Carl
Kriimmel, 10 acted, in effect, as Kruger's liaison with Gov-
„
?BA
'
Sam Sch/M08, OSAF Qu. Nr. 3388/32, 20 November
1932, "Dienstanwei sung fur den Gruppenstab z.b.V. in Berlin".
o
See next page.
9IfZG, Zgs. 248 (II), Holtzendorf, Eidess taatliche
Erklarung, 16 April 1957, Bl . 63; IMT, XXIX, 1850-PS, "Ak-
tenvermerk"
, Kruger-Vietinghof f " , 5 July 1933, 2ff. Little
information can be found concerning Bernuth, who reportedly
fell in action in Russia in 1941.
l0A machine gun company commander during the First World
War, Kriimmel entered the Universitat Munchen after the war,
became active in athletic clubs, and earned a doctorate in
political science in the early 1920s. An employee of the Army
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ernment and Nazi Party agencies which had interests in the
military sport program. Krummel also served as public re-
lations officer for the Chef AW Organization. 1
1
The four
staff inspectorates, horse and vehicle driver training,
naval training, communications training, and pioneer (com-
bat engineer) training, were each led by a Chef AW Organiza
tion Inspector responsible for conducting not only Chef AW
training, but also training carried on by the entire SA in
his area of competence. The four inspectors, two of whom
were recent Army retirees, 12 had their own small staffs as
well as a liaison officer assigned to them from the Defense
Ministry. 13 Although the Chef AW Organization inspectors
Sport School in Wiinsdorf from 1923 (?) to 1 933, he became close
Z?
ie
Su
S
^
Wlth Reichenau
'
^d at his insistence, transferred tothe Chef AW in 1933. Krummel left the Chef AW in 1934 to becomehead of the office for physical education (Abt. K) in the Reich-Prussian Ministry for Education, Culture, and Popular Education.He died in an airplane crash in 1938.
11 BA, NachlaB Kruger/10, undated organization schematicdiagram.
12Brigadier General (Ret.) Leo Hederich, Inspekteur der
SA/SS Reiterei, and Lt. Col. (Ret.) Alexander Bernay, Inspek-
teur des SA Nachrichtensports.
1 3BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, undated organization schematic
diagram; Oberste SA-Fuhrung, Gleiderung des Stabes des Obersten
SA-Fiihrers, Miinchen, n.d. [19 34], 33-43. (Hereafter cited as
OSAF, Gliederung
. ) The Reichswehr assigned Major Graf Rothkirch
(a former commander of the Army Sport School, Wiinsdorf) as liai-
son to the Inspector of SA/SS Riding Affairs, and the Navy assign
ed Lt. Commander von Kieseritzski to the Inspector of SA Naval
Affairs. Evidence indicating the names of the other two liaison
officers has not survived.
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had the authority to araw up training regulatiQns ^ ^ ^
reSPOnSiM1Uy fOT ^~„g these was sharea wlth the~S
°
f SA G^- U
- Vision which later caused
difficulty.
During the fall of 1933 and the winter of 1 933-34
,
Kruger added several more c,+- = - f ™.»-
•
«*J. staf sections and made minor re-
organizations of his headguarters . 1 5 He eliminated W.hmann's
Position as Staff Leader of the Chef AW Organization, assign-
ing him instead to head the newly created "staff" section,
the functions of which appear to have been routine matters
of administration. 16 Kruger moved Krummel to the new ter-
rain sport section, making him responsible for supervising
the Chef AW Organization military sport schools. Krummel
still retained his public relations duties, but Kruger seems
to have personally assumed responsibility for dealing with
agencies outside his own organization with interests in mili-
tary sport. In addition, the Chef AW created a technical
(building construction and plans) section, and an Inspector-
ate of SA Schools section which appeared to enjoy a slightly
1933 »n^n<U
Sain Sch/405
>
0SAF Ch
«
Nr
-
1513/33, 11 SeptemberiyjJ, Dienstanweisung fur den Inspeckteur der Marine-SA sowie
?^T/^ at i?ncPlan ^ diS Marine-SA", NS-23/125,OSA? cht NR
' I
2 September 1933, "Dienstanweisung fur den Inspek-teur des Nachnchtensports"
.
1 5See next page.
1
6
OSAF, Gliederung
, 33. The reasons for Wahmann's de-
motion are unknown, but a colleague claimed he was an alcoholic
who had to be persistently "dried out". Perhaps this resultedin his degradation. See IfZG, Zas. 1709, Huwe, Bl. 8ff
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elevated position compared to Kriimmel 1 s baliwick and the
four inspectors of the technical schools. The Inspector
of SA Schools, Heinz Spaiing, acted as an inspector general
for all chef AW Organization and SA training. 17
By the spring of 1934, Kriiger's staff numbered 181.
Forty-five were listed as "specialists" and ninety-four
were either assistants to the specialists or secretaries to
the same. Kriiger hired one doorman, and the remaining
forty-one employees held jobs such as handyman, driver, and
guard. 1
8
Although the headquarters of the Chef AW Organization
was located in Berlin, Rohm authorized, during September
1933, the appointment of a Chef AW Organization deputy
(Beauftragter ) to the staff of each major SA command.^ To
a certain extent, Rohm followed normal military practice in
defining the responsibilities of the Chef AW Organization
deputy. While reminding the deputies in an order issued on
the 9th of September that they had "... to attend to the
17
OSAF, Gliederung
, 33-43.
1 8
IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, October 1933-March
1934, Bl. 12f.
19BA, NS-23/126, OSAF II, Nr. 1607/33, 20 October
1933, effective 15 September 1933. (There were 8 SA Senior
Groups (one in Austria and 7 in Germany) and 20 SA Groups.
See IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1525/33, 8 September 1933.
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timely and proper execution of all orders of the Supreme SA
Headquarters and the Chef AW pertaining to training, "20 the
SA Chief of Staff strongly reitPrafpn <-uy y -^eireratea to the senior SA com-
manders that they were atill f«n» •y s ully responsible for the state
of training in their commands. 21
Rohm made, however, some deviations from orthodox
military custom. By tradition, a military commander is per-
mitted to pick his own staff, the only exceptions coming in
the area of technical advisors (e^, surgeons, lawyers,
communications specialists) where professional training
dictates the choice. The SA Chief of Staff partially ig-
nored this custom and ordered both Rrttger and the concerned
SA commanders to recommend candidates for appointment as
Chef AW Organization deputies. Rohm reserved the final de-
cision for himself, 22 and the entire arrangement caused con-
siderable rancor among the parties involved. 23 He further
complicated staff relations by assigning the deputies to
Kruger's staff for administrative matters (pay and promotion),
7nBA, NS-23/125, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1510/33, "Betr. Ausbil-dung im SA Sport", 9 September 1933. Er hat dafiir zu sorgen,daB alle Anordnungen der Obersten SA-Fuhrung bzw. des Chefsdes Ausbildungswesens, die die Ausbildung betreffen, rasch und
richtig durchgefuhrt werden." See also BA, NachlaB Kriiqer/9a,
"Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 7.
21 Ibid
. ,
and OSAF, Ch. Nr. 1507/33, "Betr. SA-Schulungs-
lager," 9 September 1933.
22 Ibid.
23See Chapter IX, 245ff
.
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whrle at the same tin, the SA Chief of Staff winded each
deputy that he »
.
.
.
nonetheless belongs generally to the
staff to whioh he is attached. "24 The ambiguities inherent
in this relationship led to constant quarreling between
Kruger and the SA commanders.
The direct lines of communication between the Chef
AW Organization schools and the central headquarters in
Berlin were severed by Rohm. Some of the SA commanders
asserted that the Chef AW Organization schools that were
located within the boundaries of their commands ipso facto
fell under their authority, a position hotly disputed by
Kruger. 25 Rohm sided with his commanders and encouraged
them to inspect all facilities within their commands. 26
Kruger did succeed, in October 1933, in removing all purely
internal administrative matters concerning the camps from
the purview of the SA commanders, 27 but the chain of com-
mand between the Chef AW and his schools continued to pass
through the major SA headquarters until the separation of
BA, NS-23/125, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1510/33, "Betr. Aus-brldung im SA-Sport"
, 9 September 1933. "...gehort jedochim ubrigen zum Stabe der Dienststelle
, der er zugeteilt ist."
25
BDC, Personalakt Kruger, Rohm to Kruger, OSAF Ch.
Nr. 1527/33, "personlich"
, 13 September 1933."
26BA, NS-23/126, OSAF 1552/33, "Dienstanweisung furden Fiihrer einer Obergruppe." 18 September 1933.
27IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW, Nr. 0/5515/106/3 3,
21 October 1933.
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the Chef AW Organization from the SA in August 1934.28
In October 1933, Kruger authorized the Chef AW Or-
ganization deputies small staffs of their own. At the
Senior SA Group level, deputies were permitted seven
assistants ,29while their colleagues at the SA^^
had to make do with an assistant and driver. 30 Within six
months the staff of the Senior Group deputy had increased
to twenty, and a similar proliferation had occurred at the
level of the SA Group. m addition, Kruger assigned each of
his deputies a security specialist . 3 1 while some of this
increase in personnel can be attributed to the bureaucratic
phenomenon of spontaneous generation, some posts were prob-
ably created to meet the expanding work load of the Chef
AW Organization. Spurred on, moreover, by the Nazi Party,
Kruger made special efforts to find positions for the Party
stalwarts, the "old fighters". 3 2 These efforts apparently
28BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 8.
29Ibid. / OSAF/Chef AW, V/6001/33, 26 October 1933.
30
Ibid., OSAF/Chef AW, V/6557/1 1 7/33 , 3 November 1933.
3
1
Ibid., Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag , 2 June 1934, Bl. 86f
32ga, NS-10/77, "Staatistische Abteilung, betr. Lehr-
und Ausbildungspersonal Chef -AW", bi/2, 20 December 1934.
There is some ambiguity in the term "old fighter." In its
proper usage, the term applies only to those Nazis who were
Party activists prior to September 1930, but it often meant
anyone who had joined the Party before January 1933. It is
not clear which definition Kruger used.
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included creating "make work" positions.
Although the basic control apparatus of the Chef AW
Organization consisted of the central staff in Berlin and
the regional deputies, a semi-autonomous agency, the Keich
SA university Office, was established by R5hm on the 9th of
September as part of KrUger's organization. 33 The Reich SA
University Office supervised the
.iUtary sport prograra for
students at universities and other institutions of higher
learning.
„hile the University^ ^
xtS inclusion in the Chef AW Organization represented a con-
siderable triumph for Kruger.
Hitler's "Basic Principles for Pre-Military Youth Fit-
ness Training" of 12 July had defined Kruger's responsibili-
ties in respect to youth and terrain sport programs, but had
not mentioned the considerable military sport activities con-
ducted by university students under the aegis of the Nai-
oriented AWA, led by Otto Schwab. 34 During the spring of
1933, he had increased the AWA ' s activities and with the ap-
proval of the National Socialist German Students' League,
the German Student Corporation, educational authorities, and
the Army, had established AWA military sport offices at all
19 33. The te
ed in
SA Un
33BA, Sam Sch/279, OSAP I, Nr. 1586/33, 16 October
34See Chapter III, 58f.
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the universities and institutions of higher learning. 35
Schwab had approached Rohm and the Reichswehr in
late April or early May, asking for assistance in finding
suitable leaders for his military sport offices. Rohm re-
sponded at once, ordering his subordinate commanders on the
4th of May to recommend prospective candidates to Kriiger,
who, because of the immediacy of the projected appointments,
made the final selections. In urging the commanders to sub-
mit their recommendations to Kriiger immediately, R6hm pointed
out that "positions not occupied by SA and SS leaders will,
in all likelihood, end up in the hands of the Reichswehr ." 36
The Army, justifying his suspicions, allocated on the 15th
of May the funds necessary to support military sport train-
ing squads for Schwab's offices. 37 It is questionable
c u k.
35BA/ NS -23 /125, OSAF I, Nr. A 174/33, 4 May 1933;Schwab s request to the Reichswehr for assistance was thesubject of CHL TA 400/33 g.K. T4III, 29 April 1933 [missing],
£
G
?5nn/J° in BA
'MA/ 11 H/139
'
Wehrai*t Memorandum to TA,Nr. 3899/33 g.K., Wehramt III, 15 May 1933.
36BA/ Ns-23/125, OSAF I, Nr. A 174/33, 4 May 1933.
8. Stellen, die nicht durch SA-und SS-Fuhrer besetzt werden,gehen hochstwahrscheinlich in die Hande der Reichswehr iiber."Bl
. 2
.
3 7BA-MA, II H/1 39, Wehramt memorandum to TA, Nr. 3899/33
g.K., Wehramt III, 15 May 1933. The personnel for these train-
ing camps had already been assigned on 10 April. See CHL TA
232/33 g.K. T2IIIA/T4III
. Commencing with the Winter Semester
1933-34, the Reichswehr assigned five officers to the uni-
versities to teach military science courses. IMT, XXIX,
1850-PS, Gerullis-Kriiger conference, 17-18 July 1 933, 8. For
some idea of the nature of these military science courses, see
IfZG, Ma-619, Haushofer Papers, "Wehrwissenschaftlichen Vor-
lesungsverzeichnis des Wintersemesters 1933-34", Universitat
Miinchen. Bl. 161 851 .
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whether or not the Army could have met this cogent, a
fact which the Army seemed to realize a month later when
the shortage of military instructors undated the transfer
of the entire military sport training program to the SA.
in order to consolidate his position as director
of all military sport training, Kruger had to bring Schwab
and his AWA under the authority of the Chef AW
Kruger had no difficulty in gaining the support of the Army
for such a move. Colonel Heinrich von Vietinghoff genannt
Scheel, an officer assigned to Reichenau's staff, endorsed
the idea on the 5th of July. 38 The chef Aw^
Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, under whose
jurisdiction student affairs fell, as well as responsibility
for military sport subsidies. Frick agreed "... that the
entire military sport training program for the university
students should be placed under the direction of the Chef
AW. "39 Kr0ger hurdled the lajgt poss . ble obstacle tQ h . s plan
by securing an endorsement of Frick 's position from Minis-
terial Director Gerullis 40 of the Prussian Ministry for
_
..
38IMT/ XXIX, 1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk," Vietinghoff-Kruger meeting 5 July 1933, 2ff. 9
39
BA, Nachla/3 Kriiger/10, "Aktenvermerk, Besprechunq
mit Minister Frick", 10 July 1933. "
. . . daB die gesamte wehr-
sportliche Ausbildung der Studentenschaft ebenfalls unter dieAufsicht des Chef des Ausbildungswesens gestellt werde."
40A former university professor from Konigsberg, he was
aMmistenaldirektor in charge of student affairs in the Prus
sian Mmisterium fur Wissenschaft
, Kunst und Volksausbildung
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Academes, Art, and Popular Education. Gerullis not only
seconded Prick, but suggested to Kruger that he forestall
any opposition from the touchy students by appointing one
of their leaders, either Schwab or Gerhard Kruger, ^ to
the staff of the Chef AW Organization. 42
Kruger followed this advice and appointed Schwab to
his staff, probably in August, although Schwab seems to have
worked already for the Chef AW Organization in some capacity
during July. Apparently Schwab made an attempt to retain
his relative independence as head of the AWA, but his ap-
pointment to Kruger 's staff and the disbanding of the AWA
in August frustrated this effort. 44
Having thus neutralized by absorbtion any potential
opposition from the AWA, Kruger, on the 9th of September,
41 (6 December 1908-)
.
Kruger headed the German StudentCorporation. He hoined the NSDAP in 1928 while a student at
SeiP?r, d\ In, 1 ? 29 uhe transferred to Leipzig, and from 1931to 1933 he headed the Deutsche Studentenschaft . Receiving his
tiSnruntii
n
i945?°
ry
" ** * nw*"* ° fm ^si "
.
n <o
42
™r, XXIX, 1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk", Gerullis-Kriiger
,
1 7-1 8 July 1 933, 8.
JSchwab's retroactive appointment to 1 July 1933, (BANS-23/126, OSAF II, Nr. 1607/33, 20 October 1933) and the factthat he was not mentioned in the first set of orders listing
Chef AW appointments (see IfZG, Fuhrerbefehl , Nr. 16, OSAF II,
Nr. 4411/33, 1 August 1933) suggests that his initial activi-
ties for the Chef AW were either unofficial or undetermined,
but later recognized, hence his appointment with seniority as
of 1 July.
44IfZG, Zgs. 1685, Heinrich Bennecke, Bl . 17f.; Bracher,
Machtergreifung
, 895.
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replaced the defunct AWA with his cwn creation, the Uni-
versity Office. He named the Dresden SA Brisade^r^ Hein-
rich Bennecke^ to lead ^ Univergity^ ^
Schwab as Bennecke'
s deputy. An integral section of the Chef
AW Organization staff, Bennecke' s small section enjoyed
considerable autonomy from Kruger in its supervision of the
military sport offices at the universities and other insti-
tutions of higher learning. Bennecke personally selected
the military sport office leaders, choosing students or
recent graduates. The military sport camp directors were
chosen by Kruger and local SA leaders, and there seems to
have been some hostility between the camp leaders and the
students. During the winter of 1933-34, Rohm ordered all
healthy German male university students to report to their
respective university military sport office to register for
attendance at a military sport camp. The student, prior to
his fifth semester, had to complete successfully a military
« 10 f
5p
f
rs°nal
f
kt Heinrich Bennecke, OSAF II, B, Nr. 3583/33, 12 September 1933. Bennecke claimed that he received word
?;Li}lsD
Unexpected appointment while on vacation. IfZG, Zgs.Jb«b, Bennecke, 17f. and Bennecke, Rohm Putsch, 28. Born 8February 1902, Bennecke had a long history of involvement withradical nationalist causes. A Zeitfreiwilliger with I.R. 23in 1920 (during the Kapp Putsch), he served in Upper Silesia
with the Freikorps HaBfurther, and was again a Zeitfreiwilliger
with Pionier Abt. 7 in Munich during the time of the HitlerPutsch. A member of the NSDAP (Nr. 4840) since 1922, he servedin the Dresden Frontbann (1924 to 1926), the National SocialistGerman Students' League (1926-28) and in the Dresden SA from
1929. He commanded SA Brigade 33 when appointed to the Chef AW.Following the war he became an apologist for the SA.
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sport training course. 46
While consolidating his position vis-a-vis rival
daunts for the mantle of military sport training tsar,
KrUger busily recruited personnel for his organization.
Despite Rahm's furinations in May concerning
"unacceptable"
Reichskuratorium personnel, the Chef AW kept most Reichs-
kuratorium employees, including von Neufville and von 01-
berg. 4 7 other personnel fojf ^ chef ^ 0rgani2ation^
recruited from the SA and the general public.
SA men interested in joining Kruger's organization
had to apply through SA channels, with their immediate SA
commander making his evaluation of their military abilities,
character, and "... the degree of [their] ideological soli-
darity ....» 4 8 BefQre sending the application tQ Krtiger/
,. n . 4.
46BA
:
Sam Sch/279, OSAF I, Nr. 1632/33, 31 October 1933
and ?fZG
nW
Zar
n
?,^
r dSS R
-^s SA^ochsc^mts" '
greifuna' llV llil' *lm 2°~ 23 ' B^cher, in Machter-i±ung_, 895, states that the Reich SA Hochschulamt was in-
sectlons 2°3 f% ^ f'.^e above-mentioned "DlenstanweJsung;
,
It^tl
2,3,6,7, and 9 clearly establishes the subordinate
Tflr ° ^at Bennecke
'
s section to the Chef AW. See alsoI1ZG, Zgs. 1685, Bennecke, Bl. 20.
47BA, NS-23/157, OSAP/Chef AW IIa/314/33, 17 July 1933-
rho^Jtt^wt?7?; 2741/33 t0 Kr0ger ' 23 Jul^ and letter
'
C ef AW St/IIa 820/33 to OSAF, 4 August 1933; NachlaB Kriiger/
10, has an undated organization schematic diagram listing 01-berg as head of its administrative section. Regierungsrat a DJahn transfered to the Chef AW as Olberg's assistant. See IfZG,
Fuhrerbefehl Nr. 19, OSAF II, 1640/33, 9 November 1933; and
Neufville transferred to the Chef AW, section A-9, Referatfur Gelandesport, on 27 March 1934. See IfZG, Fuhrerbefehl
Nr. 23, OSAF P, 6400.
48IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW IIa/313/33, 17 July 1933.
...den Grad der weltanschaulichen Festigkeit
. . .
.
" Bl. 30.
the appropriate SA regional zander reviewed it and made
hrs own recommendations, whioh was apparently decisive.
«
Non-SA applicants wrote Kruger's staff in Berlin
directly, fillip out an application fQrm ^ respondlnq
to a questionnaire. In addition, they had to submit a
certificate of exemplary character from their local police
authorities, as well as military proficiency and evaluation
records and letters of reference. 50
Kriiger hurried to begin training operations, and he
usually notified successful applicants within ten days of
receipt of their files. He assigned newly appointed per-
sonnel to instructor training courses conducted by the
Army. 51 Most appointments to the Chef AW Organization were
probationary for 90 days, at which time, following a review
and evaluation of the candidate's performance, permanent
appointment followed. 52
By January 1935, at the time of the disbanding of
the Chef AW Organization, it employed over 10,000 people. 53
49BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 8.
1q„ 0
uIfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW, IIa/313/33, 1 7 July
51 BA-MA / II H/139, CHL TA 578/33 g.K. T4IIIa, 2 Aug-
ust 1933. This order required each Military District to es-tablish a training school for Chef AW instructors.
52IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW, IIa/313/33, 17 July
1933, Bl. 30.
53BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Niederschrift"
, Bl. 5. Thisfigure represents those on the payroll as of 24 January 193 5.
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As was to be expected from the nature of the training, a
large percentage of Kruger's instructors were veterans of
military service, about 40% and many of these were
former career men whose military service had been cut short
by the drastic reduction in the size of the Army following
the loss of the war. 55 Krager made a conscious effort fo
hire the "old fighters"
,
and he claimed that more than half
of his employees fell into thie category. 5 6
At the bottom of the Chef AW Organization, and its
reason for existence, were its schools and military sport
camps. Surviving evidence indicates that the Chef AW Or-
ganization had some 242 schools, of which 148 were devoted
to military sport training, 24 were used for terrain sport
(Gelandesport
) instruction, 14 provided SA leadership train-
ing, and 3 were Chef AW Organization instructor training
facilities. An additional 7 schools gave advanced marks-
manship instruction, 17 prepared SA men for cavalry and
Bennecke claims that there were over 13,000 Chef AW employeesSee his Rohm Putsch, 27ff. Kruger requested in his budget,for the period from October 1933 through March 1934, fundsfor 7303 employees. See IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, Bl. 26
54 BA, NS-10/77, "Staatistische Abteilung, betr. Lehr-
und Ausbildungspersonal Chef AW", Bi/Z, 20 December 1934.
55BA, NachlaB Kruger/10, [Chef AW] Personalamt to Grup-
penchef I, im Hause, 29 January 1935; IfZG, Zgs. 1709, Huwe,
Bl. 4.
56BA, NS-10/77, "Staatistische Abteilung, betr. Lehr-
und Ausbildungspersonal Chef AW", Bi/Z, 20 December 1934.
transportation duties, 9 taught communications technics
(including pigeon post and dog handling)
, 8 instructed
would-be combat engineers, 9 were SA naval schools, and one
gave instruction to SA medics and first aid specialists . 57
Chef AW enrollment statistics have unfortunately not
survived, and any estimate of attendance must come from the
planned enrollment estimates contained in Kruger 's budget
proposals, which may not have been attained. in the first
six months of the operations of the Chef AW Organization
(October 1933 through March 1934), it appears that some
110,000 to 115,000 students attended military sport courses.
Prom April 1934 through March 1935, Kruger planned to train
316,330 students. 59 In all likelihood, owing to the re-
58
57There are several conflicting lists and totals forthe number of Chef AW schools. The most detailed Ust L that
Arb^?^aS ldent . d^ r Reichsanstalt fur Arbeitsvermittlung undrbeitslosenyers 1Cherung, III 7480/252, 30 December 1935, inBA, Sam Sch/421, reproduced in appendix A. This document listedall former Chef AW Organization AW schools in order for formeremployees to establish a claim for unemployment compensation.According to this list, there were 233 Chef AW schools, but forsome unknown reason, the 9 Chef AW naval schools do not appear.Kruger himself stated that he ran 236 schools. See BDC, Per-
sonalakt Kruger, I, letter Kruger to Dr Hans Frank, 9 August1935. The Chef AW budget proposal for fiscal year 1933 requeststunds for 240 schools, but the proposal for fiscal year 1934
requests money for only 215 schools. See IfZG, Fa-90/2, Bl.
2, 63. For a list of Chef AW schools, see Appendix A.
58BA, NachlaB Kruger/15, undated letter of Kruger to re-
sponse to RWM 32/33g. VGH, 22 September 1933. Kruger was re-
quested to respond no later than 29 September. See also IfZG,
Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, Bl. 7.
59
IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, 2 June 1934, Bl. 63,indicates a projected enrollment of 276,640. In addition, Kru-
ger planned to train 39,690 terrain sport students. See BA,
NachlaB Kruger/10, Etatsvorschlag, Abt. "G", 2ff.
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organization of the ch&? &t,t -p n ,C ef AW following the »R6hm Putsch" of
30 June 1934, the organization fell short of if.bn r ts projected
goal, and may have trained only 220,000 men. 60 In the
twenty months of its formal existence, a conservative esti-
mate is that some 330,000 men attended Chef AW Organization
schools and camps.
Chef AW Organization personnel received excellent
salaries which generated envy and created considerable ill-
will, especially in the rest of the SA, the vast majority
of whose members received no pay. ^ Claiming, with some
tisticarreporfofmi ™b°rated an SA
received thfsA bfdge n T934 and Ile'sZfi '-"till SA menbadge was awarded to those who coveted Che? II milsport courses and passed a test. The chef AW ceased ooeratrons in March 1935, so probably no more than 00 000those receiving the SA badge in 1935 attenaea KrUgerVcamps and some of the men who received the badge in 1934
5»» ? S^?"p:Letea the Chef Aw instruction in 1 933 See BA
In March 19^°^' nc' 1<3 ' 1606 V41/Be/Se. 31 March
SA t™^ 11 ' ^ °SAF assumed responsibility to award thesport badge. See BA, NS-23/128, OSAF 13174, 16 March m 5 .
6
1
BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Niederschrift
" , "An dasPersonal" of the Chef AW Organization, wrote General F?omm
zfhi^" m Y o
ene
u
al
,
°f
t
iCe
'
"WUrden «berhOte Gehalter be™ahlt. Bl. 2; ibid., "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 19; IfZG, Zqs
R«hm
Gaertner
{
"Erlebnis", Bl. 19; Bennecke, Rchmputsch ; 29.o nearly May 1933, had received 15 mil lion RM from theReich Interior and Finance Ministries to assist unemployed
oLm?$; *°£m i^?ndSd t0 ^arrison ca. 100,000 men in camps.
i Fa
" 90 / 1 ' Wahmann letter to Kruger, 7 May 1 933, andBA, NachlaB Kruger/15, letter Wahmann to Kruger, 11 May 1933Rohm expressed his chagrin at the shoddy treatment accordedthe SA in financial matters in letters of the 23rd and 25thof May 1933, to Nazy Party Treasurer Schwarz. See HA, f. 328Rohm only received 3 million RM, the remainder being directedto Kruger in July. The money thus passed effectively fromRohm's control. See BA, NachlaB Kriiger/15, Frick-Kriiqer meet-ing, 10 July 1933.
justification, that he needed the relatively high salaries
in order to compete with the military servlces anfl ^^
Labor Service in the search for good instructors." Kru-
ger paid his full-time instructors, on the average, m 226
monthly, 63 about ^ same pay^ ^^
earned monthly. 64
Kruger 's largess in dispensing generous salaries was
matched by his seemingly extravagant outlay for the sport
schools and their attendant facilities. While critics in
the Army later accused him of fiscal irresponsibilities , 65
the circumstances associated with the military sport program
dictated that it would be expensive. The enormous expansion
of student enrollment (from approximately 12,000 trained by
the Reichskuratorium in the spring of 1933 to the 250,000
students per year mandated by Hitler) necessitated the ac-
quisition of numerous training facilities in addition to
W4M .
During the winter of 1933-34, Kruger attempted to
Ihtl^t
h
J
s
.P^rso
£
nel from joining the Reichswehr, claimingt at the Reichswehr was deliberately enlisting his best per-
;.
SeV fZG/ Fa ~ 9°/ 1 ' Blomberg to Rohm, RWM 168/34 g.K.LIIA, 22 February 1934; Kruger to Rohm, Ch/G 837/34, 24 Feb-ruary 1934; and Rohm to Blomberg, 26 February 1934.
6 BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 19ff.
6 4 IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, memorandum of conversation
with Reichenau, November 1933, Bl. 6.
65BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Niederschrift "
,
passim .
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the 28 Reichskuratorium camps and the 16 SA military spert
schools which Kruger already had. The obvious source of
training facilities, namely the pre-war Army garrison facili-
ties, which were available at no cost and plentiful, had to
be rejected for security reasons. Most of these garrisons
were located in large towns and cities, where the clandes-
tine training of the SA would be all too easily observed.
The need for secrecy dictated that most Chef AW Organiza-
tion schools be located in small, relatively isolated rural
communities, 66 which meant that building had to begin from
scratch.
In his instructions for establishing Chef AW Organi-
zation facilities, Kruger urged his assistants to try every
conceivable means to keep construction costs to a minimum.
He stated that communities which offered to assist either
in the construction or the financing of Chef AW facilities
would be given first consideration for the location of the
schools. For whatever construction or renovation was neces-
sary, he wrote, it was imperative to approach the Reich Labor
Service for assistance, which presented the most economical
means of building a camp or school, involving only the cost
of materials. If the Labor Service refused to assist, he
cautioned his staff members to sign contracts only with
reputable firms owned by Nazi Party members (preferably of
66 BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellung nahme" , Bl. 22f.
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long-standing) which would be ^ ^
SA xnen for Chef AW projects." Kruger also urged his assis .
tants to explore other avenues of economy, such as long_tem
leasing, or arranging tax credits with the Reich Finance
Ministry for communities which assisted the Chef AW build-
ing program. Insofar as possible, Kruger attempted to
build his camps and schools on public property. m Bavaria,
in contrast to the arrangements of the Bavarian Government
with other Nazi Party agencies, the Chef AW Organization
negotiated an arrangement so that it did not pay any rent
for using state property. 69
Despite attempts to reduce costs, the enormous growth
of Kruger 's staff and the tremendous increase in pre-mili-
tary training activities necessitated an immense expenditure
of funds. Kruger absorbed the small (RM 1.5 million) Reichs-
kuratorium budget in July, and received during the summer of
1933 some additional assistance from the Reich Ministry of
the Interior and the Army. 70 while this money covered his
67IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW 0/G Nr. 90/70/33, 14September 1933, Bl. 59F.
68BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 23ff.
6 9BA, Sam Sch/421, Bay. Staatsmin. d. Finanzen, Nrs.
18000 and 18001, to Landeszweigstellen
, 27 April 1934.
70BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme", Bl. 11;
"Niederschrift"
,
Bl. 1; IMT
,
XXIX, 1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk"
,
Blomberg-Kruger meeting, 15 July 1933. During the winter of1933-34, Kriiger received some funds from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. See BA, NachlaB Kruger/11, PMd1 , VOI
1403/33/1 F, 1105/1-18.12, 2 January 1934.
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Mediate operating costs, a firm budget was imperative
, and
Kruger prepared one by November, estimating his yearly ex_
Penses at KM 118,203,600. To see his organization through
the remaining half
.(1 Oct. 1 933 - 31 March 1 934) of fiscal
Year 1933, he requested RM 79,382,000. The budget, however,
never gained official approval from the Finance Ministry.
Its experts, along with Defense Ministry and Chef AW of-
ficials, agreed that a formal confirmation of the Chef AW
Organization budget could serve no useful purpose, because
the scope of the Chef AWs mission was as yet undefined? •"
Kruger did not receive the RM 79 million, but got instead
RM 47 million. 71
Similar problems developed in preparing the 1934
budget. During the first six months of 1934, neither the
OSAF nor the Defense Ministry would agree to allow the other
to assume responsibility for Kruger 's finances. The purge
of Rohm in June 1934, ended this conflict. The re-organi-
zation of the Chef AW Organization during the summer of 1934
occasioned a repetition of the strange argument that an un-
determined mission obviated the need for official approval
of the budget. Perhaps this was a sign of unwillingness on
the part of the Government and the Army to legalize and make
permanent the Chef AW Organization. Kruger nonetheless re-
71 IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, n.d. [Nov. 1933], Bl.
7-26, 126; BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
,
12f.;
"Niederschrift" , Bl . 1.
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quested m 120 raillion in 19 34 for his schools and ^^
tiona! KM 23 million for terrain sporfc ^^^^^ Reich
SA University Office, and HiUer Vouth training camps. He
received RM 90 »UUon. of which all but 8 ^ ^
the Chef AW Organization. 72
The fact that Kruger had considerable difficulty and
finally failed to seoure „ sound financlal foot±ng ^ ^
organization should not be allowed to obscure the remarkable
support which he did receivp m +->^ ~ •j-ecei e. in the nine months of its
existence, the Reichskuratorium received RM 1 . 5 million,
in contrast, the Chef AW Organization, which existed for
slightly less than two years, enjoyed subsidies of RM 137
million
.
The purpose for the outlay of all this money was to
expand the military sport training program, and Kruger began
his first courses in some 70 camps on the 15th of October
1933. Terrain sport camps began four days later. 73 m
spite of the efforts of the Reichswehr to train Chef AW
instructors during August and September, there appears to
have been a shortage of trained Chef AW instructors, which
72BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 13-18-
"Niederschrift", Bl. 1f. ;
73IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW, G. Nr. 138/81/33, 20September 1933, and OSAF/Chef AW AA 4318/93/33, 9 October1933. For a list of schools in operation see ibid
. , Bl. 198fThe schools were equally distributed in each military district1 -e
.
,
5-6 schools per district.
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necessitated further assistance from the Army, already
short-handed itself. On ,9 September, the Army Command
ordered each Military District to assign two officers and
20-25 enlisted men to assist Chef AW Organization schools
within their respective district-* m K„ ~ ,r x u icts. The Defense Ministry
specified that whenever possible district colanders would
assign to this duty the same soldiers who had earlier
assisted the Chef AW Organization or the Reichskuratorium
instructors. To maintain the deception that the Chef AW
Organization and the Reichswehr had no contact, the De-
fense Ministry in September 1933 ordered its men assigned
to Kriiger's organization to wear the SA uniform. 74
The Army provided further assistance to the Chef AW
Organization by preparing the programs of instruction and
the lesson plans for Kriiger's schools. SA military sport
training was, wrote the Army Command in an order of the
27th of July 1933, basic recruit training under arms. 7 ^
BA-MA, II H/139, CHL TA 730/33, g.K. T4IIIA, 19September 1933; WKVII/2188, WKII/Ib, 1588/33 g.K./Ia-A, 25September 1933; and WKVII/734, CHL TA 740/33 g.K T4IIIA/337/33 g.K.H., 29 September 1933.
J
5BA-MA, WKVII/1451, Abschrift of CHL TA 533/33 g.K.
T4III, "Richtlinien fur die vormilitarische Ausbildung"
, 27July 1933. "SA-Sport ist Rekrutenausbilung mit der Waffe
Das Ziel der SA-Sportausbildung ist die grundliche Einzelausbildung (Rekrutenausbildung) " See also BA, NachlaB
Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 8. (emphasis in original)
According to regulations issued in the summer of 1933,
successful completion of the basic SA military sport course
was a pre-requisite to enlistment. 76
SA military sport courses lasted four weeks, and the
technical (communications, combat engineer, riding and driv-
ing, and seamanship) courses averaged three weeks in dura-
tion. 77 The students' 13 hour day was long but well-regu-
lated and the students were kept busy. Reveille came at
6 AM, followed by physical training and breakfast. Morn-
ings were devoted to learning field exercises (e^.
, forced
marching, offensive and defensive tactics, and field forti-
fication techniques)
,
while afternoon instruction focused
on marksmanship, range estimation, map reading, assembly/
disassembly of military weapons, and outpost and sentry duty,
followed by more physical training, drill, and team sports.
Organized into squads and platoons, the student groups com-
peted against one another, with the victors receiving
special privileges, usually an extended leave from camp.
Dinner was held at 6 PM, and unless some form of night train-
ing was scheduled, evenings were free. The students were
7 BA-MA, WKVII/1451, Abschrift CHL TA 533/33 g.K.
T4III, "Richtlinien"
, 27 July 1933. This was later changed togive priority to those who had completed pre-military train-
ing. See BA, Sam Sch/405, "Merkblatt fur den Eintritt in die
Reichsmarine"
,
Fruhjahr 1934; and NS-23/319,
','Merkblatt fur
den Eintritt in das Reichsheer"
,
April 1934.
7 BA-MA, WKVII/1451, Abschrift CHL TA 533/33 g.K.
T4III, "Richtlinien", 27 July 1 933; IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef
AW Insp. d. SA/SS Reiterei 490/33, 26 October 1933; and BA,
NS-23/319, Chef AW, Landesfiihrer IV, Pi/G, 201/34, Be/Fa,
9 November 1934.
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they received from the chef Aw Organlzation ^ ^^
canteen or in the local c_ity
. The ^^^
normally extinguished at 10 PM. 78
Some of the first Chef AW teohnioal courses had to
be conducted in Army garrisons because the SA facilities
were not completed. Various Reichswehr units were ordered
by the Defense Ministry in September 19 33 to assign soldiers
to assist the Chef AW Organization instructors and to pro-
vide logistical support and lodging for the Chef AW schools
quartered in their garrisons." The orders to the garrison
commanders stressed the secrecy of the program, insisting
that all correspondence concerning any SA training employ
the street, rather than the military address of the garri-
son and its units "because foreign policy reasons prohibit
any visible relationship between the SA and the Reichswehr,
and for the duration of the courses, the wearing of the SA
uniform by the students in the vicinity of the garrison is
80prohibited." The Chef AW Organization students in this
109*1 a f ^
Fa
7
9°/ 1
'
CHL TA 533/33 g.K. [T4III, 27 July1933 Anlage 2, Bl. 1-24; BA, R-53/191, letter Karl-Heinzbtigler (zur Zeit bei der SA-Sportschule Aschaf fenburg) tohis uncle Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, 20 March 1934.
^BA-MA, WKVII/734, CHL TA 734/33 g.K. T4IIIA, Wehr.A 648/33 g.K. In 51, 28 September 1933.
8°Ibid
.
,
and CHL TA 740/33 g.K./337/33 g. K .H
.
, 29
September 1933. "Da aus aussenpolitischen Grunden kein
Zusammenhang zwischen Heer und SA nachweisbar sein darf,ist den Teilnehmern wahrend der Dauer der Lehrgange das
Tragen der SA-Uniform im Bereich des Standorts verboten."
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instance wore the uniform of the Reichswehr
.
81
Although a few SA men attended technical training in
Reichswehr garrisons, most SA men received their military
sport training in Chef AW Organization camps. The typical
camp was new and situated on the outskirts of or at some
distance from a rural community. This relative isolation
aided the physical security of the camp and helped to dis-
courage the curious. The camp, surrounded by a fence, was
usually constructed of wood and had private bungalows for
the staff and their families, barracks for the students,
and communal dining, bathing, and recreation facilities.
The Chef AW Organization initially adopted the camp ar-
rangement because of its low cost and ease of security,
but later the camp became extolled by the Nazis as an end
in itself, a place where young Germans learned not just to
work, but to live with one another in the "healthy" atmos-
phere of a National Socialist community. 82
Although the size of the camps often varied on ac-
count of location, Kriiger attempted to achieve uniformity
among them. Military sport schools had an average enroll-
ment of 210 students per course, as did the terrain sport
schools. There were 54 staff members assigned to each of
these schools. Enrollment figures for the technical schools
81 Ibid.
82
°^Bemett, Leibeserzeihungen
, 79 f f
.
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fluctuated fro, 280 students per combat engineer course to
160 per communications course. The staff of a communica-
tions school numbered 85, in comparison to 64 at combat
engineer schools, and only 37 at marksmanship schools. 83
To recognize the growing number of SA men who had
been graduated from Chef AW Organization military sport
courses, Rohm established the SA Sport Badge in December
1933. Applicants had to complete several preliminary tests
prior to attending a Chef AW military sport camp, and at
the end of the four week course the final test was con-
ducted. SA and SS men who passed all the tests were en-
titled to wear the badge on their uniforms. 84
When Rohm created the sport badge in December, Krii-
ger's Chef AW Organization had already been in operation
for several months and had probably graduated some forty
or fifty thousand SA and SS men from its courses. From a
nucleus of 18 Reichskuratorium camps and 16 SA schools,
Kruger had built and put into operation over seventy mili-
tary sport schools by mid-October 1933. In addition, with-
in a scant five months he had organized a command structure
83 IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag (1.4.34-31.3.35)
2 June 1934, Bl. 63, 66-94.
84BA, NS-23/1, OSAF, I Nr. 1719/33, betr. SA-Sportab-
zeichen, 5 December 1933. The precise requirements for theSA badge were issued in a 15pp. pamphlet prepared by Kruger,
a copy of which can be seen in BA, Sam Sch/415, "Ausfiihrungsbestimmungen. See also SA Mann , No. 13, 31 March 1934
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capable of directing and supporting his large and far-flung
military sport sohool empire. Finally, he had outmaneuvered
his rival Nazi Party comrades who had contested his claim
to direct all military sport programs. On the other hand,
Kruger's position was by no means secure and the most bitter
and prolonged opposition to his organization came from his
fellow political soldiers in the SA.
CHAPTER IX
BETWEEN THE SA AND THE REICHSWEHR
JULY 1933 - JUNE 1 934
The Bad Reichenhall Agreement of July 1933 repre-
sented the highpoint of Relchswehr_SA relations
. ^ ^
Army
.3 standpoint, the decision to allow the SA to direot
the military sport program relieved the already over-oom-
mitted military instruotors of the burden of having to
train thousands of SA men. Moreover, in the eyes of the
Army command leaders, the SA now had a meaningful role in
national defense, with which they falsely assumed the SA
would be satisfied.
Rohm, however, appears to have interpreted the
Reichenhall Agreement as the beginning of an increased role
for the SA in national defense and national policy determi-
nation. He expected Hitler, at any moment, to create a SA
Reich Ministry, which among other things, would be respon-
sible for all non-regular defense forces and activities. 1
Rohm had, for the most part, gained control of all irregular
forces at Reichenhall, but his ambitions were greater.
Execrating the lack of political commitment in the pre-1914
4
'IfZG, Fa-90/1, Wahmann to Kruger, Bericht Nr. 1,
7 May 1933, Bl. 5. Messerschmidt
, in Wehrmacht
, 27, arguesthat Rohm, by gaining control of all pre-military trainingprograms, had already won an important concession and thatpre-military training provided him and the SA a base from
which to expand their power.
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Army and the Reichsvehr, he castigated the Army for its
non-partisan politican attitude. Such attitudes, he wrote,
had contributed materially tc the loss of the 1914-1918 war.
The German soldier did not, he claimed, have any political
convictions to inspire him to carry on the struggle when
all appeared lost. Such courage of conviction, explained
the SA Chief of Staff, could only emanate from a sincere
commitment to a political ideology. m the new National-
Socialist state, he asserted, the traditional efficiency
of the German Army must be tempered by the political con-
viction of its soldiers, whose loyalty for not only the
state but the Nazi movement must be unshakeable. Thus,
explained Rohm, the apolitical Reichswehr was an anachron-
ism in the Nazi state and it would have to be replaced by
an army of steadfast National Socialists. 2 R6hm apparently
never expressed a clear decision regarding the future of
the Reichswehr, but ambiguously implied that the Reichswehr
either would become a training cadre for a SA Peoples' Army
or would become the elite striking force of the Nazi Peoples'
Army
.
J
With a series of misunderstandings marring Reichswehr-
2R6hm, Hochverrater
, 110, 168f.
JPapen, Memoirs
, 313; Gisevius, To the Bitter End
,1 1 2
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SA relations during the spring of ,933, < both parties hoped
that the agreement reached at Reichenhall would eliminate
areas of conflict. Army officers left Bad Reichenhall con-
vinced that their difficulties with the SA had been resolved
and that the SA would atte.pt no further inroads into mili-
tary spheres of activity.* This relative calm and
was quickly shattered when the Army Command began to dis-
cover that Rohm had no intention of allowing the Army to
dominate the SA pre-military training program. While this
program did provide a temporarily useful outlet for the SA,
Rohm saw the danger of allowing Blomberg and Reichenau to
fashion Kruger and the Chef AW Organization into a brown
auxiliary of the Reichswehr. The SA Chief of Staff had to
retain his authority over Kruger in order to further his
ambitions for a greater military role for the SA, while the
Reichswehr could not allow the SA any further incursions
4A number of these misunderstandings were gui+-e pettvsuch as the failure to exchange salutes between SA and Reichs-Pe
^°r
el
-
S
f
e BA
'
NS - 2 3/1 25, OSAF IIB 107/33, 1 9 April19 33; and Messerschmidt
, Wehrmacht und NS . 32. For the moreserious matter of SA men arresting military employees, see the
^f^thy correspondence in ^A-MA
, RW 6/V66 and WOl-5/108; BA,NS-23/125, OSAF 1313/33, 27 June 1933, and IfZG, F-56, Auf-
zeichnung des Generals a.D. Kurt Weckmann, Bl. 8f. The quest-ion of whom should lead SA units incorporated into the Grenzs-
chutz presented the thorniest problem of 1933. The SA in-
sisted on retaining its own leaders, and the Army demandedthat it should name the leaders. This issue wrecked the
Grenzschutz of that period. See IfZG, Zgs. 39 (I), Fretter-
Pico, Bl. 31f; Zgs. 11, Bockmann, Bl. 3f; Zgs. 105, Mellen-
thin, Bl. 33f; and F-56, Weckmann, Bl. 5-8."
Keitel, Verbrecher
, letter of Frau Lisa Keitel to
her mother, 5 July 19 33, 53.
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into the sphere of national defense without abrogating its
claim of being the sole national military force. To allow
R6hm undisputed control of the pre-military training program
was to open a veritable Pandora's Box of insatiable SA de-
mands which might culminate in the replacement of the Army
by the brown battalions. Thus Kriiger, from the onset of
his appointment as Chef AW, found himself in the extra-
ordinarily difficult position of being responsible to two
antagonistic factions, each intent on eliminating the in-
fluence of the other. 6 While the domination of the Kriiger
Organization was only one facet of the struggle between the
Reichswehr and the SA, it was the most visible and tangible
objective for each party.
While the majority of Kriiger 's problems stemmed from
the antagonisms of the Army and the SA toward one another,
more than a few of his difficulties arose from his attempts
to institutionalize his precarious position, namely to give
his organization some statutory definition and hence pro-
tection against caprice. His efforts were perhaps not un-
justly perceived by Rohm and Reichenau as "empire building" J
In this contest Kriiger' s abrasive personality proved of
6BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 5-9;
IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Erlebnis", Bl. 17-24; Vogelsang,
"Chef AW", 9f; Steiner, Clausewitz bis Bulganin
,
112f; Ben-
necke, Reichswehr und Rohmputsch
, 30, 46.
7BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, Himmler to Kriiger, 29 De-
cember 1939.
241
inesti^ble value. With a sense of duty that allowed no
COfflPr°miSe
' ^ Sh"nk fr°m "° 'ask, no matter
-t, essential to the completion of his mission. When the
occasion denuded, he could be brutally frank
. He had al-
ready accused Reichenau of working against hi. and the SA,*
and had become involved over an alleged slight in an acri-
monious dispute with the Prussian Ministry for Education,
Arts, and Vocational Training. 9 Supremely confident, his
self-righteousness could be insufferable. An idealist, he
drove himself and his personnel ruthlessly, yet they re-
warded his excessive concern for their welfare with con-
siderable respect and fidelity. 10 Hls portraits reveal a
cold haughtiness and a lack of either expression or emotion. 11
Kriiger's personality, his military background, and his austere
private life made him suspect in the eyes of many of the
radical SA leaders, while these same characteristics gave
him a certain entre with the Defense Ministry.
Kruger had developed one additional capacity which
was to serve him well: an instinct for identifying and in-
gratiating himself with the "right" people, those who
BA, Sam Sch/421, Kruger to Reichenau, Qu 1538/33,
19 June 1933.
9Ibid., Gerullis to Kruger, 15 August 1933; Kruger
to Gerullis, 17 August 1933.
10See IfZG, Fa-90/1
, Wahmann letters to Kruger, May
1933; Steiner, Clausewitz bis Bulganin, 112ff.
1l The only picture of Kruger readily available in the
United States is in Nikolai Tolstoy, The Night of the Long
Knives
, New York, 1972, 47.
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wielded power. For example, at the end of February 1933,
radioal SA leaders from Silesia requested his assistance^
in blocking the appointment of an allegedly notorious Free
Mason to the Breslau Police Presidium. Deploring the fact
that the political leaders of the Nazi Party rarely consult-
ed SA leaders prior to making important personnel appoint-
ments, the radical SA leaders in their letter to Kruger
noted that this most unacceptable candidate was even al-
leged to be friendly with Goring. Kruger's reply to the
Breslau SA leaders has not survived, but he forwarded their
letter on 2 March to Goring 's Prussian Ministry of the In-
terior where it was surely read and recorded with interest,
as well as gratitude. 12
Although Kruger had already clashed with Reichenau,
and perhaps recognized in him an opponent of equal ambition
and energy, the two appeared to have resolved their differ-
ences by the end of July in the light of the greater threat
posed by the ambitious Rohm. Side-stepping a clumsy effort
earlier in the month by Reichenau to assert Reichswehr con-
trol over his budget, 13 Kruger nonetheless apparently agreed
1 2BDC, Personalakt Kruger, letter of Gruppens tabsfuhrer
Puckler to Kruger, " vertraulich" , 28 February 1933. The letter
has Kruger's initial at the top and a stamp marking receipt by
the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, 2 March 1933. Goring,
a former commander of the SA, despised Rohm and feared his
power. He especially hated SA leaders Edmund Heines (Breslau)
and Karl Ernst (Berlin) , for whose arrest and execution he
was personally responsible.
13 IMT, XXIX, 1850-PS, Blomberg-Kruger conversation,
15 July 1933, 4f.
243
in the interests of harmony to submit his final budget to
the Reiehswehr for review. ^ By the end of July Kruger and
Reichenau signed an agreement which oalled for Kruger to
train some 250,000 men yearly with the Army providing what-
ever assistance he needed. 15
Keichenau's greatest success in his dealings with
Kruger consisted in gaining a strong voice in Chef AW per-
sonnel selection. The military nature of the Chef AW train-
ing programs dictated employment of as many veterans as
possible and it appears that Reichenau proved quite willing
to supply Kruger with numerous personnel suggestions and
recommendations. 1 * Reichenau, moreover, had "liaison-
officers assigned to the important Chef AW Organization
staff sections. These military liaison officers kept
Reichenau informed of activities at the highest level of
the Chef AW Organization and in all likelihood influenced
Kriiger's plans and decisions. 17 After Hitler became alarm-
ed in October 1933 over alleged security leaks in the Kruger
Organization, Kruger created security specialists for the
14BA, NachlaB Kruger, "s tellungnahme"
, 12f.
Slhi
-A - , 9; BA-MA, WK VII/1451, RWM TA 533/33 g.K.
T4III, Berlin, 27 July 1933 (Abschrift)
.
1 6Bracher, Machtergreifung
, 893f; Messerschmidt
,
Wehrmacht und NS
, 26f.
17IfZG, Zgs. 248 (I), Holtzendorff , Bl. 58; BA,
NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 9.
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staff of each SA Group headquarters. These specialists
were almost entirely selected by Reichenau, who encouraged
them to work closely with local Reichswehr counterparts.
The Chef AW security sections provided the Reichswehr with
considerable information concerning internal SA activities.'
Finally, Reichenau secured the appointment of Dr. Karl
Krummel to head the General Section of the Chef AW Organi-
zation staff. Krummel was responsible for liaison and co-
ordination of Chef AW activities with government agencies.
Krummel left his position of instructor at the Army Sport
School in Wiinsdorf only at the insistence of Reichenau,
who had been a close acquaintance for ten years. 19
In addition to gaining some influence in the Chef
AW Organization by influencing personnel selection, it is
possible that Reichenau may have considered using the Kriiger
Organization to split and weaken the SA. By providing SA
men, disgruntled with their small share in the spoils of the
Nazi regime, with an example of Reichswehr-SA cooperation,
namely the Chef AW Organization, Reichenau may have wanted
to show SA men that not only was cooperation with the Army
1 ftIfZG, Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk Kriiger, 19 October 1933;
Zgs. 1709, Huwe, Bl. 11; Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Erlebnis" , Bl
.
5; Bennecke, Reichswehr und Rohmputsch
, 46f; Manstein, Sol-
datenleben
, 184-187.
1 9 I am indebted for this information to Prof. Dr.
Horst Uberhorst, who graciously permitted me to read his
manuscript of a forthcoming biography of Krummel.
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feasible, but beneficial: beneficial to the Army by allevi-
ating the manpower shortage, and beneficial to the SA by
providing employment. He may have hoped that in the long run
such an example might attract the conservative and reasonable
elements of the SA to the Reichswehr and the state, leaving
Rohm and his radicals isolated and without significant politi-
cal influence. There was, from Reichenau's standpoint, little
risk in pursuing a policy directed at dividing the SA. Should
he have only partial success, at least the Kruger Organization
vital to defense plans, would remain safely under Army control
and should he achieve complete success, rallying the "decent"
SA men to the Reichswehr banner, the problem of the intractabl,
Rchm would disappear.
Although his own position between the Army and the
SA was not at all clear, Kruger had no doubts as to his
position vis-a-vis other SA leaders. In an order issued
19 July, he informed them that they would no longer visit
Defense Ministry officials without his permission, noting
that "by the establishment of the headquarters of the Chief
of Training Affairs of the SA, all intercourse and the sole
liaison with the Army has been laid in my hand". 20 Two days
later Rohm explained to his SA commanders that they would
provide Kruger any assistance he needed in making personnel
20IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF Chef AW, V/R/360/33, 19 July 1933.
"Durch die Einrichtung der Dienststelle des Chefs des Aus-
bildungswesens der SA ist der gesamte Verkehr und die einzige
Verbindung zur Reichswehr in meine Hand gelegt."
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sections. Further
, wrote the gA CMef of gtaff(
ers would piace no obstacles in the path of their men who
wished to join the Chef AW. 2 "!
In dealing with men whose inflamed sensitivities de-
manded twelve lives as retribution for every SA man lost in
action,^ R5hm , s order authorizing a personnel raiding ex-
pedition and Kruger's arrogant tone were bound to provoke a
strong reaction. The SA Group Commanders complained bitter-
ly to Rohm, 23 and according tQ Kr( .ger/ procrastinat . on/ re _
luctance, begrudging compliance, and in some cases outright
defiance, characterized the cooperation he received from his
fellow SA leaders. 2 4 A conference held at Bad Godesburg
during the middle of August, at which Hitler, Rohm, Reichenau,
Kruger, and the senior SA leaders were present, failed to re-
solve the nascent conflict. Hitler and Rohm repeated, in
lengthy and "flimsy" speeches, the tired platitudes that the
Army remained the sole fighting force of the nation. Nothing
was accomplished toward resolving Kruger 's anomalous position
or tenuous authority, and Hitler's attempt to paper over
21 Ibid
.
,
OSAF Chef AW Nr. 490/33, 21 July 1933.
22
,Ibid., OSAF Ch. 1415/33, 31 July 1933, "Disziplin".
23Rohm immediately scheduled a conference of all majorSA commanders and staff leaders for 3 August 1933. See BA
NS-23/125, OSAF I, Nr. 1413/33, 28 July 1933. No record of
this conference can be discovered.
24BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 3, If.
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serious rifts between warring factions with vague formulas
did not prove to be a crashing success. 25
In the absence of a decision by Hitler, Rohm was not
slow in either responding to Reichenau's efforts to dominate
indirectly the Chef AW Organization or in answering the
angry cries of his subordinates who professed to be outraged
at Kriiger's arrogance. While not quite countermanding his
order of 21 July, the SA Chief of Staff effectively super-
seded it six weeks later. Reserving for himself the authori-
ty to approve Kriiger's regional staff director (Chef AW
deputies) nominations, Rohm permitted senior SA commanders
to make recommendations concerning the suitability of Krii-
ger's nominees. 26 in addition, he made Chef AW deputies
subordinate not to Kriiger but to the senior SA commanders , 27
who were made responsible for implementing Kriiger's direct-
28ives. in a similar fashion, Rohm authorized the four Chef
AW training inspectors to issue training regulations for the
entire SA, but assigned authority for executing these direct-
25Muller, Heer und Hitler
, 93; GraB, Jung
, 119.
26BA, NS-23/125, OSAF Ch . Nr. 1510/33, 9 September
1933; NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 7.
27Ibid.
BA, NS-23/125, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1507/33, 9 September
1933; NS-23/126, OSAF 1551/33, 18 September 1933, "Dienstan-
weisung fur den Fiihrer einer Obergruppe."
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ives to SA unit colanders. 29 The SA Chief of Staff thus
effectively subverted Kruger. s authority, granted in July
by Hitler, 30 to deal directly with SA colanders in matters
relating to military sport. m the event of non-compliance
by refractory SA leaders, Kruger could now only request
R6hm, who alone had the prestige and authority in the SA to
compel obedience, to enforce the training directives.
Fearing that Rohm's newest orders would only exacer-
bate his worsening relations with SA leaders, Kruger com-
plained to the Chief of Staff that his "...regulations
governing the relations between SA unit headquarters and
[the Chef AW] Inspectors could be expected to lead to dif-
ficulties ." 3
1 m a private reply, Rohm all but accused
Kruger of disloyalty and sharply admonished him to avoid
the imperious tone which permeated his correspondence. "I
accept", wrote Rohm, "the responsibility [for any problems]
because I have issued the order. You have", he continued,
1Q„ „
BA
'
Sam Sch/405, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1513/33, 11 September
1933, Dienstanwesiung fur den Inspekteur der Marine-SA sowie
Organisationsplan fur die Marine-SA"; NS-23/125, OSAF Ch. Nr.
1511/33, 12 September 1933, "Dienstanweisung fur den Inspek-
teur des Nachrichtensports.
"
3oOSAF Ch/A/35/33, 5 August 1933, quoted in BA, NachlaB
Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 3. This order has not been
discovered.
31 BDC, Personalakt Kruger, Rohm to Kruger, OSAF Ch.
1527/33, 13 September 1933, personlich. "...Regelung des
Verhaltnisses zwischen Dienststellen und Inspektionen Schwierig
keiten zu erwarten waren."
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"dutifully expressed your apprehension; [however] after I
have made the decision, the matter rests." 32
While the actions of SA commanders, who appointed
men hostile to Kriiger to the Chef AW deputy posts, 33 seemed
to justify Kriiger's predictions, a new issue arose which
threatened to destroy the Chef AW Organization. From the
genesis of the Organization, Kriiger and Reichenau had in-
corporated training with military weapons into the curricu-
lum of the military sport program. They planned to prevent
public disclosure of this aspect of SA training34 at least
until Germany received approval to re-arm from the Disarma-
ment Committee of the League of Nations. Kriiger appears to
have naively expected the League to acquiesce momentarily,
but he did warn the Defense Ministry in September that
despite stringent security precautions, it would be impos-
Ibid
.
"Die Verantwortung dafiir trage ich, da ichdie Anordnung getroffen habe
. Du hast Deine Auffassung
pflichtgemaB vertreten; nachdem die Entscheidung von mir
getroffen wurde, muB es damit sein Bewenden haben."
33BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 8;Sam Sch/421, Kriiger to Rohm, 5 December 1933, personlich.
34As early as August 193 3 the German Government took
steps to prohibit press reports concerning SA military sport
training. IfZG, Ma-260, RMdl to RM fur Volksaufklarung und
Propaganda, IA 2200/1.8, 7 August 1933, Bl. 6227728. For
military security precautions, see BA-MA, WK VII/1451,
(Abschrift) RMW TA 533/33 g.K. T4III, 27 July 1933; WK VII/
734, CHL TA 734/33 g.K. T4IIIA, Wehr. A. 648/33 g.K. In 5L,
28 September 1933; and CHL TA 740/33 g.K./337/33 g.K.H.,
29 September 1933.
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sible to maintain complete secrecy for a prolonged period. 35
Well aware of the potentially damaging effects that prema-
ture public disclosure of the military sport program could
have on his efforts to find approval to re-arm, Hitler, who
probably knew of Kruger's warning, ordered in early October
a halt to all weapons training in the SA sport camps. 36
The halt was merely temporary, for "as soon as the diplo-
matic situation permits", said the Army Command, "weapons
training in SA sport camps will re- commence ." 3 7
The security measures instituted in July by the Army
and Kriiger to conceal military sport training proved insuf-
ficient for Hitler, who castigated SA leaders for lax
security precautions during a meeting on 17 October. After
insisting that there were spies in the SA, he claimed that
it was possible for these agents to expose SA military train-
ing activities, with terribly detrimental consequences to
current diplomatic negotiations . 38 Hoping to transfer some
35
BA, NachlaB Kriiger/15, RWM 32/33 geh. VGH IV, to RMdl
PMdl, RL-M, OSAF (CHEF AW), 22 September 1933, with Kruger's
comments on the enclosure, returned 26 September 19 33.
36BA-MA, WK VII/1451, WK VII/7 I.D., Ib/Ia 1679/g. Kdos
M, 5 October 1933, with telephone call notes of 6 October, re-
ferring to Ib/Ia 1664/g.K./M, 3 October 1933 memorandum from
Hitler.
37Ibid
. ,
WK VII/1342, RMW CHL TA 788/33 T4lIIa/T2IIIc
,
g.K., 10 October 1933. "Die Waf fenausbildung wird in den SA-
Sport Lagern wieder aufgenommen werden, sobald die auBen-
politischen Lage es zulaBt." SA units which trained in Reichs-
wehr camps (normally specialized training) continued their
weapons training.
38IfZG, Fa-90/1, Kriiger Aktenvermerk , 19 October 1933.
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of this censure from the SA, Rohm sought to shift responsi-
bility for any future problems to the Army. He instructed
Kruger to inform Reichenau that Blomberg must accept respon-
sibility for any security leaks arising from the military
sport program. Otherwise, noted the Chief of Staff, he
would order a halt to all SA-Reichswehr training activities . 39
Hitler's remarks to the SA were doubtless prompted
by the German walk-out from the League of Nations on 14 Octo-
ber following unsuccessful efforts to secure League approval
to rearm. 40 Hitler seems to have feared that disclosure of
SA military sport programs could become an excuse for inter-
vention by hostile powers. Paradoxically, as the success
of the walk-out tactics became evident, so did Germany's
isolation and vulnerability. Hitler's observation of 3
February 1933 concerning the quality of French statesmanship
became painfully obvious to the officers in the Defense Min-
39
Ibid. Cf. Bracher, Machtergreifung , 932f., who allegesthat Hitler's speech of 17 October 1933 was a distinct blow toRohm, placing him on the defensive vis-a-vis the Army. Follow-ing Hitler's speech, both SA and the Army increased security
measures. See BA-MA, II H/153, RWM Abw. 496/33 IIIL g.K., 3
November 1933; BA, NS-23/126 OSAF Z, Nr. 1615/33 g.K. 25 Octo-ber 1933.
4oHitler had continued, without success, the efforts ofhis predecessors, to secure approval of the Disarmament Commis-
sion of the League of Nations to re-arm and expand the Reichs-
wehr. His failure to secure concessions led to the German walk-
out on 14 October. He was apparently still willing to negotiate
unilaterally in February. As a quid pro quo
, he offered to cease
weapons training activities in return for permission to ex-pand the Reichswehr. See DGFP
,
C, II, Nr. 271, Memorandum ofHitler-Eden conversation, 20 February 1934, 516ff; and Nr. 306,German Ambassador to England to German Foreign Ministrv, 8March 1934, 572.
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Ut*< in light of Germany's isolation and weak military
posture, accelerating the Army expansion plan adopted in
1932 became imperative, and alteration of any of its pro-
visions, especially those regarding pre-military training,
which had acquired even greater importance and urgency,
bordered on irresponsibility. it at once became obvious
to both Rohm and the generals that accelerating the expan-
sion program would further strain the over-taxed Reichs-
wehr and could not be accomplished without a steady influx
of pre-trained recruits from the military sport program.
On the surface, Rohm's ultimatum to Blomberg to ac-
cept complete responsibility for security for SA military
sport programs appears to have been a mixture of arrogance
and presumption, but it was actually a shrewd and almost
successful attempt to wrest control of the Kriiger Organiza-
tion from Reichenau. Rohm not only knew that the Army would
not and could not assume responsibility for the actions of
a party organization, but he was also cognizant that the
Army considered the military sport program to be essential.
Even Reichenau had acknowledged the Army's reliance on the
SA sport program, telling Kriiger that if the program were
discontinued, the Border Guard and certain aspects of mili-
tary training would have to be abandoned. 41 Regardless of
'ifZG, Fa-90/1, Kriiger Aktenvermerk, 19 October 1933.
Effective 1 October 1933, the Reichswehf required Border Guard
recruits to have completed either a Reichskuratorium or Chef
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Reichenau's hopes for dividing the SA, the Array oould not
allow Rohra to halt Chef AW Organization activities. Al-
ready burdened with the task of training additional reoruits,
the Relchswehr oould not easily have assuraed the vast train-
ing activities carried out by the SA, yet these activities
were essential to the success of the Array's expansion and
mobilization plan. 42
It thus became imperative for Reichenau to reach a
new modus Vivendi with Rohm to insure that the work of the
Chef AW Organization continued. Rohm's ultimatum of October,
however, placed the Army in an awkward position: were it to
accept responsibility for Chef AW security, the blame for
the inevitable security disclosures would fall upon the
Reichswehr, yet it was patently impossible to scrap the SA
military sport program. The obvious alternative, which Rohm
hoped to see Hitler adopt, was to divorce the Chef AW Or-
ganization from all ties with the Reichswehr, giving the SA
Chief of Staff undisputed authority over his semi-autonomous
AW military sport training course. BA-MA, II H/139, CHL TA
510/33 g.K. T4lIIa/ Richtlinien fur die Tatigkeit der Grenz-
schutz A-Bataillone ab. 1.10.33, 17 August 1933.
42m ,The most succinct reasoning for Reichswehr-SA co-
operation was given by the 7th (Bavarian) Division's Artil-
leriefiihrer in BA-MA, WK VII/741, Art.Fu. VII, la 65/33 g.K.,
24 October 1933. "Die Zusammenarbeit [with the SA] erstreckt
sich auf folgende Gebiete: ... (b) Gewinnung des planmafiigen
Rekrutenersatzes fur das Heer, (c) Gewinnung von Ersatz fur
kurzeren Dienst im Heere, (d) A=Vorberei tungen [mobilization]
in personneller und materieller Hinsicht." (emphasis in origi-
nal) .
subordinate
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In early December, the General staff considered in-
creasing, as soon as was possible, the Reichswehr to twenty-
one infantry divisions as outlined in the 1932 expansion
plan.« Already ^ mil±tary personnel assigned ^ KrUger , s
camps and schools had been ordered to return to their units
no later than 1 March 1934« and similar orders were issued
to the Border Guard advisors. « As mllitary personnel at .
tached to the Chef AW Organization returned to their units,
much of Reichenau's influence over it would evaporate, and
as the Army accelerated its expansion program, it would de-
pend on Rohm's favor.
By December, the Reichswehr could neither put off
4 3
^ 4.x, n
°n 1
f
December, General Ludwig Beck, the new Chiefof the General Staff, circulated a study calling for the im-mediate implementation of the November 1932 expansion plan.Noting that volunteers would suffice to meet manpower quotesonly for the first half of 1934, he stated that a universalmilitary service requirement would have to be introduced nolater than October 1934 in order to continue the expansion ef-
rort. To create a reserve force, he wrote, the new recruits
shouxd only have to serve for one year of active service fol-lowed by a number of years in a reserve status. BA-MA, II H/153CHL TA. 1113/33 g.K. T2IIIb, 14 December 1933, "Neues Frieden-
'
sheer
.
On the following day, the Defense Ministry informed major
unit commanders that "alle yom Oktober 1934 in das Reichsheer
emgestellenden Soldaten werden nur noch auf die Dauer ein esJahres verpflichtet
.
" Ibid
. , V7K VII/1517, RWMin 660/33 g.K.'
'
Wehr. A. Allg. (II), 15 December 1933. (emphasis in original).
See also Rautenberg, Riistungspolit ik
, 306ff.
44BA-MA, WK IV/89, WK IV la Op 2 278/33 g.K., 13 November
1933. Rautenberg, Rustungspoli tik
,
224f., indicates that by the
winter of 1933, 1530 Reichswehr officers and 4590 enlisted men
were attached to either Reichswehr or SA units conducting military
sport training. In other words, over one-third of the entire
Reichswehr officer corps was committed to aiding SA training!
4 5 BA-MA, ii h/153, TA 1228/33 g.K., T2IB, 15 December 1933.
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reaching some understanding with Rohm nor afford to risk
'
angering or alienating him by categorically rejecting his
demands for a greater role for the SA in defense prepara-
tions. His elevation to the long-desired Reich cabinet
rank, albeit without portfolio, « on 1 December 1933 indi-
cated his growing importance. The establishment, on the
same date, of the SA sport badge, was a measure of the
growing number of military sport graduates. Knowing the
predicament of the Army, Rohm pressed at once for a greater
role for both himself and the SA in military affairs. Even
today the extent of his demands is unknown, but it appears
that he insisted on complete control of the Border Guard
and recognition that the SA constituted Germany's military
reserve force. 47
4 6Kriiger claims that Rohm became a Reichsminister on
8 November 1 933. See BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, " Stellungnahme"
,
Bl. 4f. It is more likely that Hitler told Rohm of his pend-ing appointment on 8 November, the anniversary of the Munich
Putsch and the date on which NSDAP honors lists were published,
as Rohm's certificate of appointment signed by Hitler and Hin-denburg, is dated 1 December 1933. See HA, f. 328, Rk. Nr.
13837, 1 December 1933.
47IfZG, Zgs. 152, Stapf, Bl. 1,7, 14ff., conversation
of 7 September 1951, Bl. 1; Zgs. 1709, Huwe, Bl. 39; Bennecke,
Reichswehr und Rohmputsch
, 40; Foertsch, Schuld und Verh^ngnis
,
4 7f. Both Stapf and Bennecke state that Rohm wanted tosee the
SA become a militia, modelled on the Swiss system. Predicated
on universal military service, the Swiss militia was impractical
as a model for Germany for a number of reasons, among them geo-
graphy, expense, and prohibitions against compulsory military
service. Rohm certainly knew of these limitations and instead
probably favored only the Swiss pattern: a cadre/mobile strik-
ing force (perhaps to be assumed by the Reichswehr) with a sub-
stantial defensive force, the militia, whose function in Ger-
many would be assumed by the SA.
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During December and early January, Reichenau and
RShm (or their assistants) conducted a series of inconclus-
ive talks concerning the role of the SA in the military ex-
pansion effort. Just how far these talks progressed and on
just what points they broke down is unclear. 48 Because the
Reichswehr personnel shortage really left no other choice,
it seems that Reichenau agreed to allow the SA to take over,
without interference from the Army, all military sport train
ing, and he appears to have discussed the possibility of an
expanded role for the SA in the Border Guard, hinting that
the SA might take over the Border Guard. General Staff of-
ficers, led by their new chief, Ludwig Beck, 49 opposed the
transfer of the Border Guard to the SA. Noting that the
Border Guard was integrated into the mobilization plans,
they logically claimed that the Army, responsible for all
mobilization measures, had to retain command of the Border
IfZG, Zgs. 152, Stapf, Bl. 141 Stapf, a LieutenantColonel then in charge of mobilization plans, states thatReichenau offered extensive concessions to the SA, to includetransferring to its control the Border Guard. This claim has
no collaboration, and Reichenau' s alleged concessions were
not so "extensive". See below.
49
1880-1944. A brilliant staff officer, Beck had
initially been sympathetic to younger officers who supported
the Nazis. Beck became Chief of the General Staff on 10 Octo-
ber 1933. His later moral and practical objections to the Nazi
regime were ignored and he retreated into the purely profession
al aspects of his work. Retiring in 1938 on account of his
opposition to Hitler, Beck later became a chief conspirator
and was shot for his role in the attempt on Hitler's life,
on 20 July 1944.
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Guard. 5°
Actually, Relchenau's conversations with Rohm, how-
ever unpalatable to the General Staff, did not compromise
anything essential to military interests. In the unlikely
event that the Border Guard was transferred to the SA, the
loss was negligible. The military efficiency of the Border
Guard, staffed after 1933 almost entirely by SA men, was
poor 51 and hence its contribution to the defense effort was
limited. The Army, moreover, could simply not spare the
soldiers needed to improve the readiness status of the
Border Guard.
The dilemma the Army faced with regard to the SA and
R6hm-s demands received considerable attention at the Army
commanders conference held in late December. After con-
firming the preparatory steps taken by Hammerstein and Beck
to implement the expansion plan, Blomberg stated that the
Reichswehr would expand to 21 infantry divisions within the
next four years. For 1934, he explained, voluntary enlist-
ments would prove sufficient to meet enlistment quotas, but
50IfZG, Zgs, 152, Stapf, Bl
. 14. See also Stapfs note
to other General Staff sections stating that only after the
mission and organization of the putative SA Ministry was madepublic could Army planners include the SA in military planning
BA-MA, H-1/319b, TA, Chef T2, 1218/33 g.K., 7 December 1933.
51 IfZG, Zgs. 39 (I), Fretter-Pico , Bl. 32-38; F-56,
Weckmann, Bl. 5. Not all relations between SA units and
Border Guard instructors were hostile. See BA-MA, WK VII/
182, Aktenvermerk Kommandantur Regensburg, 13 November 19 33.
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his long range goal was to have compulsory military service
reintroduced. There were, he noted, two additional prob-
lems: the future of the Border Guard and the efforts of the
SA to form its own armed force. However, "the Reich Chan-
cellor agrees
... completely", he said, "that everything [re-
lating to defense] except E£-miU^^ [SA miUtary
sport] is the function of the armed forces. "52 The DefGnse
minister cautioned the generals not to argue for the time
being with SA leaders (whose men still staffed the Border
Guard) concerning command authority over Border Guard units.
Instead, he urged that these problems be brought to his at-
tention so that he could handle them personally. "Such
problems must not", he insisted, "be allowed to disturb the
relationship [of the Army] to the SA and its leaders." 53
The implication was clear: the SA was not to be disturbed
as its men, services, and assistance were still needed. 54
52BA-MA, WK VII/4082-2, "Besprechung in Berlin am
22. und 23.12.1933." "Der Reichskanzler stimmt mit dem
Reichswehrminister darin uberein, da£ auBer der vormili-
tarishchen Ausbildung alles bei der Reichswehr liegt.
.
.
"
Bl. 2. (Emphasis in original) A week later, weapons train-ing in SA sport camps resumed. Ibid
.
, WK VII/1453, CHL TA
1139/33 g.K., T4IIIa, 28 December 1933.
53
Ibid., "Durch solche Schwierigkeiten darf das Ver-
haltnis zur SA und ihre Fiihrer nicht getriibt werden."
54The Chief of the Allgemeine Abteilung was more
specific when he later states: "Die Bezirkskommandos sollen
der Truppe vorallem Leute zuleiten, die vormilitarische Aus-
bildung [SA military sport] mit Erfolg durchgemacht haben."
Ibid.
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Prior to the Army conference of 22 December, Rohm
apparently had reached the conclusion that he would be able
to take-over full control of the Chef AW Organization be-
cause of the Army's preoccupation with its expansion program.
Wasting little time, he intimated during a December confer-
ence with regional SA leaders that responsibility for all
training conducted by the Chef AW Organization school, and
camps would soon be transferred to them. This transfer
would, he added, result when the SA Ministry became opera-
tive and would produce a drastic change in the mission of
the Chef AW. 55
Although not invited to this conference, Kriiger had
discovered its deliberations, and protested to Rohm that
transferring the military sport program responsibilities
to the senior SA commanders would destroy his hopes for
assuming a complete take-over of the program when the mili-
tary advisors returned to their units. Execrating the
senior commanders, he complained that they had dealt impru-
dently and independently, in violation of his orders to the
contrary, with the Reichswehr, frustrating and complicating
his own work. The leader of OSAF section 1,56 he added,
had publicly stated that the newly issued SA sport badge
was unnecessary. Kriiger concluded his letter with a request
55BA, Sam Sch/421, letter Kriiger to Rohm, 5 December
193 3.
56Generalmajor a.D. Franz Ritter von Horauf. See
Chapter IV, n. 51
.
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for a personal meeting to resolve these grievances, clear-
ly the work, he added, of jealous third parties. 57
Rohm's response, if any, to Kriiger's charges U un-
known, but Kriiger seems to have concluded that his tenure
as Chef AW would be very short should Rohm gain complete
control of the military sport program. Accordingly, he
approached Reichenau in January to forestall Rohm's antici-
pated take-over of the Chef AW Organization. The Defense
Ministry initially favored retention of the current system,
that is, with Kriiger in coordination with the Defense Minis-
try conducting the military sport program. 58 Krager instead
suggested that his staff be organized into two sections: one
for training and one for administration , 59 and asked Reiche-
nau to appoint a military officer to direct the training
section. Because this suggestion would clearly allow him
some influence within the Chef AW should it be completely
transferred to Rohm, Reichenau agreed and nominated Lt . Col.
Wilhelm Auleb for the new position, with the proviso that
57BA, Sam Sch/421, letter Kriiger to Rohm, 5 December 19
See the report of a conference on terrain and mili-
tary sport, 5-7 January 1934, held in the Defense Ministry and
chaired by Dr. Kayser, Reichenau' s specialist for training. BA
Sam Sch/421, NSLB Reichsreferent fur Gelandesport E. Lin/3 to
NSLB Reichsgeschaf tsfiihrer Kolb, 22 January 1 934.
59 IfZG, Fa- 90/1, OSAF Chef AW, "Geschaftsordung fur den
Stab des Chefs des Ausbildungswesens" , 23 January 1934.
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Auleb receive an appropriate SA rank. 60 Kruger accepted
Reichenau's proposals and the two men prepared an agreement
authorizing Kruger's proposed re-organization of his staff
and Auleb 's transfer to the post of Chef AW chief of Staff
with the SA rank of Oberfiihrer . 6
1
Blomberg presented the proposed agreement to Rohm,
along with suggestions delineating the Reichswehr 's concepts
of what tasks the SA should fulfill in the event of mobili-
zation and in the Border Guard. These proposals, except for
Kruger's and Reichenau's draft agreement, have not survived,
but Rohm rejected all of them.62 From his perspective# an
Army officer serving as Chef AW chief of staff perpetuated
military meddling in internal SA affairs and shattered what-
ever hopes he had of assuming complete control over the mili-
tary sport program. Kruger's proposal, moreover, left no
doubt as to where the SA stood vis-a-vis the Reichswehr:
"
... in the areas in which the SA has a military interest
(training, mobilization, Border Guard), it is subordinated
60IMT, XXXI, 2823-PS, "Vorschlag RWM iiber Aufgaben-
gebiet Oberstleutnant Auleb im Stabe des Chefs AWs", 24
January 1934, 166f.
6
1
Ibid., "Vereinbarung zwischen RWM und OSAF, 1/34",
162.
6 2 IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Befehlhabersbe-
sprechung, 2-3 February 1934. See Blomberg 's remarks, Bl. 212
The surviving agreement (footnote 61) was never signed by
either party. Auleb, in April 1934, was assigned as a deputy
commander of the Lubeck Wehrgau. See 1934 Reichswehr Stel -
lungsbesetzung
,
I, 27. Cf. Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten
Reich, I, 111, who incorrectly asserts that the Chef AW-
Reichswehr agreement became operative.
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to the Defense Minister and his chain of command. "63
R5hm, who had maintained all along to the public the
fiction that he had no ties with Reichswehr and had duti-
fully acknowledged the Reichswehr as Germany's sole military
force, 64 was apparently surprised by prQposals
_
His hopes for a greater and more autonomous role for the SA
in military affairs were dashed, and this disappointment,
ooupled with the lack of visible progress towards the cre-
ation of the SA Ministry65 profoundly upset hlm
_ 0utrage<J
and chagrined, he sent an angry missive to Blomberg at the
end of January, which arrived providentially (for Blomberg)
during the middle of a generals' conference. After hearing
the Defense Minister briefly recount his failure to reach
an understanding with the refractory Rohm, the generals
then listened while Reichenau read aloud the SA Chief of
Staff's letter. "I envision," wrote Rohm, "the Reichswehr
* J
IfZG/ Ed~ 1 / 1 ~ 2
'
Liebmann Notizen, 2-3 February 1934
...auf den Gebieten, auf denen SA sich militMrisch betatigt(Ausbildung, Mobilmachung, Grenzschutz)
, untersteht sie demReichsverteidigungsminister und den nachgeordneten Kommando-
stellen der Wehrmacht." Bl. 212. Cf. Zgs. 152, Stapf, who
asserts that Reichenau made many concessions to the SA, Bl.14ff, and conversation notes, 7 September 1951, Bl. 1.
6 4See his interview in the SA Mann (2), 13 January 1934.Zwischen der Reichswehr und der SA bestehen keinerleiBedingungen .
"
65Even the Army had expected Hitler to create the SA2^rY : A General Staff stu<3y of mid-January 1934 includeda SA Ministry in mobilization plans, placing it on a level withtne Army and the Navy Commands, and the Air Transport MinistryBA-MA, H-1/319b, Chef TA, "Vorschlag: Spitzengliederung" ? Y *
15 January 1934.
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from now on only as a school for the training of the nation.
Direction of war efforts and those of the mobilization will
be, from now on, functions of the SA.-66 Blo^ calmly
noted that Rohm-s attitude left him no choice but to ap-
proach Hitler and request his intervention. On account of
the unstable foreign affairs situation, the Defense Minister
explained, it was impossible that Hitler would reach a de-
cision before the end of the month, but, he hastened to add,
any information on the subject would be relayed at once to
the generals. For the meantime, said Blomberg, the generals
were to avoid clashes with the SA leaders. The new Chief
of the Army Command, Major General Werner Freiherr von
Fritsch,* 8 promised "...that he would oppose the demands of
66
n^<-
IfZG
f
Z 9S - 182, Weichs, February 1934 CommandersConference notes: »Ich erkenne die Reichswehr nur noch aLSchule fur das Volk an. Die Kriegsfuhrung und also aSch dieMobilmachung sind kunftige Sache der SA
. B1.8; and Ed-1/1-2Liebmann Notizen, Bl. 212. Liebmann
' s record of Rohm's exact'wording is slightly different, but conveys the same message.
6 7Ibid-/ Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 2-3 February 1933Betehlshaberbesprechung, Bl. 21 2f.
68
1 880-1939. A highly respected General Staff officer,Fritsch opposed, on account of professional reasons, any par-ticipation by the SA in defense matters. A batchellor, hededicated his life solely to his profession, serving as Chief
of the Army Command from January 1934 to 1938. He incurred
Hitler's displeasure by appearing to move too slowly. Too
popular and respected to be relieved, instead he was smearedby the Nazis on false charges of homosexuality and suspendedfrom duty. Although he was exonerated of all charges, Hitlerdid not return Fritsch to his post. Exercising his privilege
as honorary commander of an artillery regiment, Fritsch ac-
companied it into the field in 1939, where he fell in action.
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'
the SA with all his power and energy. "69
During the week following the 2-3 February generals
conference, Fritsch apparently convinced Hitler that the
Reichswehr, constitutionally responsible for defense, re-
quired undisputed authority in all aspects of national
security in order to accomplish its mission. Hitler, who
had previously appeared unconcerned about Rohm's pretensions,
told Blomberg on 11 February, as they travelled to Berchtes-'
gaden for the Army ski championships, to assume a more re-
calcitrant attitude vis-a-vis the SA. This meant, he ex-
plained, that the SA was to have a major role only in the
area of military sport. 70
rw4. u?IfZG/ Ed
"
1 /1-2, Liebmann Notizen, "...da/3 eriFntschj sich mit aller Kraft und seiner ganzen Person denAnspruchen der SA widersetzen werde." Bl. 213?
F
70
thin Bl ^w't^3 * 15 l' St *Pf > Bl. 14ff; Zgs. 105, Mellen-
I JJ' V S n0t knOWn when or if Fritsch personallyS?w£ le*' hT -°u 5 Febru^y Hitler told theassembledLtf- at Friednchsroda that their tasks were to spreadthe National-Socialist ideology, anchor the Fiihrer principle,and assist the movement by acting as the guarantor of the neworder See SA. Mann (5), 5 February 1934. Considerable enerayand ink has been spilled to explain why Hitler "chose" theReichswehr instead of the SA in 1934. While interesting andimaginative, these essays overlook the consistency of his
utterances since 1924, namely that the armed forces were the
sole military force of the state and that the mission of theSA was political and educational. Hitler's assignment of the
military sport program to the SA did not deviate from this
position. To him, the main function of the Chef AW Organiza-
tion was sport and ideological education.
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A c«ittee of senior staff office^ frora the SA
and the Reichswehr reached a new understanding on 23 Febru-
ary. This latest draft, submitted to RShm and Blomberg,
dearly established Reichswehr supremacy in all areas of
national security.
" The duties of the SA ±n connectiQn
with national defense are regulated.
..,
- read the first
sentence of the draft, "by the Reich Defense Minister. "72
SA defense responsibilities consisted, according to the
proposal, of providing military sport instruction in con-
nection with youth training, of training elegibles not
called to military service, and of preserving the skills
of both veterans and SA sport course graduates who had no
active military service. 73 Although restricting all SA
military-related activity to military sport training, the
draft proposal cannot be regarded as a victory for Kruger;
instead, considerable authority was taken from him. in ac-
Beck BnVlllli T* ^11' ' 81 ' 14ff « From the A rmy,a d Stapf; from the SA, Generalleutnant a.D. Friedrich
fh! p
V
°\ u S fhUlenbUrg (SA Fuhrungsamt liaison officer tot e Reichswehr)
,
Max Juttner (OSAF, z.b.V.), and Friedrich
S l T-uVOn Krausser <SA Deputy Chief of Staff and head ofthe Fuhrungsamt). It is indicative of Rohm's attitude towardKruger that the latter, although most concerned and affectedby any Army-SA agreements, did not represent the SA.
72 IMT, XXVIII, 1849-PS, "Aktenvermerk betr. DenkschriftReichsverteidigung, streng geheim!", 23 February 1934. "DieAufgaben der SA werden von seiten des Reichsverteidigungs-
ministers im Zusammenhang mit der Landesverteidiqunq
.festgelegt.
" , 583.
73Ibid., 583f.
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cordance with the terms of the 1933 Bad Reichenhall Agree-
ment, he prepared general policy guidelines for youth and
terrain sport programs so that these programs would inter-
look with his own. The new proposal stipulated that the
Reioh Sport Commissar and the Reioh Youth Leader, under
the direction of the Defense Minister, were to assume
autonomous responsibilities for terrain and youth sport
programs respectively. 74
Evidence does not permit reconstruction of the week
of 23-28 February, 75 but Rohm protested his almost complete
exclusion from military affairs to Hitler. The SA Chief of
Staff apparently elicited some sympathy from the Chancellor,
who permitted several face-saving alterations to the final
agreement, which was signed by Hitler, R6hm, and Blomberg
at the well-documented Schlieffen Association meeting, 28
7 4 In al l likelihood the Army was responsiblefor this diminution of Kriiger's (and SA) authority. WhileRohm had no love for Kruger, it is inconceivable that hewould have willingly surrendered any of his authority (how-
ever indirect) to his fellow satraps and rivals. On the
other hand, the transfer of the direction of youth and ter-
rain sport from the SA to its rivals would not materially
affect the military sport program and would permit the Army
to play Rohm's rivals against him.
75Harry Wilde, in "Rohm's Putsch", Polit i sche Studien
,
110, June 1959, 376f., claimed that Rohm and Fritsch reached
an agreement during this week allowing the SA some role indefense preparations. Wilde bases his assumption on an
interview with Reichsleiter Max Aman. More recent scholar-
ship rejects the idea of a Rohm-Fritsch understanding. See
Muller, Hitler und das Heer, 109ff.
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February 1934.76 The definitive agreement77 between ^
SA and the Reichswehr embodied several significant changes
from the earlier proposal of 23 February, encompassing in-
creased defense-related responsibilities for the SA. m
addition to those defined on 23 February, SA units could
now be accepted into the Border Guard so long as they
could meet minimal military proficiency standards establish-
ed by military region commanders (Wehjxyau^^
.
Prospective Reichswehr and Border Guard recruits had to
complete successfully a Chef AW Organization military
sport course, but membership in the SA was no longer manda-
tory prior to attending such courses. 78 SA responsibilities
in the event of mobilization were relatively minor, but
their inclusion in the final agreement represented a sub-
stantial triumph for Rohm. In addition to maintaining
mobilization schedules for designated SA units, the SA
agreed to make available its equipment if needed to the
Bennecke, Reichswehr und Rohmputsch
, 45f; MiillerHitler und das Heer
,
98f; Bracher, Machtirgr'eifunq
. 943All these sources reconstruct the meeting from General Lieb-
mann's notes (ifZG, Ed-1/1-2, Bl
. 219ff.) and Krttger's Akten-
vermerk of 23 February 1934 (Cf. Footnote 72)!
7 7The document signed on 2 8 February has not survived.However, its contents can be reconstructed from the exhaustive
notes of General Liebmann and an order of ArtilleriefuhrerVII, Nr. 312/34 g.K., Ia, 8 March 1934, and CHL TA 100/34
g.K. T4lIIa, "betr. kunftige Ausbildung a.d. RH" , 5 March
1934, both in BA-MA, WK VII/1451, (Rh 26-7/254).
78
BA-MA, WK VII/1451, Art.Fiihrer VII, Nr. 712/34
g.K. Ia, 8 March 1934, Ziff. 8.
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Reichswehr. The provision to call SA units to aotive
service was a major concession in principle, by Army author!
ties, who carefully insisted that "military qualification is
a pre-reguisite [and] military requirements are decisive. " »
The Reichswehr also expressed a willi„gness to consider Sft
unit leaders for command positions in mobilized SA and Bor-
der Guard units, but these leaders had to meet military
standards. 80
The changes between the draft of 23 February and
the final agreement did not all benefit the SA. The SA had
to acknowledge that "the Reich Defense Mini*^ has sole
responsibility for defense preparations ,» 8 1 and military
officers received greater freedom to inspect Kruger's camps
and schools. All SA activities contributing to the military
effort were subject to military review and inspection . 82
Finally, Hitler indicated that he approved of this Reichs-
wehr-SA cooperation only as a temporary, expedient solution.
79
-
Ibid
- *
ziff
- 12, "Militarische Eignung ist Voraus-
setzung. Militar-Belange entscheiden .
"
8°Ibid
. , Ziff. 13.
8
1
Ibld « / Ziff. 1. " Reichsverteidigungsminister tragt
allei
.
n Verantwortung fur Vorbereitung der Landesverteidigung.
"
(emphasis in original). See also IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann
Notizen, Bl. 219.
82BA-MA, WK VII/1451, Art.Fuhrer VII Nr. 712/34 g.K.
Ia, 8 March 1 934 , Ziff. 1,2,3,8,9,10, 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 5 , 1 7 and 18; andCHL TA 100/34 G.K. T4lIIa, 5 March 1934; IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Lieb-
mann Notizen, Bl. 219ff.
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"He [Hitler) had decided," wrote General (later Field mr-
shal) von Weichs, "to develop a large standing army from
the nucleus of the Reichswehr.... For the transition period
Ifrom the Reichswehr to a conscript, standing array] he ap-
proved the Defense Minister's suggestion to utilize the SA
for Border Guard duties and pre-railitary [military sport]
training.
"
83
Following some expressions of initial unhappiness , 84
which may have been feigned to placate radical SA leaders,
Rohm faithfully executed his portions of the 28 February
agreement. On 12 March he established four special SA in-
spectors whose job was to insure " frictionless cooperation "
between the Army and the SA. " The direction of national
defense and its [associated] measures lies/' wrote the SA
Chief of Staff, "in the hands of the Reich Defense Minister
83IfZG/ Zgs
. 182, Weichs. "Er [Hitler] sei daher
entschlossen, ein Volksheer, aufgebaut auf der Reichswehr...
aufzustellen. Fur die Ubergangszeit genehmige er den Vorsch-lag des R.W.M., die SA fur Grenzschut zaufgaben und fur vor-
militarische Ausbildung heranzuziehen . " Bl. 9; and Zgs. 37,Foertsch, Bl. 1. An Army order of 3 April indicates that the
Reichswehr viewed the 28 February agreement as a temporary
measure: "Bis auf weiteres bleibt die Ausbildung auSerhalb
des Reichsheeres als UbergangsmaBnahme
. . .
.
" BA-MA, WK VII/
2188, Art.Fuhrer VII, la 385/34 g.K.
84At a SA reception held immediately after the Schlief-
fen Day meeting, Rohm allegedly spoke of the Reichswehr-SA
agreement as "a new Versailles Dictation". IfZG, Zgs. 105,
Mellenthin, Bl. 34. See also Zgs. 152, Stapf, Bl. If., 7.
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<Reichswehrminister)." 8 5 to Qrder Qf ^^ ^
pre-empt discontent expected to arise from the exclusion of
the SA from greater participation in military affairs. Rohm
acknowledged the disappointment and frustration of his men
especially the "old fighters", who had expected to reap more
tangible benefits from the Nazi political victory, and he
promised immediate relief to those with no employment pros-
pects. Nonetheless, he felt compelled to conclude his order
with a strong reminder that duty and discipline were more
important than personal gain. 86
The definitive SA regulation governing the relation
of the SA to the Reichswehr was signed by Rohm on 19 March. 87
ledged thatXS^- "feib^STl0^ Zusammenarbeit" and acknow-
woSk ? Leitung der Landesverteidicruna und ihrerX^reitun^en liegt m den Hande des Reichs^teidicTu^ff-
p
1Bifte^ (Reichswehrministers)". BA-MA, WK VII/1342, OSAF
*' Nr
;
G ~ 371
'
Dienstanweisung fiir die Inspekteure Ost,Sudost, Mitte und West der SA" , 12 March 1934, Bl 1 The
in
S
or?g?nalT?
re SUb°rdinate to the SA Fuhrungsamt.' (Emphasis
. , t
86SA Verordnungsblatt (18), 15 March 1934. Rohm prom-ised to establish SA-Hilfslager, of which little is known and
whose fate appears to have been similar to that of the NationalWorkshops of Paris in 1848.
8 7BA, Sam Sch/4 1, OSAF Fuhrungsamt, G-429, "Betr.
Spitzengliederung der SA und Zusammenarbeit zwischen 'den
Spitzendienctstellen der wehrmacht und der SA" , 19 March 1934.
This document, a photostat with Rohm's signature, is errone-
ously dated 19 April in IMT, XXXI, 2821
-PS, 162f. The sche-
matic diagram found in the BA is not reproduced in the IMT
version. Kruger's file note accompanying his copy of the
-
order indicates that he did not see it until 14 April. The
Reichswehr order faith the same schematic diagram) parallel-
ing Rohm's 19 March directive is "Vorschlag fur die Zusam-
menarbeit zwischen den obersten Dienststellen der Wehrmacht
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He indicated that all activities concerning mobilization
and the Border Guard would be handled by the SA Fiihrungsamt
.
while Kriiger retained control of all military sport training<
Moreover, Kriiger 's authority to issue directives to the
Reich Youth Leader and the Reich Sport Commissar, in order
to insure that sport programs were comprehensive and pro-
gressive, was re-affirmed. 88 The SA Chief of Staff reversed
his gradual diminution of Kruger's authority to direct train-
ing within the Chef AW Organization schools and camps, noting
that "the Chef AW is responsible for this training. "89
Rohm's reason(s) for restoring Kruger's control over all SA
military sport training is unknown, but it is possible that
Blomberg may have insisted that the vital military sport
training program remain in "safe" and experienced hands, as
any disruptions could cause chaos in the Army's expansion
efforts
.
At any rate, following the agreement signed at the
Schlieffen Assembly meeting, there appear to have been no
major controversies or arguments of substance between the SA
and the Reichswehr, or between Kriiger and Rohm. A huge Army
propaganda effort to cultivate the image of the Reichswehr
und der Obersten SA-Fiihrung;
, in BA-MA, RW 6/v65, Der Reichs-
verteidigungsminister TA Nr. 9/34, g.K. T2IV, 18 May 1934.
88BA, Sam Sch/421, OSAF Fiihrungsamt G-42 9, 19 March
1934, Ziff. 3.
89Ibid
. ,
Ziff. 4. "Verantwortlichkeit fur die Aus-
bildung ist der Chef des Ausbildungswesens .
"
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as the sole German military force, 90 which began in April,
appears to have been an unnecessary and wasted effort to
insure the success of the 28 February Agreement. Reichswehr
intelligence officers discovered no SA intentions of vio-
lating the agreement. Army-Chef AW Organization relations
were relatively frictionless
, and orders issued by Blomberg
in late May governing terrain and youth sport training mere-
ly re-affirmed the policies established almost one year
earlier at Bad Reichenhall . 92 Military officials approved
the wearing of the SA Sport Badge on the Army uniform. 93
There is insufficient evidence to indicate if Kruger's
relations with Rohm improved or worsened after 28 February.
Many SA commanders still regarded Kruger and his organiza-
tion as a tool of the Army, 94 even though on at leagt Qne
.
.
9°See BA-MA, RW 6/v56, for Major Hermann Foertsch's
Briefing Notes outlining a Reichswehr campaign to improve thepublic image of the armed forces.
9
1
During the 2-3 February Commanders Conference, Fritschhad ordered the generals to collect material concerning Rohm's
plans and intentions. IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann, Bl. 213, and
BA-MA, WK VII/1295, CHL TA 544/34 f.K. T2IIIa, 17 April 1934.
This material never revealed any anti-Army actions on behalf
of the SA. Miiller, Hitler und das Heer
, 111. Rohm, who be-
lieved that the SA would have its day of reckoning, albeit it
in a different fashion from what actually occurred, ordered
his subordinates to make careful notes on those people and
agencies defaming the SA. IfZG
,
Fa-90/1, OSAF P Nr. 1455/34,
16 May 1934.
92BA-MA, WK VII/1451, Der Reichsverteidigungsminister
,
TA 300/34 g.K. T4IIIa, 24 May 1934, and Anlage 1 to the same.
93Heeresverordnungsblatt (16), 1 8 June 1934, Ziff. 289.
94BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme" , Bl. 8; IfZG,
Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Erlebnis", Bl. 20.
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occasion he supported the position of SA Group Berlin-
Brandenburg instead of that taken by one of his own staff
members. 95 Difficulties in preparing a Chef AW budget still
continued, and both Rohm and Blomberg contested the respon-
sibility for the budget. Blomberg eventually prevailed,
and Rohm agreed on 28 May to allow the Defense Ministry to
assume responsibility for Kruger's financial support. 96
This transfer was still in progress when it was superseded
by the events of 30 June 1934, the so-called Rohm Putsch.
This well-documented event need not be retold here.
Recent scholarship has concluded that Rohm had developed
no immediate Putsch plans and that most Army officers, with
the possible exception of Blomberg, Reichenau, and Fritsch,
had no foreknowledge of the action to be taken against the
SA. On the other hand, Hitler's motives for smashing the
SA, the extent of the death list during the planning stages,
and the moment at which Hitler decided to smash the SA are
still debated. y Whatever the final outcome of these argu-
95BDC, Personalakt Kruger, I, Bl. 210f, 284.
96ba, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 17f;
Niederschrif t" , Bl. 2.II vr ,•
9 7Bennecke claims that the NSDAP leadership and the
Reichswehr, not the SS, were the driving forces behind the
events of 30 June. See his Reichswehr und Rohmputsch
, 55, 61 f.,
and 68ff. Messerschmidt acknowledges that Reichenau played
the most active and meaningful role of any Reichswehr officer,
but he admits that the extent of Reichenau 1 s role is unknown.
Wehrmacht und NS
, 48. Muller, in Hitler und das Heer
,
113ff.,
agrees that Reichenau* s activities are not at all clear, but
he implies that Reichenau may have forced Hitler's hand.
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ments, there is no evidence indicating that Kruger and the
Chef AW Organization members either knew of or participated
in the events of 30 June. Not a single Chef AW Organization
man was shot in connection with the Putsch, those few arrest-
ed were released almost at once, and the Chef AW units were
the only ones in the SA allowed to retain their weapons after
30 June 19 34. 9
8
The indictment of Bennecke, namely that the conflict
between the OSAF and the Chef AW exacerbated the tense sit-
uation between Rohm and the Reichswehr and precipitated the
events of 30 June," cannot be sustained. While SA-Reichs-
wehr relations had not been overly friendly, serious hostil-
ity was temporarily avoided by the acceptance of the Schlief-
fen Assembly compromise by both parties. With Rohm no longer
in a position to threaten the existence of the Chef AW Organi-
zation or its vital contribution to the re-armament effort,
the Army had no immediate reason to seek his destruction.
Kruger, with his own position secure after 28 February, like-
Bracher, in Machtergreifung
,
934ff., states that Hitler had
no alternative but to kill Rohm who had become too dangerous a
rival. See also Helmut Krausnick, Das 30. Juni 1934. Bedeutung
,
Hintergrlinde
,
Verlauf
, supplement to Das Parlament , 30 June
1954, who also argues that the Army-SA conflict was secondary
to the struggle between the SA and the Nazi Party.
98See Heydrich's instructions to SS and police, BA, Sam
Sch/421, Funkausspruch aus Berlin, Nr. 91-48-2, 1325; and Nr.
97-82-2, 1345, 3 July 1934; BA-MA, LPI-SW, H04-1/17, Chef der
LAPO, Nr. 81-0107-1700, 1 July 1934; Bracher, Machtergreifung
,
916.
"Bennecke, Reichswehr und Rohmputsch , 45.
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wise had no reason to seek Rohm's elimination. Kruger
did hope eventually to become independent of the SA, which
K6hm. s removal, might or might not have assisted, but Kruger,
for all intents and purposes, achieved his goal of autonomy
from OSAF when Blomberg and Rohm agreed to military super-
vision of the Chef AW budget. Kruger thus had no reason to
sabotage a fragile agreement which guaranteed his autonomy.
Finally, there is no evidence that Rohm seriously attempted
to subvert or renounce his agreement with Blomberg. 100 Al-
though the "night of the long knives" (June 30 1934) appears
to have degenerated from a strike at Rohm and his coterie
to a vendetta of the triumphant faction in the Party against
personal and political enemies, there seems to be no reason
to believe Hitler's assertion that he acted to crush an im-
minent revolt by Rohm and his clique. 101
0n 3 March Blomberg wrote Hitler complaining thatthe SA Headquarters Guards (Stabswache) were being heavily
armed and appearing under arms in public. Blomberg appeared
more upset over the public display of armed SA men than he was
over their existence. Rohm, prompted by Hitler, reminded his
commanders of his earlier orders forbidding a display of armedguards. See IfZG, Fa-90/1
, Blomberg letter to Hitler, confi-dential, 3 March 1934 and OSAF G, Nr. 312/34, persolich, 6March 1934. See also Zgs. 105, Mellenthin, who describes
mutual SA-Reichswehr slights during this period.
101DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, Nr. 55, Reich Cabinet MeetingMinutes 3 July 1934, 118-122. Hitler also claimed that Rohm
nad violated the agreement of 28 February 1934 (the editor'sdesignation of the violated agreement as one made on the cruiser
ca
U
u
nd iS incorrect
) and had been procuring arms for theSA. The Reich Chancellor claimed that a letter from Blomberg(possioly that mentioned in footnote 100) "completely estab-lished" Rohm's treason. The letter from Blomberg establishingRohm's guilt has never been found.
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Evidence, in a positive sense, indicating that Reich-
enau had succeeded in isolating Rohm and the radical leaders
from the more moderate majority of SA men is lacking. Yet,
in a negative sense, the ease with which the SS dispatched'
Rohm and purged the SA, as well as the total absence of any
opposition or reaction to the wholesale executions, tends to
indicate that Rohm and his fellow radicals were indeed iso-
lated, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that the
military goals which Reichenau envisioned for the Krtiger
Organization were accomplished. After military personnel
attached to the Chef AW Organization as advisors returned
to their units in the spring of 1934, Kruger's organization
continued to function and provide the Reichswehr with re-
cruits whose basic military training was behind them. In
May 1934, Blomberg expressed further confidence in Krtiger
by requesting that the Chef AW train 240,000 additional men
by 1 October 1935, 102 a strong endorsement of the mllitary
sport program indicating that the Army depended on the Chef
AW Organization to relieve the over-taxed soldiers of the
onerous burden of conducting basic recruit training.
102BA-MA, WK VII/1451, Reichsverteidigungsminister,
TA 300/34 g.K. T4IIIa, 24 May 1934, Bl. 15. An additional
4000 were to be trained by the Navy.
CHAPTER X
THE END OF THE KRUGER ORGANIZATION
JULY 193 4 TO JANUARY 1935
The events of 30 June 1934 drastically altered the
relationship among the Reichswehr and the SA, the SA and
the Kriiger Organization, and the Army and the Kruger Or-
ganization. In early July Hitler ordered the Army to assign
no further defense-oriented tasks to the SA, and instituted
a purge of SA leaders. He allowed the Reichswehr a free
hand in suggesting replacements for the vacated SA posts. 1
Of perhaps greater importance to the Reichswehr than the
emasculated SA was the uncertain future of the Chef AW
Organization. Scanty evidence indicates that in mid-July
Kruger and Reichenau planned not only to continue the mili-
tary sport programs conducted by the Chef AW Organization,
but to separate it from the SA and increase Kruger 1 s re-
sponsibilities. It is impossible to ascertain if these
plans originated prior to 30 June, and although no evidence
1 BA-MA, WK VII/744, WK VII/7 I r D, 344 g.K. lc, 17
August 1934.
2Meeting v/ith his chief of staff, la and Ic officers
on 1 July 1934, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division,
General Adam, expressed his grave concern about the future
of the military sport program, Muller, Das wahre Vaterland,
361 .
3
BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, hand-written notes on Wehrjugend
proposal; Reichsverteidigungsminister , Nr. 653/34 g.K. L Ila,
10 July 1934; 9a, "S tellungnahme" , Bl. 10f.
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e*1Sts to support such an assertion, it cannot be entirely
hissed. certainly the idea of an independent Chef AW
can be found in Kriiger' s proposal of February 1933 and a
Defense Ministry study of March 1933. 4 R5hm's approval,
in May 1934f for the transfer Qf ministeriai
for the Chef AW budget to the Defense Minister 5 intimates
that some larger project may have been in the works.
At any rate, Reichenau sent Kriiger, on 10 July, a
Proposal for the reorganization of youth training programs. 6
Reichenau and Blomberg apparently envisioned transferring
all youth training organizations and associations to one
large agency. Blomberg, in his capacity as Defense Minis-
ter, would have had, according to Reichenau's plan, super-
visory responsibility for the agency, but its actual direc-
tion and operation would be handled by Kriiger. He would
have sufficient authority to insure cooperation of all
interested parties. Reichenau tentatively assigned this
putative agency the designation "military youth" (Wehrjucrend )
Agreeing with Reichenau's proposal, Kriiger merely suggested
a few minor changes. A note in Kriiger 's writing indicates
that he insisted on a clear definition of his authority over
4Cf. Chapter VII, 179ff , . 184f.
5BA, Nachlab Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 17f.
6Ibid.
,
10, Reichsverteidigungminister Nr. 653/34 g.K.L Ila, 10 July 1934. The wording of the order indicates thatit was prepared for Hitler's signature.
the Hitler Youth and student training programs .
7
A tentative understanding, reached with the Defense
Ministry during July, defined the responsibilities of the
"Director of Military Youth" (Kruger). His new responsi-
bilities included supervising all sport and military sport
training, required for all eligible (physically and racial-
ly) German males, commencing at age 10 and continuing
through their twenty-first year. Although he had no
responsibility for conducting rudimentary sport training
in either the Hitler Youth or the public schools according
to this latest agreement, he would train sport instructors
for the Hitler Youth and the state schools. Kruger 'a actual
instructional responsibilities were to be limited to conduct-
ing military sport courses for the above-mentioned sport in-
structors and for German males, ages 19 through 21. m
theory, young men joining either the Labor Service or the
armed forces escaped having to attend the "military youth"
courses, but in practice the military services gave preference
to prospective recruits with credentials from either the Kru-
ger Organization or the Reich Labor Service which conducted
its own military sport program. All in all, the Reichswehr
clearly profitted the most from the proposed "military youth"
program: just about all male Germans, whether or not they
served in the armed forces, would receive military training
Ibid., Kruger marginalia
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in some fashion. 8
Even though Kruger and the Defense Ministry officials
were convinced of the necessity for a single youth sport
agency, Hitler avoided committing himself to the project.
His procrastination can, in all likelihood, be attributed
to the rapid deterioration of President von Hindenburg's
health during July. With the demise of the Reich President
imminent, Hitler shrank from creating dissention in the
Party, a sure consequence should he attempt to impose order
on the factious state and Party potentates with vested
interests in the youth question. The death of Hindenburg
and Hitler's smooth assumption of power on 2 August ended
fears of a succession crisis, and on 8 August Hitler sepa-
rated the Chef AW Organization from the SA, 9 the first step,
hoped Kruger, toward forming a Reich youth agency around the
nucleus of the Chef AW.
_ nrs/ ^
IfZG
'
Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann, 9 Oct. 1934. Bl. 229ff.;Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk, 12 October 1934; Anlage 1, "Entwurf
eines Gesetzes iiber die Zugehorigkeit zu den nationalsozial-lstischen Erziehungsverbanden"
; BA, NachlaB Kruger/10, "Entwurf
... with Kruger's marginalia; Sam Sch/421, letter (former NSLBGelandesportreferent) Sturmfuhrer E. LinB im Stabe des Chefs AWto Reichsgeschaftsfiihrer [of NSLB] Kolb, 14 September 1934; NS-
12/1313, letter Kruger to Bay. Staatsmin. und Reichsleiter [desNSLB] Schemm, Chef AW J, 105723/34, 9 October 1934.
9BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Niederschrift iiber den Chef desAusbildungswesens", Rk. 6754, 25 September 1935, Bl . 1; "Stel-
lungnahme", Bl. 9; IfZG, Fa-90/1
,
Kruger to Schatz, G, 4296/34,
10 August 1934. It is not certain if this order was initiallykept secret. A SA order of 9 August indicates that the "bishe-
rigen Unterstellungsverhaltnis
" of the Chef AW to the OSAF re-
mained in effect. BA, NS-23/127, OSAF Fuhrungsamt F-2, 204604,
9 August 1934.
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Throughout August and September Kruger worked closely
with Reichenau "...with the goal of placing all pre-military
training in one hand. "10 Both conceived of ^ „miUtary
youth" program enrolling nineteen and twenty year olds who
would spend one year of their "military youth" period in
the Reich Labor Service and the second in the Chef AW Organi-
zation. To facilitate implementation of this program, Kru-
ger re-shaped his entire organization. With its separation
from the SA, Chef AW Organization deputies assigned to the
staffs of the major SA regional commands no longer had a
function, and Kruger reorganized the deputies into Chef AW
district directors, whose territories paralleled those of
the military district commands. The Chef AW Organization
District Headquarters Director (Chef AW Landesfiihrer ) had
a small staff whose mission was to work closely with mili-
tary recruiting and mobilization authorities in order to
insure a continuous flow of military sport graduates into
the Army. A Chef AW Regional Headquarters performed the
same function at the smaller military region (Wehrgau) level.
To facilitate speedy reorganization, Kruger suspended all
Chef AW Organization military sport courses during August
and September. 11
IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk: Wehrjugend, 12 October
1934. " . . .mit dem Ziel, die gesamte vormilitarische Erziehung
in eine Hand zu legen."
1
1
Ibid
. ,
BA, Nachlafl Kruger/9a, "Stellunghahme"
, Bl.
1 f. A complete list of the Chef AW districts and regions can
be seen in the appendix.
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in spite of their smooth start, differences of
opinion between KrOger and the Defense Ministry developed
quickly. During discussions held during juiy Reichena^
Kruger had mentioned, apparently without contradiction or
opposition, that he envisioned a Chef AW Organization budget
in the neighborhood of approximately RM 200 million. ™ He
accordingly was chagrined when Blomberg, in August, drew the
line on a budget of no more than RM 120 million, a figure
later reduced to RM 80 million. 13 The Chef AW Organization
special training courses immediately fell victim to the new
budget. Kruger terminated cavalry, combat engineer, and
communications training courses at the end of September,
closing thirty-eight schools and camps and laying off 1376
employees
.
1
4
His chagrin over the loss of the specialized
training camps was not shared by the Chief of the Army Com-
mand, General von Fritsch, who had apparently favored this
action all along. 15 Evidence ig insufficient tQ state why
12BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
, Bl. 15;IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk 12 October 1934.
1 3IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk 12 October 1934. Kruger
claimed he requested RM 120 million for Fiscal Year 1934, butReichswehr records indicate he asked for only RM 100 millionBoth sources agree that he received ca. RM 80 million. Ibid'
•
BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Niederschrift ; , Bl . 1f.
1 4IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk, Miindliche Besprechung
mit Oberst v. Vietinghoff, 26 September 1934; Aktenvermerk,
25 October 1934.
1 5Ibid., Aktenvermerk Vietinghoff, 26 September 1934.
Kruger vainly tried to see Fritsch prior to the closing of the
special training camps.
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Fritsch wanted to end the courses, but he had always demon-
strated a great antipathy to the Nazi paramilitary organiza-
tions, an attitude shared by his colleague and Chief of the
General Staff, General Beck.
Blomberg delivered an additional blow in September
by demanding the return of all Chef AW Organization weapons. 16
His position was legally unimpeachable; the weapons had been
merely "loaned" to the Chef AW Organization . 1 7 Kruger none-
theless vehemently and vainly protested the action of the
Army. With some justification, he felt he had been shabbily
treated. He had, he told Colonel von Vietinghoff (Reiche-
nau's deputy), purhcased the weapons with funds from his
budget and it did not appear entirely just to have to turn
them over to the Army without some sort of compensation. He
further noted that the Army had already declared most of
these weapons unserviceable and planned to turn them over to
the Reich Post Office and the Reich Railway Directory. 18
Vietinghoff did not answer Kruger 's objections. Blomberg'
s
rationale for wanting the return of the "borrowed" weapons
ibid., Fa-90/1, letter Blomberg to Kruger, Reichs-
verteidigungsminister, W.A. 1140/34 g.K. L la, 14 September
1934.
17See Chapter VII, p. 193, and IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Lieb-
mann Notizen, 5 July 1934, Bl. 226.
1 8
°IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk miindliche Besprechung
mit Oberst von Vietinghoff, 21 September 1934. Kruger had
already protested on 18 September the loss of his organiza-
tion's weapons.
284
is unknown, but it appears that pressure fro, Pritsch and
Beck to curb the Chef AW Organization caused him to insist
that the armed forces retain its monopoly as the nation's
sole military force in theory as well as in practice. At
any rate, such were the sentiments he expressed to his
senior commanders on 9 October. "Weapons training", he
enunciated, "of soldiers and reserve forces remains solely
the task of the armed forces." 19
By early October, Blomberg had finally written a
draft of the "law concerning the membership in National
Socialist Training Associations ", 20 which summarized his
July understanding with Kruger. He received this document
shortly after a meeting with von Vietinghoff on 12 October,
during which the Chef AW had passionately criticized the
apparent Army procrastination over preparing the "military
youth law." Once again he stressed his disastrous financial
situation, insisting that he needed at least KM 10 million
per month in order to continue operations. 21
Ibid., Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Befehlshaber-besprechung, 9 October 1934. "Waf fenausbildung der Soldaten
und Ersatzreservisten bleibt allein Aufgabe der Wehrmacht."
Bl. 229. Blomberg did allow Kruger to retain a few weapons(probably of small bore caliber) for marksmanship training.
20^ .During a conference with the Reichswehr commanders
on 9 October, Blomberg told them that the "law for state and
military training" was still in preparation, and outlined its
essential principles. IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bl.
229; BA, Nachlafi Kriiger/10, "Entwurf . . . "
2
1
IfZG, Fa-90/2, "Aktenvermerk Wehrj ugend" , 10 October
1934.
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Whatever hopes the long-awaited draft of the law
concerning membership in Nazi training organizations may
have awakened in Kruger, his desire for its speedy imple-
mentation remained unfulfilled. Army guidelines distributed
to German military attaches on 25 October indicate that as
of that date no further progress had been made toward im-
plementing the law. 22 0n 7 November Reichenau wrote Kruger,
informing him that a lack of funds and a subsequent re-
evaluation of Kruger 's proposed "military youth" organiza-
tion dictated several changes, which, noted Reichenau,
already had the approval of Blomberg and Hitler. 23 Once
the international situation would permit, he wrote, the
Government planned to introduce compulsory military and
Labor Service requirements
.
2 4 m the meantime, he added,
as many young Germans as possible would serve six months
in the Labor Service, during which they would complete
their military sport training, necessitating a merger of
some Chef AW Organization activities with the Labor Service.
Instead of Kruger becoming "Reich Leader of the Military
22 Ibid., Ma-241, Reichswehrministerium/Ausland, "Stich-
worte fur Ausfuhrungen vor den Militar-Attaches , 25 October 19
^ JIbid.
,
Letter Reichenau to Kruger, Der Chef des Wehr-
machtamts, Nr. 1390/34 g.K., L IIA, 7 November 1934.
O A
During his commanders conference of 9 October 1934,
Blomberg stated that he hoped a universal military service re-
quirement would become law by 1 October 1935. See IfZG, Ed-1/1-
Liebmann Notizen, Bl. 231 f.
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Youth"
,
Reichenau instead proposed that he be appointed
"inspector of Terrain Sport"
, responsible to Blomberg for
training sport instructors for the SA, SS CSchutsstaff.i » .
Hitler Youth, Reich Labor Service, and the National Social-
ist Teachers Association. m addition, noted Reichenau,
the Defense Minister intended to appoint an active officer
to serve as Chef AW chief of staff and to name a committee
of representatives from agencies responsible for sport in-
struction to act as a board of governors for the Kriiger
Organization. 25 On the issue of training with military
weapons, the Army remained adamant: "weapons training
...
is solely the task of the armed forces. Organizations other
than the armed forces do not engage in weapons instruction.-:
This newest proposal for the Organization Kriiger con-
tained several important changes, all of which militated
against both the independence and permanence of the Chef AW
Organization. Not only did Reichenau want to remove Krii-
ger »s organization from providing military sport instruction
2 5IfZG, Fa-90/2, letter Reichenau to Kriiger, Der Chefdes Wehrmachtamts
,
Nr. 1390/34 g.K. LIIA, 7 November 1934-
BA, NachlaB Kriiger/ 10, "Entwurf eines KabinetsbeschluBes zumGesetz iiber die Zugehorigkeit zu den nationalsozialis tischen
Erziehungsverbanden"
.
26BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, "Entwurf eines Kabinets-
beschluBes.
.
.
" "Die Waf fenausbildung ... 1st allein Aufgabe
der Wehrmacht. Verbande auBerhalb der Wehrmacht betrieben
keine Waf fennausbildung.
"
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directly to young men, but the Army's plans for a board of
governors and a military officer serving as chief of staff
to Kruger virtually eliminated the latter 's former inde-
pendence
.
Kruger immediately realized the direction toward
which Reichenau's changes to their July understanding head-
ed: the eventual eclipse of the Chef AW Organization and
its transformation into a diminutive instructor training
2 7bureau. Gathering information with which to undermine
Reichenau's arguments, the Chef AW discovered that the bud-
get situation was not as bleak as the Defense Ministry
indicated. The Reich Labor Service, he found out, had
emerged from its budget surgery in far better shape than
had his own organization. 28 in a letter to the Defense
Ministry, Kruger suggested three major changes to Reiche-
nau's latest proposal: (1) members of the Reich Labor
Service would not conduct their own military sport program,
but instead would undergo training in special Chef AW Or-
ganization camps; (2) the military sport requirement for
all male Germans could only be fulfilled in Chef AW Organi-
zation camps; and (3) the Chef AW, as the official respon-
2 ^ Ibid
. ,
Kruger marginalia.
2
8
Ibid ; , Amt-M, M/G-, 34 to Kruger, im Hause, 14 No-
vember 1934. The Reichsarbeitdienst
,
asking for RM 260 million,
eventually received RM 200 million. Cf. Ba, R-43, 11/516,
RFM, Ar 1610 (34)-12I, betr. Haushaltsmittel f. RAD, 6 June
1934; RFM Ar 1610 (34) -1 4 I, 9 July 1934.
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sible for all military sport training, would supervise all
activities related to military sport training conducted by
the Hitler Youth, the schools, and the Reich Labor Service.^
Reichenau's reponse to Kruger's suggestions has not
survived, but it appears that he remained unconvinced, be-
cause there was no immediate resolution of his and Kruger's
differences. Instead, a meeting of all interested parties
concerning the "military youth" law took place on 20 Novem-
ber 1934. Little information pertaining to this conference
exists, and neither its location nor its participants are
known. However, since the proposed law concerned several
Nazi paramilitary and service organizations ( e.g.
,
SA, SS,
Hitler Youth, Chef AW Organization, and the Reich Labor
Service) and the Defense Ministry, it is probable that
representatives from all these groups attended. While no
transcript of this conference is known to exist, the in-
structions for the SA representatives 30 leave no doubt that
the Chef AW Organization received full measure of the antip-
29 Nachla/3 Krtiger/10, "Fragen zum Gesetz iiber die
Zugehorigkeit zu den Nationalsozialistischen Erziehungsver-
banden bzw. zum Entwurf eines KabinetsbeschuluBes"
; "Stellung-
nahme zum Entwurf eines Kabinetsbeschlufles zum Gesetz iiber
die Zugehorigkeit zu den nationalsozialistischen Erziehungs-
verbanden". Both these documents are undated but are attached
to Reichenau's letter of 7 November 1934 with a remark that
the material was brought to Reichenau's attention.
30BA, Sam Sch/239, Fernspruch Stabschef-Oberfuhrer
Reimann am 20. 11. 193 4 (vorm.), (festgelegt nach Diktat).
The SA representatives were Gruppenfuhrer Marxer (head of SA
personnel office) and Brigadefuhrer Max Jiittner (assistant
to Lutze)
.
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athy which had developed between it and the SA.
Following the R6hm Putsch, growing hostility char-
acterized relations between Kruger and the new SA Chief of
Staff, Viktor Lutze. 31 In all likelihood ^ burgeQnlng
antagonism originated from the irreconciliable and con-
flicting concepts each had of the role of their respective
organizations. Lutze, on good terms with the Army, had no
intention of allowing Kruger to monopolize completely all
non-regular defense preparations. The first clash came in
July when Lutze reminded Kruger, who then was still in the
SA, that the sole agency for transmitting the wishes of the
Defense Ministry to the entire SA was the OSAF, not the
Chef AW Organization. It was unmilitary, wrote the SA Chief
of Staff, that a subordinate section of the SA staff would
issue directives from the Defense Ministry to the SA with-
out consultation with or the approval of the Supreme SA
Headquarters. 32 Kruger ignored Lutze and attempted to pre-
serve his position as the sole SA liaison to the Defense
31 28 December 1890 to 1943. Entering the Army in 1912Lutze saw service on all fronts during the First World War andreceived a number of decorations. Blinded in his left eve, hewas medically discharged in 1919, and entered a business enter-prise in Hannover. He joined the SA in 1923, and became a
regional commander and deputy Gauleiter in 1925. In 1931, Lutzebecame OSAF-Nord. Following the Nazi victory, he became PolicePresident, then Oberprasident of Hannover until his appoint-
ment as SA Chief of Staff on 30 June 1934. He died from in-juries received in an auto wreck in 1943.
32BDC, Personalakt Kruger, I, Lutze to Kruger, OSAF
M/G 3806/34, 24 July 1934. A similar letter from Lutze, M/G
1066/34, of 18 July went unanswered.
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Ministry, an especially difficult task after his separa-
tion from the SA in August. On 1 7 October an exasperated
Lutze wrote:
I am telling you [Kriiger]
, as I have alreadydone several months ago, for the very lasttime today, that there is no need for anintermediary to' transmit to me the wishesand requests of the Defense Ministry. I seeno reason why the Defense Ministry cannotdeal directly with me. 33
While arguing in this instance from a defensible
position, Lutze nonetheless contributed to the rift which
developed between the SA and the Chef AW Organization. In
an order published the day after Hitler separated Kriiger 's
organization from the SA, the SA Chief of Staff explained
to the SA that he foresaw no changes in either his relations
with Kriiger or in the latter 's subordinate relationship to
34the OSAF. Further, several senior SA leaders insisted
that Kriiger' s overweening ambition had resulted in the
events of 30 June, an attitude hardly conducive to insuring
Ibid
. / Lutze to Kriiger, OSAF 163/34, geheim, 17October 1934. "...telle ich Ihnen, wie ich das bereits
schon einmal vor Monaten getan habe, heute zum letzten Male
mit, da/3 es keiner Zwischenstelle bedarf, die mir Wunsche
Ynd Anregungen des Reichswehrministeriums iibermittelt , daich keinen Grund sehe, dafi das Reichswehrministerium direkt
mit mir verhandelt."
34BA, NS-23/127, OSAF, Fuhrungsamt F-2, 20464,
9 August 19 34.
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smooth relations between the two groups. 35 " Don . t speak to
us of the Chef AW,
"
said Lutze. s adjutant to a Chef AW Or-
ganization staff officer, "for us, he is a red flag! "36
A further controversy errupted over the continued
wearing of the SA uniform by Chef AW Organization personnel
who as yet had no distinct uniform. Lutze, in a letter of
26 October, excoriated Kruger for allowing his men unauth-
orized liberties (e^.
, pinned-back coat lapels, white
leather gloves) in wearing their uniforms. These trans-
gressions were deplorable, wrote the SA Chief of Staff,
because the public, he added, which could not be expected
to distinguish non-existent differences between the uniforms
of the two groups, would naturally conclude that all who
wore the SA uniform, properly or otherwise, belonged to the
SA. Lutze concluded his letter with the threat that if Chef
AW Organization men failed to conform to SA uniform regula-
tions, he would see to it "... that they no longer [will]
run around in uniform. "37 More aggravating to Kruger was
35BDC, Personalakt Kruger, I, report of 26 August 1934,
conversation between Wahmann and former SA Reichschochschuleleader Heinrich Bennecke. Bennecke has reproduced this docu-
ment in the appendix to his Reichswehr und Rohmputsch
,
Anlage
3 6BDC, Personalakt Kruger, I, unsigned, undated report
of a Chef AW staff officer (most likely Wahmann) with SA Ober-
fiihrer Reimann, Lutze 's adjutant. "Sprechen Sie ja nicht bei
uns vom Chef AW, der is fur uns ein rotes Tuch!"
37Ibid
. ,
Lutze to Kruger, OSAS BB, 4119 II/21-d, 26 Oc-
tober 1 934. "...da/3 sie nicht mehr in Uniform herumlaufen .
"
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the voiding of the SA identification papers carried by Chef
AW Organization men. This mean action forced him to issue
new identity cards for his men, who in the meantime were
harassed by police during random security checks and who
lost their special railroad travel discount. 38
Lutze did not restrict himself to petty swipes at
Kriiger; Lutze 's measures establishing SA training schools
were clearly aimed at making Kriiger 's Chef AW Organization
appear redundant and hence a wasteful extravagance. In
early November the SA Chief of Staff directed SA Groups in
western Germany to send selected students to a new SA in-
structor training academy located near Hanau. The graduates
would, he wrote, form cadres for similar schools which he
hoped to set up in each SA Group. "Because these schools
will be real SA schools", he added, "special care must be
taken in the selection of leaders" with emphasis placed
upon their commitment to the National Socialist movement. 39
Further measures were taken to establish sport and ideologi-
cal schools for each SA Group, 40 and on 15 November Lutze
38BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, letter Landesfiihrer V (Stutt-
gart) to Kriiger, Nr. 4302/34, 19 November 1 934 .
on
•^BA, NS-23/127, OSAF Z, 31373, 7 November 1934 . "Da
diese neuen Schulen wirkliche SA Schulen werden sollen, muB die
Auswahl die zum Lehrgang kommandierten Fiihrer besondere Sorg-
falt gelegt werden." (emphasis in original) Students from the
eastern regions of Germany attended the second course ( 6 Jan.
1935-3 Feb. 1935). See Ibid
. , OSAF F, 31373/11 Ang. , 30 Nov.
1 934 .
40Ibid., OSAF P, 32607, 14 November 1934; NS-23/428,
OSAF F-3, 32749, 20 November 1934.
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appointed Reich Sport Commisar von Tsham^er und Osten to
the OSAF as sports consultant. He received orders to unify
SA sport instruction, insuring its compatibility to existent
SA ideological and terrain sport training. 41
The abrasive Kriiger had not, however, restricted him-
self to alienating the SA. He arrogantly dismissed a re-
quest to audit his books from Party Treasurer Fran, Xavier
Schwarz, <2 who had been specifically designated by
to review SA finances following the Rohm Putsch. 43 Ack-
nowledging receipt of Schwarz 's request, Kriiger imperiously
stated that since his organization had, at the express
orders of the Fiihrer, been made independent of the SA, an
examination of the books was out of the question. 44 Schwarz,
one of the select few who enjoyed Hitler's complete confi-
dence and a former bureaucrat to whom bluster and chicanery
were everyday occurrences, refused to be cowed by any situ-
ation. Demanding access to Kriiger 's financial records, he
41
Ibid., NS-23/127, OSAF F-3, 32472, 15 November 1934.
42
27 Nov. 1875- A career civil servant in the BavarianCivil Service, Schwarz held a number of middle-level positions
culminating in his appointment to the city council of Munich.
During the First World War he served all four years as a mili-
tary official. He became NSDAP Treasurer in 1925 when Hitler
refounded the party.
43 IFZG, Fa-90/1
,
letter Reichsschat zmeister der NSDAP
Schwartz to Kriiger, Nr. 17761 , 31 July 1934. The completed
audit, dated 14 December 1934, can be seen in HA, f. 319.
44Ibid., letter Kriiger to Schwarz, G 4296/34, 10 Aug-
ust 1934.
294
replied that according
to the interpretation of the Fuhrer re-
o?
r
fi
ng
c^
h
?
laW f°r Securing the Unityf the State and the Party (1 December1933), according to which I am theplenipotentiary of the Fuhrer in all
contractual affairs of the NSDAP
. . all
S^Sff^f ^S NSDAP ' itS offi^> and
approval 4f
ed °™-tions require my
Kriiger 's response has not survived, but an audit by the
Army, conducted one year later and accusing Kriiger of gross
mismanagement, gives some indication as to why he attempted
to block the Party Treasurer's audit. 4 6
While very little evidence providing insight into
the relationship between Chef AW Organization camps and the
people of the towns in which the facilities were located
has survived, ill feelings between the two groups existed
in at least one area. A number of peasants in the village
of Iburg (Westphalia) complained to local government auth-
orities that students from the Iburg Chef AW Organization
camp had trampled grazing areas and had blocked access to
45 i~Ibid., letter Schwarz to Kriiger, 6 October 1 934 .
"Auf die erste Durchfiihrungsverordnung des Fiihrers zum Gesetz
zur Sicherung der Einheit von Partei und Staat vom 1.12.33,
wonach ich als Generalbevollmachtiger des Fiihrers in alien
vermogensrechtlichen Angelegenheiten der NSDAP gelte und...
auch alle Vertrage der NSDAP und ihrer Gliederung sowie der
Amter meiner Genehmigung bediirfen."
46
*"BA, Nachla/3 Kriiger/9», "Niederschrift"
,
passim .
.The local Re^ierungsprasident. 47 routinely
sent the complaints to the Iburg camp commandant with a re-
quest that he address the problem. 48 The c_der
that he failed to see any harm in his students using the
disputed areas for only two or three hours daily. He needed,
he explained, access to the grazing areas in order to con-
duct his training, and he added, he had a contract with the
community guaranteeing him this right. He was going to
complain to Kruger, he wrote, that the locals were trying
to break the contract, implying that the Chef AW would take
some retaliation against the peasants. "After all," con-
cluded the commandant, "according to my arithmetic, the
miserable creatures [the cattle] still have 21 hours [per
day] in which to graze. "49 perhaps having second thoughts
about this intemperate letter, the commandant dispatched a
second missive three days later, informing the Regierungs-
prasident that he would reduce the number of students using
the grazing area. After congratulating himself for this
masterful solution, his anger resurfaced as he concluded
A *~
7
'There is no precise English translation for this
term. The boundaries of a Regierung varied, but the area, on
the whole, was larger than a US county, and the Regierungs-
prasident was an appointed civil servant, responsible to
the state government.
48BA, NS-23/1 58, letter Regierungsprasident Osnabriick
to Chef AW Sportschule Iburg, III D3
, 17, 12 July 1934.
49Ibid
. ,
letter Commandant SA Sportschule Iburg to
Regierungsprasident Osnabriick, Nr. 1308/34, ES , 15 July 1934 .
"Es verbleiben den armen Vieh dann noch rechnerisch 21
Stunden zum FraB."
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that "... the complaint of the np^Anfcn peasants
... is no argument,
but mere chicanery
1 »
50 The imperturbable R^er^rssi-
dent handled the situation adroitly. Rejecting Camp Com-
mandant Busch's letters as both impertinent and unsatis-
factory, he prohibited Chef AW Organization students from
using the disputed area until 1 October. Busch's threat
to write Kruger, added the R^^^^ was crass
and unnecessary, and he explained to Busch that he had
already taken the liberty of forwarding to Kruger copies
of all of Busch's correspondence with local officials. 51
This one affair is insufficient to hazard even a
suggestion that such incidents were characteristic of Chef
AW Organization relations with local residents. The only
other evidence bearing on this area, Kruger's testimony,
which is of course self-serving, contradicts the Iburg im-
pression. Nonetheless, only a few problems of the Iburg
type would have been needed to add many local and regional
government officials to the growing list of Kruger's enemies
By late 1934 this list included not only such long-standing
rivals as Hitler Youth Leader von Schirach and Reich Sport
Commissar von Tschammer und Osten, but the newer and poten-
I^id.
,
letter Commandant SA Sportschule Iburg to
Regierungsprasident Osnabriick, 10 July 1934 . "Mit guten Willen
liesse ich eine Losung finden, aber Beschwerden der Bauern ...ist kein Argument, sondern Chikane!"
5
1
Ibid., letter Regierungsprasident Osnabriick to SA
Sportschule Iburg, HID, Nr. 20/2, 24 July 1934.
tially more dangerous foes, namely Lutze, the Reich Labor
Service, the Army Command (Fritsch and Beck), Nazi Party
Treasurer Schwarz, and possibly a few local government of-
ficials
.
By November 1934, with opposition to the Chef AW
Organization coming from all directions, the first of a
series of conversations among interested parties concern-
ing the proposed "military youth" law took place. 52 During
the first meeting, held on 20 November, SA representatives
Marxer and Jiittner pointed out that the "SA had prepared a
series of its own [sport training] camps which obviated the
need for a second organization [the Chef AW Organization],
the existence of which serves merely to double expenses." 53
Following this damaging observation and taking advantage of
the lack of enthusiasm of Reichswehr officers for entering
again the maze of paramilitary instruction, Marxer and
Jiittner proposed that a new Reichskuratorium, under Reichs-
wehr auspices, be created; otherwise, they added, the SA
must assume complete responsibility for youth training.
Adding to the already uncomfortable atmosphere, they ob-
jected vehemently to the provision in the draft of the
52BA, Sam Sch/239, "Fernspruch Stabschef-Oberfuhrer
Reimann am 20. 11. 34 (vorm. ) See footnote 30, this chapter.
Ibid.
,
"SA bearbeitet an sich samtliche Lager, die
alle der SA unterstehen, damit nicht eine zweite Organisation
notwendig ist, durch welche erst wieder doppelte Kosten
entstehen wiirden."
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"military youth" law calling for the termination of Wor-
ship in the Party and the sa for the duration of one's mili-
tary service. 54 ., The reasQns ^^ ^^
they said: "the movement and the state are one, which the
Reichswehr always maintains when it [this position] is to
their advantage. There is no reason why the armed forces
should not mesh completely with the National Socialist State
and stop pursuing special interests ." 55
Apparently nothing constructive came from this meet-
ing. Three days later Lutze wrote to the Deputy of the
Fiihrer, Rudolf Hess, 56 seeking an interview wlth Hitler
_
Explaining that while he (Lutze) realized that Hitler was
free to accept the current wording of the "military youth"
54For this law, see BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, "Entwurf
eines Gesetzes uber die Zugehorigkeit zu den nationalsozial-lstischen Erziehungsverbanden , " Ziff. 4.
55BA, Sam Sch/239, "Fernspruch Stabschef
. .
.
" "Grunde
sind klar: Bewegung und Staat sind eins, was RW [Reichswehr]ja immer behauptet, wenn es zu ihrem Vorteil ist. Es istkein Grund vorhanden, da/3 die Wehrmacht sich nicht voll inden nationalsozialistischen Staat einfiigt und Sonderinteressen
betreibt
.
11
56 26 April 1896- Hess was a management trainee in Ham-
burg when the First World War began and he joined the 1st
Bavarian Artillery Regiment. Wounded twice, he was promoted to
Lieutenant and joined the flying corps. After the war, he be-
came a student at the University of Munich and became active
in racist political groups, including the NSDAP in 1921. He
formed the first SA unit at the university. While in jail with
Hitler after the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch, he became
his private secretary, a position which was elevated to Deputy
of Hitler in 1933.
law, there were several sections with which the SA disagreed
He insisted that the Chef AW Organization once again be sub-
ordinated to the SA and that SA and SS men be allowed to re-
tain their membership in these organizations while perform-
ing their active military service obligations
.
^ Hess ar-
ranged for Lutze to meet Hitler on 27 November, and although
there is no record of their conversation, Lutze's notes
which he prepared in advance have survived. These confirm
that the SA Chief of Staff either hoped to regain control
of Kriiger's organization or to eliminate it and have the SA
assume Kriiger's responsibilities. 58
Hitler appears to have made no commitment to Lutze
and instead ordered the concerned youth training agencies
to re-draft the "military youth" law. The agencies promptly
passed this task to a committee. 59 The five page revised
"military youth" law proposal, which called for a cabinet
decree reorganizing and regulating military sport training,
was apparently the work of this committee. Compared to
Kriiger's original understanding with the Army in July, the
final draft reflected a number of important compromises,
57BA, Sam Sch/239, Lutze to Hess, 23 November 1934.
5 8Ibid., Lutze's handwritten notes, "Dem Fiihrer soil
unterbreitet werden"
.
59Volkischer Beobachter
, 4 December 19 34. According tothe newspaper, present at a meeting of 3 December were Reichs-kommisar Hans Frank [the former NSDAP counselor]
, Hitler Youth
Leader von Schirach, Reich Labor Minister Seldte, and RAD Lead
er Hierl.
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which reduced considerably his autonomy and authority.
According to this latest proposal, German males from
ages 19 to 21 were to be incorporated into the "military
Youth". At some time during their 19th year, attendance at
a Chef AW Organization course was mandatory, followed by six
months Labor Service and subsequent entry into the armed
forces. When possible, Kruger was to maintain separate
facilities and courses for students who were members of the
SA or SS. Additionally, special intructor training courses
were to be conducted for Hitler Youth leaders. Funds for
all these courses would come from the Defense Ministry, which
would assign an officer to serve as Kruger 's chief of staff
and a civilian administrator to direct the finances of the
Kruger Organization. Kruger lost all authority over Hitler
Youth and Reich Labor Service training activities, and
Lutze's demand that SA men be allowed to continue their SA
membership while on active military service was rejected. 60
Neither the SA nor the Army contributed significantly
to the drafting of this proposal which never became law.
The SA and the Reichswehr instead appear to have
undermined both the revised "military youth" proposal and the
Kruger Organization. Lutze had manifested his: opposition to
the Chef AW Organization on numerous occasions, and he had
60BA, Nachlafi Kriiger/10, " (KabinettsbeschluB) " Entwurf
vom 11. 12 . 34
.
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carefully directed attention to the needless expense of
maintaining two military sport training organizations, his
own and Kriiger 's, a situation whioh, he had claimed with
logic, violated the military axiom of unity of command.
From the side of the Defense Ministry, enthusiasm for the
Kruger Organization had subsided since July. First came
the decision that the advanced Chef AW training courses
were no longer necessary, then the Army Command had in-
sisted upon the return of its weapons. Budget discussions
between Kriiger's officials and the Army dragged on intermi-
nably
.
6 1
Perhaps more to the point, Reichswehr officials were
happy to tolerate the Kriiger Organization so long as the
Government graciously provided the funds for this organiza-
tion from the Reich Interior Ministry, but they became re-
luctant to fund it when the money was to come from their own
budget, as mandated by the proposed "military youth" law.
Further, by October 1934 the Army had almost reached the man
power level which its experts had hoped to attain by 1938, 62
6
1
Ibid., 9a, "Stellungnahme" , Bl . 18f. The Army report
of 1935 accusing Kriiger of gross fiscal incompetence and mis-
management rings hollow. Although the Army succeeded in appointing its own financial expert to the Chef AW staff only in Nov-
ember 1 934, Kriiger had, from the inception of his organization,
kept Army officials aware of his total expenditures and had
submitted for their inspection copies of his budget.
62Rautenberg, Riis tungspolitik
, 309-313; Absolon,
Wehrmacht, I, 53-58.
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an expansion which in all probability strained the defense
budget. Achieving its 1938 goals four years ahead of sched-
ule, Army officials may have argued that money allocated for
the Chef AW Organization, whose function no longer appeared
quite so critical now that the Army had a surfeit of men,
could be better spent to the advantages of the armed forces
by the Defense Ministry itself. Moreover, there appeared
little need for subsidizing the expensive Chef AW Organiza-
tion schools when a similar agency, the SA, would perform
the same task at no expense to the Army.
The Army, in fact, had been leaning in this direction
since November. Fritsch published an order on 4 December
allowing SA and SS units to train with Army recruit battal-
ions. This training, explained Fritsch, implied no peace-
time military function for the SA; however, in war or mobili-
zation, those SA and SS units which had undergone military
training would serve as replacement units, forwarding men
to the front as required. 63 Even though the Army restricted
this training to men over twenty-five years of age, the im-
plication was that the Army, no longer overwhelmed by a
flood of recruits, could spare personnel and facilities to
train non-regulars. In other words, the Chef AW Organization
had become obsolete.
BA, Sam Sch/477, CHL TA 6008/34 g.K. T2IIIa, 4 De-
cember 19 34.
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In early December both the Army and the SA became
openly hostile to Kriiger. Blomberg sent him an angry letter
on 6 December, accusing him of harboring anti-Reichswehr
elements within his organization, and demanding an "investi-
gation and thorough measures against the guilty and any
suspicious [elements]." 64 An order from the OSAF to the
entire SA expressed a desire for the establishing of warm,
comradely relations with the National Socialist Motorized
Corps (NSKK) while forbidding any contact between SA units
and the Chef AW Organization . 65 The most insidious blow
of what Kriiger called "the incomprehensible attitude of
the SA toward the Chef AW
.
.." 6 came with Lutze's attempt to
have Kriiger expelled from the Party as well as his post on
account of his alleged role in the so-called Killinger Af-
fair. Killinger, 67 the Dresden SA leader and Minister-
Ibid. /421, letter Blomberg to Kriiger, RWM 1699/34
g.K. Ha, 6 December 1934. "Ich halte beschleunigte Unter-
suchung und durchgreifende MaBnahmen gegen Schuldige und
irgendwie Verdachtige fur dringend erforderlich.
"
65BA, NS-23/2, OSAF Ch. No. 35110, 26 November 1934;
NS-23/319, SA Gruppe Kurpfalz, 197/34 (betr. OSAF G 3410, F-2,
geh. 368), 13 December 1934.
66BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, letter Kriiger to Staatssek.
in der Reichskanzlei Dr. Lammers, (to be forwarded to Hitler),
Nr. 1156/35, 6 April 1935. "Die unverstandliche Einstellung
der SA gegen den Chef AW.
67
1 886-1 944
.
A Navy officer until 1918, he joined the
Erhardt Brigade and became the military leader of Organisation
Consul. He led the Erhardt Brigade in 1921 in Upper Silesia
and later the Wiking Bund in Saxony. Killinger joined the
NSDAP in 1927, and in 1933 became the Minister-President of
Saxony. From 1937 to 1939, he served as the German Consol in
San Francisco, then Ambassador to Rumania, where he committed
suicide
.
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President of Saxony
,
had been arrested and interrogated for
alleged anti-Reichswehr activities in connection with the
events of 30 June 1934. A NSDAP court of honor subsequent-
ly cleared him of those charges. ™ Lutze later discovered
that Kruger supposedly had master-minded Killinger' s arrest
and regretted only that the Saxon Minister-President had
not been shot. 69 Lutze explained these allegations to Kr(._
ger, offering him a chance to account for his actions. 70
Receiving no response, the SA Chief of Staff forwarded the
material to Major (Ret.) Walter Buch, head of the Nazi
Party Court and Tribunal. Citing what he believed to be
Kruger 's monstrous deed against a fellow SA Obergruppen
fuhrer and Party Comrade, Lutze indicated that he felt
obliged to initiate action against Kruger "... with the
goal of [his] removal from office and expulsion from the
Jttazi] Movement." 71 Since this complaint involved re-
6 8See his memorandum of 1 October ]934, BDC , Per-
sonalakt Killinger.
69Ibid.
,
letter of Obergruppenfiihrer von Jagow to
Lutze, 14 December 1934. Jagow admitted that his informant
was Gauleiter Kube (of Dresden)
.
70Ibid., letter Lutze to Kruger, OSAF 270/34 geheim,
personlich! streng vertraulich! 20 December 1934; Personalakt
Kruger, II, Lutze to Kruger, OSAF 270/34, B/R, 8 January 1935.
7
1
Ibid., Personalakt Kruger, II, letter Lutze to
Erster Vorsitzender des Obersten Parteigerichts
,
Pg. Buch,
OSAF 270/34 geh. B/R, 23 January 1935; Lutze also informed
von Killinger. See Ibid
. , Lutze to von Killinger, OSAF
270/34 geh. B/R, 24 January 1935.
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opening the 30 June controversy, Buch refused to handle the
case and sent the material to Hess who, at Hitler's express
order, stopped the investigation . 72 As a final straw
, Lutze
halted lateral transfers from the Chef AW Organization to
the SA and ordered his personnel office to issue discharge
certificates for all former SA men in Kruger's employ. 73
Sometime in January 1935, on an unknown date and for
reasons which are not clear, Hitler decided to disband the
Chef AW Organization. Surviving evidence indicates that
Hitler made his decision possibly as early as 3 January, 74
and certainly no later than 12 January, for on that date
Blomberg told his commanders that "the Kriiger Organization
is going to disappear. The Fiihrer has already ordered its
dissolution. "75 Kriiger vainly protested the decision on
72Ibid
- i Personalakt von Killinger, Buch to Lutze,
26 January 1935; Hess to Lutze, Br/Wi, 9 May 1935.
73BA, NS-23/428, OSAF P-1 , 9 January 1935. In excep-
tional cases, Chef AW personnel could seek re-ins tatement inthe SA—at their former SA rank.
74A cryptic remark made by Reichenau to Kriiger on 31
January 1935 leaves open the possibility that Hitler may have
made a tentative decision on 3 January against the Kriiger Or-
ganization: "... er [Reichenau] habe bereits am 3. Januar Ober-
gruppenfiihrer [Kriiger] die Willensmeinung des Fuhrers iiber den
Chef des Ausbildungswesens gesagt " See IfZG, Fa-90/1, Ak-
tenvermerk: Anruf des Generals v. Reichenau am 31. Januar 1935,
3:15 Uhr". A list of dates relating to the disbanding of the
Chef AW in Kruger's handwriting confirms a conversation with
Reichenau on 3 January, but provides no further insight. BA,
NachlaB Kriiger/10.
7 5/3IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Befehlshaberbesprechung,
12 January 1935. "Organisation Kriiger fliegt auf. Fuhrer hat
Auflosung bereits befohlen." Bl. 238.
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15 January after a conversation with the Defense Minister. 7 *
If Hitler had intended for his order to remain confidential
(it carried a secret classification when formally issued),
he was disappointed. Five days after Blomberg told his gen-
erals of the imminent disbanding of the Kriiger Organization,
top level Nazis shared the secret. 77
Hitler did not explain his reasons, at least in writ-
ing, for disbanding the Chef AW Organization. 78 Certainly
Kriiger did not lack either rivals or enemies with close ties
to Hitler. Lutze, his most outspoken foe, clearly had in-
dicated his opposition to Kriiger »s organization, castigating
it as a waste of money. The SA Chief of Staff appears to
have painstakingly orchestrated party rivals in their chorus
against Kriiger and successfully blocked his bid to become
"Reich Leader of the German Military Youth", a position
76Nachla6 Kriiger/10, list of dates relating to dis-banding of the Chef AW Organization.
77By 17 January, General Vogt, formerly of the GVA and
now a Hitler Youth official, knew of Hitler's order. His con-
nections with the Defense Ministry had, in the past, been close,
and it is inconceivable that he would have failed to relay this
information to his superiors who were keenly interested in the
Chef AW Organization. See IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Besprechung iiber
Fragen des dt. Jugenddienst am 17. 1. 193 5, Aktenvermerk"
,
signed "von Bonin" [a Colonel in Reichenau's office, who ap-
parently leaked the news]. See also Fa-90/1, letter Johannes
v. Guenther to Chef AW Gruppenfuhrer Spaing, 28 January 1935.
7 8Hitler's letter to Kriiger informing him officially
of the disbanding of his organization gives no reasons why
this faction was taken. IfZG, Fa-90/1, letter Der Fiihrer und
Reichskanzler, Nr. 272/35 g.K. L Ila, Berlin, 24 January 1935.
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which threatened their baliwicks. The arrogant and ideal-
istic Kruger had few friends to intercede on his behalf;
even his former comrades in the SA regarded him as a traitor
to the SA after the Rohm Putsch. Moreover, from Lutze's
standpoint, the Killinger Affair could not have exploded at
a better time.
Nonetheless, evidence tends to assign a greater re-
sponsibility to the Reichswehr than the SA for the demise of
the Kruger Organization. Enthusiasm for an independent Chef
AW had clearly waned since the events of the 30 June. Cer-
tainly money was a factor as the Army Command, during the
fall of 1934, constantly whittled away at Kruger's budget.
Moreover, the desperate need in 1933 for semitrained re-
cruits had for the most part diminished. France had not
attacked or threatened Germany for its unilateral violations
of the Versailles Treaty, and the Army, in 1934, had already
reached its 1938 expansion plan goals, the next stage of
which called for re-introducing conscription. It appears
that the Defense Ministry had no idea when Hitler planned
to re-introduce a universal military service requirement,
but such a move was expected no later than October 1935. 79
It is unlikely that the Chef AW Organization would have
survived for any length of time once the draft had been re-
instated, and Army officers may have urged disbanding the
/yCf. Blomberg's remakrs of 9 October, footnote 25;
Manstein, Soldatenleben
,
187.
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Kruger Organization in order to point out the need for a
draft.
Rumors current in Berlin, 80 to which Kruger apparent
ly subscribed, 81 blamed the Reichswehr for undermining Kru-
ger' s autonomy. 82 One former Chef AW Organization member
claimed that the Army had detailed Lt. Colonel Erwin Rommel
(the later Field Marshall) as Chef AW Organization Chief of
Staff, but that his work was sabotaged by Kruger »s staff
director, Wahmann. Rommel, according to this source, then
recommended to Hitler the abolition of the Kruger Organiza-
tion. 83
80IfZG, Fa-90/2, Kruger »s handwritten notes of a con-
versation with Blomberg, 24 January 1935. See also Reichenau's
uar^l^S ^
KrUger/ ibid" Fa~90/1 , Aktenvermark, 31 Jan-
8
1
Ibid
- i Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk, 31 January; letter Jo-hannes von Guenther to Spaing.
8 2Ibid., Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk, 31 January, with Reich-
enau; letter Johannes v. Guenther to Chef AW Gruppenfuhrer
Spaing, 28 January 1935. Guenther stated that these rumors
were current in November 1934. See also Zgs. 44, Gaertner,
Bl. 6. Lutze's adjutant told Wahmann that the Reichswehr
planned to replace Kruger with a general as soon as Kruger
had set up the Chef AW Organization. BDC, Personalakt Kruger,
I, Oberfuhrer Reimann Comments.
83Major (Ret.) Huwe, a Chef AW staff officer, claimed
that Hitler ordered the Army to assign a young officer deco-
rated with the Pour le Merite for combat heroism as Chef AW
chief of staff. Rommel, writes Huwe, received this assignment.
Since the Youth Law proposal of 11 December 1935 had not pro-
gressed beyond the committee stage, Kruger, zealously retain-
ing his diminishing independence, may have refused to accept
Rommel as his chief of staff. While this action would represent
a volte face from Kruger' s position of January 1934, he now
had to contend with the Reichswehr as a threat.
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Greater credence can be given to the thesis that the
Army presented Kriiger, in late December 1 934 or early Ja
ary 1935, with a series of conditions which, if accepted,
would have effectively destroyed his autonomy. Even the
plementation of the proposed "military youth" law of 11 De-
cember, which called for a military officer to become Chef
AW Organization chief of staff, curtailed Kriiger's autonomy.
The Rommel appointment could have been one of the Army's
conditions for allowing Kriiger's organization to continue.
In the event that he might not accept restrictions on his
autonomy, the Army Command could then blame him for his own
demise, knowing that the SA would assume his training tasks.
Both Reichenau and Kriiger allude to this thesis, 84 and Krii-
ger certainly appears to have felt that Reichenau had used
him poorly. In a stormy session with Blomberg on the morn-
ing of the 24th of January, Kriiger told the Defense Minister
that he no longer wished to work with Reichenau. "I do not
have the impression," he added, "that General von Reichenau,
in the last [few] weeks has been completely honest [in his
dealings] with me." "That is preposterous," sputtered Blom-
berg, "on account of two very different reasons. First, be-
cause it is not in keeping [with Reichenau] , and second, be-
84Said Reichenau to Krtfger, "Der Chef AW hatte es in
der Hand gehabt, den Dingen einen anderen Ausgang zu geben."
IfZG, Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk , Anruf des Generals v. Reichenau,
31.1. 1935.
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cause it is false. "85 The Defense Minister ^
accede to Kriiger's request and assigned Ministerial Advisor
Dr. Packel of the General Army Office to assist in dis-
mantling the Chef AW Organization. 86
In summation, it appears that Hitler, following the
recommendation of the Army which was seconded by Lutze,
ordered the Chef AW Organization disbanded in early January.
Kriiger's organization had outlived its usefulness by the
winter of 1934. The Army, along with all other government
agencies, had in late 1934 to face a general constriction
of funds and the RM 80 million allocated to Kruger for 1935
was an immense sum that the Army apparently decided it could
spend more profitably elsewhere. Moreover, by transferring
his duties to the SA, the Reichswehr retained, without cost,
the same benefits. In addition to the Army, the Nazi Party
agencies interested in pursuing military sport activities
(the SA, SS, Hitler Youth, and Reich Labor Service) in all
likelihood subjected Hitler to a litany of complaints against
Kruger. These agencies hoped to eliminate a dangerous rival
and to accrue whatever money that might become available
8 5
IfZG, Fa-90/2, Kriiger's hand-written notes, conver-
sation with Blomberg, 24.1. 35. "Kr [iiger] 'Ich habe nicht den
Eindruck gewonnen, dafl Gen. von Reichenau in den letzten Woche
ehrlich loyal mit mir zusammen gearbeitet hat!' v. Bl [omberg]
'So geht das nicht, aus zweierlei Griinden. Erstens, weil es
nicht zutrifft, und zweitens, weil es nicht wahr ist. 1 "
86
Ibid., Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk : Besprechung mit den
Chef des Truppenamts ... 4. Februar 1935; CHL 103/35 g.K. II
Ang.
,
Berlin, 7 February 1935.
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should his organization be disbanded. Finally, Kriiger's
abrasiveness left him without friends or protectors when
they were most needed.
CHAPTER XI
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION
During the spring of 19 35, Kriiger met on numerous
occasions with General Beck and Colonel Fromm (of the
Army's General Office) to discuss arrangements for the
dismantling of Kriiger 1 s organization. Its facilities
and equipment were transferred for the most part to the
Army, with other Government and Party agencies receiving
what remained. Kriiger encountered numerous difficulties
in attempting to find employment for the former members
of his Chef AW Organization. Overcoming considerable re-
sistance on the part of the Army Command, the Chef AW
persuaded reluctant military officials to allow his men
to enlist in the Army training battalions under extremely
favorable circumstances. Chef AW Organization employees
with no prior military service were, for example, sent to
special training courses for several weeks, then assigned
to Army training units as instructors. These men received
accelerated promotion to non-commissioned officer ranks.
^
^IfZG, Fa-90/1, " Aktenvermerk : Besprechung mit dem
Chef des Truppenamts Generalleutnant Beck als Vertreter des
Chefs der Heeresleitung ... am 4. Februar 1935."
2
BA-MA, WKVII/408-1, CHL 400/35 g.K. Allg. E, II,
8 February 1935.
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Ex-Chef AW Organization leaders who could meet officer
candidate standards likewise received instruction in
special courses and were then commissioned in the reserve
forces with a regular appointment following after a year
of probationary service. 3 Nonetheless, the Army did not
need all of Kriiger 's former employees, and ill-feelings
developed between Fromm and Kriiger, who insisted that the
Army could have accepted more of his men. 4
As Kriiger gradually dismantled his organization,
its functions were taken over by other Nazi agencies.
Hitler transferred responsibility for pre-military train-
ing in part to the Hitler Youth 5 and in part to the SA.
It took over the awarding of the SA Sport Badge. Lutze
appointed former Reichskuratorium executive President von
Neufville to direct the newly-created training section of
the OSAF. The Sport Badge fell under his purview. 6
3Ibid
. , CHL 8C4/35 PA (A), 30 March 1935.
4IfZG, Fa-90/1, "Aktenvermerk, 4 Februar 1935"; BA,
NachlaB Kriiger/10, letter Kriiger to Blomberg, 8 February
1935; letter Kriiger to Staatssekretar Lammers, 9 February
1935; letter Kriiger to Blomberg, 11 February 1 935; 9a, letter
Kriiger to Fromm, Chef AW Nrs.,346 and 34 7, v.E., 11 February
1935; Kriiger to Lammers, Chef AW Ch/G 386/35, 26 February
1925 [sic ] ; letter Kriiger to Lammers, Chef AW 51 3/35, 26 March
1935; letter Kriiger to Lammers, Ch/G 759/35, 17 May 1 935.
5See Chapter VI, passim
.
, of Gerhard Rempel's MS on the
Hitler Youth. This is a revised draft of his dissertation, "The
Misguided Generation: Hitler Youth and SS, 1933-1939", Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, 1971.
6IfZG, Fa-107/2, Stiftungsurkunde der SA Sportabzeichen,
15 February 1935; BA, NS-23/128, OSAF 13174, 16 March 1935;
OSAF F, 15654, 28 March 1935; OSAF 26909 to RFSS, NSKK, RJF
,
PO, DLV, and RAD, 24 May 1935; Sam Sch/414, OSAF Ausb.Abt.A,
11/32281
, 6 June 1935.
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Owing to a lack of evidence, it is not possible to
state exactly the fate of most Chef AW Organization person-
nel. The Chef AW Organization was officially disbanded on
the 1st of July 1935.7 According to Kriiger, only 4930 of
his men had found positions when the Organization officially
disbanded, and a further 6051 men were still looking for em-
ployment at that time. 8 if the figures of Military District
VII (the only one for which evidence is available) can be
considered representative, most of Kriiger 's men who had
found employment by the time the Organization was officially
disbanded did so in the ranks of the Army. 9 The SS, in
spite of a ban on recruiting, accepted some former Chef AW
men, many of whom rose to the highest SS grades. 10 Other
Nazi Party organizations proved less receptive, although
even Lutze accepted back a few former SA men, but at their
previous SA rank, which was generally lower than that held
in the Chef AW Organization. 11
7BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, letter Kriiger to Reichs-
kriegsminister, 21 June 1935.
8BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stand der Unterbringung
vom 31 . Mai 1 935.
"
9BA-MA, WKVII/4082-1 , WKVII 508/35 g. Ib/N, 14 Feb-
ruary 1935; WKVII Ha to lib, 23 February 1 935; WKVII 1956/
35 g.K. lib, Az, 12 lib Ch.AW, 29 March 1935; WKVII 1968/35,
Az. 12 lib g.K. /Chef AW, 1 April 1935.
l0For example, Kriiger himself, and General der Waffen-
SS Felix Steiner and General der Waffen-SS Gottlob Berger.
11 BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, letter Kriiger to Hitler, Ch/
G/ 472/35, 14 March 1935; IfZG, Fa-90/1 , OSAF P, Nr. 13113,
18 June 1935.
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The final chapter of Kruger's relationship with the
Defense Ministry ended in a victory for Kriiger. Col. Fromm
prepared a report (at whose instigation is not clear) con-
demning him for allowing gross irregularities in the admin-
istration of Chef AW financial matters. Most of the problems
to which Fromm pointed concerned unsigned agreements and
leases with local communities in which Chef AW camps were
located. In some cases, stated Army bureaucrats, the ab-
sence of a lease allowed the town to claim Reich property,
while in other cases towns were left holding the bill for
projects initiated by Kruger's organization. Where leases
had been signed, noted the author of the report, long-term
agreements were the rule, and the Reich was now faced with
the prospects of paying enormous sums for property for which
it had no use .
'
2
Kriiger was permitted to make a rebuttal, and in a
thirty-three page document submitted to Hitler on the 10th
of October, he refuted the Army's claims, one by one. He
acknowledged that many agreements and leases had not been
signed, explaining that the need for a piece of property
often meant that he had had to take over and use certain
facilities or areas before the legal paper work could be
completed. These anomalies would have been rectified, he
12BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Niederschrif t uber den Chef
des Ausbildungswesens" , Rk. 6754, 25 September 1935.
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said, had his organization not been suddenly disbanded. The
same excuse applied to the long-term leases. Not knowing
that his organization was to have a short existence, he
stated that he had attempted to negotiate the best possible
terms for the Reich, and that implied long-term leases. 13
Hitler read both reports and accepted Kriiger' s version,
fully exonerating him. The Fiihrer told Himmler that "... the
Icontracts and leases] would have been quite proper had the
Organization of the Chef AW continued [to exist]." 14
Blomberg and Reichenau ended their close relationship
in 1935 with the transfer of Reichenau to Bavaria to command
the Bavarian Military District. Both officers subsequently
became Field Marshals, but Blomberg had his career cut short
in 19 38 when it was discovered that his new wife had starred
in pornographic films. He survived the war to die in Allied
captivity at Nurnberg in 1946. Reichenau successfully com-
manded armies in Poland, France, and Russia, where he died
of natural causes in 1942.
The emnity between Kriiger and Lutze lasted until the
latter' s death in 1 943 . Kriiger never forgave Lutze for his
role in bringing about the dismantling of the Chef AW Organi-
zation. In February 1 943, Kriiger discovered that Lutze had
Ibid., "Stellungnahme zur Niederschrift iiber den
Chefs des Ausbildungswesens . " 10 October 1935.
14BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, RFSS, Tgb. Nr. AR/1 525 Geh.,
Himmler to SS Personalbiiro , Nach Vortrag beim Fiihrer, 18.10.
1935, 31 October 1935. "... die [Vortrage] wohl richtig gewesen
waren wenn die Organisation des Chefs A.W. weiter bestanden
hatte.
"
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vacationed in a resort area in Poland reserved for survivors
of the Stalingrad disaster, a faux pas which Kriiger hastily
passed on to Himmler. He asked Himmler, apparently with
some relish, to initiate action to have Lutze removed from
his post. Himmler duly passed on Kriiger »s request to
Bormann, but Lutze died of injuries incurred in an automo-
bile accident in May 19 43 before any official action was
taken
.
Kriiger himself returned to the SS which he had left
in April 1931. The Army offered him the opportunity to
enter active service, although in exactly what capacity or
at what grade cannot be determined. The former Chef AW de-
clined, accepting instead an appointment as SS Obergrup -
1 7penfiihrer
. He never really attained the position of em-
inence he had held as Chef AW and was shunted about from
one relatively menial SS position to another. During the
war he served as the Senior SS Officer and Police Leader in
15IfZG, Ma 290, HSSPF-Ost [Kriiger] to RFSS Himmler,
923/43, 23 February 1943, Az. Kr/F 1.
1 6
BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, letter Kriiger to Chef des
Herrespersonalamts Generalmajor v. Schwendler, Ch. 284/35,
1 February 1935. The content of the letter merely indicates
that the Army offered Kriiger some position on the 25th of
January. One of Kriiger 1 s staff officers, Major (Ret.) Huwe,
claimed that the Army extended a brigadier's commission to
Kriiger who declined it, stating that he would only accept a
commission as a major general. See IfZG, Zgs . 1709, Huwe,
Bl. 9.
1 7
BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, letter Hitler to Kriiger,
7 February 1935.
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the General Government in occupied Poland, a position which
he disliked intensely. Only in the last years of the war
was his request to be transferred to the Waffen-SS granted.
He disappeared in action in Austria during the last month
of the war. 1
8
Any assessment of the military sport movement neces-
sarily falls into two parts: a military evaluation and a
political one. While the circumstances giving birth to the
military sport movement were both political and military,
namely the Versailles Treaty and the turbulent first years
of the Weimar Republic, the Defense Ministry conceived and
developed military sport in 1924 as a solution to a military
problem. Only much later, in 1930, following the resurgence
of political extremism, did the political potential of the
military sport program become apparent and attractive. Even
Hitler, who certainly did not underestimate the indoctrina-
tional value inherent in military sport training, stressed
first and foremost its military value.
Yet efforts to judge objectively the contribution of
military sport training to Germany's overall defense posture
run into difficulties owing to a lack of evidence. Bombing
raids in the Second World War appear to have claimed most
Army records concerning its role in military sport, and the
files of the majority of private organizations involved in
1
8
Ibid
. ,
II, passim
rm
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the project have likewise disappeared. Evidence in the fo
of statistics and contemporary evaluations is, for the most
part, not available. 19 Military sport graduates as such
also never faced that ultimate standard against which mili-
tary efficiency is measured, war. On the other hand, the
fact that war did not occur except at Germany's bidding in
1939 tends to suggest that at the very least military sport
may have had a deterent value, itself perhaps a sufficient
justification for the program. Moreover, the continued
interest in military sport for over a decade by the Army
Command indicates that leading military figures thought
highly of the program.
In addition to the immediate military benefits aris-
ing from the military sport program, the Defense Ministry
regarded its attendant advantages as equally important.
Most Army officers remained convinced that future wars would
require mass armies, perhaps not as gigantic as those of the
First World War, but certainly large enough to require con-
scription to fill their ranks. With all aspects of military
conscription forbidden by the Versailles Treaty, military
leaders looked upon military sport as a means of circumvent-
1 9The only contemporary evidence available concerning
the quality of Chef AW training is found in Kruger' s report
to Hitler. Kruger wrote: "Es liegen eine Fulle vor Urteilungen
hoher und hochster Kommandostellen der damaligen Reichswehr
vor, daB es dem Chef AW gelungen ist, eine Rekrutenbildung
zu leisten, wie sie das Heer benotigte." in BA, NachlaB Krti-
ger/9a, Stellungnahme" , Bl . 32. It is unlikely that Kruger
would tell anything but the truth in a matter so easily veri-
fied.
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ing the letter of the law. Military sport records provided
local government and military authorities with some idea,
however vague, of the names and numbers of young men who
had had some fashion of military training. In the absence
of any administrative machinery for conscription, organiza-
tions and groups with military sport programs could be called
upon in the event of a national emergency to provide the
names of their members
.
But perhaps of even greater importance to the armed
forces than preparing membership lists or conducting mili-
tary instruction, organizations which encouraged military
sport training promoted, in effect, the concept that every
citizen owed some service to his country. It was precisely
this belief which the Defense Ministry had to nurture in
order to facilitate the re-enactment of universal military
service laws as soon as political conditions would permit.
To what extent military sport activities contributed to the
creation of a climate amenable to re-introducing conscription
must remain an unanswered question owing to a lack of quan-
tifiable evidence. Judging, however, from the size of the
military sport movement, as well as the growing interest in
voluntary labor service, the efforts of the Army Command to
keep alive the concept of citizenship and service would ap-
pear to have reaped not inconsiderable dividends.
At the same time, the involvement with military sport
organizations implied per force an entanglement with politi-
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cal parties and interest groups, adding a dimension to mili-
tary sport into which the Army stepped with the greatest re-
luctance. This political facet had its origins partially in
the partisan nature of many of the organizations which pur-
sued military sport and partially in the dream of General
Groener that a military sport program could help to under-
mine the growing inroads made by National Socialism in the
ranks of the nation's youth.
In following its military sport objectives, the Army
Command could not avoid contact with political organizations.
German schools and universities did not offer team or indi-
vidual sports in their curricula, nor did they sponsor inter-
scholastic or inter-collegiate sport activities. Sport clubs,
youth organizations, veteran's groups, and political associa-
tions filled this vacuum. In its efforts to interest as many
people as possible in military sport, the Defense Ministry
could not escape working with private associations, many of
which pursued political goals.
Groener and Schleicher sought to keep the contact with
partisan organizations to a minimum. Their method was to
restrict military sport training to individuals instead of
allowing private organizations as a whole to participate.
In other words, members of either Nazi or Socialist para-
military organizations could enroll in military sport in-
struction, not as SA or Reichsbanner men, but simply as Ger-
man citizens. The Army hoped that its military sport students
322
would be capable of setting aside political differences in
the interest of national defense. Overt forms of political
expression were expressly forbidden and the Army preferred
to work with non-partisan associations, a preference that
sometimes gave way in practice.
In short, the policy followed by the Army Command
consisted of welcoming the rank and file of the paramilitary
organizations, provided that they refrained from partisan
political practices and submitted to the guidance of mili-
tary authorities. This policy purposely presented extremist
factions and movements which claimed that their party line
transcended patriotism with an awkward dilemma. Endorsing
or participating in the Army sponsored military sport pro-
gram meant a humiliating surrender to the Army on its terms.
On the other hand, a steadfast adherence to ideological
purity was likely to result in the apostasy and defection
of members unable to shed completely their remaining bourgeois
values
.
Caught in a dilemma from which they could not emerge
in all likelihood without some losses, the extremist politi-
cal parties responded predictably. The Communists, who in
any case were not asked to participate, denounced Groener's
program as a means of spreading militarism to the as yet
untainted working classes, while the Nazis claimed to take
no interest in defending a rotten and corrupt political sys-
tem. In practice the Nazis responded favorably to military
sport, but Hitler attempted to keep the participation of
his men to a minimum, fearing that their loyalty could be
undermined. Unfortunately, supposedly responsible politi-
cal parties offered no encouragement to the Government and
the Socialists even attempted to prevent their supporters
from enrolling in the Army program. For their failure to
support the military sport program the Socialists must bear
a heavy share of responsibility for the failure of the Re-
public to capture the loyalty of its youth.
The habitual suspicion with which most Socialists
viewed the military as well as the outright opposition from
pacifist elements within the party encouraged the Party
leaders as well as the rank and file to dismiss the military
sport program as just one more means by which the Army
planned to launch a counter-revolution to overthrow the Re-
public. The ideologues of the Party objected not to mili-
tary sport itself, which their own paramilitary organization
practiced, but at the participation of the Army Command in
such activities, which they claimed led to a renewal of ties
between the Army and the ultra-nationalist organizations.
This charge was not an outright prevarication, for
available evidence indicates that more conservative than
liberal groups participated in the military sport program.
On the other hand, it ignores the role that their own propa-
ganda and pacifist rhetoric played in creating this situation
Many young workers grew up listening to a steady diatribe
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which characterized all officers as reactionary militarists
who planned to enslave the working classes of Germany in the
service of finance capitalism and Prussian Junkerdom. As a
result, most working class youths evidenced little enthusiasm
for the project and were all too ready to dismiss it. More
conservative and nationalist-oriented youths accordingly
took the place of the Socialists in the program, reinforcing
the Socialist claim that it was one-sided.
Although the Army Command can be absolved of the ac-
cusation that it sought the participation of only conserva-
tive organizations in its military sport project, General
Groener cannot. His military background and subsequent ca-
reer in the Republic left him with an aversion for the
Socialists which he never overcame. As long as he remained
Defense Minister the Army seems to have made no serious ef-
forts to have reached a modus vivendi with the Socialists
concerning the military sport project. Instead of trying
to overcome the hostility between himself and the Socialists,
Groener instead directed his efforts at trying to undermine
the Nazis, winning over what he considered their better ele-
ments, the rank and file of the SA.
General Groener' s successor, General Schleicher, can-
not be accused of a blind reliance on the political right,
but his deviousness and public abandonment of his mentor had
left him personna non grata in most circles. The withdrawal
of the Socialists from the Reichskuratorium destroyed his
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chances for forging a united front against political extrem-
ism which led to his isolation and resignation. The General
deserved better treatment, for it was he who had made the
first step toward a rapprochement between the SPD and the
Defense Ministry.
The collapse of the Schleicher Government ushered in
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists who wasted no time
in establishing a one-party state. The illusion that the
Army could remain above politics slowly evaporated as the
Hitler Regime grew in popularity and strength. With Hitler
interested in expanding the Army, the military sport project
took on an extra importance. Both the Army and the SA grasp-
ed at once the political implications of the military sport
project. It became an important pawn in the larger struggle
between the two forces for the mantle of national defense
leadership in the National Socialist state. The demands of
the SA for a greater role in military planning, of which gain
ing control of the military sport program was the first step,
could not be ignored with impunity. Hitler's ties to the SA
were closer than any loyalties he had to the Army. The Army,
however, could not spare the instructors for the military
sport program. The inevitable compromise was a length reach-
ed: the SA was to run the program under the aegis of the Army
This arrangement provided the Army with a means of
achieving its immediate goal, military expansion, while at
the same time it gave the Defense Ministry intelligence of
SA affairs and an opportunity to exert influence within the
SA. Reichenau appears to have hoped that his connections
with the Kriiger Organization would allow him the opportunity
to manipulate factions within the SA in the hopes of neu-
tralizing its radical elements whose interests threatened
to prove inimical to those of the Army, society, and the
nation
.
The pursuit of such a policy would seem to render
the armed forces culpable of collaboration with National
Socialism and guilty of opportunism, manifested by complete-
ly abandoning the policy first enunciated by Seeckt, namely
that the Army stood above partisan politics.
The charge of collaboration with the Nazi Regime can
be readily dismissed. In a one-party state, in which the
state and the one political party are theoretically united,
and in which party institutions merge with government in-
stitutions ( e.g . , SS, Chef AW Organization, Reich Labor Ser-
vice)
, collaboration becomes a meaningless term. Mere
existence itself under these conditions means collaboration.
The accusation of opportunism implies that Army lead-
ers, in order to win support for military expansion, reck-
lessly abandoned their previous principle of political im-
partiality and embraced National Socialism which in turn
promised to support the expansion program. The answer to
this charge involves an explanation of former policies, an
analysis of motivation, and a definition of self-interest.
In the first place, efforts to eliminate or at least
to reduce the clauses of the Versailles Treaty restricting
military expansion had begun as soon as the Treaty was
signed. Moreover, it was the Papen Government which had
initiated the steps, three months prior to Hitler's coming
to power, to begin expanding the army. it can also be argued
that military expansion was not necessarily inimical to the
state and that it did not solely benefit the armed forces.
It provided jobs, reduced unemployment, and stimulated the
economy. The history of the relationship between Hitler and
his generals in the years immediately prior to the Second
World War refutes the argument that they had favored expan-
sion in order to go to war.
The question of whether the intrusion of the Defense
Ministry into the affairs of a political organization, the
SA, was motivated by considerations of survival, or a desire
to root out radical elements before they could influence Hit-
ler, or for immediate military interests connected to the
military sport program must remain unanswered. The principle
figures are dead and they left behind a surprisingly small
and inconclusive amount of documentary material.
Evidence does suggest, however, that the Defense Min-
ister and his assistant followed the broad outlines of the
policy laid down by their predecessors, namely that in re-
solving its military problems (manpower) , the Army should
not surrender any of its autonomy to any political entity
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other than the state. In other words, the Army wanted
soldiers whose loyalty to the country transcended political
loyalties. While this policy was no longer entirely feas-
ible in the National Socialist state, Reichenau and Blomberg
felt that it was necessary to isolate and neutralize that
political extremism emanating from the SA, a major source of
Army recruits, which might weaken the loyalty of the armed
forces. Whether or not this interpretation of Army interests
in the long run constituted a marked deviation from the policy
followed by the Defense Ministers and Army Commanders during
the Weimar Republic, the reader will have to decide.
It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the
Army's policy from 193 3 to 1935. All that can be stated as
fact is that Rohm and his radical coterie were eliminated,
albeit drastically. To what extent the Army motivated Hit-
ler's actions has never been, nor probably can be, determined.
Moreover, the Army was not the sole agency which wanted to
reduce Rohm's power; there were others who feared and loath-
ed him, and his vision of a Spartan-like state was hardly at-
tractive .
What is perhaps significant is that the Army retreated
to its former political isolation following the elimination
of Rohm and the dismantling of the Chef AW Organization. It
is no coincidence that official interest and support for the
military sport program declined as the expectation of the re-
introduction of conscription arose. A draft, to a certain
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extent, obviated the need for military sport training, and
the resources available to the armed forces in 1935 did not
permit both a massive military sport training program and
the conscription of hundreds of thousands of young men. Yet
the military sport program had done its work well: the Army
had reached its projected 1938 size in late 1934, an ex-
pansion that might neither have been possible nor have un-
folded so smoothly without the existence of recruits whose
basic military training lay behind them, for the most part,
when they entered military service.
In retrospect, what emerges from the evidence is an
unpleasant picture of lost opportunity. The Army did not
lead the Nazis by the hand into the Government; if anything,
leading military officials struggled for several years to
develop and implement a program aimed at reducing the politi-
cal base of the Nazis. The SA military sport program was not
a revolutionary National Socialist policy, but merely the
National Socialist continuation of the youth training policy
of the Weimar Republic and the Army, albeit with Nazi modi-
fication and amplification. One is struck by the vacilla-
tion, lethargy, indecisiveness , and the absence of any sense
of urgency in the councils of the Weimar Republic in contrast
to the resolute and strong-willed attitude of the National
Socialists. Therein perhaps lies the tragedy of the military
sport program. Judging from the success of the Nazi ideo-
logical indoctrination of Germany's youth following 1933, one
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can only wonder what might have happened had Groener and
Schleicher succeeded in establishing the military sport
program in 1930. Putting aside conjecture, however, the
historian can only attempt to relate and explain what hap
pened.
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Appendix A.
List of Chef AW Schools and Camps
This list was prepared for the purpose of enablingformer Chef AW Organization members to document their claimsfor unemployment compensation. It was intended to be in-
clusive, but for some unknown reason, the 9 naval sport
schools are not included. The organization into 9 Landerparalleling the Wehrkreise
, reflects the Organization at~~itsheight in January 19 35.
Source: BA, Sam Sch/421
,
Anlage 1 of President der
Reichsanstalt fur Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenver-
sicherung, III, 7408/252, 30 December 1935.
Wehrkreisverwaltung I.
Landesfiihrer I Konigsberg
Bereichfiihrer Konigsberg
SchieBschule Pillkallen
Nachrichtenschule Metgethen
Pionierlager Tapiau
Fiihrerlager Schmolainen
A - Schule Gudwallen
Bereichfiihrer Allenstein
Fiihrerschule Passenheim
Gelandesportschule Lyck
A - Schule Ublick
Bereichfiihrer Elbing
Reitschule Marienburg
A - Schule Riesenburg I - III
A - Schule Pr. Holland
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Wehrkreisverwaltung II.
Landesfiihrer II Stettin.
Bereichfuhrer Stettin
Pionierlager Greifenberg
Nachrichtenschule Warsow
Fiihrerschule Rothenklempenow
Gelandesportschule Belgard I
Gelandesportschule Nest
A - Schule Belgard II
A - Schule Anklam I - II
A - Schule Lubmin
Bereichfuhrer Schwerin
Gelandesportlager Neustrelitz
Stammschule Neustrelitz
Fiihrerschule Burg Stargard
A - Schule Bad Kleinen
A - Schule Meyenburg
A - Schule Sternberg
A - Schule Serrahn
Bereichfuhrer Hamburg-Stadt
Fiihrerschule Malente
A - Schule Molln I - III
Bereichfuhrer Hamburg-Land
Reitschule Elmshorn
Reitschule Eutin
Reitschule Schleswig
A - Schule Neumiinster
A - Schule Middelburg
Gelandesportschule Leek
A - Schule Dan.Nienhof
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Wehrkreisverwaltung III
.
Landesfuhrer III Berlin
Bereichftihrer Berlin
Lehrabteilung
Reichsnachrichtenschule
Reichschunde- und Brieftauben-
Schule
ReichsschieBschule
Reichssanitatsschule
Reichsfahrschule
Reichsschule f
. Weltanschauung
Pionierpark
Ftihrerschule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
SS - Schule
Kladow
Berlin-Lichtenberg
i
Sperenberg
Velten
Berlin
Ruhleben
Neubabelsberg
Oranienburg
Harnekop
Biesenthal
Belzig
Wriezen I - II
Wolzig
Hohenelse
Pieskow
Sanssouci
Pyritz
Bereichftihrer Frankfurt a/0 .
Pionier lager Christians tadt
A - Schule Rehnitz
A - Schule Sorau I - III
A - Schule Frankfurt a/0
Bereichftihrer Magdeburg,
Re it schule Gardelegen
Ftihrerschule Altengrabow
A - Schule Letzlingen
A - Schule Dornburg
A - Schule Wernigerode
A - Schule Golpa
A - Schule Sandersleben
SS - Sportschule Grafenhainichen
A - Schule Sandersleben
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Wehrkreisverwaltung IV,
Landesfuhrer IV Dresden
Bereichfuhrer Dresden
Nachrichtenschule
SchieBschule
Fuhrerschule
Fuhrerschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Dresden
Erdmannsdorf
Struppen
Stenz
Freiberg I und
Zeithain I und
Oberschona
II
II
Bereichfuhrer Leipzig
Pionierlager
Reitschule
Reitschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
SS- Sportschule
Leisnig
Wermsdorf
Altenburg
Neusorge
Hainichen
Rochlitz I und II
Pretzsch
Borna I und II
Leisnig
Bereichfuhrer Weimar
Nachrichtenschule
Reitschule
Fuhrerschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
SS- Sportschule
Jena- Lichtenhain
Gotha
Sondershausen
Geilsdorf
Arnstadt
Eisfeld
Ranis
Greiz
Wasungen
Waltershausen
Tannich
Mihla
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Wehrkreisverwaltung V.
Landesfiihrer V Stuttgart
Bereichfiihrer Stuttgart
Nachrichtenschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Pionierlager
A - Schule
Cannstatt
Goppingen I und II
Eningen
Kapfenburg
Adelsheim
Neckarsulm
Reutlingen
Bereichfiihrer Ulm
SchieBschule
Fiihrerschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Heidenheim
Hechingen
Deggingen I und II
Unterbohringen
Immendingen I und II
Schadenweilerhof
Bereichfiihrer Karlsruhe
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
Lahr I
Larh II
Kaisers lautern
Landau
Achern I und II
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Wehrkreisverwaltung VI,
Landesfuhrer VI Munster
.
Bereichfuhrer Munster
Pionierlager
Nachrichtenschule
Reitschule
Reitschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
Hoxter
Lippstadt
Munster
Detmold
Meschede
Musen
Detmold
Borghorst
Beverungen
Lette
Altenvoerde
Klafeld
Bereichfuhrer Bremen
Reitschule
Reitschule
Reitschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Leer
Stade
Hoya
Aurich
Iburg
Stade
Nordholz
Bereichfuhrer Koln
Reitschule
Reiterfuherlehrgang
Schule f . Leibeslibungen
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
Krefeld
Krefeld
Linnich
Velen
Morsbach
Bergneustadt
Freudenberg I und II
Wildbergerhutte
Jtilich
Eveking
Wahn
Viktorshohe
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Wehrkreisverwaltung VII.
Landesfiihrer VII Miinchen
Bereichfiihrer Munchen
Nachrichtenschule
Schule f. Weltanschauung
SchieBschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
Steinhoring
Kempfenhausen
Lechfeld
Hohenkammer
Memmingen I und
Seeon
Niedernfels
Laufen
Murnau I - ill
Mittenwald
II
Bereichfiihrer Regensburg
Pionierlager
Fiihrerschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Deggendorf
Erbendorf
Landau
Sulzbach
Zwiesel
Bereichfiihrer Niirnberg
Reitschule
Fiihrerschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
SS- Sportschule
A - Schule
Ellingen
Altdorf
Ingolstadt
Eichstatt I
Fiirth I
Lauf
Fiirth II
Rothenburg
- Ill
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Wehrkreisverwaltung VIII
Landesfiihrer VIII Breslau
Bereichfiihrer Breslau
Nachrichtenschule
SchieBschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
SS- Sportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Wills chkau
Striegau
Wohlau
Lams dor f I und II
Cosel
Dambritsch
Sylsterwitz
Reichenbach
Bereichfiihrer Liegnitz
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
Gelandesportschule
Schonau
Boberstein
Ullersdorf
Bunzlau
Warmbrunn
I und II
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Wehrkreisverwaltung IX,
Landesfuhrer IX Kassel.
Bereichfiihrer Hannover
SchieBschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportlager
SS- Sportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Peine
Bevern I und II
Einbeck I und II
Uelzen
Scheuen
Achterberg
Wolterdingen
Wolfenbuttel
Hakensblittel
Wennigsen
Levershausen
Bereichfiihrer Hessen
Fiihrerschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportlager
SS- Sportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Altenburg
Hanau I - III
Friedberg I und II
Arolsen
Schwarzenborn
Corbach
Neuhof
e
Rieneck
Schlitz
Bereichfiihrer Koblenz
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
Gelandesportschule
Kiez I und II
Babenhausen I - III
Traben-Trarbach
Bad Schwalbach
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L SpitS ° f the voluminous archival resources avail-able to the scholar of the National Socialist period, thereare enormous gaps
.
Some material was deliberately destroyed;
?tt ^
611 victim to the war. The records of the ChefAW Organization and the Reichskuratorium, for example, wereturned over to the Army in 1937, sent to the Heeresarchiv inPotsdam, and apparently destroyed in a bomb raid during 1944The alleged destruction of the Kriiger records has presentedgrave difficulties in the writing of this work. To a certain
extent I have been aided, perhaps saved, by that bete noire
of taxpayers, the bureaucrat. His penchant, and that of theGerman office worker in particular, for reproducing documents
and forwarding them to sister agencies has made this disserta-
tion possible.
I. Unpublished Archival Collections
A « Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv
, Munchen (BHStA)
1. Allgemeines Staatsarchiv (BHStA, I)
Signature MI (Innenministerium)
MI 71940
MI 72449
Signature MK (Kultusministerium)
13828; Forderung der Leibesiibungen/Gelandesportschulen,
1932-33.
13832; Turnen und Sport: Reichskuratorium fur Jugender-
tiichtigung.
13847; Bayerische Gesellschaft zur Forderung der
Leibesiibungen, Bd. IV, 1931-33.
13864; Gelandesportschulen—Gauschule Henfenfeld.
1386 8; Korperliche Ertiichtigung der Jugend: Volks-
sportschule, Kurse fur Leibesiibungen und Klein-
kaliberschieBen
.
13874; Volksertuchtigung: 1929-1933. Horl, August,
Oberstleutnant a.D., Leiter.
Signature MF (Finanzministerium)
67303; Gelandesportschule, Bd. I, 1932-23.
2. Geheimes Staatsarchiv (BHStA, II)
Bund Bayern und Reich, 2/3, 2/4, 2/5, and
3. Kreigsarchiv (BHStA, IV)
Bestand Stahlhelm
54; Wehrsport.
78; Bundesamt Verfiigungen, 1 933.
B. Berlin Document Center
, Berlin (BDC)
Material from the Personalakten of:
Bennecke, Heinrich
Croneiss, Theodor
Daleuge, Kurt
Epp, Franz Ritter von
Grolmann, Wilhelm von
Helldorff, Wolf Graf von
Horauf, Franz Ritter von
Killinger, Manfred von
Kruger, Friedrich-Wilhelm
Kuhme, Kurt
Lutze, Viktor
Schulenburg, Friedrich Graf von der
Spaing, Heinz
Steiner, Felix
Tschammer und Osten, Hans von
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C. Bundesarchiv
, Koblenz (BA)
R-36; Deutscher Gemeindetag
R-36/2013; Akten betr. Reichskuratorium fiir Jugender-
tuchtigung, Zeitungsausschnitte, 1932-35.
R-43; Reichskanzlei
R-43, 1/1472; Kabinettsprotokolle
, 1/1/35-31/3/35.
R-43, 11/143; Zustandigkeitsfragen
, 1933-42.
R-43, 11/516; Akten betr. Arbeitsdienst
, 30/1/33-30/9/34.
R-43, Jugendertiichtigung, 18/10/30-31/12/35.
R-43, 11/828; Reichskanzlei Akten betr. Stahlhelm, Bund
der Frontsoldaten.
R-4 3, 11/1292; Mobilmachung 1933-35. I
R-53; Stellvertreter des Kanzlers
R-53/191; SA, 1933-34.
NS-10; Adjutantur des Fiihrers
NS-10/77; Schriftwechsel mit der NSDAP angegliederten
Verbanden, vor allem organisatorische Fragen und Personal-
fragen, Befehle, Einladungen und Bittschriften betr. A-Z
,
1933-34.
NS-12; Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund (NSLB)
NS-12/1313; Correspondence of E. LinB, Reichsreferent fiir
Gelandesport in der NSLB Reichsleitung
.
NS-23; Akten der Obersten SA-Fiihrung
NS-23/1; Befehle, Anordnungen, OSAF , 1933-34.
NS-23/2; Befehle, Anordnungen, OSAF, 1934.
NS-23/1 23; Verfiigungen der Obersten SA-Fiihrung, 1.1.31-
30.6.32.
NS-23/1 24; Verfiigungen der Obersten SA-Fiihrung, 1.7.32-
18.4.33.
NS-23/1 25; Verfiigungen der Obersten SA-Fiihrung, 19.4.33-
15.9.33.
17
_
3
3
34
26; VerfiigUngen der Obersten SA-Fiihrung, 16.9.33
31
~2
Y1^''
VerfUgungen der Obersten SA-Fuhrung, 18.3.34
NS-23/128; Verfugungen des Obersten SA-Fuhrung, 1.1.35-
NS-23/157; Allgemeines Personalamt, 1932-1933.
NS-23/158; Allgemeines Personalamt, 1933-1934.
NS
-23/3 10; Fuhrer Tagung, 1938.
NS-23/319; Ausbildungsamt 1934.
NS-23/414; Verhaltnis AW zur Partei und zum Staat.
NS-23/428; Befehle der Obersten SA-Fuhrung, 1934.
Sammlung Schumacher (abbreviated "Sam Sch")
.
Sam Sch/239; Hitlerjugend
.
Sam Sch/262; Reichsarbeitsdienst
.
Sam Sch/271; Stahlhelm.
Sam Sch/ 2 7 9; NS Studentenbund.
Sam Sch/ 40 4; Oberste SA-Fuhrung.
Sam Sch/405; SA-Marine, Motor, Nachrichten, Pionier,
Sondereinheiten.
Sam Sch/409; SA-Schulen.
Sam Sch/414; SA, Allgemeines A-N.
Sam Sch/415; SA, Allgemeines, 0-Z
.
Sam Sch/421; Chef AW.
Sam Sch/477; Ausbildungswesen der SS.
NachlaB Friedrich-Wilhelm Kriiger (NL Kriiger) .
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D
* Bundesmilitararchiv
, Freiburg i.B. (BA-MA)
Many of these files have three file numbers: the newBundesmilitararchiv signature, RW (Reichswehr) or RH (Reichs-heer); the old EAR number, such as W01
-5/107; and the originalfile number and title, for example, OKW 888. To facilitateidentification, old and new signatures, when known, will be
1
.
OKW-Reichswehrministerium
RW 6/66 (W01-5/107); "Reichswehrministerium, Geheimakten
uber NSDAP, Zwischenfalle mit der SA, Januar 19 33-30
Juni 1934". (OKW 878)
RW 6/67 (W01-5/108); "Geheim Akten iiber NSDAP, Zwischen-
falle, 1.7.34-4.35". (OKW 858)
RW 6/65 (W01-5/1 12) ; "Partei Organisationen der SS, SA,
HJ und Wehrmacht, Juli 1935-Juni 1938". (OKW 863)
RW 6/71 (W01-5/106); "Wehrpolitisches Amt der NSADP"
.
§0KW 9 57)
RW 6/56 (W01-5/1 56) ; "Akten Reichswehrministerium-Wehr-
machtsabteilung iiber Ic Besprechungen , Januar 19 35-
April 1938". (OKW 888)
r
RW 6/46 (W01-5/160) ; "Wichtige politische Verfugungen
des Reichswehrministers und Befehlhabers der Wehr-
macht" .
2. Chef der Heeresleitung
RH-1/12 (H 24/5); "Adjutant Chef HL; Geheimakten fur
Chef der Heeresleitung."
H-1/319b; "Spitzengliederung der Wehrmacht".
RW-6/158 (H-35/29); "Vortrage Dr Goebbels und andere".
RH-15/49 (II H/139); "Haushaltsmittel fur Neuaufstellung,
Ausbildung, u.a.".
RH-15/8 (II H/153, teil 2.); Schriftwechsel uber den Auf-
bau des Heeres, 18.12.33-29.3.34".
II H/228; "Neues Friedensheer
,
anlg. '32".
m
~\ 2/
l~,lt,
(I1 H/ 292 >' "Ausbildung-Kurzausbildung,
4 3j\/ 32 •
RH-8/896 (Wi I F5/498); Reichswehr support for the
Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung
.
3
. Wehrkreis
RH-37/2265 (WK IV/89);. "RH II (4.12.33-15,2.34) IV AK"
.
RH-53-7/1178 (WK VII/182); "Planstudie A XVII, Grenzschutz"
RH-46/89 (WK VII/732); "Ausbildung auBerhalb des Reichs-
herres, 1933".
RH-46/90 (WK VII/734) ; "Ssmmelakt Kurzausbildung; Aus-
bildung auBerhalf des Reichsheeres".
RH-46/97 (WKVII/741); "Grenzschutzarbeiten 11/31-5/34,
Pionier Abteilung 7".
RH-46/99 (WK VI 1/74 3) ; SA-Reichswehr cooperation on mob-
ilization; Auflosung of the Chef AW.
RH-46/107 (WK VII/759); "Politisches und Spionage 1933".
RH-46/361 (WK VII/983); SA.
RH-39/285 (WK VII/1242); Reports from 7th Kraftfahrabteil-
ung on its participation in the events of 30 June 1934.
RH-26-7/744 (WK VII/1 295) ; "Zusammenarbeit mit Wehrver-
bande"
.
RH-26-7/377 (WK VII/1342); SA-Reichswehr cooperation.
WK VII/1 451; SA-Reichswehr cooperation after 30 June 1934.
RH 26-7/294 (WK VII/1 451); "Ausbildung auBerhalb des Heeres
1933-35"
.
RH 26-7/362 (WK VII/1453); "Ausbildung auBerhalb des
Reichsheeres, SA-Sportlagern"
.
RH 26-7/300 (WK VII/1484); " Innenpoli tische Angelegen-
heiten, besondere Vorkommnisse , Organisation".
RH 26-7/295 (WK VII/1 51 7); expansion of Reichswehr.
RH 26-7/397 (WK VII/1 61 2)'; Rohmputsch in WK VII.
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RH 46/97 (WK VII/1741); "Landesschut z Arbeiten"
.
RH 37/308 (WK VII/2188); "Ausbildung aufierhalb des
Reichsheeres, 1933-34".
RH 53-7/1085 (WK VII/4082-1 ) ; Auflosung of the Chef AW.
RH 53-7/1086 (WK VII/4082-2); "Erganzungsplane 1934-1937".
RH 57/9 (H-04-1/7); Landespolizei Inspektion Siidwest,
"Aktionen gegen die SA-Rohm Revolte, Juni-Juli 1934".
RH 57/50 (H-04-1/47); Landespolizei Inspektion Siidwest,
"Beschlagnahmte Waffen, Munition und Gerat der SA
und P.O . "
.
4. Nachlasse
Beck, Ludwig Generalobers t (N-28)
.
Bredow, Ferdinand von Generalmajor (N-97)
.
Groener, Wilhelm Generalleutnant (N-46)
.
Hammers tein-Equord, Kurt Freiherr von Generaloberst (N-26)
.
Heye, Wilhelm Generaloberst (N-18).
Schleicher, Kurt von Generalder Infanterie (N-42).
Seeckt, Hans von Generaloberst (N-24 7)
.
Stiilpnagel, Joachim von General der Infanterie (N-5) .
E. Gordon Papers
,
Amherst, MA.
Testimony of Reichsinnenminister a.D. Wilhelm Sollman
Questionnaires, ex-Reichswehr officers,, for the period
1919-1926
Letters from former Reichswehr Officers, for the period
1927-1935
F. Hauptarchiv der NSDAP , Hoover Institution
Microfilm Collection (HA)
.
Folio numbers
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83 Stennes Putsch.
305 Oberste SA Fiihrung.
306 Oberste SA Fiihrung.
307 Oberste SA Fiihrung.
308 Oberste SA Fiihrung.
311 Oberste SA Fiihrung.
312 SA Reichsfiihrerschule
.
315 anti-SA material.
316 SA regional material.
317 Polizei Direktion Munchen, 1931 Prosecution of SA.
319 Oberste SA Fiihrung.
322 SA, 1931, dissatisfaction with Reichsleitung
.
323 SA, Sturm 33.
324 SA, 1934 paragraph 175 (homosexuality) proceedings.
325 Stennes Putsch.
326 Oberste SA Fiihrung.
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